Kolstad v. Claussen: Explicit Findings Required on Developmental-Needs and Domestic-Violence Best-Interest Factors in North Dakota Custody Cases

Kolstad v. Claussen: Explicit Findings Required on Developmental-Needs and Domestic-Violence Best-Interest Factors in North Dakota Custody Cases

I. Introduction

In Kolstad v. Claussen, 2025 ND 213, the North Dakota Supreme Court revisits two recurring problem areas in family law:

  • the sufficiency of district court findings when applying the statutory “best interests of the child” factors; and
  • the treatment of alleged domestic violence in residential responsibility (custody) determinations.

The case arises from a dispute between unmarried parents, Kalynn Ann Kolstad (plaintiff/appellant) and Dylan Wayne Claussen (defendant/appellee), over residential responsibility for their two minor children and the accompanying child support obligations. After a bench trial, the district court ordered equal residential responsibility and set child support, concluding in particular that Claussen’s job change—though lowering his income—was not done to avoid child support, but to allow him to parent his children.

On appeal, Kolstad challenged:

  1. the adequacy of the district court’s findings on the best-interest factors, focusing on:
    • factor (c): the children’s developmental needs and each parent’s ability to meet those needs; and
    • factor (j): evidence of domestic violence; and
  2. the child support determination, arguing that Claussen’s reduced income should trigger imputed income under the child support guidelines as a voluntary reduction to escape support.

The Supreme Court:

  • affirmed the child support ruling, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Claussen’s employment change was for parenting reasons, not to reduce child support; but
  • reversed and remanded the residential responsibility portion for lack of sufficiently clear and specific findings on best-interest factors (c) and (j).

The opinion reinforces and clarifies a now-robust line of North Dakota authority: district courts must make explicit, reasoned findings tying the evidence to each best-interest factor—especially in domestic violence cases—and must explain how those factor findings support the ultimate residential responsibility award.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Tufte, writing for a unanimous Court (with one Justice disqualified after oral argument), issued a mixed ruling:

  • Residential responsibility (custody):
    • The district court correctly recited and applied the statutory best-interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14‑09‑06.2(1).
    • However, with respect to factor (c) (developmental needs) and factor (j) (domestic violence), the court’s findings were internally ambiguous and insufficiently explained.
    • The Supreme Court could not discern:
      • whether factor (c) actually favored Kolstad or neither parent; or
      • whether the district court believed credible evidence of domestic violence existed, and if so, how that evidence was weighed under factor (j).
    • Because adequate findings are a prerequisite to meaningful appellate review, the Court reversed in part and remanded for more detailed and clarified findings on factors (c) and (j).
  • Child support:
    • Kolstad argued that Claussen’s move from a high‑paying job at Sundre Sand and Gravel (earning $115,465 in 2023) to a lower‑paying position, and then to a lower‑hour position back at Sundre, was a voluntary reduction undertaken to avoid child support.
    • Under N.D. Admin. Code § 75‑02‑04.1‑07(7), an obligor’s income may be imputed if he “makes a voluntary change in employment resulting in reduction of income,” which is defined as a change made “for the purpose of reducing the obligor's child support obligation.” The obligor has the burden to show the change was not made for that purpose.
    • The district court found that Claussen’s change in employment was made “for good reason” — namely, the demands of his prior job were incompatible with his parenting responsibilities, especially for his older child for whom he had primary residential responsibility.
    • Given testimony from Claussen and his supervisor confirming these parenting-based reasons, the Supreme Court held the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the child support determination.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Kolstad and Claussen lived together for about four years and are the parents of two children, born in 2020 and 2022. They separated in February 2024. Claussen also has an older child, born in 2016, from a prior marriage, for whom he has primary residential responsibility.

In March 2024, Kolstad initiated this action seeking primary residential responsibility and child support. Claussen counterclaimed, seeking primary residential responsibility or, in the alternative, equal residential responsibility and child support consistent with the guidelines.

At the October 2024 bench trial, the parties presented evidence concerning:

  • their respective caregiving roles;
  • their employment histories and schedules;
  • the children’s developmental needs; and
  • a disputed allegation of domestic violence: Kolstad testified that during her move out of the home in March 2024, Claussen intentionally “slammed the door onto [her] leg,” producing bruises shown in photographs; Claussen denied assaulting her and suggested the bruises may have come from his pickup running boards.

The district court:

  • awarded equal residential responsibility for the two younger children;
  • found that Claussen changed employment to better parent his children, not to evade child support;
  • calculated Claussen’s current income at $60,288 based on his new hourly rate at Sundre Sand and Gravel;
  • offset the parties’ child support obligations and ordered Claussen to pay Kolstad $157 per month.

Kolstad appealed, challenging both the custody findings and the child support determination.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court’s reasoning is grounded in a series of earlier decisions and statutory/administrative provisions. The opinion weaves these authorities into a coherent framework governing both custody findings and child support.

1. Standards of Review in Custody Cases

The Court reiterates that:

  • Residential responsibility findings are factual and reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. (Queen v. Martel, 2022 ND 178, ¶ 3, 980 N.W.2d 914.) A finding is clearly erroneous if:
    • it is induced by an erroneous view of the law;
    • no evidence supports it; or
    • after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court is left with a firm conviction a mistake has been made.
  • Under this standard, appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility, and they do not “retry” custody cases or substitute their judgment simply because they might have reached a different result. (Mowan v. Berg, 2015 ND 95, ¶ 5.)
  • Nevertheless, the district court must “state its findings of fact with sufficient specificity to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis for its decisions.” (Shively v. Shively, 2025 ND 69, ¶ 4 (cleaned up).)
  • Findings are sufficient if they “afford a clear understanding of the court’s decision and assist the appellate court in conducting its review.” (Boldt v. Boldt, 2021 ND 213, ¶ 10.)

Kolstad primarily applies these principles not to re-evaluate the merits of who should have residential responsibility, but to insist that the district court’s reasoning be transparent and logically traceable from evidence to factor findings to ultimate custody outcome.

2. Best-Interest Factors and Non-Mathematical Balancing

North Dakota’s best-interest analysis is governed by N.D.C.C. § 14‑09‑06.2(1), which sets out multiple factors (a) through (m). The Court specifically cites:

  • Factor (c): the “developmental needs” of the child and “the ability of each parent to meet those needs, both in the present and in the future.”
  • Factor (j): evidence of domestic violence, including the statutory presumption in certain circumstances, as discussed more fully below.

The Court again underscores that this is not an arithmetic exercise. As stated in Armitage v. Armitage, 2024 ND 97, ¶ 15, “Determining parental responsibility is not a mathematical formula by which the factors are added up and the person with the most factors in [that person’s] favor is awarded residential responsibility.” The district court is required to:

  • evaluate each factor individually;
  • assign appropriate weight, which will differ case to case; and
  • explain how the combination of findings supports the overall residential responsibility decision.

Kolstad uses this principle to fault the district court for signaling that factor (c) “would favor [Kolstad]” while failing to reconcile that finding with its equal-residential-responsibility conclusion or to explain the weight given to the factor.

3. Domestic Violence Factor and Presumption

N.D.C.C. § 14‑09‑06.2(1)(j) governs how domestic violence is considered in custody decisions. The statute requires:

  1. The court “shall consider evidence of domestic violence.”
  2. If the court finds:
    • “credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred,” and
    • either:
      • one incident of domestic violence resulting in serious bodily injury, or
      • one incident involving the use of a dangerous weapon, or
      • a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding,

    then a rebuttable presumption arises that the perpetrating parent “may not be awarded residential responsibility.”

  3. The presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s best interests require that the perpetrating parent have residential responsibility. The court must make “specific findings of fact” showing the custody arrangement “best protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence.”

The Court further cites Clemenson v. Clemenson, 2025 ND 195, ¶¶ 11–12, which distills this into a two-step analysis:

  1. The court must first find credible evidence that domestic violence occurred.
  2. It must then find one of the three statutorily defined circumstances (serious bodily injury, dangerous weapon, or pattern of domestic violence) to trigger the presumption.

Even if the presumption is not triggered, domestic violence must still be weighed under factor (j). (Mowan, 2015 ND 95, ¶ 13.) Kolstad reinforces this by insisting that trial courts:

  • explicitly state whether they find credible evidence of domestic violence;
  • explain why the presumption does or does not arise; and
  • analyze whether, presumption aside, the domestic violence evidence tips factor (j) in favor of one parent.

4. Specificity and “Reasoned Explanation”

Shively v. Shively, 2025 ND 69, features prominently. There, the Court remanded for “a reasoned explanation of the district court’s decision.” Kolstad applies the same approach: when the appellate court cannot clearly discern:

  • what the district court decided on a key factor; or
  • how that factor was integrated into the ultimate custody ruling;

the proper remedy is remand for clarification and additional findings, not the appellate court’s own reweighing of evidence.

5. Child Support: Voluntary Employment Changes and Imputed Income

Child support determinations involve mixed questions of law, fact, and discretion and are reviewed accordingly. The Court cites Woelfel v. Gifford, 2020 ND 197, ¶ 18, for the framework:

  • Questions of law are reviewed de novo;
  • Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; and
  • Certain decisions (e.g., deviations) may be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Failure to comply with the child support guidelines is an error of law.

A central provision is N.D. Admin. Code § 75‑02‑04.1‑07(7), which provides:

  • If an obligor makes a voluntary change in employment resulting in a reduction of income, the court may impute income based, for example, on prior earning capacity.
  • A “voluntary change” is defined as “a change made for the purpose of reducing the obligor’s child support obligation.”
  • The rule directs courts to consider multiple factors in determining voluntariness, including standard of living, work history, education, health, age, criminal record, barriers to employment, efforts to seek employment, the stated reason for the change, and “likely employment status if the family before the court were intact,” among others.
  • The obligor bears the burden of proving that the change was not made to reduce child support.

Kolstad applies this rule and concludes that, on this record, Claussen met that burden.

6. Appellate Deference to Credibility Determinations

On the child support issue, the Court relies on Toppenberg v. Toppenberg, 2025 ND 121, ¶ 10, reiterating that under the clearly erroneous standard, the Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility.

This deference is evident in how the Court treats the employment-change testimony. The district court credited Claussen’s stated reasons (family time, caring for children, more stable hours), and there was corroboration from his supervisor. Regardless of any contrary inferences one might draw, the Supreme Court declined to disturb those factual findings.

C. Legal Reasoning on Residential Responsibility

1. The Demand for Clear, Coherent Findings

The Supreme Court’s critique of the district court is not that it chose equal residential responsibility, but that its written findings:

  • were ambiguous about what it actually found on key best-interest factors; and
  • did not sufficiently articulate the logical path from specific factor findings to the ultimate award of equal residential responsibility.

This problem was especially acute for:

  • Factor (c): developmental needs and each parent’s ability to meet them; and
  • Factor (j): domestic violence.

In both areas, the Court found itself uncertain as to what the district court had actually decided and why. Under Boldt and Shively, that uncertainty itself is reversible error because it obstructs meaningful appellate review.

2. Factor (c): Developmental Needs of the Children

Factor (c) asks the court to evaluate:

“the child’s developmental needs and the ability of each parent to meet those needs, both in the present and in the future.”
— N.D.C.C. § 14‑09‑06.2(1)(c)

The district court found:

  • Kolstad was meeting the children’s developmental needs and would continue to do so.
  • There was “little to no evidence” regarding Claussen’s ability to meet those needs.
  • Because of that lack of evidence, “one could argue” that factor (c) should favor Kolstad—and “taken by itself, the Court would agree and this factor would favor [Kolstad].”
  • However, the court then expressed it was “less confident in the weight that this factor should play” in determining primary residential responsibility.

The Supreme Court identifies two plausible readings of this discussion:

  1. Factor (c) actually favored Kolstad, but the court deemed it insufficient to alter the overall result.
    If that is what the district court meant, it needed to:
    • state plainly that factor (c) favored Kolstad; and
    • explain how it weighed that factor in the context of the totality of the factors.
    Simply stating that the court was “less confident in the weight” of factor (c), without explaining why, leaves the appellate court unable to review whether that weighting was reasonable and consistent with the evidence.
  2. Factor (c) ultimately was treated as neutral, favoring neither parent.
    If that is what the court meant, the Supreme Court found the explanation inadequate because:
    • the court acknowledged that the only evidence presented showed Kolstad meeting developmental needs;
    • there was “little to no evidence” of Claussen’s ability; yet
    • the court nonetheless treated the factor as neutral, without explaining why a lack of evidence about one parent’s ability did not tip the factor in favor of the other parent.

Either way, the findings did not satisfy the requirement that the court’s factual determinations be stated “with sufficient specificity” and that they “afford a clear understanding” of the reasoning.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

  • remanded for the district court to clarify whether factor (c) favors Kolstad or neither parent; and
  • required that, whichever conclusion is reached, the court must explain its reasoning, including:
    • if the factor is neutral, why the lack of evidence of Claussen’s ability does not tilt the factor toward Kolstad; and
    • if the factor favors Kolstad, why and how the overall residential responsibility award remains justified in light of that finding.

The Court thereby emphasizes that:

  • district courts need not mechanically award custody to the parent with the most factors in their favor; but
  • they must honestly and clearly state their factor-by-factor findings and then articulate how those findings interact to support the ultimate ruling.

3. Factor (j): Domestic Violence

The domestic violence issue was more complex, both factually and legally.

a. Evidence Presented

Kolstad testified that during her move in March 2024:

  • She attempted to enter Claussen’s bedroom as he was exiting.
  • He “slammed the door onto [her] leg,” causing bruising.
  • She introduced photographs of bruises; she testified that:
    • the photos showed bruises from two separate altercations; and
    • one specific photo (the fourth) depicted the bruise from the bedroom-door incident.

Claussen denied assaulting her and:

  • testified that he had never assaulted Kolstad; and
  • suggested the bruises likely came from his pickup’s running boards as she got into the truck.

The district court accepted that Kolstad was bruised but did not clearly state:

  • whether the bruising was intentionally inflicted by Claussen (domestic violence);
  • whether it resulted from an accident; or
  • whether it instead came from the running boards, as Claussen suggested.
b. District Court’s Ambiguous Finding

In its written discussion of factor (j), the district court:

  • acknowledged that the photographs showed bruising;
  • recognized that the situation was emotionally charged; and
  • stated that these circumstances “supports a finding of credibility in [Kolstad’s] accusation of the event.”

Yet it also stated that:

  • Claussen’s character, “as presented by his testimony and all the other evidence,” made “acceptance of this event as described by [Kolstad] more difficult to accept on the limited evidence presented.”
  • It concluded that the incident “[did] not rise to the requirement for finding a presumption under this factor,” and that “this factor favors neither parent.”

The Supreme Court saw two problems:

  1. Credibility was left unclear.
    The district court appeared to say both:
    • Kolstad’s evidence “supports a finding of credibility” in her accusation; and
    • the court found it “more difficult to accept” her description of the event due to Claussen’s character evidence.
    The opinion does not clarify whether the court ultimately accepted or rejected Kolstad’s version of events.
  2. The statutory framework under factor (j) was not fully and explicitly applied.
    The district court merely concluded that the “requirement for finding a presumption” was not met, without:
    • stating whether it found credible evidence of domestic violence at all; and
    • if it did, explaining whether the incident involved serious bodily injury, a dangerous weapon, or formed part of a pattern of violence, and why or why not.
c. Supreme Court’s Required Analytical Sequence

The Supreme Court uses this case to clarify the proper sequence under factor (j):

  1. Determine whether credible evidence of domestic violence exists.
    The court must make an explicit determination:
    • Does it believe that an act of domestic violence occurred based on credible evidence? If yes, it must say so; if no, it must say so.
  2. If credible domestic violence is found, determine whether one of the three statutory triggers for the presumption is present.
    • Did the incident cause serious bodily injury?
    • Did it involve a dangerous weapon?
    • Is it part of a pattern of domestic violence reasonably proximate to the proceeding?
  3. If credible evidence plus a trigger exists, apply the rebuttable presumption.
    • The court must then analyze whether the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the perpetrator’s custody is nonetheless in the child’s best interests.
    • Specific findings must show that the custody arrangement “best protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence.”
  4. If the presumption does not arise, domestic violence must still be weighed as a factor.
    • Even absent a presumption, any credible evidence of domestic violence must be taken into account under factor (j).
    • The court must then decide whether, in light of all the evidence, factor (j) favors one parent or neither, and explain why.

In Kolstad, the Supreme Court could not tell:

  • whether the evidence was found credible; and
  • whether (and how) the evidence was weighed beyond the threshold conclusion that no presumption arose.

Thus, it reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to:

  • clarify its findings on whether domestic violence occurred;
  • apply the statutory framework, including consideration of serious injury, dangerous weapon, or pattern;
  • if the presumption is triggered, determine whether it was rebutted; and
  • if not triggered, determine how the domestic violence evidence weighs factor (j), including whether it should favor one parent (presumably, if violence occurred, the non-perpetrating parent).

D. Legal Reasoning on Child Support

1. The Employment History and Income Shift

The record reflects that:

  • Claussen worked at Sundre Sand and Gravel during the relationship, earning $115,465 in 2023 as a plant operator, working 60–80 hours per week.
  • Around February 2024, near the time of the parties’ separation, Claussen left Sundre and went to work for Coteau Properties.
  • In September 2024, he returned to Sundre at a lower-paying, more regular-hours position earning $25 per hour.
  • The district court calculated his gross annual income at $60,288 for child support purposes, based on this new hourly rate and schedule.

Kolstad contended that this represented a voluntary reduction in income warranting imputation under N.D. Admin. Code § 75‑02‑04.1‑07(7).

2. Evidence of Claussen’s Reasons for Employment Changes

Claussen testified that:

  • he left Sundre for Coteau because the demanding schedule at Sundre (long hours, extensive travel) made it Harder to spend time with his family and to help Kolstad with the children;
  • he later returned to Sundre in a different, lower‑paying position with more stable hours so that he could:
    • care for his older child, A.D.C., for whom he has primary residential responsibility, including taking him to school; and
    • spend more time with his daughters.
  • his mother had temporarily altered her work schedule to help with childcare, but this was not a sustainable long‑term solution, motivating the job change.

His Sundre supervisor, Paul Severson, corroborated this:

  • Claussen originally left Sundre to “improve his lifestyle” and “have a little more time off” with his family.
  • When he returned, it was because Sundre’s new role offered more stable hours and no overnight shifts, enabling him to “be there with the kids.”
  • Severson also confirmed that when Claussen has his daughters, he works typical daytime hours (8:00–17:00/17:30), taking longer hours only when he does not have them.

The district court found that the change in employment “was made for good reason,” specifically that the prior job’s schedule and travel were “unworkable for parenting his children.”

3. Application of the Guidelines and Standard of Review

The Supreme Court noted that under § 75‑02‑04.1‑07(7):

  • a reduction in income is not automatically treated as voluntary for imputation purposes;
  • the determinative question is whether the change was made for the purpose of reducing child support;
  • the obligor has the burden of disproving such a purpose; and
  • the court must consider a range of factors, including family circumstances and likely employment if the family were intact.

Given the testimony from Claussen and Severson, and considering that Claussen already had primary residential responsibility for another child and needed to adjust his work to fulfill those obligations, the district court credited Claussen’s explanations as genuine and parenting‑motivated.

On appellate review, the Supreme Court:

  • emphasized its inability to reweigh the evidence or second‑guess the district court’s credibility determinations (Toppenberg);
  • found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the job changes were not made to reduce child support; and
  • held that the child support calculation therefore complied with the guidelines and was not clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the child support portion of the judgment.

IV. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Implications for North Dakota Trial Courts

Kolstad sends a clear message to trial judges: form matters in custody decisions. It underscores:

  • Findings must be explicit and internally consistent, particularly on:
    • factor (c) — developmental needs; and
    • factor (j) — domestic violence.
  • Ambiguity in whether a factor favors one parent or is neutral is not acceptable when that ambiguity prevents meaningful appellate review.
  • In domestic violence cases, perfunctory statements that “the presumption does not apply” are insufficient without:
    • a clear credibility finding;
    • an explanation of whether the statutory triggers are or are not met; and
    • a separate explanation of how the domestic violence evidence is weighed, even if no presumption arises.

Pragmatically, this decision will likely lead district courts to:

  • structure their written custody findings more carefully, using headings or specific subsections for each best-interest factor;
  • state plainly whether they credit or discredit conflicting testimony on sensitive issues like domestic violence; and
  • explicitly articulate how particular factor findings influenced the ultimate residential responsibility allocation.

B. Domestic Violence and Child Custody

Kolstad is especially significant in domestic violence jurisprudence:

  • It reinforces that domestic violence analysis is mandatory and structured, not discretionary or perfunctory.
  • It clarifies that:
    • first, the trial court must decide whether credible evidence of domestic violence exists; and
    • second, only then can it assess the presumption conditions (serious injury, dangerous weapon, or pattern) and apply or decline to apply the presumption.
  • It reiterates that even when the statutory presumption is not triggered, any credible domestic violence evidence must still be weighed as a factor and may tip factor (j) in favor of the non‑perpetrating parent.

For parties and counsel, this means:

  • Alleged victims should:
    • present detailed, corroborated evidence showing:
      • the nature and extent of injuries (to address “serious bodily injury”);
      • whether any object used may constitute a “dangerous weapon”; and
      • the existence of a pattern (multiple incidents, involving similar behavior, threats, or controlling conduct).
    • request explicit findings on:
      • whether the court finds domestic violence occurred;
      • whether the presumption arises; and
      • how the factor is weighed even without the presumption.
  • Alleged perpetrators should:
    • present alternative explanations for injuries or allegations, with supporting evidence;
    • highlight the absence of serious injury or pattern where applicable; and
    • ask the court to make explicit credibility findings and presumption analyses to avoid adverse inferences on appeal.

C. Developmental Needs and Evidence Presentation

The focus on factor (c) in Kolstad underscores that:

  • Parties must present specific evidence of each parent’s ability to meet children’s developmental needs — including emotional, educational, medical, and social aspects.
  • A lack of evidence about one parent’s ability may legitimately lead a court to find that the other parent is stronger on this factor.
  • District courts must then openly acknowledge and explain such disparities rather than glossing them over as “neutral” when the record is one‑sided.

In practical terms, counsel should ensure that:

  • witnesses (including teachers, daycare providers, therapists, etc.) and documentary evidence (school records, medical records) are used to demonstrate a parent’s insight into and support of the child’s developmental needs;
  • they do not assume generalized testimony about “being a good parent” suffices — specifics matter.

D. Job Changes, Parenting, and Child Support

The child support portion of Kolstad will likely be cited in future disputes over job changes. The case illustrates that:

  • Not every reduction in income by an obligor is treated as an attempt to evade child support. A parent may legitimately reduce income to:
    • take on greater parenting responsibilities;
    • obtain more regular hours to coordinate schooling and childcare; or
    • address other bona fide family-related constraints.
  • However, the obligor must meet the burden of proof by:
    • offering credible, detailed testimony about the reasons for the job change; and
    • ideally providing corroboration (e.g., employer testimony or documentation) showing that:
      • the new position has more favorable hours for parenting; or
      • the prior job’s demands were indeed inconsistent with child-care obligations.

For practitioners, Kolstad highlights the importance of:

  • carefully developing the factual record on the timing, motivation, and consequences of job changes; and
  • linking these changes explicitly to parenting responsibilities rather than merely to financial considerations.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Clearly Erroneous” Standard

When the Supreme Court reviews a trial court’s factual decisions, it uses the “clearly erroneous” standard. This means:

  • The appellate court will not reverse merely because it might have reached a different factual conclusion.
  • A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if:
    • the trial court applied the wrong legal rule;
    • there is no evidence to support the finding; or
    • after looking at all the evidence, the reviewing court is convinced a mistake was definitely made.
  • The appellate court defers heavily to the trial judge on matters of witness credibility and weight of evidence.

In Kolstad, this standard explains why the child support portion of the judgment was affirmed despite arguments that a different factfinder might have been more skeptical of Claussen’s motives for changing jobs.

2. Best-Interest Factors

North Dakota law sets out a list of factors the court must consider to decide what arrangement is in the “best interests” of the child. Each factor focuses on a different dimension of the child’s life, including:

  • emotional ties;
  • stability and continuity;
  • developmental needs (factor (c));
  • moral fitness;
  • mental and physical health; and
  • domestic violence (factor (j)), among others.

The court does not simply count how many factors each parent “wins.” Instead, it:

  • evaluates each factor’s relevance and weight in the particular case; and
  • then makes a holistic decision on custody or residential responsibility.

3. Domestic Violence Presumption

The law imposes an extra layer of protection in cases involving domestic violence:

  • If the court finds that domestic violence occurred and:
    • the violence caused serious bodily injury, or
    • involved a dangerous weapon, or
    • was part of a pattern close in time to the custody case,
    then:
    • a presumption arises that the perpetrator may not receive residential responsibility; and
    • the presumption can be overcome only with very strong evidence (“clear and convincing”) that custody with that parent is still best for the child.
  • Even if the presumption is not triggered, the domestic violence still counts as a negative factor against the perpetrator in the custody analysis.

The key contribution of Kolstad is its insistence that trial courts walk through this analysis explicitly on the record.

4. Voluntary vs. Involuntary Job Changes in Child Support

In child support cases, an obligor’s income is usually based on current actual earnings. But if the court finds that the obligor intentionally took a lower-paying job or became unemployed for the purpose of reducing child support, it can “impute” income based on prior earnings or earning capacity.

Key points:

  • “Voluntary” in this context does not simply mean any job change chosen by the obligor. It specifically means a change made to avoid or reduce child support.
  • A job change for legitimate reasons — health issues, caring for children, unavoidable layoffs, etc. — will usually not justify imputation.
  • The obligor has the burden to show that the new job was taken for legitimate reasons rather than to escape support.

In Kolstad, Claussen carried this burden by showing that his job change was designed to make his work schedule compatible with his parenting responsibilities.

VI. Conclusion

Kolstad v. Claussen, 2025 ND 213, deepens a consistent trend in North Dakota family law: appellate insistence on clear, specific, and reasoned findings in child custody and domestic violence contexts. The decision:

  • reaffirms that residential responsibility decisions are factual and reviewed for clear error, but those findings must be articulated with sufficient clarity to permit review;
  • requires district courts to:
    • state whether best-interest factor (c) favors one parent or is neutral; and
    • explicitly apply N.D.C.C. § 14‑09‑06.2(1)(j) by determining whether credible domestic violence occurred, whether statutory presumption triggers are met, whether the presumption is rebutted, and how the evidence is weighed even absent the presumption;
  • clarifies that legitimate, parenting-driven job changes will not automatically lead to income imputation under the child support guidelines if the obligor can carry the burden of showing the change was not made to reduce support.

For practitioners and trial judges alike, Kolstad is a touchstone for:

  • structuring best-interest findings with sufficient detail and internal coherence;
  • handling domestic violence allegations rigorously and transparently; and
  • properly evaluating employment changes in the child support context.

While the Supreme Court did not itself reassign residential responsibility, its remand commands a fuller and more transparent articulation of the trial court’s reasoning — ensuring that, whatever the eventual outcome, it is grounded in a careful, legally sound analysis of both children’s developmental needs and any credible evidence of domestic violence.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota

Judge(s)

Tufte, Jerod E.

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