Knowledge of a Lawsuit Without Actual Notice of Citation Negates Conscious Indifference Under Craddock:
A Commentary on Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, Supreme Court of Texas (Dec. 5, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam opinion in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919 (Tex. Dec. 5, 2025), is a significant contribution to Texas law governing default judgments and motions for new trial under the venerable Craddock doctrine. The case lies at the intersection of three recurring themes:

The strong Texas policy disfavoring default judgments and favoring adjudication on the merits;
The increasingly common use of alternative service of citation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b); and
The standards for setting aside no‑answer default divorce decrees under the three‑part test of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939).

The Court clarifies a critical point: a defendant’s knowledge that a lawsuit has been filed is not the same as actual notice that she has been served with citation, and the former alone does not defeat a Craddock motion. Where a defendant credibly asserts that she never received the citation—even if alternative service was properly carried out—and promptly appears when she learns of the default, the first Craddock element is satisfied unless the plaintiff adduces actual contrary evidence.

This opinion sharpens the doctrinal line between:

proper execution of service (constructive notice), and
proof that the defendant actually knew about the citation and the risk of default (actual notice).

In doing so, the Court extends prior “lost citation” and “misplaced papers” precedents and aligns Craddock practice with its recent, strong admonitions in In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024), that doubts about default judgments must be resolved against the party who obtained them.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

Jenna and Gary Tabakman were married for thirteen years and had one child. After alleged mistreatment, Jenna left the marital home and moved in with her parents. The same month, Gary filed for divorce and told Jenna that he had done so.

Key factual points from the opinion:

Jenna testified she was scared, lacked money for an attorney, and believed she would be served in person with divorce papers.
Her father corroborated that they were “waiting for service of process.”
After “months of multiple unsuccessful service attempts,” the trial court authorized alternative service under Rule 106(b).
The process server then posted the citation, petition, and alternative‑service order on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ house.
No answer was filed; Gary moved for a default judgment, and the trial judge orally rendered a default divorce.

Around the same time as the oral rendition, Jenna, allegedly prompted by Gary’s threat to abscond with the child and dog, contacted a lawyer. Within three weeks, her counsel:

filed an answer, and
filed a motion for new trial under Craddock.

Despite that appearance, the trial court signed a written Default Final Decree of Divorce a few days later. Jenna did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s act of signing a default decree after she had appeared, and the Supreme Court notes that this issue was not before it.

B. Trial Court Proceedings on the New Trial Motion

At a later evidentiary hearing on Jenna’s motion for new trial:

The trial court found that Jenna had “set up a meritorious defense” (second Craddock element).
But it also held that:
- Jenna was “consciously indifferent” in failing to answer (first element), and
- She failed to show that a new trial would not harm or injure Gary (third element).

The court further found that Jenna had been properly served by alternative service. On appeal, Jenna challenged the adequacy of service, but the Supreme Court ultimately declined to disturb the lower courts’ service ruling, finding no reversible error and invoking its discretion not to write further on that point (citing Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024)).

C. Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Houston) affirmed. It addressed only the first Craddock element, concluding that Jenna:

knew about the lawsuit and service attempts, and
offered an “insufficient” excuse for not answering, namely that she did not know she had been served via posting and “did not take steps to avoid service.”

Given Gary’s testimony that he had informed Jenna about the divorce and the process server, the court of appeals treated the dispute as a credibility issue. It reasoned that because Jenna’s factual assertions were “controverted,” the trial court was free to resolve conflicts against her and deny a new trial.

D. Issues in the Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court of Texas, Jenna sought review on:

Whether she satisfied the first Craddock element—i.e., that her failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to mistake or accident;
Whether she had set up a meritorious defense (second element); and
Whether she showed that granting a new trial would not result in undue delay or injury to Gary (third element).

The Court granted review, reversed the court of appeals, and itself applied all three Craddock elements, remanding to the trial court for a new trial.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court’s key holdings are:

First Craddock element (no intent or conscious indifference):
- Jenna’s explanation—that she believed she would be personally served, did not avoid service, never saw the citation posted on the door, and promptly acted when she learned of the default—if true, negates intent or conscious indifference.
- Her excuse is supported by her father’s corroborating testimony about the house, construction, and the security guard’s usual practice.
- Gary’s evidence that alternative service was properly executed does not controvert Jenna’s claim that she never actually received the citation; alternative service establishes how and when service was attempted, but not when the defendant received actual notice.
- Thus, Jenna satisfied the first Craddock element as a matter of law.
Second element (meritorious defense):
- Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense by asserting, and supporting, a reimbursement claim for separate property (funds used as a down payment on the marital home).
- At the Craddock stage she need only present a prima facie defense, not prove it by clear and convincing evidence; Gary’s controverting evidence does not defeat her showing.
Third element (no undue delay or injury):
- Jenna alleged no undue delay or injury, stated she was ready for trial, and offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default and litigating the new‑trial motion.
- This shifted the burden to Gary, who alleged general financial harm and “strain” on their child but did not show how a new trial would prejudice his ability to present his case on the merits.
- Under Evans and Dolgencorp v. Lerma, such general assertions of harm are insufficient; thus Jenna met the third element.

The Court emphasizes, in line with In re Lakeside Resort, that:

“Any doubts about a default judgment—not just doubts about service—must be resolved against the party who secured the default.”

Accordingly, the Court reverses the court of appeals and orders a new trial.

IV. Legal Framework and Key Doctrines

A. Default Judgments and Texas Policy

The Court grounds its analysis in a strong, reiterated policy: default judgments are “greatly disfavored” in Texas. As restated from In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC:

Adjudications after an “adversarial clash” of both parties promote accuracy and fairness.
Ex parte proceedings raise risks of unfairness, erroneous judgments, and threats to judicial integrity because such judgments are “backed by the coercive power of the State.”
Courts “merely tolerate” default judgments so that defendants cannot defeat jurisdiction simply by refusing to appear.

From this policy, the Court draws a strong interpretive rule:

“Any doubts about a default judgment—not just doubts about service—must be resolved against the party who secured the default.”

This principle frames the Court’s generous application of Craddock.

B. The Craddock Test

Under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., and later decisions such as In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006), a defendant seeking to set aside a no‑answer default judgment must show:

The failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to a mistake or accident;
The defendant “sets up” a meritorious defense; and
The motion is filed at a time and under circumstances such that granting a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

If these three elements are satisfied, Craddock requires that a new trial be granted. Even if not satisfied, the trial court still retains broad authority under Rule 320 to grant a new trial for “good cause,” especially in the default‑judgment context.

C. Service of Citation and Alternative Service

Texas law distinguishes:

Filing of the petition: This commences a lawsuit (Rule 22).
Service of citation: A citation is a formal command to the defendant to appear and answer, warning that a default may be taken for failure to respond (Rule 99(c); Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002)).

Rule 106(b) allows a trial court to authorize alternative service—such as posting on the door—when personal service is impracticable. But as State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993) teaches, alternative service proves only how and when service was executed; it is “no evidence” of when the defendant actually received notice.

Crucially, under Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990):

“Absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.”

Thus, even if a defendant knows that a lawsuit has been filed, she has no obligation to answer until she has been formally served (or waives service).

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. The Craddock Line: Intent, Negligence, and “Some Excuse”

Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939).
Established the three‑part equitable test for setting aside no‑answer defaults, balancing fairness with finality.
Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995).
Clarified that:
- A failure to answer is not “intentional” merely because the act (or omission) is deliberate; and
- “Conscious indifference” is more than mere negligence.
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006).
Refined the first Craddock element:
- The key question is “Why did the defendant not appear?”
- “Intent” or “conscious indifference” in this context means the defendant “knew it was sued but did not care.”
- A defendant who credibly says “I didn’t get the suit papers” generally satisfies the first element, especially in “lost citation” scenarios.
Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012).
Held that an excuse such as leaving the citation in a stack of papers and forgetting it—while perhaps negligent—still negates conscious indifference when supported by explanation. It reinforces that “some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” can suffice.
Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012).
Stressed that the controlling fact is the absence of an intentional failure to answer rather than the quality (“goodness”) of the excuse.
Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992).
Confirmed that even a mistake of law—if genuine—can satisfy the first Craddock element.
In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006).
Clarified the evidentiary standard:
- A defendant meets the first element when her factual assertions:
  1. if true, negate intent or conscious indifference; and
  2. are not controverted by the plaintiff.
- Also held that misunderstanding a citation after actual service and then doing nothing is insufficient.

Tabakman slots squarely into this line, but in the specific context of alternative service and disputed actual notice.

B. Policy Against Defaults: In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC

In In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024), the Court:

Described default judgments as “greatly disfavor[ed]” and fundamentally different from other judgments;
Emphasized the systemic value of “adversarial clash” for truth‑finding; and
Announced that any doubts about a default judgment must be resolved against the party who obtained it, not just doubts regarding service.

Tabakman applies this policy directive aggressively in the Craddock context, reinforcing a trend toward liberally granting new trials where a plausible excuse and defense are shown.

C. Service and Notice Cases: Constructive vs. Actual Knowledge

Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002).
Defined a “citation” as a document directed to the defendant that:
- tells the defendant he or she has been sued, and
- commands the defendant to appear and answer.
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990).
Held that mere knowledge of a pending suit is not enough; absent proper service (or waiver), a defendant has no duty to respond.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993).
Addressed alternative service, highlighting that proof of alternative service shows when and how service was performed but is not evidence of when the defendant actually received notice.
Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987).
In the Rule 21a context (service of notices), recognized a rebuttable presumption of receipt that disappears when the addressee testifies to non‑receipt; the presumption is not evidence and “vanishes” upon contrary proof.
Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025).
Cited for distinguishing actual knowledge from constructive knowledge in the context of Rule 306a’s deadline‑extension mechanism (notice of judgment). The reference underscores the Court’s broader jurisprudential sensitivity to the distinction between “legal/constructive” and “actual” notice.
Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006).
In addition to its Craddock role, the case is a template for “I didn’t get the papers” scenarios—here invoked to analogize non‑receipt in the alternative‑service context to lost-citation cases.

D. Meritorious Defense and Injury Cases

Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009).
Clarified two key points:
- “Setting up” a meritorious defense means alleging facts which, if true, constitute a defense in law, supported by affidavits or other prima facie evidence; the defendant need not fully prove the defense.
- For the third element, a defendant’s sworn assertion of no delay or injury, coupled with willingness to proceed to trial and compensate for default‑related costs, shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show specific injury.
Dir., State Emps. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994).
Held that general claims of financial difficulty or burden are not enough. The injury must relate to the plaintiff’s ability to present his case on the merits at the new trial.
In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021).
In a divorce context, recognized that allowing a new trial to litigate a separate‑property claim does not “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of community assets” and therefore does not, by itself, establish injury.

E. Judicial Resource Stewardship: Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp.

The Court cites Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024) for the principle that, as “stewards of scarce judicial resources,” it may decline to provide detailed reasons on issues that do not require reversal and where further discussion would not significantly develop Texas jurisprudence. This explains its brief treatment of Jenna’s independent complaint about adequacy of service, and its decision instead to resolve the case entirely on Craddock grounds.

VI. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. First Craddock Element: Intent and Conscious Indifference

1. The Court’s Framing: Why Didn’t She Appear?

Consistent with Fidelity & Guar. Ins., the Court frames the key inquiry as: “Why did the defendant not appear?” The answer, in Jenna’s case, is multifaceted:

She believed, mistakenly, that she would be personally served.
She did not attempt to evade service.
She never saw the citation, petition, or alternative‑service order posted on the parents’ front door.
When she learned that a default had been orally rendered, she swiftly retained counsel and filed an answer and a Craddock motion—before the written default decree was signed.

The Court emphasizes that:

A failure to answer is not “intentional” just because it is deliberate.
“Conscious indifference” means, essentially, knowing you have been sued and not caring enough to respond.
The controlling issue is the absence of an intentional failure to answer, rather than a polished or particularly compelling excuse.

2. Mistake of Law as a Valid Excuse

Jenna assumed she would be personally served. This is technically a mistake of law, because Texas courts may authorize alternative service under Rule 106(b). Yet the Court, invoking Bank One v. Moody, reiterates that a mistake of law can satisfy the first element:

“[A] mistake of law may satisfy the first element.”

Thus, Jenna’s misunderstanding about permissible service methods is not disqualifying; it is part of a broader narrative showing that she did not appreciate that she had been officially served, and therefore did not knowingly disregard a duty to answer.

3. Non‑Receipt of Citation in an Alternative-Service Context

Jenna and her father both testified that:

They never saw anything posted on the front door on the day alternative service was carried out.
The house was under construction; the construction crew never gave them any papers.
The community’s security guard—who normally would notify them of visitors—never notified them of service attempts that day.

The process server, for her part, testified that she:

Never saw Jenna at the residence; and
Effected service by posting, as ordered, but did not provide evidence that Jenna actually saw the papers.

The Court views this as analogous to the “lost citation” cases: in those matters, the defendant cannot explain precisely how the citation disappeared, but can credibly assert non‑receipt or misplacement, supported by some contextual evidence. Here, in the alternative‑service context, Jenna cannot explain what happened to the posted papers, but she and her father credibly say they never saw them—precisely the type of explanation Fidelity & Guar. Ins. and Sutherland view as sufficient, if uncontroverted.

4. Knowledge of Lawsuit vs. Knowledge of Citation

The court of appeals conflated two kinds of knowledge:

Jenna’s knowledge that Gary had filed a lawsuit; and
Her knowledge that she had been formally served with a citation that commanded a response on pain of default.

The Supreme Court sharply distinguishes the two:

Filing a petition commences a suit, but does not itself impose a duty on the defendant to answer.
A citation, by contrast, commands an answer and warns of default (Rule 99(c)).
Absent service, waiver, or other proper notice, knowledge of a pending suit alone imposes no duty to act (Wilson v. Dunn).

The opinion further notes that receiving “actual notice” by some unauthorized method of service is legally equivalent to never having received proper service at all (Fid. & Guar. Ins., 186 S.W.3d at 574 n.1). This underscores that the formal and authorized character of service is what triggers the duty to answer.

This distinction is the doctrinal core of the opinion:

“Not receiving the citation and being unaware of its service generally suffices to excuse a failure to answer before judgment, even if the defendant is aware of the lawsuit.”

5. Was Jenna’s Excuse “Controverted”?

Under In re R.R., when the defendant’s factual assertions:

if true, negate conscious indifference; and
are not controverted by the plaintiff,

the first element is satisfied as a matter of law.

Gary argued that Jenna’s assertions were “controverted” because:

The process server testified she properly posted the citation as ordered; and
Gary testified that he had discussed the divorce, the process server, and “the citation of service” with Jenna.

The Supreme Court rejects this contention:

Proper execution of alternative service shows only the attempt to notify, not that actual notice was received (State Farm Fire & Cas.).
The process server admitted never seeing Jenna or handing her papers.
Gary’s testimony is too vague—he never specifies what exactly he told Jenna about the citation or when, and the record does not show that he actually put her on notice that service had been accomplished.

Thus, there was no genuine contradiction of Jenna’s central claim—that she never received the citation. Evidence of valid service does not equate to evidence of actual receipt, just as a Rule 21a presumption of receipt “is not evidence and vanishes” upon contrary testimony (Cliff v. Huggins).

Accordingly, the Court holds that Jenna’s excuse was not controverted in the R.R. sense, and the first Craddock element was met.

B. Second Craddock Element: Setting Up a Meritorious Defense

The second element requires only that the defendant “set up” a meritorious defense, not that she prove it. Under Dolgencorp v. Lerma, that means:

Pleading facts that, if true, constitute a valid defense in law; and
Supporting those facts with affidavits or prima facie evidence.

Jenna asserted—and supported through testimony and documents—a reimbursement claim from the community estate to her separate estate for funds used as a down payment on the marital home. Gary argued that she had not, and could not, overcome the community‑property presumption by clear and convincing evidence, as required by Family Code section 3.003.

The Court correctly notes that Gary’s criticism is premature at the Craddock stage:

The defendant does not need to prove the defense by the ultimate burden (here, clear and convincing evidence).
She need only make a prima facie showing that, if accepted, would constitute a legal defense (e.g., that certain funds were her separate property and give rise to a reimbursement claim).
Whether she ultimately prevails on that defense is a matter for trial on the merits, not for summary rejection at the new‑trial stage.

The Supreme Court agrees with the trial court’s earlier finding that Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense, satisfying the second Craddock element.

C. Third Craddock Element: Delay or Injury to the Plaintiff

For the third element, the defendant bears an initial burden:

to assert that granting a new trial will not cause undue delay or injury; and
to offer to go to trial promptly and compensate for costs associated with the default.

Once that is done, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show specific injury that a new trial would cause, as explained in Dolgencorp and Evans.

Jenna:

Alleged no undue delay would result;
Stated she was ready for trial; and
Offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default judgment and litigating the new‑trial motion, including potential attorney’s fees.

Gary claimed:

He had incurred legal fees managing the community estate and selling the marital home;
Undoing the default decree’s possession and custody orders would “put a lot of strain” on their child.

The Court finds this insufficient:

Generic assertions of financial harm or emotional strain, without more, do not show that Gary would be “disadvantage[d] in presenting the merits of [his] case at a new trial” (Evans).
In any event, In re Marriage of Sandoval suggests that allowing a new trial to litigate a separate‑property/reimbursement claim does not “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.”
Thus, no cognizable “injury” in the technical Craddock sense is shown.

Accordingly, Jenna meets the third element.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Default Judgment

A default judgment is a judgment entered against a party who fails to respond or appear in the lawsuit within the time allowed. In a no‑answer default:

The plaintiff’s factual allegations are generally taken as admitted;
The defendant loses without having his or her side heard;
Courts treat such judgments with caution because they bypass the adversarial process.

B. The Craddock Test in Plain Terms

To undo a default, the defendant must show three things:

It wasn’t on purpose. The failure to answer wasn’t intentional or due to an “I don’t care” attitude. There was some mistake, confusion, or accident.
There’s something worth fighting about. The defendant has some real defense that, if true, could change the outcome (for example, a separate‑property claim in a divorce).
No unfair harm to the other side. Letting the case be tried won’t unfairly hurt the plaintiff, beyond the ordinary burden of litigating the case on the merits.

C. “Intentional” and “Conscious Indifference”

Intentional failure to answer: The defendant deliberately chose not to respond, knowing that she had been properly served and understanding the consequences.
Conscious indifference: The defendant knew she was sued and that an answer was required, but simply didn’t care enough to respond—more than mere forgetfulness or misplacement.
Mere negligence: Being careless, disorganized, or mistaken can still be negligent, but does not equate to conscious indifference under Craddock.

D. Alternative Service

Alternative service under Rule 106(b) is when a court authorizes a non‑traditional method of service (e.g., posting papers on a door, leaving them with someone else, or other methods reasonably calculated to give notice) because personal service has been impractical or unsuccessful.

Important points:

It is legally valid service if done as ordered.
But it does not guarantee the defendant actually sees the papers.
Proof that service was performed (e.g., an affidavit of posting) is not proof that the defendant actually received the documents or understood the need to answer.

E. Citation vs. Lawsuit

Lawsuit filed: The plaintiff files a petition. The case is technically “pending,” but the defendant has no legal duty to answer yet.
Citation served: The defendant receives formal notice and is commanded to respond within a certain period, under threat of default judgment.
Knowing “my spouse filed for divorce” is not the same as knowing “I have been formally served and must answer within X days or I will lose by default.”

F. Meritorious Defense

A meritorious defense is any defense that, if supported by the evidence, could change the outcome. At the Craddock stage:

The defendant need not prove the defense, only show that it is plausible and supported by some evidence.
In a divorce, asserting a valid separate‑property or reimbursement claim is a typical example.

G. Delay or Injury

For the third element:

Delay means the defendant is using the new‑trial motion to stall; showing readiness for trial and prompt action usually negates this.
Injury means unfair prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present his case at a new trial (e.g., loss of key evidence, unavailability of essential witnesses), not just inconvenience, cost, or emotional strain.

VIII. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying the Role of Actual Notice in Craddock Motions

Tabakman makes explicit an important rule that was implicit in prior “lost citation” cases:

When a defendant credibly asserts that she never received the citation and did not know she had been served—backed by some explanation or corroboration—she generally satisfies the first Craddock element, even if:

the lawsuit was properly commenced,

alternative service was validly ordered and carried out, and

she knew in a general sense that a lawsuit existed.

This rule will be especially important in cases involving:

service by posting;
substitute service on third parties; and
service via non‑traditional methods (including electronic methods if and when authorized).

B. Limiting Trial Courts’ Ability to Reject Uncontroverted Excuses

The decision reinforces that:

Where the defendant offers a plausible excuse that, if true, negates conscious indifference, and
the plaintiff does not produce actual evidence contradicting the core factual assertions (such as actual receipt of citation),

trial courts are not free to simply disbelieve the defendant and deny a new trial. The “uncontroverted assertions” rule from In re R.R. has sharper teeth after Tabakman.

C. Strengthening the Anti‑Default Policy in Family Law

Divorce and custody cases frequently involve:

parties with limited resources and limited legal sophistication;
non‑lawyer litigants who misunderstand service and procedural requirements; and
use of alternative service when one spouse has moved out or is difficult to locate.

By requiring a new trial where a spouse like Jenna:

did not actually receive notice of citation,
promptly appeared on learning of the default, and
asserted real property defenses,

the Supreme Court signals that no‑answer default divorces will be closely scrutinized. This is especially so where child custody, property division, and long‑term economic rights are at stake.

D. Practical Guidance for Litigants and Counsel

For defendants seeking to set aside defaults:

Provide detailed affidavits explaining:
- what you knew (and did not know) about the lawsuit;
- whether you ever saw the citation or other suit papers;
- what happened at your residence or mailing address during the relevant period (e.g., construction, mail issues); and
- any corroborating facts (security procedures, co‑occupants’ knowledge).
Act quickly once you discover the default; prompt filing of an answer and motion for new trial strongly supports your good faith.

For plaintiffs enforcing defaults:

Understand that a valid return of alternative service, standing alone, may not defeat a well‑supported Craddock motion.
If actual notice is disputed, obtain concrete evidence (e.g., admissions, communications, tangible proof) that the defendant knew of the citation and the need to respond.
Be prepared to show specific prejudice from granting a new trial—such as loss of evidence or key witnesses—not just inconvenience or added cost.

E. Doctrinal Tightening of “Knowledge of Suit” vs. “Knowledge of Service”

The Court’s reliance on Wilson v. Dunn and its reiteration that knowledge of a filed petition does not create a duty to act will likely influence:

Rule 306a cases (notice of judgment) where actual vs constructive knowledge matters;
Challenges to both default and post‑answer defaults premised on inadequate or misdirected service; and
Future cases involving new forms of service (for example, social‑media or email service), where proving actual awareness may be more complex.

F. Expanded Use of Sandoval in Property‑Division Defaults

By citing In re Marriage of Sandoval in the third‑element analysis, the Court essentially:

Normalizes the idea that a new trial limited to property classification (e.g., separate vs community) does not “upset” the core structure of a divorce decree (custody/possession/support); and
Implies that granting such a new trial typically does not amount to “injury” under Craddock.

This positions property‑division defenses in divorce defaults as particularly strong candidates for relief under Craddock, so long as they are timely asserted and prima facie supported.

IX. Conclusion

Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman refines and extends Texas default‑judgment jurisprudence in several important ways:

It firmly distinguishes between knowledge of a lawsuit and knowledge of having been served with citation, holding that the former does not create a duty to answer absent the latter.
It confirms that, in the alternative‑service context, a defendant’s credible assertion of non‑receipt of the citation—corroborated by surrounding circumstances—satisfies the first Craddock element unless the plaintiff produces actual contrary evidence.
It reiterates that “some excuse,” even a mistake of law or negligence, will suffice so long as it negates the idea that the defendant “knew and did not care.”
It applies a generous prima facie standard to the meritorious‑defense requirement and a demanding standard for showing injury under the third element, particularly in divorce property‑division settings.
It operationalizes In re Lakeside Resort’s policy that all doubts about default judgments must be resolved against the party who secured the default.

The decision thus strengthens Texas courts’ longstanding preference for trials on the merits over judgments by default. In practice, Tabakman will make it easier for defendants—especially in family‑law cases involving alternative service—to obtain new trials when they can show they never truly had their “day in court” because they never actually knew they had been formally called to appear.

Knowledge of a Lawsuit Without Actual Notice of Citation Negates Conscious Indifference Under Craddock: A Commentary on Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, Supreme Court of Texas (Dec. 5, 2025)