Knowledge of Suit vs. Notice of Service: Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Craddock’s First Element in Default Divorce Cases

I. Introduction

In Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, the Supreme Court of Texas revisits the familiar but frequently contested terrain of setting aside default judgments under the Craddock doctrine. The case arises from a default divorce decree entered after alternative service was authorized and executed by posting process on the door of the wife’s temporary residence. The trial court denied the wife’s motion for new trial under Craddock, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding she had acted with “conscious indifference” by not answering despite knowing about the divorce suit and attempted service.

The Supreme Court reverses, holding that:

• An excuse that the defendant never received the citation—even when alternative service was properly carried out—can satisfy the first Craddock element if supported by some explanation.
• Mere awareness of the existence of a lawsuit is legally distinct from notice that service of citation has been effected, and the latter is what matters for assessing conscious indifference.
• The wife in this case satisfied all three Craddock elements and was entitled to a new trial.

This opinion is significant for Texas civil practice generally and family law specifically. It clarifies how courts must treat alternative service and actual notice when applying Craddock, reinforces the strong presumption against default judgments, and lowers the practical evidentiary burden on defendants who plausibly contend they never received posted citation.

II. Case Background

Jenna and Gary Tabakman were married for thirteen years and had one child. After what Jenna described as mistreatment by Gary, she left the marital home and moved in with her parents. Gary promptly filed for divorce and told Jenna that he had done so. Jenna, lacking funds for counsel and afraid, testified that she believed she would be personally served with “divorce papers” and that she and her father simply waited for that to occur.

Multiple attempts at personal service failed. The trial court then authorized alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). A process server posted the citation, petition, and the alternative-service order on the front door of the parents’ home. No answer was filed, and Gary moved for a default judgment. After a hearing, the trial judge orally rendered a default divorce.

Unaware of the hearing or the oral rendition, Jenna consulted an attorney after Gary allegedly warned her he intended to leave with their child and the family dog. Within three weeks of the hearing—and before the judge signed the written default decree—her lawyer filed both:

• an answer, and
• a motion for new trial under Craddock.

Days later, the trial court nonetheless signed the default final decree of divorce. In a later evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the court:

• found that Jenna had established a meritorious defense, but
• concluded she was consciously indifferent in failing to answer, and
• held she failed to show that granting a new trial would not harm or injure Gary.

The court of appeals affirmed, focusing exclusively on the first Craddock element and holding that Jenna’s claim of non-receipt of service, despite knowing of the lawsuit and service attempts, did not negate conscious indifference. It reasoned that conflicts in evidence about her awareness of the proceeding allowed the trial court to rule against her.

The Supreme Court grants review, reverses, and remands for a new trial.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Court (per curiam) holds:

1. First Craddock element – no intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer.
   Jenna’s excuse—that she believed she would be personally served, did not avoid service, never received the citation posted on the door, and quickly answered once she learned of the default—if true negates intentional or consciously indifferent conduct. The Court stresses:
   • Conscious indifference means: knowing you have been sued and not caring enough to respond.
   • A mistake of law about service can qualify as a valid excuse.
   • Not receiving suit papers, especially under alternative service, can be a sufficient excuse if supported by some explanation.
   • Evidence that alternative service was properly executed does not controvert testimony that the defendant never actually received the citation.
2. Second Craddock element – meritorious defense.
   Jenna adequately “set up” a meritorious defense by asserting, with supporting testimony and documentation, a reimbursement/separate-property claim concerning the funds used as a down payment on the marital home. She was not required at this stage to conclusively overcome the community-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
3. Third Craddock element – no undue delay or injury.
   Jenna alleged no undue delay or injury, expressed readiness for trial, and agreed to pay Gary’s reasonable costs associated with securing the default judgment, including potentially his fees relating to the new-trial motion. That shifted the burden to Gary to show specific prejudice to his ability to present his case at a new trial. His assertions of financial costs and strain on the child were too general and not tied to any impairment of his presentation at trial. The Court finds the third element satisfied.

Accordingly, the Court reverses the court of appeals and remands to the trial court for a new trial on all issues, without oral argument (Tex. R. App. P. 59.1).

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. The Craddock Framework

The governing doctrine comes from Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939), and its long line of progeny. Craddock provides that a default judgment must be set aside and a new trial granted when the defendant shows:

1. the failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to accident or mistake;
2. a meritorious defense; and
3. that a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

The Court reiterates the modern formulation from In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114–15 (Tex. 2006), and In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022), and emphasizes that when all three elements are met, a new trial must be granted.

2. Disfavoring Default Judgments – In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC

A major policy backdrop is In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024). The Court quotes Lakeside extensively to stress:

• Default judgments are “greatly disfavored.”
• Texas has a strong policy preference for resolving disputes on the merits through an “adversarial clash” of evidence and ideas.
• Ex parte proceedings raise fairness and integrity concerns and risk erroneous judgments enforced by the coercive power of the state.
• Defendants cannot simply avoid courts by refusing to appear, but any doubts about a default judgment—not just service questions—must be resolved against the party who obtained the default.

Tabakman operationalizes this policy by applying it directly within the Craddock analysis, reminding lower courts to err on the side of granting a new trial where reasonable doubts exist about the defendant’s actual notice and intent.

3. Conscious Indifference and “Some Excuse” – Smith, Sutherland, Milestone, and Fidelity & Guaranty

Several prior decisions shape the Court’s understanding of “conscious indifference”:

• Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995): Conscious indifference is more than mere negligence; a deliberate failure to answer is not automatically “intentional” in the Craddock sense.
• Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006): The critical inquiry is “Why did the defendant not appear?”. When the honest answer is “I did not get the suit papers,” the default “generally must be set aside,” assuming some explanation from those most likely to have seen the papers or looked for them.
• Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012): The controlling fact is the absence of an intentional failure to answer, not the presence of a strong or “good” excuse.
• Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012): Forgetting about a citation buried in a stack of papers during a holiday period was sufficient—“some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” will usually suffice to negate conscious indifference.

Tabakman extends this line of authority to the context of alternative service, holding that non-receipt of papers posted under Rule 106(b) may be a sufficient excuse when supported by testimony from those most likely to have seen them (e.g., the defendant and a parent with knowledge of who comes to the house and what is brought inside).

4. Mistake of Law as an Excuse – Bank One v. Moody

The Court cites Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992), for the proposition that even a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element. In Tabakman, this supports Jenna’s belief (incorrect as a matter of law) that she would necessarily be served personally with divorce papers. Although alternative methods are authorized by Rule 106(b), her misunderstanding—combined with her non-avoidance of service and lack of actual receipt—falls within the ambit of a non-indifferent mistake.

5. The Distinction Between Lawsuit and Citation – Sierra Club and Wilson

A key doctrinal move is the Court’s insistence on differentiating:

• knowledge that a lawsuit has been filed, from
• actual notice that a citation has been served (i.e., that the defendant is officially required to answer or risk default).

Two precedents anchor this:

• Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002): A lawsuit begins with the filing of a petition (Tex. R. Civ. P. 22), but a citation is a document directed to the defendant, informing them they have been sued and commanding them to appear and answer. The citation also warns of potential default (Rule 99(c)).
• Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990): Absent valid service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit imposes no duty on the defendant to respond.

The court of appeals blurred these categories by treating Jenna’s awareness of the divorce lawsuit and of efforts by a process server as if they imposed a duty to answer, even though Jenna claimed never to have received the citation posted on the door. The Supreme Court expressly corrects this approach, holding that:

“[N]ot receiving the citation and being unaware of its service generally suffices to excuse a failure to answer before judgment, even if the defendant is aware of the lawsuit.”

6. Alternative Service and Actual Notice – State Farm, Cliff, Red Bluff

The opinion clarifies the evidentiary consequences of alternative service:

• State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993): Alternative service provides proof of how and when service was executed but is “no evidence in the record of when defendant received actual notice.” The Tabakman Court reiterates this logic. A return of service showing that a citation was posted on a door proves compliance with Rule 106(b); it does not prove the defendant actually saw the document.
• Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987): Notices served under Rule 21a carry a presumption of receipt, but that presumption is not evidence and vanishes when there is contrary evidence of non-receipt. The Court uses this analogy to stress that inferences drawn from constructive notice cannot override concrete testimony of non-receipt.
• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025): Although decided in a different context (notice of judgment under Rule 306a), it underscores the legal distinction between actual and constructive knowledge.

Taken together, these cases support the Court’s conclusion that Gary’s evidence of proper alternative service did not “controvert” Jenna’s testimony that she never received or saw the posted citation and that no one in the household brought it to her attention.

7. Meritorious Defense & No Injury – Dolgencorp, Evans, Sandoval

For the second and third Craddock elements, the leading authority is Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009). Dolgencorp holds:

• To “set up” a meritorious defense, the defendant must allege facts that would, if true, constitute a legal defense and support them with affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof.
• Once the defendant alleges that granting a new trial will not delay the case or injure the plaintiff and offers to reimburse costs, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate specific injury.

The Court also cites:

• Dir., State Emps. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994): General claims of harm or financial cost are insufficient to defeat the third element without showing that the new trial would impair the plaintiff’s ability to present the merits of the case.
• In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021): In Sandoval, the Court held that allowing a party to raise separate-property claims post-decree does not disturb the underlying divorce, custody, and support determinations. Tabakman uses Sandoval mainly to illustrate that adjudicating separate-property issues does not necessarily “injure” the opposing party in the sense relevant for the third Craddock prong.

Applied here, these authorities support the Court’s conclusions that:

• Jenna’s reimbursement/separate-property claim, supported by testimony and documents, was enough to “set up” a meritorious defense, even if Gary’s contrary evidence might prevail at trial.
• Gary’s broad assertions of financial cost and emotional “strain” on the child did not show the sort of litigation prejudice that would defeat the no-injury requirement.

8. Judicial Economy and Selective Issue Resolution – Walker and the Service Challenge

Jenna also challenged the validity of service itself. Both the trial court and court of appeals had held service was proper under Rule 106(b). The Supreme Court notes:

• It has reviewed the record and sees no reversible error on the service-validity question; and
• Further discussion of service would not meaningfully advance the state’s jurisprudence.

Citing Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024), the Court invokes its discretion as “stewards of scarce judicial resources” to decline extended discussion of issues not essential to the disposition. Instead, it decides the case fully on Craddock grounds, a choice that also demonstrates the breadth of equitable relief available even when service is technically valid.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Reframing the First Craddock Element: “Why Did She Not Appear?”

The Court begins with the overarching Fidelity & Guaranty question: Why did the defendant not appear? For Jenna, the answer is:

• She believed she would be personally served (a mistaken but sincere belief).
• She did not attempt to evade service.
• She never saw any citation or lawsuit papers posted on the door.
• Neither she nor her father received or were informed of those documents.
• Upon learning that a default judgment had been orally rendered, she swiftly retained counsel and filed an answer before the written decree was signed.

Under the Court’s precedents, this narrative, if true, negates an inference that she “knew she had been sued and did not care.” The analysis proceeds on two key axes: (1) the adequacy of her excuse, and (2) whether Gary controverted it.

2. Adequacy of the Excuse: Mistake, Non-Receipt, and Prompt Action

The Court stresses several elements that make Jenna’s excuse credible and legally sufficient:

• Mistake of law regarding type of service: Believing that “divorce papers” must be personally served is erroneous but falls squarely within the category of excusable mistake recognized in Bank One v. Moody.
• Evidence that she did not evade service: Jenna described no attempts to hide or refuse service, and her testimony about the single contact between the process server and her mother supports that she was not avoiding contact.
• Non-receipt of the posted citation: Jenna testifies that she never saw any documents posted on the door. Her father corroborates this with detailed testimony about ongoing construction, the role of the community security guard in admitting visitors, and his never receiving notices or documents from workers or security that day.
• Prompt reaction once aware of the default: After Gary allegedly threatened to leave with their child and pet, she quickly retained counsel; within about three weeks of the oral rendition, her lawyer had filed both an answer and a Craddock motion, and did so before the judgment was signed.

These facts fit comfortably within the “some excuse, though not necessarily a good one” standard. The Court analogizes to prior cases in which misplacement of papers or forgetfulness sufficed. Here, non-receipt under alternative service is at least as understandable as misplacing personally delivered papers.

3. Why Alternative Service Does Not Defeat Craddock Relief

The central doctrinal move is rejecting the notion that a properly executed alternative-service return inherently undercuts a defendant’s claim of non-receipt.

Rule 106(b) exists precisely because actual personal notice is sometimes impractical or impossible. As Costley teaches, alternative service establishes constructive notice and supports the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, but does not prove that the defendant actually saw the citation. Thus:

• A valid alternative-service order and return ensure procedural regularity and due process from a formal standpoint.
• They do not disprove, as a factual matter, a defendant’s contention that the posted papers never came to her attention.

For Craddock purposes, what matters is not simply whether service was legally sufficient to support a judgment, but whether the defendant’s failure to answer was the product of conscious indifference. That inquiry focuses on actual notice, not legal sufficiency. Hence, the process server’s testimony that she posted the citation and never saw Jenna does not contradict Jenna’s assertion that she never received the citation.

4. Distinguishing Knowledge of a Lawsuit from Notice of Citation

The court of appeals effectively reasoned: “Jenna knew about the divorce and about attempts at service, so her failure to answer must have been consciously indifferent.” The Supreme Court rejects this syllogism, relying on Wilson v. Dunn and Sierra Club to draw a bright line between:

• Knowledge of the suit’s existence (Jenna knew Gary had filed), and
• Receipt of the citation commanding an answer on pain of default.

Without service, waiver, or citation, a defendant has no legal duty to act. More importantly, for Craddock analysis, one cannot infer that a defendant “did not care” about the lawsuit merely because she did not respond before being told she must. Tabakman thus instructs lower courts not to conflate awareness of litigation with proof of conscious indifference to the formal duty to answer.

5. Meritorious Defense: A Prima Facie Standard, Not a Mini-Trial

On the second Craddock element, the trial court had already found that Jenna established a meritorious defense; the court of appeals did not disturb that finding. The Supreme Court nevertheless revisits it briefly, both to confirm it and to caution against overloading the meritorious-defense inquiry.

Jenna advanced, among other defenses, a reimbursement/separate-property claim regarding the funds used as a down payment on the marital residence. She supported this with testimony and supporting documents. Gary responded that she had not overcome the statutory presumption that property possessed during marriage is community property, which requires clear and convincing evidence (Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003).

The Court’s response is twofold:

• At the Craddock stage, the defendant’s task is only to “set up” a meritorious defense—that is, to provide prima facie support for a legally viable position. She need not prove it by the standard that would govern at trial.
• Whether she ultimately meets the community-property burden is a matter for trial, not a basis to deny a new trial.

This is a reminder that Craddock “mini-trials” on the merits are improper; the court need only be satisfied that the defendant has a non-frivolous defense with some evidentiary support.

6. No Undue Delay or Injury: Shifting the Burden

For the third Craddock element, Jenna alleged that:

• Granting a new trial would not cause delay or harm to Gary.
• She was ready to go to trial.
• She was willing to pay Gary’s reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred to obtain the default and to litigate the new-trial motion, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

Under Dolgencorp, this showing shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove that a new trial will cause real prejudice to his ability to present the case. Gary testified about:

• Financial costs associated with managing community assets and selling the marital home; and
• Potential strain on their child if the custody and possession orders in the default decree were undone.

The Court, citing Evans, holds this is not enough: general financial harm or emotional strain, without a showing that a new trial will impair his ability to fully and fairly litigate the merits, does not establish “injury” under Craddock. The Court also notes that, as in Sandoval, adjudicating separate-property claims does not inherently disrupt the broader structure of the divorce and custody arrangement in a manner that precludes a new trial.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Strengthening Relief from Defaults After Alternative Service

The most immediate impact of Tabakman is on cases involving alternative service by posting (or similar methods). The opinion makes clear:

• A properly executed alternative-service order and return will usually establish jurisdiction and validate the default judgment on its face.
• Yet defendants may still obtain equitable relief under Craddock by showing they never actually received the posted papers, supported by some explanation.
• The plaintiff cannot defeat such a showing merely by pointing to the return of alternative service; they must present genuine evidence that the defendant actually received notice of the citation or knowingly ignored it.

This is likely to increase the frequency with which default judgments based on alternative service are set aside, particularly where:

• the defendant provides credible testimony regarding non-receipt; and
• others in the household or with knowledge of the property corroborate that they never saw or received the notice.

2. Clarifying the Role of Constructive Notice in Craddock Analysis

A broader doctrinal contribution is the Court’s clear separation between:

• Constructive notice sufficient for jurisdiction and validity (e.g., proper alternative service, mailing under Rule 21a), and
• Actual notice relevant to equitable relief from default (e.g., whether the defendant actually saw the papers and deliberately chose not to respond).

By emphasizing that constructive notice alone does not controvert a sworn denial of actual receipt, the Court refocuses the first Craddock element on the defendant’s subjective awareness and state of mind. This will shape how trial courts resolve conflicts between formal proof of service and factual claims of non-receipt.

3. Reaffirming the Merits-Focused Policy Against Defaults

Building on In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, the Court reinforces that:

• Default judgments are exceptional and disfavored.
• Any doubts—whether about service, notice, or state of mind—should be resolved against the party who obtained the default.
• The system’s interest in accurate, adversarial adjudication generally outweighs efficiency concerns in maintaining an uncontested default.

This signals to trial courts that narrowly reading defendants’ excuses for failing to answer, particularly in emotionally fraught contexts like divorce and child custody, risks reversal. The Court is instructing judges to err on the side of allowing cases to be fully heard.

4. Practical Effects in Family Law Litigation

In the family law context, especially where resource and power imbalances are common, Tabakman has several implications:

• For petitioners (e.g., filing spouses):
  • Even when alternative service is obtained and strictly followed, there is a meaningful risk that a default decree will later be set aside if the other spouse credibly claims non-receipt and promptly seeks relief.
  • Counsel would be prudent to consider additional steps (such as informal notice, follow-up communications, or confirmations of receipt) to reduce the likelihood of a successful Craddock challenge.
• For respondents (e.g., absent spouses):
  • The opinion lowers the practical barrier to setting aside default divorces where they truly did not receive the papers, especially in alternative-service scenarios.
  • Respondents must still act quickly upon learning of a default and be prepared to provide specific testimony (and, where possible, corroboration) about non-receipt and their diligence.

Additionally, the Court’s treatment of the reimbursement/separate-property issue confirms that property-division defenses, even when complex and fact-intensive, qualify as “meritorious defenses” for Craddock purposes and justify reopening default divorces.

5. Guidance on Litigating Craddock Motions

Tabakman offers practical guidance for both sides in future Craddock hearings:

• Defendants should:
  • Clearly explain why they did not answer (not just that they were unaware of the judgment).
  • Provide testimony from the person(s) most likely to have handled, seen, or received the suit papers.
  • Describe living arrangements, security procedures, or unusual circumstances (like construction) that plausibly explain non-receipt.
  • Quickly file a motion for new trial when they learn of the default, attach supporting evidence, and explicitly allege no delay or injury with an offer to pay reasonable costs.
• Plaintiffs should:
  • Recognize that merely introducing the return of service will not generally suffice to controvert an excuse of non-receipt.
  • Consider offering evidence that the defendant in fact became aware of the citation (e.g., statements, conduct, or admissions showing they knew they were required to answer and chose not to).
  • On the third element, be prepared to demonstrate specific litigation prejudice (e.g., loss of evidence, unavailability of key witnesses, or irreversible reliance interests), not merely costs or inconvenience.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Default Judgment

A default judgment is a court ruling in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant fails to file an answer or otherwise appear by the deadline stated in the citation. It is not based on a full adversarial trial; instead, it is entered because the defendant did not participate.

2. The Craddock Test

The Craddock test is an equitable rule that allows a defendant to ask the court to set aside a default judgment and grant a new trial. The defendant must show:

1. They did not deliberately ignore the lawsuit; their failure to answer was due to accident, mistake, or misunderstanding.
2. They have at least one plausible legal defense, supported by some evidence.
3. Reopening the case will not unfairly harm the plaintiff or cause undue delay.

If these elements are met, the court must grant a new trial, even if service was technically proper and the judgment valid on its face.

3. Conscious Indifference

“Conscious indifference” means more than carelessness. In this context, it essentially means knowing you have been officially required to respond to a lawsuit and choosing not to care enough to act. If the defendant reasonably did not believe they had to answer yet (for example, because they never saw the citation), they are generally not consciously indifferent.

4. Alternative Service (Rule 106(b))

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b), a court can authorize alternative service when traditional personal service is unsuccessful. Common methods include:

• posting the documents at the defendant’s usual place of abode; or
• other methods likely to give the defendant notice (e.g., leaving papers with someone else, sometimes electronic methods when authorized).

Alternative service is enough to make the judgment legally valid, but it does not guarantee that the defendant actually saw the papers. That distinction is crucial in Craddock analysis.

5. Citation vs. Petition

The petition is the document the plaintiff files to start the lawsuit and to state their claims. The citation is a document issued by the clerk and directed to the defendant, telling them that:

• they have been sued,
• they must file a written answer by a specific deadline, and
• if they do not, a default judgment may be entered against them.

Knowing that a lawsuit has been filed is not the same as receiving the citation and its warning. Tabakman places heavy weight on this distinction.

6. Meritorious Defense and Prima Facie Proof

To show a meritorious defense, the defendant:

• does not have to prove they will win at trial, but
• must outline a legally valid defense and provide enough evidence (called prima facie evidence) that, if believed, would support that defense.

In this case, Jenna’s claim that the down payment was funded by her separate property and that the community estate owed her reimbursement is such a defense.

7. Undue Delay or Injury

The third Craddock element focuses on whether reopening the case would:

• substantially delay the resolution, or
• cause unfair prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present their case (for example, evidence might be lost, or key witnesses unavailable).

General complaints about cost, time, or the inconvenience of another trial are usually not enough. The harm must affect the fairness of the litigation itself.

VI. Conclusion

Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman is a significant addition to Texas law on default judgments and the Craddock doctrine. The Supreme Court:

• reaffirms that default judgments are strongly disfavored, and all doubts about them must be resolved against the party who obtained the default;
• clarifies that knowledge of a lawsuit is not equivalent to notice that citation has been served and does not, by itself, negate a defendant’s Craddock excuse;
• holds that properly executed alternative service does not, by itself, controvert a defendant’s sworn claim that they never actually received or saw the posted citation;
• confirms that a modest evidentiary showing is sufficient to “set up” a meritorious defense and satisfy the no-injury element; and
• demonstrates the Court’s willingness to grant relief from default judgments even where service is formally valid, in the name of robust, adversarial resolution on the merits.

By sharpening the distinction between constructive and actual notice, and by insisting on a humane, policy-conscious reading of “conscious indifference,” Tabakman will guide lower courts toward more generous use of equitable relief in default situations. In family law and beyond, it tilts Texas practice further toward ensuring that, wherever reasonably possible, rights and obligations are determined after both sides have been heard.