Lassiter v. Robeson County Sheriff’s Department: Recalibrating North Carolina’s Joint Employment Doctrine and the Centrality of Control

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in Lassiter v. Robeson County Sheriff’s Department, No. 54PA24 (Dec. 12, 2025), is a major clarification of the State’s workers’ compensation law on “joint employment” and its relationship to the “lent employee” doctrine.

The case arises from serious injuries suffered by Deputy Stephen Matthew Lassiter, a Robeson County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO) law enforcement officer, while working an off-duty traffic control assignment on an I‑95 bridge repair project being performed by Truesdell Corporation under a North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) contract. Lassiter sought workers’ compensation benefits from both RCSO and Truesdell, arguing that Truesdell was a joint employer.

The opinion addresses:

• How to distinguish joint employment from the lent employee doctrine;
• The proper elements of the joint employment test under North Carolina law;
• The level of control a putative secondary employer must possess for joint employment to exist; and
• The consequences of these doctrines for off‑duty law enforcement arrangements and multi-employer worksites.

The Court holds that Lassiter had an implied contract of hire with Truesdell and that the nature of his work for RCSO and Truesdell was sufficiently related, but that Truesdell did not exercise the requisite control to be a joint employer. The Court also expressly disavows a misstatement in Whicker v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 246 N.C. App. 791 (2016), which had improperly conflated the joint employment and lent employee doctrines.

The Court thus reverses the Court of Appeals in part, holding that RCSO was Lassiter’s sole employer for workers’ compensation purposes at the time of injury. Two strong opinions—one concurrence/dissent by Chief Justice Newby and a full dissent by Justice Riggs (joined by Justice Earls)—would have found Truesdell to be a joint employer based on the degree of control exercised through the traffic control plan and project coordination.

II. Background of the Case

A. Factual Setting

Deputy Stephen Lassiter had been a full-time law enforcement officer with RCSO since 2008. Like many agencies, RCSO allowed officers to perform approved off-duty employment (often called “off-duty details”) to supplement their income. Under written RCSO policy, officers had to obtain prior approval from the Sheriff or designee before accepting such work.

In 2017, NCDOT awarded Truesdell Corporation a contract—State Highway Contract DF00182—to perform concrete repair work on I‑95 bridges and overpasses in Cumberland and Robeson Counties. A critical contractual provision required Truesdell to:

“[F]urnish and [u]se uniformed Law Enforcement Officers and marked Law Enforcement vehicles … to direct or control traffic as required by the [traffic control] plans and the Engineer.”

Truesdell subcontracted:

• To TTCP Express to design the traffic control plan, and
• To AWP to supply and place traffic control devices (cones, barrels, signs).

NCDOT retained Summit Design and Engineering (“Summit”) as its construction engineering and inspection consultant; Summit acted as NCDOT’s “eyes and ears,” including for traffic control compliance.

Truesdell contacted RCSO to obtain off-duty law enforcement officers to fulfill its contractual traffic control obligation. Within RCSO:

• Captain James Obershea and Deputy Jonathan Edwards served as project coordinators for off-duty assignments;
• They handled officer recruitment, scheduling, and site assignments; and
• RCSO required Truesdell to pay officers directly, leading Truesdell to collect W‑9 forms and issue direct payments based on RCSO-submitted timesheets.

The nightly protocol proceeded as follows:

1. Summit’s engineer (e.g., Timothy Cullipher) held a brief “tailgate safety meeting” with Truesdell’s project engineer and Deputy Edwards to review the traffic control plan and any adjustments (subject to Summit/NCDOT approval);
2. Separately, Deputy Edwards conducted an RCSO-only briefing where he assigned each officer to a specific position on the traffic control route; and
3. RCSO maintained authority over which officers were used, when they worked, and their exact on-site positioning.

On March 28, 2019, Captain Obershea and Deputy Edwards concluded the plan required seven officers rather than the six originally specified. They requested approval from Truesdell and NCDOT for an additional officer, which was granted. Obershea then called Lassiter, who agreed to work the off-duty traffic control assignment. Lassiter filled out a W‑9 upon arrival and began directing traffic per his RCSO assignment.

Later that evening, Captain Obershea directed Lassiter to switch positions with him along the route. Lassiter moved his unmarked patrol car—with blue lights activated—to the new position, and while directing traffic he was struck by a vehicle and severely injured.

B. Procedural History

• Form 18 and initial proceedings: Lassiter filed a Form 18 Notice of Accident listing both RCSO and Truesdell as employers. Both denied an employment relationship. A hearing was held before a deputy commissioner of the Industrial Commission.
• Deputy Commissioner and Full Commission: Deputy Commissioner Peaslee held that Lassiter was an employee of RCSO but not Truesdell. The Full Commission affirmed.
• Court of Appeals: On appeal by RCSO and its carrier, the Court of Appeals:
  • Agreed Lassiter was an employee of RCSO (not an independent contractor), and
  • Held that Truesdell was liable as a joint employer.
• Supreme Court: Truesdell and its carrier petitioned for discretionary review. The Supreme Court allowed the petition and focused solely on whether Truesdell was a joint employer.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

Justice Barringer, writing for the Court, identifies the central issue as whether, at the time of his injury, Lassiter was jointly employed by both RCSO and Truesdell or solely employed by RCSO. The Court:

1. Clarifies the doctrinal distinction between the joint employment doctrine and the lent employee doctrine;
2. Holds that an implied contract of hire existed between Lassiter and Truesdell;
3. Holds that the “nature of the work” element under joint employment was satisfied (Lassiter’s traffic control duties furthered both employers’ interests);
4. But concludes that Lassiter did not satisfy the control requirement for joint employment because Truesdell lacked the requisite right to control the details of his work; and
5. Accordingly, reverses the Court of Appeals in part and holds that RCSO was Lassiter’s sole employer for workers’ compensation purposes.

The Court emphasizes that:

• “The vital test is … the right of control or superintendence … as to details.” (Hayes v. Board of Trustees)
• Merely designating where work is performed and what task is to be done is not enough; the alleged employer must have the right to control how the worker does the job.

The Court also expressly disavows Whicker “to the extent that it improperly conflates the two doctrines,” reinforcing that the “nature of the work” element is different under joint employment and lent employee analyses.

Chief Justice Newby concurs in part and dissents in part, agreeing with the doctrinal clarification and with the existence of an implied contract and satisfaction of the nature-of-work element, but concluding that Truesdell did exercise sufficient joint control (relying heavily on Leggette v. J.D. McCotter, Inc.). Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissents and would have affirmed the Court of Appeals’ finding of joint employment, using a factor-based analysis of control derived from McGuine and Henderson.

IV. Doctrinal Clarification: Joint Employment vs. Lent Employee

A. The Two Doctrines and Their Origins

The Court begins by explaining that, under North Carolina workers’ compensation law, a plaintiff may establish simultaneous employment by two employers under either of two distinct doctrines:

1. Joint employment doctrine, which applies when:

   “a single employee, under contract with two employers, and under the simultaneous control of both, simultaneously performs services for both employers, and … the service for each employer is the same as, or is closely related to, that for the other.”
   — Anderson v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 83 N.C. App. 634, 636 (1986) (citing Larson)

2. Lent employee doctrine, which applies when:

   “an employer lends an employee to another party,” creating a “general employer” and a “special employer.”
   To establish this, it must be shown that:

   1. The employee has a contract of hire with the special employer (express or implied);
   2. The work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and
   3. The special employer has the right to control the details of the work.

   — Collins v. James Paul Edwards, Inc., 21 N.C. App. 455, 459 (1974); Larson, § 67.01(1)

The Court underscores that although both doctrines require a “contract of hire” and an inquiry into control, they are analytically distinct.

B. The “Nature of the Work” Requirement: Correcting Whicker

The key doctrinal clarification concerns the “nature of the work” element:

• Under joint employment, it is sufficient that:

  “the service for each employer is the same as, or is closely related to, that for the other.”
  — Texas Gulf, 83 N.C. App. at 636 (emphasis added)

• Under the lent employee doctrine, the requirement is stricter:

  “the work being done is essentially that of the special employer.”
  — Collins, 21 N.C. App. at 459 (emphasis added)

In Whicker v. Compass Group USA, Inc., the Court of Appeals had announced that under both doctrines the plaintiff must show that the work performed was of the same nature as that performed by the alleged employer. Justice Barringer characterizes that as error and expressly disavows Whicker “to the extent that it improperly conflates the two doctrines.”

The Court explains the rationale:

• In joint employment, the worker is concurrently under the control of two employers, and drawing a neat distinction between “general” and “special” employer is often artificial.
• Because both employers are simultaneously benefitting from substantially overlapping services, it is enough that the services are “the same as, or closely related,” for each.
• In the lent employee context, by contrast, the focus is on whether the worker has essentially shifted into the business of the special employer for the particular work at issue, thus justifying shifting primary liability.

This explicit doctrinal disentangling is one of the decision’s most important precedential contributions: it clarifies the elements of each doctrine and solidifies a more nuanced, Larson-informed framework for multi-employer liability in North Carolina.

V. Application of the Joint Employment Doctrine in Lassiter

Because the parties did not contest that Lassiter was an employee (rather than an independent contractor) of RCSO, and no one argued the lent employee doctrine, the Court evaluates only joint employment. It structures the analysis around three elements:

1. Contract of hire with both employers;
2. Simultaneous control by both employers; and
3. Service for each employer that is the same as, or closely related to, that for the other (“nature of the work” requirement).

A. Implied Contract of Hire

The Court finds an implied contract of hire between Lassiter and Truesdell based on:

• Lassiter’s knowledge that he was performing off-duty work for a private company engaged in highway repair;
• His understanding of the agreed hourly rate ($55/hour);
• His completion of a W‑9 for Truesdell at the jobsite; and
• Truesdell’s direct payment to Lassiter, including $275 for the night of the accident.

Citing Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520 (1998), the Court notes that an implied contract arises from circumstances and conduct showing a “tacit understanding,” even absent express terms. Here, the mutual conduct—Truesdell’s direct pay and Lassiter’s off-duty work at Truesdell’s request—was more than sufficient.

This is a notable point: the Court makes clear that direct payment plus mutual understanding of the work relationship is enough to create an employment contract, even if no formal hiring paperwork or express acknowledgment of employment exists.

B. Control: The “Vital” / “Crucial” Test

The control element is the pivot on which the case turns. The Court surveys previous authority—most importantly Hayes v. Board of Trustees, 224 N.C. 11 (1944), Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457 (1966), Leggette v. J.D. McCotter, Inc., 265 N.C. 617 (1965), and related Court of Appeals decisions including Henderson, McGuine, Collins, and Demolition Dynamics—and identifies several “indicia of control”:

• Who supplies materials and tools;
• Who supervises the worker;
• Who can terminate the worker’s services;
• Who assigns duties; and
• Who controls the manner and method of performance.

However, the Court consistently reiterates that the decisive point is whether the alleged employer has the right to control the details of the work:

“The vital test is … the right of control or superintendence over the contractor or employee as to details.” — Hayes, 224 N.C. at 15

“The crucial test … is whether he passes under the [alleged employer]’s right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.” — Lewis, 267 N.C. at 465 (quoting Weaver v. Bennett)

1. What Truesdell Controlled

The majority acknowledges that Truesdell exercised some level of control:

• Through the NCDOT-required traffic control plan, Truesdell determined:
  • Where traffic control officers were needed;
  • How many officers would be used (subject to RCSO’s requests and NCDOT’s approval); and
  • Whether traffic would be detoured, slowed, or otherwise managed.
• Truesdell communicated its need for officers and approved deviations from the original plan, such as the addition of a seventh officer on the night of Lassiter’s injury.

But, critically, the Court characterizes this as high-level, task-oriented control—specifying the jobsite, task, and general staffing—without control over how officers actually carried out traffic control.

2. What RCSO Controlled

By contrast, the Court finds that RCSO, through Captain Obershea and Deputy Edwards, retained exclusive, detailed supervisory control over Lassiter and the other officers:

• RCSO alone:
  • Selected which officers would work each shift;
  • Determined their hours;
  • Assigned each officer to a specific position along the route; and
  • Retained the authority to remove an officer from the jobsite.
• Truesdell could not directly reposition or discharge an officer; it had to request any changes through RCSO.
• On the night in question, the decision that Lassiter should move to the position where he was ultimately injured was made solely by Captain Obershea, not by anyone from Truesdell.
• On-site, RCSO officers took breaks and coordinated their own activities without direction from Truesdell; they could leave for county emergencies and were obligated to prioritize law enforcement duties if a crime was encountered.
• RCSO policy—not Truesdell—required that Captain Obershea and Deputy Edwards serve as project coordinators; they received no Truesdell training and did not sign documents appointing them as Truesdell’s agents.

The Court underscores that on the night of the accident, RCSO officers “had no contact with any representative of Truesdell” before the accident. In light of this, the Court rejects any characterization of Obershea or Edwards as de facto Truesdell supervisors: they coordinated off-duty assignments because RCSO’s own policy required it, not because Truesdell controlled them in that capacity.

3. Tools, Equipment, and Expertise

The Court also notes that Truesdell did not supply Lassiter’s tools or equipment. Lassiter:

• Used his RCSO-issued badge and patrol vehicle (with blue lights and siren);
• Used his personal flashlight; and
• Borrowed a reflective jacket from another deputy.

The design and placement of traffic control devices (cones, barrels, signs) were handled by AWP, a subcontractor. But RCSO officers themselves implemented the plan based on their law enforcement training and judgment, not instructions from Truesdell.

4. The “Lewis–Collins–Demolition Dynamics” Line

The Court leans heavily on a line of cases that refused to find an employment relationship when the alleged employer merely:

• Told a worker where to go or what general job to perform, but
• Did not control the means and methods used to accomplish it.

Examples:

• Lewis v. Barnhill: telling a worker where steel joists should be placed was insufficient; the worker retained skill and judgment in how to move and position them.
• Collins: a defendant’s employee telling plaintiff where to deliver asphalt and drawing a route map did not amount to employer-like control.
• Demolition Dynamics: directing what demolition needed to be done without directing how to perform the tasks did not show sufficient control.

The majority views Truesdell as analogous: it specified the traffic control plan’s layout (place) and objective (direct traffic in a certain direction or detour) but did not exercise control over the details of how officers managed the traffic.

5. Distinguishing Leggette

Chief Justice Newby’s separate opinion relies heavily on Leggette v. J.D. McCotter, Inc., where this Court held that a construction company and a building supply company were joint employers of a heavy equipment operator. There, the construction superintendent:

• Directly assigned the operator tasks (e.g., “move earth,” “pour concrete”);
• Directly ordered the operator to lower a beam in the specific incident leading to his death; and
• Had practical authority to stop the operator from performing dangerous tasks.

In Leggette, although the operator retained technical control over how to manipulate the machine, the construction company’s superintendent was on‑site, giving ongoing, specific directions. The majority in Lassiter emphasizes that, by contrast, no one from Truesdell was present at the traffic control points directing Lassiter’s movements:

“[I]t was Captain Obershea—not a representative of Truesdell—who ordered plaintiff to switch positions with him on the route, ultimately leading to plaintiff’s injury.”

Thus, the Court finds that Leggette describes a substantially more intensive level of control than what Truesdell exercised here.

6. Conclusion on Control

On the totality of circumstances, the Court holds that Lassiter failed to show simultaneous control by both RCSO and Truesdell:

• Control over who worked, where they were positioned, and how they directed traffic lay with RCSO.
• Truesdell’s involvement, although substantial at the project level, did not cross the threshold into control over the details of Lassiter’s work.

Therefore, the “crucial test” of joint control was not satisfied, and Truesdell was not a joint employer.

C. Nature of the Work

The Court has little difficulty finding the third element met. Lassiter’s activities—controlling traffic to facilitate bridge repair and protect public safety—simultaneously:

• Furthered RCSO’s law enforcement and public safety mission; and
• Furthered Truesdell’s contractual obligation to NCDOT to implement a traffic control plan.

Because under joint employment the services for each employer need only be “the same as, or closely related to” each other, this element is plainly satisfied.

VI. The Separate Opinions: Competing Views on Control

A. Chief Justice Newby’s Concurrence/Dissent

Chief Justice Newby agrees with the majority’s:

• Clarification of the distinction between joint employment and lent employee;
• Recognition of an implied contract of hire between Lassiter and Truesdell; and
• Conclusion that the nature-of-the-work element was met.

He parts ways only on the control element, arguing that Leggette should guide the outcome and that, under that precedent, Truesdell exercised sufficient joint control.

His key points:

• Traffic control plan as control: Like the construction company in Leggette directing the operator’s general tasks, Truesdell:
  • Dictated when officers were needed;
  • Dictated where officers would be stationed (via the plan and maps with marked positions); and
  • Dictated what traffic pattern to implement (e.g., detour vs. slowdown).
• Specialized skill does not negate control: In Leggette, the operator’s skill over the machine did not prevent a finding of joint control by the construction company. Similarly, here, officers’ specialized traffic-management expertise should not immunize Truesdell from being found a joint employer when it directs what must be done.
• Termination power: Even if only RCSO could terminate an officer’s general employment, Truesdell had effective power to terminate an officer’s services on the project by requesting that an officer not return—just as the construction company in Leggette could end the operator’s use of its rented machinery.
• Number of officers and Lassiter’s presence: Truesdell’s approval power over whether additional officers could be used (here, the decision to allow a seventh officer) meant that “if Truesdell had not controlled how many law enforcement officers were present each night, plaintiff would not have been at the site on the night of the accident.” This is a strong indicator of control.

In Chief Justice Newby’s view, the majority places undue weight on the absence of micromanagement (“how” to direct traffic) rather than on Truesdell’s right to define the task and necessary staffing. He would hold Truesdell and RCSO jointly liable.

B. Justice Riggs’s Dissent (joined by Justice Earls)

Justice Riggs fully agrees with the majority’s articulation of the doctrinal test but disagrees with the application. Using the five-factor framework from McGuine (which in turn drew on Henderson and Leggette), she emphasizes:

• Equipment: While RCSO supplied much of the law enforcement gear, Truesdell, through its subcontractors, supplied all traffic control devices and infrastructure necessary for the work.
• Supervision and assignment: Truesdell’s project engineer conducted daily pre-shift “tailgate meetings” and provided detailed traffic route maps marked with officer positions; RCSO officers were “funnels” transmitting those assignments to line officers.
• Termination power: Echoing Chief Justice Newby, she notes that if Truesdell requested that an officer not return, RCSO would replace the officer to preserve the contract.
• Control over manner and method: Crucially, while officers used their discretion in the moment, they were bound to follow Truesdell’s traffic control plan; any changes to route or method required Truesdell’s approval, often after consultation with Summit’s safety inspector.

For Justice Riggs, these factors demonstrate that Truesdell had a sufficient right of control over the details and progression of the work—especially given the project’s technical complexity and safety-sensitive nature—to qualify as a joint employer.

She thus would have “modify[ied] and affirm[ed]” the Court of Appeals, holding that Truesdell and RCSO were jointly liable for Lassiter’s injury.

VII. Key Precedents and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning rests on a network of prior decisions and secondary sources:

A. Hayes v. Board of Trustees (1944)

Hayes is the foundational case on the control test in North Carolina. It established that:

“The vital test is … the right of control or superintendence … as to details.”

• Role in Lassiter: The Court quotes Hayes repeatedly to anchor its insistence that mere specification of a task or objective is not enough; the putative employer must have the right to dictate how the work is done.

B. Lewis v. Barnhill (1966)

In Lewis, the Court held that a general contractor who told a worker where to place steel joists did not thereby become his employer. The worker retained independent judgment as to how to move and place the joists.

• Role in Lassiter: The Court analogizes Truesdell’s traffic plan to the contractor’s directions in Lewis: designating the place and target of work does not, by itself, create an employment relationship.

C. Leggette v. J.D. McCotter, Inc. (1965)

Leggette is the central joint employment precedent. There, a building supply company rented a machine and its operator to a construction company. The Court found joint employment because:

• The construction superintendent was on-site, actively directing the operator’s tasks;
• He specifically ordered the operator to lower a beam in the incident causing the injury;
• The construction company could effectively terminate the operator’s services at the jobsite; and
• Both the building supply company and construction company benefitted from the work.

• Role in Lassiter:
  • The majority distinguishes Leggette as involving much more intensive, live, task-specific direction than present here.
  • Chief Justice Newby and Justice Riggs treat Leggette as a close analogue supporting joint employment, emphasizing parallels in task assignment and effective termination power.

D. Collins, Henderson, McGuine, Demolition Dynamics (Court of Appeals cases)

• Collins v. James Paul Edwards, Inc. (1974): Provided the lent employee elements and illustrated that route instructions for a delivery driver do not necessarily create employment.
• Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford County, Inc. (1984): Discussed factors relevant to control in a joint employment context.
• McGuine v. National Copier Logistics, LLC (2020): Synthesized control factors and reaffirmed the importance of the right to control.
• Anderson v. Demolition Dynamics, Inc. (2000): Observed lack of sufficient control where a supervisor set tasks but did not direct how to perform them.

These Court of Appeals decisions are not binding on the Supreme Court, but Lassiter repeatedly notes that they are “persuasive,” and it adopts and refines the factor-based methodology they reflect.

E. Whicker v. Compass Group USA, Inc. (2016)

Whicker had stated that under both the joint employment and lent employee doctrines, the plaintiff must show that the work performed at the time of injury was of the same nature as work for the alleged employer. The Supreme Court now expressly disavows this statement as incorrect, clarifying that:

• Joint employment requires “same or closely related” services for each employer;
• Lent employee requires that the work be “essentially that of the special employer.”

This correction resolves doctrinal confusion and restores the distinct contours of each doctrine traced by Larson and earlier North Carolina case law.

F. Estate of Belk v. Boise Cascade Wood Products (2019)

The majority closes by citing Estate of Belk for the proposition that an explicit contractual agreement regarding the right of control is “strong evidence” of an employer–employee relationship.

This serves as a practical invitation for law enforcement agencies and contractors to address workers’ compensation responsibility through express contractual provisions if they wish to allocate or share liability in future off-duty arrangements.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is a “Jurisdictional Fact” and Why Does It Matter?

The existence of an employment relationship under the Workers’ Compensation Act is treated as a jurisdictional fact. That means:

• The Industrial Commission’s findings on the issue are not binding on appellate courts, even if supported by evidence;
• Appellate courts review the issue de novo—they make their own independent findings from the record.

This is why the Supreme Court in Lassiter engages in its own detailed assessment of the facts concerning control, rather than deferring to the Commission’s characterization.

B. Joint Employment vs. Lent Employee vs. Independent Contractor

• Independent contractor: A worker who controls the manner and method of their work and is not subject to the right of control by the hiring entity over details. Typically not covered as an “employee” under workers’ compensation (with some statutory exceptions).
• Lent employee: A worker originally employed by one employer (“general”) who is temporarily “lent” to another (“special”). If the special employer:
  • Enters into a (possibly implied) contract of hire with the worker;
  • Receives work that is essentially its own; and
  • Has the right to control the details of the work;
  then the special employer may be liable for workers’ compensation as if it were the primary employer.
• Joint employment: The worker is simultaneously employed by two employers at the same time, performing the same or closely related services for each, while being under the simultaneous control of both. Both employers are jointly liable for workers’ compensation.

C. The “Nature of the Work” Requirement

This requirement asks: Is the work the employee is doing sufficiently connected to the alleged employer’s business?

• In joint employment, the threshold is relatively low:
  • The services must be “the same as, or closely related to” the work done for each employer.
  • Example: directing traffic both protects the public and facilitates a contractor’s road project.
• In the lent employee context, the work must be “essentially that of the special employer,” meaning it is fundamentally part of the borrowing employer’s business operations.

D. Implied Contract of Hire

A contract of hire need not be written or even verbally expressed. Courts look at:

• Who pays the worker;
• Who requests and benefits from the work;
• Whether the worker knows for whom they are working; and
• Whether the parties’ conduct shows a mutual understanding of an employment relationship.

In Lassiter, direct payment by Truesdell and completion of a W‑9 form, combined with Lassiter’s understanding that he was working for a private highway contractor in an off-duty capacity, made it straightforward for the Court to find an implied contract of hire.

E. “Right to Control” vs. Actual Control

North Carolina law focuses on the right to control, not necessarily on the constant exercise of that right. An employer might not micromanage every task but may still retain the legal right to do so, which can suffice to establish an employment relationship.

That said, courts infer the existence (or absence) of that right from the actual course of dealing—who gives orders, who can remove the worker, who controls tools, and so on. In Lassiter, the majority reads the record as showing RCSO retained that right; the dissents read the same record as establishing that Truesdell also had a substantial right of control.

IX. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Clarified Legal Test for Joint Employment

The decision settles several questions for North Carolina practitioners:

• Elements: Joint employment exists where a single employee:
  1. Has a contract of hire (express or implied) with two employers;
  2. Is under the simultaneous control of both, including as to the manner of performance; and
  3. Performs the same or closely related services for each employer.
• Separation from lent employee doctrine: Courts must not conflate the tests; the “nature of the work” requirement is notably more demanding in lent employee cases than in joint employment cases.
• Overruling Whicker in part: To the extent Whicker applied a single “same nature of work” standard to both doctrines, it is no longer good law.

This will provide more predictable guidance in cases involving temporary staffing, subcontracting, and multi-employer worksites.

B. Elevated Significance of Control in Multi-Employer Settings

By importing and emphasizing the Hayes/Lewis control framework, the Court effectively raises the bar for establishing joint employment in settings where:

• One entity sets project-level tasks or outcomes, but
• Another entity manages on-site, day-to-day supervision and work details.

This will be particularly relevant in:

• Construction projects where owners, general contractors, and subcontractors interact;
• Staffing agency arrangements; and
• Public–private collaborations, such as off-duty law enforcement details for private or governmental projects.

C. Off-Duty Law Enforcement Details and Risk Allocation

For law enforcement agencies and contractors, the opinion has concrete implications:

• Current pattern: Where:
  • The agency (like RCSO) retains control over officer selection, scheduling, and on-site deployment;
  • The contractor sets only the broad traffic or security objectives; and
  • Officers rely primarily on law enforcement training and chain-of-command;
  courts are now less likely to find joint employment with the contractor.
• Workers’ compensation exposure:
  • The primary workers’ compensation burden will likely remain with the law enforcement agency and its carrier.
  • Contractors may be less likely to be found liable as joint employers under similar factual patterns.
• Contractual solutions:
  • The Court expressly notes that “nothing in this opinion precludes sheriff and police offices from adopting contractual measures to better ensure joint workers’ compensation benefits to those most dedicated to our safety.”
  • This suggests agencies and contractors can:
    • Include explicit language allocating workers’ compensation responsibility;
    • Define the scope of control (who supervises, who can terminate, who directs details);
    • Provide for indemnity or additional-insured status to adjust risk allocation.

D. Guidance for Future Litigation

From a litigation perspective:

• Claimants seeking joint employment should:
  • Develop evidence of direct, day-to-day supervision and instructions from the putative joint employer;
  • Show that the putative employer could (and did) move them, reassign tasks, or direct how tasks were performed;
  • Highlight any training, safety meetings, or procedures controlled by the putative employer.
• Defendants resisting joint employment should:
  • Emphasize that another entity retained operational command and control;
  • Show that their role was limited to specifying project-level outcomes, not work methods;
  • Highlight the absence of authority to hire, fire, or discipline the worker.

X. Conclusion

Lassiter v. Robeson County Sheriff’s Department is a significant workers’ compensation decision for North Carolina. It:

• Clarifies and separates the joint employment and lent employee doctrines;
• Reaffirms that the right to control the manner and method of work is the “vital” and “crucial” test for an employment relationship;
• Holds that a private contractor’s project-level planning and specification of staffing needs, without more, does not amount to the level of control necessary for joint employment when another entity manages on-site supervision; and
• Invites agencies and contractors to explicitly address control and workers’ compensation responsibilities by contract if they wish to adjust or share liability.

In practical terms, the decision makes it more difficult for injured workers to establish joint employment in multi-employer settings absent clear evidence of dual, detailed control. At the same time, by articulating a clean doctrinal framework and correcting prior confusion, the Court provides clearer guidance to courts, employers, insurers, and workers navigating complex employment relationships.