Krueger v. Crockett (2025): The Tenth Circuit’s Definitive Stance on Prolonged Prone Restraints, Post-Restraint Tasers, and Universal Duty to Intervene

Krueger v. Crockett (10th Cir. 2025):
Prolonged Prone Restraints, Post-Restraint Tasers, and the Expansive Duty to Intervene

Introduction

In Krueger v. Crockett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit delivered a 83-page published opinion that significantly fortifies the constitutional limits on force used during arrests and clarifies when officers—both participants and by-standers—are liable for failing to stop their colleagues. The death of Jeffrey Krueger after a traffic stop in Wagoner County, Oklahoma, generated three consolidated interlocutory appeals by eight individual officers—county deputies, a police lieutenant, and city patrol officers—seeking qualified immunity from Fourth-Amendment claims of excessive force and failure to intervene. The panel (Judges Hartz, McHugh, and Moritz; opinion by Judge McHugh) affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, but in doing so:

  • Conducted an unusually detailed “cumbersome review” of the record to correct factual omissions and contradictions in the trial court’s order;
  • Re-emphasised and extended existing precedent—Weigel, Booker, Perea, Vette, Teetz—to hold that any prolonged prone restraint on a handcuffed arrestee who is effectively subdued is excessive, even if the person sporadically resists or officers subjectively fear danger;
  • Declared that all officers on scene, including those whose physical contact is brief or those who momentarily walk away, may be liable both for the force and for failing to intervene;
  • Clarified when appellate courts may delve into factual disputes on interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court:

  1. Jurisdiction. Exercised collateral-order jurisdiction (Mitchell v. Forsyth) but invoked three doctrines—material-facts-not-found, blatant-contradiction, and legal-error-while-fact-finding—to comb the record de novo.
  2. Factual Reconstruction. Found that:
    • Deputies Phillips and Orr dragged Krueger out by his hair within 6 seconds of arrival, slammed his head (bloody gash, clump of hair), and drive-stun-tased him up to eight times after he lay exhausted.
    • Four other officers (Lott, Crockett, Craig, McFarland) placed 665 lbs+ on the handcuffed, face-down Krueger for roughly four minutes; leg shackles and a 12--14″ hobble chain further restrained him while he scarcely moved.
  3. Excessive Force.
    • Initial extraction/head-slam: disproportionate to a minor traffic stop; clearly established by Davis v. Clifford.
    • Repeated tasers after control gained: clearly excessive under Perea and Booker.
    • Prolonged prone restraint: clearly excessive under Weigel, Booker, Teetz.
  4. Failure to Intervene. All eight defendants were present, aware, and had time to act; liability clearly established by Booker, Fogarty, and Weigel.
  5. Qualified Immunity. Denied: constitutional violations were obvious or squarely governed by precedent; thus summary-judgment denials are affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Weigel v. Broad (2008) – cornerstone for prone restraint as deadly force; court analogised 3-minute pressure there to 4-minute pressure here.
  • Estate of Booker v. Gomez (2014) – established that pressure on a restrained back and prolonged taser use violate the Fourth Amendment. Used to defeat qualified immunity for both the taser deployments and the restraint.
  • Perea v. Baca (2016) – ten taserings held excessive; provided “fair warning” that repeated drive-stuns after control is gained are unlawful.
  • Davis v. Clifford (2016) – on-point comparator for yanking a misdemeanant out of a vehicle by hair.
  • Vette v. Sanders (2021) & Teetz ex rel. Lofton v. Stepien (2025) – reinforced duty to reassess force once a suspect is subdued.
  • Fogarty v. Gallegos (2008) – blueprint for liability where officers fail to intervene even without direct force.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Fourth-Amendment Framework. Applied classic Graham v. Connor factors, but explicated that the analysis must evolve as the situation unfolds (citing Barnes v. Felix, 2025).
  2. “Clearly Established” Test. Emphasised Supreme Court admonition against generic rules (Kisela), yet found close factual analogues; alternatively deemed the case “obvious.”
  3. Group & Individual Culpability. Reconciled earlier tension: courts may aggregate conduct in excessive-force reviews (Booker), but must still articulate each officer’s potential liability. The panel did both.
  4. Interlocutory Fact Review. Reasserted that appellate courts may revisit facts when:
    • the district court’s narrative is incomplete;
    • video blatantly contradicts findings (Scott v. Harris);
    • legal errors infect fact determinations (Pahls v. Thomas).

Impact of the Decision

  • Operational Training. Agencies within the Tenth Circuit must revise training on prone restraints, taser-deployment windows, and the affirmative duty to intervene.
  • Body Camera Protocols. The court’s reliance on missing or incomplete video underscores potential spoliation sanctions and heightens expectations for continuous recording.
  • Qualified-Immunity Litigation. District courts are warned to state assumed facts with precision; otherwise appellate courts will “cumbersomely” mine the record.
  • Policy Making & Risk Management. Municipalities face increased exposure; insurers may demand stricter restraint policies mirroring national “20-second rule” or “knee off the back” directives.
  • Criminal Proceedings. Prosecutors may bring homicide or assault charges where prone restraint continues after control is gained; the opinion supplies an appellate roadmap.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Key Terms Explained

  • Qualified Immunity: A defense shielding officials from suit unless they violated “clearly established” federal rights. Not absolute—courts ask (1) was there a violation? (2) was it clearly established?
  • Prone Restraint: Suspect is face-down, often handcuffed, with officers applying body weight. Danger: compresses lungs → positional asphyxia (inability to breathe).
  • Drive-Stun Mode: Taser prongs aren’t shot; device is pressed directly onto the body causing pain, not muscle incapacitation.
  • Hobble-Tie vs. Hog-Tie: Hobble connects ankles to handcuffs with ≥12” of slack; hog-tie is ≤12” (now banned by many agencies). Both restrict breathing when combined with weight.
  • Failure to Intervene: Officer on scene who sees excessive force must reasonably try to stop it—shouting, pulling colleague away, etc.—or face liability.
  • Cumbersome Review: Appellate practice of poring over the record when district courts omit or misstate key facts in qualified-immunity denials.

Conclusion

Krueger v. Crockett stands as the Tenth Circuit’s most comprehensive modern treatise on police use of force. It does three things simultaneously: (1) solidifies that continued weight on a restrained, prone individual is excessive even amid intermittent resistance; (2) expands the duty to intervene to anyone with a realistic opportunity—including those who step away and return; and (3) guides district and appellate courts on fact-finding duties during qualified-immunity litigation. Going forward, officers in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming are on unmistakable notice: the moment a suspect is effectively under control, any additional body-weight pressure or pain-compliance taser discharge crosses the constitutional line, and every officer who sees it must act or answer for it.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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