Introduction

This decision clarifies how Kentucky determines both the “date of injury” and the locus of injury for occupational hearing-loss claims after the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.7305(4). The Supreme Court of Kentucky holds that the amended statute does more than sort out liability among successive employers: it supplies a rebuttable presumption that effectively fixes when and where the injury manifests for liability—and, by extension, for jurisdiction—so long as the worker’s last injurious exposure to hazardous noise for at least one year occurred with a given employer in Kentucky.

The appellant, Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI), challenged Kentucky’s jurisdiction over a hearing-loss claim by appellee Troy Stidham, who worked more than sixteen years for Clas Coal in Kentucky before working an additional nine months for the same employer in Alabama. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found, and the Board and Court of Appeals agreed, that Stidham’s injury manifested in Kentucky on January 1, 2020—the last day he worked in Kentucky—making KEMI the carrier at risk. The Supreme Court affirms, expressly recognizing that the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.7305(4) supersedes earlier “last exposure” formulations and guides the injury date for hearing-loss claims.

Summary of the Opinion

• Facts: Stidham worked for Clas Coal from 2003 through October 31, 2020, including more than sixteen years in a Pike County, Kentucky mine and nine months in Alabama after the Kentucky mine closed. He regularly used hearing protection but began noticing hearing problems in 2018–2019. He was first medically diagnosed with hearing loss on August 31, 2021. He filed a Kentucky claim listing January 1, 2020 (his last Kentucky workday) as his last exposure in Kentucky. Three audiologists assigned whole person impairment ratings between 5% and 9%, attributing loss to long-term occupational noise; the University Evaluator, Dr. Brose, opined that seven months in an underground coal mine would not produce the level of loss present and that the short Alabama stint was inconsequential.
• ALJ: Dismissed the pneumoconiosis claim, awarded hearing-loss benefits based on a 9% impairment, and fixed the injury date at January 1, 2020 in Kentucky. The ALJ applied KRS 342.7305(4)’s rebuttable presumption that the employer with whom the worker was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year is exclusively liable, and found the Alabama exposure inconsequential on the medical proof.
• Board and Court of Appeals: Affirmed. Both held that KRS 342.670 (extraterritorial coverage) is inapplicable because the injury occurred in Kentucky. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the diagnosis date is not determinative of manifestation.
• Supreme Court: Affirms. The Court clarifies that, post‑2018, KRS 342.7305(4) supplies a rebuttable presumption that not only allocates liability but also informs when the injury is deemed to occur for hearing-loss claims. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual determination that Stidham’s injury manifested on January 1, 2020 in Kentucky, Kentucky has jurisdiction, and KEMI (Clas Coal’s Kentucky carrier on that date) is the carrier at risk. Extraterritorial analysis under KRS 342.670 is unnecessary where the injury occurs in Kentucky.

Analysis

Statutory Framework and Pivotal Holding

The decision turns on KRS 342.7305(4), as amended in July 2018. Before 2018, Kentucky case law (notably Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc., 474 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. 2015)) read the statute to mean the employer at the time of the last injurious exposure was exclusively liable, which in practice functioned as a “last exposure” rule. The 2018 amendment added a durational element:

When audiograms and other testing reveal a pattern of hearing loss compatible with that caused by hazardous noise exposure and the employee demonstrates repetitive exposure to hazardous noise in the workplace, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the hearing impairment is an injury covered by this chapter, and the employer with whom the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for a minimum duration of one (1) year of employment shall be exclusively liable for benefits.

Key points from the Court’s interpretation:

• The amendment “undeniably alters” Hale’s last-exposure-liability rule. The operative presumption now attaches to the employer with whom the worker was last injuriously exposed for at least one year.
• The statute does not merely apportion liability among multiple employers; it directs when an occupational hearing-loss injury is “found to have occurred” for liability purposes—information that also anchors jurisdictional analysis.
• The presumption is rebuttable: an ALJ may find a different injury date and employer if the weight of the evidence shows the injury actually manifested at a different time or under different employment.

Applying this framework, the Court upholds the ALJ’s finding that Stidham’s injury manifested on January 1, 2020 in Kentucky, rendering Kentucky’s extraterritorial statute inapplicable because the injury did not occur outside Kentucky.

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc., 474 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. 2015): Cited by KEMI for the last-exposure rule. The Court explains Hale relied on the pre‑2018 version of KRS 342.7305(4) and is materially limited by the amendment adding the one-year requirement; to that extent, Hale’s “last exposure = injury” formulation is superseded.
• Greg’s Construction v. Keeton, 385 S.W.3d 420 (Ky. 2012): Clarified that “injurious exposure” refers to exposure that would result in hearing loss if continued indefinitely, not proof of measurable loss from the last employment. The Court harmonizes Keeton with the 2018 amendment: the quality-of-exposure concept persists, but now sits alongside a minimum one-year durational predicate before the presumption attaches.
• American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky. 2004): Held that the date of injury for liability can precede diagnosis; symptoms alone can mark manifestation for liability, although diagnosis controls notice/limitations. The Court uses Brown (and Ford Motor Co. v. Duckworth) to distinguish between manifestation for liability and the separate notice/limitations triggers.
• Ford Motor Co. v. Duckworth, 615 S.W.3d 26 (Ky. 2021): Confirms that for cumulative trauma, notice/limitations run when a physician advises the worker of a work-related condition; distinct from the liability manifestation date.
• Coal Dust Coal Co. v. Stiltner, 905 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1995): Disabilities proven to have existed before leaving Kentucky employment do not implicate extraterritorial coverage; supports the conclusion that KRS 342.670 does not apply where injury existed in Kentucky.
• Amax Coal Co. v. Smith, 748 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. App. 1988): Extraterritorial coverage applies only when the injury occurs outside Kentucky; here, injury occurred in Kentucky, so KRS 342.670 is inapposite.
• Hicks v. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 686 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2024): Involved acute injury in West Virginia; extraterritorial analysis governed. Distinguished because Stidham’s injury manifested in Kentucky and extraterritorial coverage is therefore unnecessary.
• Alcon Foil Products v. Huff, 2 S.W.3d 96 (Ky. 1999) and Special Fund v. Clark, 998 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1999): Concerned discovery/notice for limitations, not the liability-manifestation date; cited to reject conflating those distinct concepts.
• Standards of review: Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1992) (scope of appellate review of Board decisions); Bowerman v. Black Equipment Co., 297 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. App. 2009) (de novo on legal questions); Abbott Laboratories v. Smith, 205 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. App. 2006); Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1993); Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984) (ALJ’s primacy on factual findings and substantial evidence standard).

Legal Reasoning

1. Who decides the manifestation date? The manifestation date for a workers’ compensation injury is a question of fact for the ALJ. The Supreme Court will uphold the ALJ’s finding if supported by substantial evidence.
2. What controls the injury date for hearing loss? For occupational hearing loss, the amended KRS 342.7305(4) creates a rebuttable presumption fixing exclusive liability on the employer with whom the worker was last injuriously exposed for at least one year. That presumption guides when (and with whom) the injury is deemed to have occurred for liability purposes. Unlike pre‑2018 case law, the new statute imposes a one-year durational requirement; thus, a short, subsequent stint of hazardous exposure that does not satisfy the one-year threshold does not, by itself, displace the earlier presumption.
3. How does the presumption operate here? Stidham worked more than sixteen years in Kentucky under Clas Coal, with daily hazardous noise. After January 1, 2020, he worked nine months in Alabama (less than one year) for the same employer. On this record, the statutory presumption places exclusive liability with Clas Coal for the injury that manifested in Kentucky as of January 1, 2020. The ALJ further found, based on expert testimony, that the Alabama exposure was “inconsequential” and did not worsen the condition; no physician opined to the contrary.
4. Why is extraterritorial coverage irrelevant? KRS 342.670 applies only when the injury occurs outside Kentucky. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the injury manifested in Kentucky on January 1, 2020, extraterritorial analysis is unnecessary. Hicks and similar cases are inapposite because they address injuries occurring outside the Commonwealth.
5. Diagnosis date versus manifestation date. The Court reaffirms that an injury may manifest for liability purposes before formal diagnosis. A later diagnosis (here, August 31, 2021) does not retroactively relocate the injury outside Kentucky or postpone manifestation when the facts and medical testimony show earlier manifestation.
6. Rebuttable—not absolute—presumption. The Court cautions that KRS 342.7305(4) creates a rebuttable presumption. An ALJ could find the injury actually manifested elsewhere or later if the evidence showed, for example, material worsening from out-of-state exposure or a lack of one-year injurious exposure in Kentucky with the relevant employer. That was not the case here.

Application to the Record

• Evidence of long-term exposure in Kentucky, onset of symptoms in 2018–2019, and expert opinions attributing the impairment to protracted noise exposure provided substantial evidence for the ALJ’s finding that the injury had manifested by January 1, 2020 in Kentucky.
• Dr. Brose’s testimony that seven to nine months of exposure would not produce the level of impairment found, and that the Alabama stint was inconsequential, undercut KEMI’s contention that the injury date must track the last calendar exposure out-of-state.
• No physician attributed any worsening to the Alabama work. This absence of contrary medical proof left the presumption intact and supported the ALJ’s factual conclusion on manifestation.

Impact

This opinion has several significant effects on Kentucky workers’ compensation law and practice:

• Recalibrates “last exposure” analysis for hearing loss. Hale’s unqualified last-exposure rule is effectively replaced by a one-year-last-employer presumption under KRS 342.7305(4). The decision confirms the amendment’s substantive effect on identifying the time/place of injury for hearing-loss claims.
• Jurisdictional clarity for multi-state employment. Where the presumption places the injury in Kentucky and the record supports that conclusion, courts need not engage KRS 342.670’s extraterritorial analysis. Conversely, if the worker’s last qualifying one-year injurious exposure occurred outside Kentucky (or evidence proves manifestation outside Kentucky), extraterritorial coverage would then become the governing inquiry.
• Diagnosis timing is not dispositive. Practitioners should not equate diagnosis date with manifestation date. Medical evidence of earlier symptom onset and exposure history can establish manifestation pre-diagnosis.
• Evidentiary focus for ALJs and litigants. The decisive evidence will often be:
  • The duration and nature of hazardous noise exposure under each employer.
  • Medical testimony on whether short subsequent exposures are consequential.
  • Worker testimony on the onset of symptoms and functional impact.
• Carrier-at-risk identification. Insurers providing coverage on the injury date (as fixed under the presumption and factual findings) bear risk regardless of brief subsequent out-of-state exposures with the same employer that do not meet the one-year threshold.
• Strategic considerations. Employers who transfer operations out-of-state should recognize that short post-transfer exposures are unlikely to shift liability or jurisdiction for hearing-loss claims already manifested in Kentucky under the statutory presumption and supporting proof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cumulative trauma injury: An injury that develops gradually from repetitive exposures or activities over time rather than a single acute event. Work-related hearing loss is treated as cumulative trauma.
• Injurious exposure: Exposure to an occupational hazard that would cause the disease if continued indefinitely. For hearing loss, this means hazardous noise exposure of the type that would damage hearing over time. Post‑2018, the presumption of exclusive liability attaches only if such exposure lasted at least one year with the employer in question.
• Rebuttable presumption (KRS 342.7305(4)): The law assumes the last employer with whom the worker had at least one year of injurious exposure to hazardous noise is exclusively liable. A party can overcome this presumption by evidence showing the injury actually manifested at a different time or with a different employer.
• Manifestation date (liability): The legally relevant date when the injury is deemed to have occurred for liability purposes. In hearing-loss claims, this date is guided by KRS 342.7305(4)’s presumption and the ALJ’s factfinding on exposure and symptoms.
• Diagnosis versus manifestation: A medical diagnosis may occur after the injury has already manifested for liability purposes. Diagnosis often controls when notice and limitations begin to run, but it does not necessarily define the injury date for liability.
• Extraterritorial coverage (KRS 342.670): A statutory mechanism allowing Kentucky benefits for injuries that occur outside the state if certain conditions are met (for example, employment principally localized in Kentucky). It is only relevant if the injury occurred outside Kentucky.
• Carrier at risk: The insurer that provided coverage on the injury date, as determined under the governing statutes and factual findings.
• Standard of review: The ALJ is the sole judge of the quality and weight of the evidence; appellate courts will not disturb factual findings supported by substantial evidence. Legal interpretations are reviewed de novo.

Key Takeaways

• KRS 342.7305(4), as amended in 2018, supplies a one-year-last-employer rebuttable presumption that guides both liability and the injury date for occupational hearing-loss claims.
• Where the injury is found to have occurred in Kentucky under that presumption and supportive evidence, KRS 342.670’s extraterritorial analysis is unnecessary.
• Diagnosis date does not control manifestation for liability; medical and lay evidence of earlier symptoms and exposure can fix an earlier injury date.
• Hale’s last-exposure rule is materially limited; Keeton’s qualitative “injurious exposure” concept remains, now coupled with a one-year durational predicate.
• Short post-Kentucky exposure (here, nine months in Alabama) does not automatically shift liability or jurisdiction, especially where expert proof deems it inconsequential.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision confirms that the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.7305(4) is not a mere tie-breaker among employers. It serves as a statutory manifestation rule for occupational hearing-loss claims, creating a rebuttable presumption that the injury occurred while the worker was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year with a given employer. Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Stidham’s injury manifested on January 1, 2020 in Kentucky—and that his brief subsequent exposure in Alabama was inconsequential—Kentucky had jurisdiction and KEMI, as the carrier on that date, is liable.

By harmonizing the amended hearing-loss statute with cumulative trauma doctrine and by carefully separating liability manifestation from diagnosis and limitations concerns, the Court provides a durable roadmap for future hearing-loss litigation—one that prioritizes the quality and duration of exposure, the evidentiary weight of medical testimony, and a clear jurisdictional boundary: apply extraterritorial analysis only when the injury occurred outside Kentucky.