Lane v. Stericycle: Salary-History Defenses and Temporal Pay Disparities under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Cheryl Lane & Adrienne Hause v. Stericycle, Inc., No. 24‑1570 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025), addresses recurring and increasingly important issues in pay discrimination litigation: the permissible use of salary history, the definition and timing of “comparators,” and the distinct burden frameworks under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII.

The case arises from Stericycle’s 2021 sales reorganization, “Project Supernova,” which created a new role—Key Account Director (KAD)—in both its national and hospital divisions. Plaintiffs Cheryl Lane and Adrienne Hause, female sales employees in the national division, alleged that after being promoted to National KAD roles, they were paid less than male Hospital KADs performing substantially similar work, in violation of the EPA and Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to Stericycle. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded judgment as a matter of law on both claims, at least as to two male promoted Hospital KADs.

Doctrinally, the opinion is significant in several ways:

It reaffirms that plaintiffs are not required to plead specific comparators in their complaint and may identify them later in litigation.
It clarifies that employees can be proper comparators even if, at some later date, their salaries converge—temporal pay disparities are actionable.
It tightens the employer’s burden on the EPA “factor other than sex” defense: salary history can justify a disparity only if the employer proves it actually relied on it and that it explains both the timing and the amount of the differential.
It illustrates how inconsistently applied promotion/raise policies and post‑complaint pay adjustments can support a finding of pretext under Title VII.

The decision thus shapes how employers may rely on salary history and internal movement (promotion versus transfer) to explain gender-based pay differences, and it underscores the evidentiary rigor required to prevail at summary judgment.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Stericycle’s Sales Structure and “Project Supernova”

Stericycle sells waste-disposal services to healthcare and commercial clients. Its sales force is divided into:

National Division – serving corporate entities, including pharmacies.
Hospital Division – serving hospitals and integrated delivery networks.

Stericycle classifies positions using “paygrades,” with higher paygrades corresponding to greater potential compensation.

In 2021, Stericycle launched Project Supernova, a reorganization that created a new role—Key Account Director (KAD)—in both divisions, classified at paygrade 8. The position was filled internally, either by:

Promotions from lower paygrade roles, or
Transfers from other roles, sometimes at similar or higher paygrades.

The opinion distinguishes:

National KADs (Lane, Hause, and others) – on the national side.
Hospital KADs – nine male employees on the hospital side.

B. Plaintiffs’ Promotion and Compensation

Before their promotions:

Lane and Hause were National Account Managers (paygrade 7).
Lane’s base salary was $92,784; Hause’s was $95,026.

They were promoted to National KAD positions as part of Project Supernova in late 2021 (exact date not documented in the record). Critically:

They initially continued to receive their prior base salaries post‑promotion.
Their base salaries were later increased to $98,000, effective December 26, 2021, after they complained of inequitable pay.

C. Male Hospital KADs’ Compensation

Nine male employees became Hospital KADs:

Two were promoted into the KAD role:

Roni Patel: previously paygrade 5 with a salary of $71,487. Upon promotion in October 2021, his salary increased to $98,000.
Robert Austin: previously paygrade 5 with a salary of $100,900. Upon promotion around the same time, his salary increased to $110,990.

Seven were transferred into the KAD role with no salary increase. Their salaries before and after transfer ranged from $101,711 to $142,000.

Thus, for some period in 2021, at least:

Patel, a male promoted Hospital KAD, was earning $98,000 as a KAD.
Lane and Hause, female National KADs, continued at $92,784 and $95,026 until the December 26, 2021 increase.

D. Internal Complaint and Salary Adjustment

On December 6, 2021, Lane, Hause, and two other women (Toni Stone and Amy Hopkins) wrote to Stericycle’s Director of Human Resources, Erin Galloway, expressing concerns about inequitable KAD compensation. Galloway promised to investigate.

On December 16, 2021, Stericycle notified the four women that their salaries would be increased to $98,000, effective December 26, 2021. Galloway testified she considered:

Years of experience, skill, and performance,
The salary range for the KAD position and prior positions, and
Salaries of comparators, including Hospital KADs.

Senior Vice President Kelly Caruso added that the National KADs’ base salaries were increased to the same level because they had all been promoted at the same time.

E. Litigation and District Court Ruling

The plaintiffs sued under:

Equal Pay Act – alleging Stericycle paid them less than male KADs for substantially equal work.
Title VII – alleging sex-based pay discrimination.

The district court:

Held that the plaintiffs established a prima facie EPA case (higher male wages for equal work).
Found Stericycle’s explanation—that pay differences were based on prior position and salary history—to be a valid “factor other than sex” as a matter of law.
Concluded the same neutral explanation defeated the Title VII claim, as plaintiffs had not shown it was rooted in discriminatory practices or pretextual.
Granted summary judgment for Stericycle on both claims.

Lane and Hause appealed; the two other original plaintiffs did not.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

Judge Pryor, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Hamilton and Jackson‑Akiwumi joining), reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded.

The Seventh Circuit’s key conclusions were:

Comparators under the EPA
- Hospital KADs were proper comparators because they performed substantially similar work to National KADs.
- Stericycle’s argument that use of Hospital KAD comparators was an “ambush” because they were not identified in the complaint failed; plaintiffs need not plead comparators.
- The district court erred in excluding Patel as a comparator simply because he ultimately earned the same salary as plaintiffs in 2022; a was enough for comparator status.
EPA “factor other than sex” defense
- For the seven transferred Hospital KADs, Stericycle successfully showed that their higher pay was based on their pre‑transfer salaries (salary history), a permissible neutral factor under Seventh Circuit precedent where there is no evidence of historical discrimination.
- For Patel and Austin, the two promoted Hospital KADs, Stericycle did not prove its defense as a matter of law. The record supported a factual dispute about:
  - whether plaintiffs received raises at the time of promotion (as Patel and Austin did), and
  - why Austin’s raise produced a much higher final salary ($110,990) than plaintiffs’ $98,000.
Title VII pretext analysis
- As to the seven transferred KADs, plaintiffs offered no evidence that the salary‑history justification was untruthful or pretextual; summary judgment for Stericycle stands in that respect.
- As to Patel and Austin, there was a genuine dispute whether Stericycle consistently applied its stated practice that promotions to KAD were accompanied by raises. Evidence suggested:
  - plaintiffs may have been doing KAD work before December 26, 2021 without a raise, and
  - they were given raises only after collectively complaining about inequity.
- A reasonable jury could deem Stericycle’s explanation “unworthy of credence” and infer intentional sex discrimination.

Accordingly, the court held that there were genuine disputes of material fact under both statutes as to the two promoted male comparators, and remanded for further proceedings.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Equal Pay Act Claim

1. EPA Framework and Precedents

The Equal Pay Act forbids paying different rates to men and women for the same work at the same establishment. The opinion relies on several foundational Seventh Circuit cases:

David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, 846 F.3d 216 (7th Cir. 2017) and Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2016) – articulating the EPA standard that a plaintiff must show:
1. Higher wages were paid to a male comparator;
2. For equal work requiring substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility; and
3. Under similar working conditions.
Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2006) – another articulation of the prima facie EPA standard cited in Lane.
Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 876 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2017) – explaining that once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to prove a sex-neutral explanation for the discrepancy.
King v. Acosta Sales & Marketing, Inc., 678 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2012) – emphasizing that, at the affirmative defense stage, the employer bears both the burdens of production and persuasion and must prove—not merely articulate—its neutral explanation.
Covington v. Southern Illinois University, 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987) – holding that an employer may base pay on prior wages in another position, unless that policy is discriminatorily applied or the salary history is itself discriminatory.
Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005) – reiterating that salary history can be a legitimate “factor other than sex,” but if historical pay was discriminatory, that must be proved rather than assumed.

These cases situate Lane within an established Seventh Circuit line that treats salary history as potentially legitimate, while requiring proof that the employer actually relied on it and that it was not itself tainted by discrimination.

2. Comparator Analysis and the Role of Pleadings

A central dispute was whether Hospital KADs—especially Patel—were valid comparators for Plaintiffs’ EPA claim.

Stericycle argued that the plaintiffs’ reliance on Hospital KADs as comparators was an “ambush” because the complaint had not mentioned them. The Seventh Circuit rejected this theory, citing:

Kellogg v. Ball State University, 984 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2021) – plaintiffs are not required to identify specific comparators in their complaint.
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) – in Title VII cases, comparator analysis often depends on the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason; thus, comparators may surface later in the case.

Although Kellogg and Coleman are not EPA cases, their pleading and comparator principles carry over: discrimination complaints do not need to list all comparators up front. In Lane, the panel expressly applied this principle to the EPA context.

As to Patel, the district court had excluded him as a comparator because by 2022 both he and plaintiffs made $98,000. The Seventh Circuit corrected this:

Evidence suggested Patel received an immediate raise to $98,000 upon promotion in October 2021.
By contrast, plaintiffs received no raise upon promotion and only obtained $98,000 effective December 26, 2021, after complaining.

Thus, during at least part of 2021, Patel earned more than plaintiffs while all were KADs. That temporal disparity was sufficient to make Patel a proper comparator. The court thereby underscored a key point: EPA liability can rest on a temporary period of unequal pay, even if the employer later equalizes salaries.

3. The Salary-History “Factor Other Than Sex” Defense

Once plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to Stericycle to prove that the pay disparity resulted from a neutral factor, such as:

A seniority system,
A merit system,
A system measuring quantity or quality of production, or
“A differential based on any other factor other than sex.” (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).

Stericycle’s primary explanation was that KAD salaries were determined by employees’ prior positions and salary histories:

Transferred KADs retained their existing (generally higher) salaries.
Promoted KADs received raises from lower prior salaries.

Consistent with Covington and Wernsing, the court reaffirmed that:

Maintaining an employee’s existing pay during a transfer is a common, legitimate practice that avoids “unmerited” pay cuts.
Salary history is not per se invalid as a “factor other than sex.”
However, an employer must show actual reliance on salary history and must address any evidence that salary history itself was discriminatory.

Applying this framework, the court bifurcated the analysis:

Seven transferred Hospital KADs: Stericycle prevailed.
Two promoted Hospital KADs (Patel and Austin): Stericycle did not carry its burden as a matter of law.

a. Transferred Hospital KADs

For the seven transferred KADs, the record showed:

Each man’s KAD salary matched his pre‑transfer salary; there was no raise at the time of transfer.
The higher salaries (ranging from $101,711 to $142,000) reflected their historical compensation in other positions.

Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that:

The historical salaries themselves were discriminatory, or
Stericycle was selectively applying salary retention in a sex‑biased way.

Under Wernsing, defendants are not required to disprove hypothetical past discrimination in salary history; plaintiffs must affirmatively show such taint. Because plaintiffs did not, the court agreed with the district court that Stericycle established a valid “factor other than sex” defense with respect to the transferred comparators.

b. Promoted Hospital KADs (Patel and Austin)

For Patel and Austin, the court reached a different conclusion. Stericycle’s asserted neutral policy was:

Promotions to KAD come with a raise.
Transfers to KAD preserve existing pay, with no raise.

Stericycle argued that:

Patel and Austin were promoted and received raises (to $98,000 and $110,990, respectively).
Lane and Hause were also promoted and received raises (to $98,000).
Therefore, promotion status, not sex, drove the pay differences.

The Seventh Circuit held this was insufficient to sustain summary judgment for two distinct reasons:

Timing dispute: Did plaintiffs receive raises upon promotion?
Magnitude dispute: Why was Austin’s salary so much higher than plaintiffs’?

On the timing question:

Stericycle could not identify in the record the date of plaintiffs’ promotions and conceded at oral argument that there was no promotion/start date documented.
Evidence suggested that Patel and Austin received raises immediately upon promotion in October 2021.
Evidence also suggested that plaintiffs did not receive a raise upon promotion and only got a raise after complaining about pay disparities, with an effective date of December 26, 2021.

Because the employer bears the burden of proving its affirmative defense at summary judgment, this evidentiary gap was fatal. The panel emphasized that Stericycle’s failure to show that plaintiffs’ raises coincided with their promotions created a genuine dispute of fact as to whether its neutral promotion/transfer policy was actually applied.

On the magnitude question:

Even if all promoted KADs received raises, Stericycle’s explanation—that promotions triggered raises—did not justify why plaintiffs’ salaries were set at $98,000 while Austin’s was set at $110,990.
The EPA defense must explain the specific amount of the differential, not merely the fact that each person received some raise.

Thus, Stericycle’s “we raised everyone who was promoted” justification “falls short of justifying the salary disparity” between plaintiffs and Austin. A jury could conclude that the gender‑based difference in final amounts was not explained by a sex‑neutral factor.

The result: Stericycle’s “factor other than sex” defense fails at the summary judgment stage as to Patel and Austin, and plaintiffs’ EPA claim survives to that extent.

B. Title VII Claim

1. Title VII Framework and Precedents

Unlike the EPA, which has a built-in affirmative defense structure and reverses the burden of proof once the plaintiff makes the prima facie showing, Title VII:

Requires proof that the employer acted “because of” a protected characteristic (here, sex).
Allows plaintiffs to proceed either by:
- Pointing to all evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer discrimination (“evidence as a whole” approach), or
- Using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

The opinion cites:

Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622 (7th Cir. 2024) – explaining these two paths and reiterating that the ultimate question is whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination.
Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 39 F.4th 903 (7th Cir. 2022) – acknowledging the coexistence of McDonnell Douglas with the broader evidentiary approach.
Lauderdale – not only in the EPA context but also for Title VII’s pretext analysis: the plaintiff must show the employer’s stated justification is a cover for discrimination.
Cullen v. Indiana University Board of Trustees, 338 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2003) – confirming that plaintiffs may pursue pay discrimination claims under both the EPA and Title VII.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) – Supreme Court precedent holding that disbelief of the employer’s explanation can support an inference of discrimination.

Under McDonnell Douglas, a pay discrimination plaintiff must show:

She is a member of a protected group (here, women).
She was meeting her employer’s legitimate performance expectations.
She suffered an adverse employment action—in this context, being paid less than a similarly situated male.

The employer must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity; the plaintiff must demonstrate that this reason is pretext—that is, not the true reason, but a cover for discrimination.

Crucially different from the EPA, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff under Title VII at all times.

2. Application to Transferred Hospital KADs

As with the EPA analysis, the court treated transferred and promoted comparators separately.

For the seven transferred Hospital KADs, Stericycle’s explanation was the same: their higher KAD salaries reflected their pre‑transfer salaries, which were preserved to avoid unwarranted pay cuts.

The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs:

Did not offer evidence that this explanation was false or inconsistently applied, and
Did not show that the historical salaries themselves were discriminatory.

Absent evidence of pretext, no reasonable jury could find intentional discrimination for disparities involving these transferred comparators. Thus, Title VII claims grounded on comparisons to the transferred KADs cannot proceed.

3. Application to Promoted Hospital KADs (Patel and Austin)

For Patel and Austin, the Title VII analysis closely tracks the EPA reasoning but now focuses on pretext rather than the employer’s affirmative defense.

Stericycle’s stated nondiscriminatory reason: pay for KADs depends on whether they were promoted or transferred. Promoted employees receive a raise; transferred employees retain existing salaries.

The critical evidentiary issue: Did Stericycle actually follow this policy with plaintiffs?

The record contains evidence from which a jury could find:

Plaintiffs were promoted and functioning as KADs before December 26, 2021.
During that time, they did not receive a raise consistent with the stated promotion policy.
They only received raises after collectively complaining about inequitable pay in their December 6 letter.

The court highlighted evidence relating to Amy Hopkins (one of the original four plaintiffs, though not an appellant):

Hopkins expressed concerns about KAD salary disparities as early as August 2021.
She was told she was already doing the KAD job but would not receive a raise.
She reiterated her concerns in September and November 2021.
Evidence suggested that all four women, including Hopkins, were promoted to the KAD role at the same time.

From this, a reasonable jury could infer that:

Plaintiffs, like Hopkins, had been promoted to KAD and performing KAD work before December 26, 2021.
Contrary to the stated policy, those promotions did not come with immediate raises.
By contrast, male promoted KADs (Patel and Austin) received raises contemporaneously with their promotions.

If a jury concludes that Stericycle’s promotion/raise policy was applied only to male employees but not to female employees until they complained, it could find the stated explanation “unworthy of credence” under Reeves and infer that sex discrimination was the real reason for the pay gap.

Therefore, the court held that plaintiffs had created a triable issue of pretext for their Title VII pay discrimination claims as to Patel and Austin.

C. Precedents on Appellate Forfeiture and Changing Theories

An additional, more procedural point: on appeal, Stericycle suggested a new justification—that pay differences were based on whether KADs worked on the hospital versus national side of the business. The panel declined to consider this theory because Stericycle had not raised it before the district court.

Citing Duncan Place Owners Ass’n v. Danze, Inc., 927 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2019), the court reinforced the principle that parties cannot change or substantially expand their legal theories on appeal. This serves as a reminder to employers and litigants more broadly: at summary judgment, they must present a complete and consistent explanation of their pay decisions and cannot later pivot to a new justification in the appellate court.

D. Doctrinal Contributions and Likely Impact

1. Recognition of Temporally Limited Pay Disparities

By holding that Patel was a valid comparator despite having the same salary as plaintiffs in 2022, the court implicitly recognized that:

EPA and Title VII claims are viable even when the employer later “fixes” the pay disparity.
A comparator relationship is not defeated merely because pay equality is eventually achieved.

This is particularly important where:

An employee is promoted without a raise and later brought up to parity after complaining or raising legal concerns.

Employers cannot avoid liability simply by equalizing pay at a later date if there was an earlier period of unequal pay for equal work.

2. Clarification of the Employer’s EPA Burden: Timing and Amount Matter

The decision tightens what it means to prove a “factor other than sex” under the EPA:

It is not enough to say, in the abstract, that “promotions come with raises” or “we rely on salary history.”
Employers must show—
- That the neutral factor was actually and consistently applied to the plaintiff and comparators, and
- That the factor explains the specific amount and timing of the pay differential.

In particular:

If the employer claims that promotions always bring raises, but the plaintiff was promoted without a raise, the policy has not been consistently applied.
If the employer cannot document the promotion date, it may not be able to prove that the pay policy was followed.
If the employer cannot explain why similarly situated promoted employees landed at different salary levels (e.g., $98,000 vs. $110,990), the “factor other than sex” defense is incomplete.

This forces employers to ensure not only that their pay rules are facially neutral but also that:

They are carefully documented (dates of promotion, raise decisions, decision-makers), and
They are consistently applied across genders.

3. Salary History: Still Permissible, but Under Evidentiary Scrutiny

Lane fits within the Seventh Circuit’s long-standing view that salary history can be a legitimate “factor other than sex” under the EPA, in the absence of proof that historical salaries were discriminatory. At the same time, the opinion reinforces a couple of limits:

Salary history cannot be used as a blanket explanation when other evidence suggests unequal application of promotion/raise policies.
Reliance on salary history must be supported by record evidence that the employer actually used it to set the challenged salaries.

Going forward, employers in the Seventh Circuit who continue to use salary history in pay-setting should:

Maintain detailed documentation of how prior salary influenced new pay decisions.
Be prepared to defend the historical salaries themselves if challenged as discriminatory.

4. Cross-Division Comparators and Organizational Structure

Another noteworthy aspect is that plaintiffs, National KADs, were allowed to use Hospital KADs as comparators under both the EPA and Title VII. The court did not question their comparator status on the basis that they worked in different divisions.

The implicit lesson: organizational divisions or labels (“national” vs. “hospital”) will not, by themselves, defeat comparator status if:

The job duties are substantially similar, and
The jobs are performed under comparable working conditions.

This prevents employers from insulating themselves from equal pay scrutiny by splitting workers into nominally distinct business units while assigning them essentially the same work.

5. Pretext and Post‑Complaint Raises under Title VII

The fact that plaintiffs received raises after complaining about gender-based disparities played an important role in the Title VII analysis:

It helped support the inference that they were doing KAD work before December 26, 2021 without appropriate pay.
It suggested that the raise might be remedial or strategic rather than the natural consequence of a neutral promotion policy.
Inconsistency between how male and female promoted KADs were treated before the complaint supports a finding of pretext.

Lane therefore reminds litigants that:

Post‑complaint or post‑charge adjustments can be relevant evidence of both underlying discrimination and pretext.
Employers should be cautious: while correcting disparities is appropriate, documentation and timing will be scrutinized to ensure the raise is genuine and not mere litigation positioning.

V. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

1. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedure where the court decides a case (or part of a case) without a trial when:

There is no genuine dispute of material fact, and
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A “material” fact is one that could affect the outcome of the case. A “genuine” dispute means a reasonable jury could decide the issue either way. At this stage:

The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‑moving party (here, the plaintiffs).
The moving party (here, Stericycle) bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue.

2. Prima Facie Case

A prima facie case is the initial set of facts that, if assumed true and left unexplained, establish a legal presumption in the plaintiff’s favor. Under:

EPA: higher male pay for equal work under similar conditions.
Title VII/McDonnell Douglas: membership in a protected class, satisfactory performance, and adverse action (here, lower pay) compared to similarly situated non‑protected employees.

3. Comparator

A comparator is a co‑worker whose situation is close enough to the plaintiff’s that comparing their treatment can reveal discrimination. For pay cases, comparators:

Generally perform the same or substantially similar job,
Have similar responsibilities and working conditions, and
Are paid more despite being no more qualified or experienced.

4. “Factor Other Than Sex” (EPA)

Under the EPA, once a plaintiff shows gender-based pay disparity for equal work, the employer can avoid liability by proving the difference is due to:

Seniority,
Merit,
Production-based systems, or
A “factor other than sex”—any other legitimate reason unrelated to gender, such as salary history, specific skills, external market forces, or specialized certifications.

In Lane, Stericycle relied on prior position and salary history, arguing those factors—not sex—explained the disparities.

5. Affirmative Defense (EPA)

An affirmative defense is a justification or excuse that, if proven, defeats or mitigates liability even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true. Under the EPA:

The employer bears the burden of both producing evidence and persuading the fact‑finder that its neutral reason is true and complete.
If the employer fails to carry this burden, the plaintiff prevails upon proof of the prima facie case.

6. Pretext (Title VII)

Pretext means the employer’s stated reason is not the real reason for its decision, but a cover for discrimination. A plaintiff can show pretext by:

Exposing inconsistencies or contradictions in the employer’s explanation,
Showing that the reason does not actually explain the facts, or
Demonstrating that the employer applied its stated policies differently for similarly situated employees of different sexes.

In Lane, the key pretext questions were whether Stericycle:

Actually gave raises upon promotion consistently, and
Could sincerely claim that promotion status, rather than sex, explained the timing and amount of plaintiffs’ raises.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

Lane v. Stericycle is a consequential decision for equal pay litigation in the Seventh Circuit. Its chief contributions include:

Comparator flexibility: Plaintiffs may use comparators from different divisions, and comparators remain valid even if later pay equalization occurs. Temporally limited disparities are actionable.
Reaffirmation with refinement of salary-history defenses: Salary history can still qualify as a “factor other than sex,” particularly for transferred employees whose pay is preserved, but employers must prove actual reliance and must address both timing and amount of pay disparities.
Heightened evidentiary demands on employers at summary judgment: Vague or incomplete explanations (“promotions get raises”) are insufficient without documentation of promotion dates and reasoning for specific salary levels.
Title VII pretext through inconsistent application of neutral policies: Evidence that women were promoted into new roles without contemporaneous raises, while men received immediate increases, can support a jury finding of intentional discrimination—even when eventual parity is reached.
Procedural discipline on appeal: Employers cannot introduce new, materially different justifications for pay disparities for the first time on appeal; consistency in defenses is essential.

In practical terms, Lane sends a clear message to employers:

Document promotion dates, pay decisions, and the rationale for salary amounts.
Ensure promotion and transfer policies are not only neutral on paper but consistently applied across genders.
Recognize that post‑complaint “fixes” do not erase earlier discrimination and may, in some circumstances, support a finding of pretext.

For plaintiffs and practitioners, the opinion underscores the value of:

Carefully mapping pay timelines and identifying periods of disparity,
Probing employers’ claimed reliance on salary history and internal movement policies, and
Using inconsistencies in timing and amount of raises to challenge neutral explanations under both the EPA and Title VII.

By reversing summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit ensures that a jury—rather than a judge at summary judgment—will decide whether Stericycle’s practices reflected legitimate business reasons or unlawful sex discrimination. More broadly, Lane v. Stericycle sharpens the standards governing salary-history defenses and emphasizes that equal pay obligations require attention not just to where salaries end, but also to how and when they get there.