Introduction

Andris Arias v. County of Bergen (Supreme Court of New Jersey, Jan. 22, 2026) addresses whether a county is immune from tort liability under the Landowner Liability Act (LLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -10, for injuries sustained during recreation on a county park path.

Plaintiff Andris Arias alleged Bergen County negligently failed to maintain or warn of a pothole on a paved pedestrian path in Van Saun County Park (a 130-acre public park in Paramus with numerous amenities and free public access). Arias fell while rollerblading and claimed serious, permanent injuries. Defendant County of Bergen moved to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), asserting LLA immunity. The trial court dismissed without prejudice; the Appellate Division affirmed (Arias v. County of Bergen, 479 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2024)); the Supreme Court granted certification.

The central issues were (1) whether rollerblading is a covered “sport and recreational activity,” and (2) whether Van Saun Park qualifies as “premises” under the LLA—particularly in a densely populated suburban setting.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court unanimously held that the LLA immunizes Bergen County from Arias’s negligence claim arising from her rollerblading accident in Van Saun Park.

• The LLA must be “liberally construed” as an inducement for landowners to open property for recreation without fear of liability (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1).
• Rollerblading falls within the statute’s contemplated activities because it is akin to “skating” (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2).
• Van Saun Park is the kind of open and expansive recreational property the Legislature intended to protect; therefore it is “premises” under the LLA.
• Post-1991, analysis should focus on the dominant character of the land (open space conducive to sport/recreation), not the pre-1991 multi-factor approach from Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co.

Disposition: Affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Boileau v. De Cecco / Boileau v. De Cecco (App. Div.)

The Court used Boileau v. De Cecco, 65 N.J. 234 (1974) (summarily affirming) and the Appellate Division decision, Boileau v. De Cecco, 125 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1973), to anchor a long-standing limit: the LLA was not meant to immunize ordinary suburban residential property such as “someone’s backyard.”

In Arias, the Court preserved that boundary—explicitly stating it saw no legislative intent to induce/immunize recreation in residential backyards or condominium developments—and did not disturb prior guidance.

2) Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co.

Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391 (1979), was the major pre-1991 interpretive framework. Harrison cautioned against an overly expansive view of immunity and proposed four considerations: zoning, nature of the community, isolation from densely populated neighborhoods, and general public accessibility.

In Arias, the Court held that the Legislature’s 1991 amendments changed the interpretive posture. Because the LLA now must be “liberally construed” (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1), the Court stated it no longer finds the Harrison factors particularly relevant, let alone determinative, for the central “premises” inquiry, which should instead turn on whether the dominant character of the property is open land conducive to sport and recreational activities.

Importantly, the Court did not declare Harrison irrelevant in every conceivable circumstance; it noted a Harrison factor might still bear on a fact-specific LLA analysis in an unusual case.

3) Whitney v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.

Whitney v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 240 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1990), denied immunity for an ATV accident on a roadway used to maintain electrical lines through a preserve, reasoning it was not the kind of undeveloped/open property the LLA protected and emphasizing the “improved” and “commercial” aspects.

Arias treats Whitney chiefly as historical context: the Legislature’s 1991 amendments arguably responded to Whitney by expressly expanding the LLA to cover premises “whether or not improved” and “used as part of a commercial enterprise” (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3(a)), and by mandating liberal construction.

4) Toogood v. Saint Andrews at Valley Brook Condominium Ass'n

Toogood v. Saint Andrews at Valley Brook Condominium Ass'n, 313 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 1998), is the Court’s key post-1991 interpretive guide. Toogood denied immunity for a rollerblading incident on a road within a residential condominium development, holding the 1991 amendments did not expand “premises” to include “owners and occupiers of suburban residential property.”

But Toogood also articulated the organizing principle adopted in Arias: the 1991 amendments were “clearly designed to focus the inquiry on the dominant character of the land and to account for the evolving types of activities considered recreational pursuits.”

Arias effectively elevates this “dominant character” framing to Supreme Court doctrine: Van Saun Park, like the open tract in Weber (discussed in Toogood), is the kind of open property inviting recreation that the LLA is meant to encourage.

5) Weber v. United States

Weber v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1998), involved an accident on a swing set in a playground within a thirty-five-acre park inside Fort Dix. Toogood cited Weber approvingly for the proposition that maintaining open tracts and allowing public recreational access is precisely the conduct the Legislature seeks to encourage.

The Court in Arias relied on that comparison: Van Saun Park is similar in kind (open, public recreational space), reinforcing immunity.

6) Mancuso v. Klose

Mancuso v. Klose, 322 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1999), refused to apply the LLA to a child injured tripping over a fence between suburban backyards. The case supports two limits reiterated in Arias: not all playful conduct qualifies as an LLA “recreational activity,” and residential neighborhood property is generally not LLA “premises.”

7) Statutory-interpretation authorities

The Court cited State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023), and Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340 (2017), for standard interpretive methodology: start with statutory text, apply ordinary meaning, and respect the Legislature’s chosen language—here, especially the explicit liberal-construction command in N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1.

Legal Reasoning

1. Textual fit: activity. The statute lists “skating” among covered activities (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2). The Court treated rollerblading as akin to skating and therefore within the contemplated recreational activities.
2. Textual fit: improved premises. The LLA expressly applies “whether or not improved or maintained in a natural condition” (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3(a)). That provision neutralized Arias’s argument that paved paths and park structures should defeat immunity.
3. Core interpretive problem: “premises.” Because “premises” is undefined, the Court turned to statutory purpose and precedent. It reaffirmed that residential property is generally outside the LLA’s intended reach (Boileau; Mancuso; Toogood).
4. Post-1991 purpose: liberal construction as inducement. The pivot in the Court’s reasoning is the Legislature’s 1991 instruction that the LLA “shall be liberally construed” to induce landowners to open property without fear of liability (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1). That express purpose displaced the pre-1991 judicial reluctance to read immunity broadly.
5. Operational test: dominant character of the land. The Court adopted the Toogood framing: the “premises” inquiry is guided by whether the property’s dominant character is open land conducive to sport and recreational activities. Van Saun Park’s size, openness, recreational orientation, and free public access made it the archetype of LLA-protected property.
6. Policy alignment: preventing deterrence and closures. The Court emphasized the practical consequences of denying immunity: increased municipal exposure could lead to taxpayer burdens, service reductions, park closures, or charging admission—outcomes “antithetical” to the statute’s inducement purpose.

Impact

• Clear rule for public parks in developed areas. A large suburban county park open to the public for recreation—even with paved paths and multiple facilities—qualifies as LLA “premises” when its dominant character is recreational open space.
• Doctrinal shift away from Harrison’s surrounding-area factors. Litigants can expect courts to give less weight to the character of the surrounding community (e.g., dense suburbia) and more weight to the character of the property itself.
• Expanded predictability for municipalities and counties. Counties and municipalities operating free public parks gain stronger assurance that ordinary negligence claims arising from covered recreational uses will be barred by LLA immunity.
• Boundary remains for residential land. The Court preserved the long-standing limitation that the LLA generally does not transform suburban residential land (backyards, condominium developments) into protected “premises.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Landowner Liability Act (LLA) immunity

A statutory rule that, when it applies, means the landowner (including public entities) generally owes no duty to keep the property safe or warn of hazards for people who enter to engage in covered sport or recreational activities.

“Premises” (undefined term)

Because the statute does not define it, courts decide case-by-case whether a property qualifies. In Arias, the Court emphasized the property’s overall character and purpose rather than its location within a suburb.

“Dominant character of the land” test

A practical inquiry into what the property primarily is: Is it chiefly an open, recreational space inviting the public to engage in outdoor sport/recreation? If yes, it is likely LLA “premises.”

“Liberal construction” (N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1)

A legislative instruction to interpret the LLA broadly to encourage landowners to open property for recreation without fear of liability—changing the earlier judicial tendency to read immunity narrowly.

Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss

A procedural motion asserting that, even taking the complaint’s allegations as true, the plaintiff has not stated a legally viable claim—here because statutory immunity bars the negligence claim.

Conclusion

Andris Arias v. County of Bergen cements a post-1991 framework for the LLA: courts should treat the statute as a broadly protective inducement and determine “premises” chiefly by the dominant character of the property as open land devoted to sport and recreation. By holding that a 130-acre, free-admission county park in a dense suburban area is LLA-protected “premises,” the Court strengthens immunity for public entities operating large recreational spaces and deemphasizes pre-1991, surrounding-area limitations associated with Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co. while maintaining the residential-property carveout reflected in Boileau v. De Cecco, Toogood v. Saint Andrews at Valley Brook Condominium Ass'n, and Mancuso v. Klose.