Knowledge of a Lawsuit Is Not Enough: Alternative Service, Actual Notice, and the Craddock Test in Tabakman v. Tabakman

I. Introduction

In Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919 (Tex. Dec. 5, 2025) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of Texas addressed when a default divorce decree must be set aside under the equitable Craddock doctrine. The case turns on a recurring and practically important question: what happens when a defendant knows a lawsuit has been filed but never receives the citation that is served by alternative means?

The Court clarifies two central points:

For purposes of the Craddock test, there is a critical distinction between (a) awareness that a lawsuit exists and (b) awareness that one has actually been served with citation.
Alternative service (for example, posting on a door) proves that service was attempted and executed in that manner, but it is not evidence that the defendant actually received or read the citation.

This decision reinforces Texas’s strong policy against default judgments, elaborates on how the first Craddock element applies where service is made by posting, and confirms the relatively light burdens on defendants under the second and third Craddock elements. The Court reverses the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and remands for a new trial.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The marital breakdown and filing of the divorce

After thirteen years of marriage and one child, Jenna left the marital home to live with her parents, alleging mistreatment by her husband Gary. Shortly thereafter, Gary filed for divorce in Texas state court and informed Jenna that he had filed. Jenna testified that she:

did not know what to do,
was scared and lacked funds to hire a lawyer, and
assumed that any divorce papers would be served on her personally.

Her father corroborated that they were waiting for personal service.

B. Failed personal service and authorization of alternative service

After months of unsuccessful attempts at personal service, the trial court authorized alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). The process server then:

posted the citation, petition, and order authorizing alternative service on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ home.

No answer was filed by Jenna. Gary moved for a default judgment.

C. Default judgment and Jenna’s belated appearance

The trial court held a hearing on Gary’s motion and orally rendered a default judgment granting the divorce and accompanying relief. Jenna was unaware of the hearing or the oral rendition.

Around that time, Gary allegedly told Jenna he planned to abscond with their child and dog. Alarmed, Jenna contacted an attorney. Within three weeks:

Jenna’s counsel filed an answer and
moved for a new trial under the Craddock standard.

Nevertheless, a few days later, the trial court signed the written default divorce decree. Jenna did not (on appeal) challenge the court’s decision to sign the decree after her appearance; the case focuses on the denial of a new trial.

D. The new trial motion and lower court rulings

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court:

found that alternative service had been properly effected,
found Jenna had established a meritorious defense,
but concluded she was consciously indifferent in failing to answer, and
further found she failed to show a new trial would not harm or injure Gary.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing only on the first Craddock element. It held that:

Jenna’s explanation—that she did not know she had been served and took no affirmative steps to evade service—was insufficient to negate conscious indifference; and
Evidence that Gary told Jenna about the lawsuit and attempts at service permitted the trial court to resolve factual conflicts against her.

Jenna petitioned for review. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review, reversed, and ordered a new trial.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court’s core holdings are:

First Craddock element — failure to answer not intentional or due to conscious indifference
Jenna met this element. Her testimony (supported by her father) established that:
- she expected in‑person service,
- she did not attempt to avoid service,
- she was unaware of the citation posted on the door, and
- upon learning of the oral default, she promptly retained counsel and filed an answer before the decree was signed.
These facts, if true, negate conscious indifference. Importantly, the Court holds that:
not receiving the citation and being unaware of its service generally suffices to excuse a failure to answer before judgment, even if the defendant is aware of the lawsuit.
Second Craddock element — meritorious defense
Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense by alleging, and supporting with evidence, a claim for reimbursement to her separate estate for funds allegedly used as the down payment on the marital home. Any dispute over whether the funds were truly separate property goes to the merits, not to whether the defense is “set up.”
Third Craddock element — no undue delay or injury
Jenna’s motion and evidence:
- asserted that a new trial would not cause delay or injury,
- stated she was ready for trial, and
- offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default judgment and acknowledged the court’s power to award fees related to the new‑trial motion.
This shifted the burden to Gary, who failed to show injury that would prejudice his ability to present the merits of his case. His asserted harms (legal expenses, administration of community assets, and strain on the child) were not the kind of injury that defeats the third element.

The Court emphasizes Texas’s strong policy disfavoring default judgments (In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024)) and reiterates that doubts about defaults—not just doubts about service— must be resolved against the party who obtained the default.

IV. The Craddock Framework and Its Evolution

A. The original Craddock test

The case rests squarely on the equitable three‑part test first articulated in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1939, opinion adopted). Under modern formulations (e.g., In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006)), a defaulting defendant seeking a new trial must show:

The failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to accident or mistake.
The defendant has set up a meritorious defense.
The motion is filed in time and a new trial will not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

Once all three prongs are met, a new trial must be granted. The doctrine is equitable and designed to reconcile the need for finality with the preference for decisions on the merits.

B. Reinforcement and refinement in later cases

The Court situates Tabakman within a line of decisions progressively clarifying and, in many respects, liberalizing the application of Craddock:

In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006) – Formalized the three elements and stressed that if the movant’s factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct and are uncontroverted, the first element is satisfied.
Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006) – Explained that:
the overarching question guiding this inquiry is: "Why did the defendant not appear?"
And clarified that in this context, intent and conscious indifference mean the defendant “knew it was sued but did not care.”
Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995) – Held that a failure to answer is not intentional merely because it was deliberate, and that conscious indifference is more than mere negligence.
Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012) – Accepted an excuse that suit papers were left in a stack and forgotten during a holiday period, emphasizing that “some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” suffices to negate conscious indifference.
Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012) – Reiterated that the key fact is the absence of an intentional failure to answer rather than the quality of the excuse.
Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992) – Established that a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element.
Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009) – Clarified that the defendant need only “set up” a meritorious defense, meaning allege facts that if true would defeat the claim, supported by prima facie evidence, and explained burden-shifting on the injury prong.
In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2022) – Reaffirmed the applicability of Craddock in the family-law context, specifically divorce default judgments.
In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024) – Emphatically described default judgments as “greatly disfavored” and “fundamentally different” from other judgments, and mandated that doubts about a default be resolved against the party who secured it.

Tabakman explicitly draws on these authorities to articulate a generous standard favoring new trials where a defendant plausibly lacked actual notice of service—even if she knew the lawsuit existed.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. First Craddock element: Intent and conscious indifference

1. The defendant’s explanation and supporting evidence

Jenna’s explanation for not answering before default can be summarized as follows:

She believed service would be personal and in‑hand.
She did not understand that alternative service—posting on the door—could be used.
She did not avoid service; she was simply never personally contacted or handed papers by a process server, nor was anything given to her family.
She was unaware of the citation being posted on the door and never saw it.
Upon hearing that Gary might abscond with the child and dog, she contacted counsel and, before the default decree was signed, filed an answer and a Craddock motion.

Her father corroborated this account by:

testifying about construction work at the house when service by posting occurred,
explaining that the community security officer customarily notified him of visitors (which did not occur here), and
stating that neither he nor the construction crew saw any documents posted on the door.

The Supreme Court emphasizes that, if true, these facts negate conscious indifference. A person who never actually sees the citation and reasonably believes she has not yet been served cannot fairly be characterized as someone who “knew she was sued but did not care.”

2. Mistake of law and the sufficiency of “some excuse”

The opinion expressly invokes Bank One v. Moody to confirm that Jenna’s misunderstanding about the form of service—expecting personal service rather than alternative service—can itself be a qualifying “mistake of law” that satisfies the first prong:

Even though she was technically mistaken due to the availability of alternative‑service methods, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b), a mistake of law may satisfy the first element.

This dovetails with Sutherland, Milestone, and Drewery, where the Court has repeatedly held that:

the controlling fact is not the quality or wisdom of the excuse, but the absence of an intentional failure to answer; and
“some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” is adequate as long as it indicates that the defendant cared but erred or misunderstood.

In that sense, Tabakman is a “natural extension” of this line of cases: just as forgetting about papers in a stack can negate conscious indifference, never seeing papers that were posted as part of alternative service can do so, particularly when corroborated.

3. Distinguishing knowledge of a lawsuit from knowledge of service

A central doctrinal move in the opinion is its insistence on the legal difference between:

knowledge that a petition has been filed (commencement of lawsuit), and
knowledge that citation has been served (triggering the duty to answer under pain of default).

The Court roots this distinction in several authorities:

Rule 22 – A civil action “shall be commenced by a petition filed in the office of the clerk.” Filing a petition begins a “lawsuit.”
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002) – Explains the role of a citation:
a "citation" is directed to the defendant, telling the defendant that he or she has been sued and commanding the defendant to appear and answer the opposing party's claims.
Rule 99(c) – Citation must warn the defendant that a default judgment may be taken in the absence of a timely answer.
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990) – Holds that:
Absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.
Drewery – Notes that having “actual notice through a procedure not authorized for service is treated the same as never receiving” proper service.

Applying these principles, the Court criticizes the court of appeals for conflating Jenna’s knowledge that a divorce had been filed with knowledge that she had been served with a citation that imposed a duty to answer. The rule it articulates is pointed:

not receiving the citation and being unaware of its service generally suffices to excuse a failure to answer before judgment, even if the defendant is aware of the lawsuit.

This is the core doctrinal clarification in Tabakman and is the main reason this opinion has precedential weight beyond the specific divorce dispute.

4. Alternative service as proof of how service occurred, not of actual notice

The opinion then addresses a common misperception: that proof of alternative service (such as a return indicating posting on a door) automatically implies that the defendant had actual notice.

Relying on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993), and Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987), the Court explains:

Alternative service under Rule 106(b) is authorized precisely when traditional methods are ineffective or impractical.
The evidence that alternative service was completed is proof of the method and timing of service, not proof that the defendant read or saw the citation.
A presumption of receipt under service rules (such as Rule 21a) is a procedural presumption, not “evidence,” and disappears when there is credible opposing testimony.

Thus, the process server’s testimony that she posted the citation on the door and never saw Jenna is:

sufficient to show that service occurred as ordered, but
insufficient to establish that Jenna actually saw or read the citation, or was aware that service had been effected.

The Court analogizes to lost citations, citing Drewery:

People often do not know where or how they lost something—that is precisely why it remains "lost."

Similarly, a defendant may be unable to explain how or why she never encountered a document that was posted on a door, especially when there were intervening circumstances (construction, third parties entering the property, etc.).

5. Was Jenna’s excuse controverted?

Under In re R.R., if the defendant’s factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct and are not controverted, the first prong is met as a matter of law. The key dispute, then, is whether Gary’s evidence controverted Jenna’s.

Gary argued:

that alternative service was properly carried out; and
that he had told Jenna about the lawsuit, a process server, and “the citation of service.”

The Supreme Court concludes this did not controvert Jenna’s assertion that she never received or became aware of the posted citation, because:

Proof of proper alternative service is not evidence of actual notice or receipt (Costley).
Gary, a lawyer, described generic conversations about the divorce, process service, and the fact a citation existed, but:
- he did not specify whether these conversations took place before or after the posting of the citation; and
- he did not testify that he told Jenna that the citation had already been served by posting or that she was now in default danger.

Without specific, contradictory evidence that Jenna knew she had been served by posting, her excuse stands as uncontroverted. Consequently, the Court holds the first Craddock element satisfied.

B. Second Craddock element: Meritorious defense

1. The “set up” standard

The second element is often misunderstood or applied too stringently by trial courts. The Supreme Court reaffirms the standard from Dolgencorp v. Lerma:

the defendant must "allege[] facts which in law would constitute a defense to the plaintiff's cause of action and [are] supported by affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof that the defendant has such a defense."

Two points are critical:

The defendant does not need to prove the defense at the new‑trial stage; a prima facie showing suffices.
Contradictory evidence by the plaintiff does not negate satisfaction of this element; it simply sets up a factual dispute for trial.

2. Jenna’s reimbursement / separate property claim

Jenna alleged that:

funds from her separate estate were used as the down payment on the marital home; and
she was entitled to reimbursement from the community estate for those amounts.

She supported this defense with both testimonial and documentary evidence. Gary countered by invoking the Family Code’s community property presumption (Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003) and arguing that Jenna had not proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the funds were separate property.

The Supreme Court holds that Gary’s argument puts the cart before the horse. Whether Jenna can ultimately overcome the community presumption at trial is a merits question. For Craddock purposes, she has:

asserted a legally cognizable defense (a separate-property / reimbursement claim), and
offered prima facie evidence to support it.

That is ample to “set up” a defense. The Court notes that it agrees with the trial court’s finding that a meritorious defense was established.

C. Third Craddock element: No undue delay or injury

1. Burden shifting under the third prong

Under Dolgencorp, the third Craddock element operates in two steps:

The defendant bears an initial burden to allege (and, if necessary, support) that granting a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.
If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show specific injury, particularly injury that will prejudice the plaintiff’s ability to present the case on the merits in a new trial.

The Court’s long‑standing approach (as in Director, State Employees Workers' Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994)) is that “general harm and financial hardship” are not enough. The injury must relate to the fairness of a future trial, not merely the inconvenience of having to try the case at all.

2. Jenna’s showing on lack of delay or injury

Jenna:

affirmatively alleged that a new trial would not cause delay or injury,
represented that she was ready for trial, and
offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in securing the default judgment and acknowledged the court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees for the new-trial proceedings.

The Supreme Court holds this meets her initial burden, shifting the burden to Gary to demonstrate specific injury beyond the ordinary burdens of litigation.

3. Gary’s asserted injuries and why they fail

Gary claimed:

financial harm from:
- legal fees incurred in managing the community estate and
- expenses in selling the marital home; and
emotional harm and strain on the child from revisiting the standard possession and custody orders embedded in the default decree.

The Court, relying on Evans, rejects these as insufficient:

Litigation costs, property administration, and compliance with an initial decree are typical incidental burdens of litigation, not “injuries” that would disadvantage him in presenting the merits at a new trial.
Although concern about strain on the child is understandable, the Court does not view re‑litigation of custody and possession as an “injury” under Craddock, particularly given Texas’s strong preference for merits adjudication in family matters.

The Court also finds support in In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021), where allowing a defendant to pursue a separate‑property claim on retrial was held not to “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of community assets.” By analogy, giving Jenna her day in court on property claims and other issues does not impose a legally cognizable injury on Gary.

Accordingly, the third Craddock element is satisfied.

VI. Relationship to Prior Precedent and Doctrinal Development

A. Reinforcing the anti‑default posture from Lakeside

The Court expressly cites In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024), to reiterate:

Default judgments are “greatly disfavored.”
They are fundamentally different from other judgments because:
- they involve ex parte proceedings,
- raise fairness concerns for the absent party, and
- pose risks to judicial integrity by increasing the chance of erroneous judgments.
Any doubts about a default judgment—not only doubts about the sufficiency of service—“must be resolved against the party who secured the default.”

Tabakman operationalizes this policy by:

refusing to equate knowledge of a lawsuit with a duty to answer absent proof of actual service, and
refusing to treat proof of alternative service as conclusive evidence of actual notice.

B. Clarifying actual vs constructive notice in the service context

The Court’s discussion resonates with its 2025 decision in Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025), where it distinguished actual and constructive notice of a judgment under Rule 306a. There, constructive notice did not equate to actual notice for purposes of extending deadlines. Here, similarly:

Constructive notice via posting or alternative service is sufficient to support jurisdiction and validity of a default judgment (as a matter of service law), but
For Craddock purposes, the Court looks to whether the defendant actually knew of the citation and consciously chose not to respond.

By emphasizing this distinction, the Court sends a clear signal: the constitutional and equitable interests in fair notice and an opportunity to be heard remain central even after a technically valid default is entered.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Default judgment

A default judgment is a decision entered against a party who fails to respond or appear in a lawsuit by the required deadline. Instead of deciding the case after both sides present evidence, the court rules in favor of the party who did appear.

2. The Craddock test

The Craddock test is a three‑part fairness test used when someone asks a court to set aside a default judgment and grant a new trial. The person must show:

It wasn’t intentional – They did not ignore the lawsuit on purpose; they missed it by mistake or accident.
They have a real argument – They can point to real facts and legal arguments that, if true, could help them win (a meritorious defense).
No unfair harm to the other side – Letting the case be retried now won’t seriously hurt or delay the other side beyond what is normal in litigation.

3. Alternative service

Normally, a lawsuit is served by personally handing the defendant the papers or by another standard method. When that fails, a court can authorize alternative service under Rule 106(b), such as:

posting the papers at a location (e.g., the front door) reasonably likely to give notice, or
other methods approved by the court (such as service via email or social media in some cases).

Alternative service is meant to help plaintiffs proceed when personal service is impractical, but it does not guarantee the defendant actually sees the papers.

4. Citation vs. petition

The petition is the document the plaintiff files to start the lawsuit; it sets out the claims.
The citation is a formal notice issued by the court clerk and directed to the defendant, telling them:
- that they have been sued,
- what court the case is in,
- how long they have to answer, and
- that a default judgment may be entered if they do not respond.

Under Texas law, merely knowing that someone filed a petition (a lawsuit exists) is not enough to require a defendant to respond. They must be properly served with the citation (or waive service) for that duty to arise.

5. Meritorious defense

A meritorious defense is simply a defense that, if the facts supporting it are true, would defeat or reduce the other side’s claim. At the new‑trial stage, the defendant need only:

allege the defense, and
provide some evidence that makes it plausible.

They do not need to prove it fully; that happens later at trial.

6. No undue delay or injury

For the third Craddock element, injury does not mean:

having to go to trial,
paying legal fees, or
losing the benefit of a default judgment.

Instead, it means that granting a new trial would put the plaintiff in a worse position for trying the case fairly (for example, key evidence is now gone, witnesses can no longer be found, etc.).

7. Separate vs. community property and reimbursement claims

Community property – In Texas, most property acquired during marriage is presumed to belong to the marital community.
Separate property – Includes property owned before marriage, gifts, and inheritances. It is not divided in divorce but may give rise to reimbursement claims if used to benefit the community.

A reimbursement claim arises when one estate (for example, a spouse’s separate estate) contributes to benefit another estate (the community) in a way that is not adequately compensated. In divorce, the contributing spouse may claim reimbursement to avoid unjust enrichment of the other estate.

VIII. Practical Impact and Future Significance

A. For defendants and their counsel

Alternative service does not doom a Craddock motion. If a defendant truly never saw a citation that was posted or otherwise alternatively served, and can credibly explain why, they may still obtain a new trial.
Emphasize facts about awareness of service, not just awareness of the lawsuit. Affidavits and testimony should:
- distinguish knowledge of the filing from knowledge of being served,
- describe living arrangements, physical access to the location of posting, and any circumstances (construction, third parties) that may explain non‑receipt, and
- show prompt action once the default or decree was discovered.
Don’t over‑plead the defense at the new‑trial stage. Under Dolgencorp and Tabakman, a prima facie showing is enough for the second element. The full evidentiary burden comes later at trial.

B. For plaintiffs and their counsel

Recognize the fragility of default judgments. Particularly where alternative service is used, defaults are more vulnerable to Craddock motions grounded in lack of actual notice.
Develop evidence of actual notice where possible. If a defendant acknowledges receipt of posted papers, texts about having seen them, or otherwise indicates awareness of having been served, preserve that evidence. It can be crucial to controvert a defendant’s excuse.
Manage expectations in family-law cases. In divorces and custody matters, courts are especially reluctant to allow default judgments to stand when a party plausibly lacked actual notice. Clients should be warned that a default decree entered after alternative service may well be reopened.

C. For trial courts

Apply Lakeside and resolve doubts in favor of a new trial. Trial courts must remember that default judgments are disfavored and that Craddock is equitable in nature.
Do not conflate knowledge of suit with knowledge of service. Findings of conscious indifference must be based on evidence that the defendant understood they had been served and consciously chose not to answer.
Understand the limits of alternative service returns. Proof that papers were posted or otherwise served under Rule 106(b) does not, by itself, refute a sworn denial of actual notice.

D. Particular significance in family law

This case is especially important in family law for several reasons:

Divorce and custody issues are too important to rest on technical defaults. The Court’s reasoning reflects a strong preference for decisions on parenting, support, and property division to follow an adversarial hearing.
Default decrees that fix custody and visitation may now be more easily reopened when the non‑appearing spouse can credibly say they never saw the citation, even if they had general awareness of a divorce filing.
Property division disputes, including separate‑property and reimbursement claims, are specifically protected by the access to a new trial outlined here, echoing In re Marriage of Sandoval.

IX. Critical Observations and Potential Questions

While Tabakman is largely a continuation and clarification of existing law, several points invite ongoing attention:

Line‑drawing on “actual notice.” The decision leaves room for factual contest:
- How much circumstantial evidence of actual notice will suffice to controvert a defendant’s denial?
- At what point do repeated generic warnings (“you’re going to get served”) become enough to support a finding of conscious indifference?
Potential for strategic behavior. Some may worry that defendants could exploit the distinction between knowledge of suit and knowledge of service by keeping themselves poorly informed. The Court’s emphasis on corroboration (like Jenna’s father’s testimony and description of construction and security practices) suggests trial courts retain tools to scrutinize credibility.
Finality vs. fairness in family law. The Court clearly prioritizes fairness and a full hearing over the finality of a default decree, particularly in divorce and custody contexts. Practitioners should expect a continued willingness to reopen default family judgments where notice is credibly contested.

X. Conclusion

Tabakman v. Tabakman sharpens and extends Texas law on setting aside default judgments under the Craddock doctrine, with three main contributions:

It decisively separates mere awareness that a lawsuit exists from awareness that citation has been served. Only the latter triggers a duty to answer.
It confirms that when service is made by alternative means, proof of proper service does not equate to proof of actual notice for Craddock purposes.
It reaffirms the relatively modest burdens on defendants for showing a meritorious defense and lack of injury, emphasizing the central role of equitable considerations and the overarching policy disfavoring defaults.

By reversing the court of appeals and remanding for a new trial, the Supreme Court of Texas reinforces that, particularly where family relationships and property rights are at stake, default judgments must yield readily to credible claims of lack of actual notice. The decision will guide trial courts and practitioners in evaluating Craddock motions in cases involving alternative service and assures litigants that technical service compliance does not defeat equitable relief when a party has not, in reality, had their day in court.