Klingler v. Bridges: Tenth Circuit Reaffirms AEDPA “Double Deference” and Requires Proof of Indian Status to Defeat State Criminal Jurisdiction

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Klingler v. Bridges (No. 25-6068, Nov. 4, 2025), which denies a certificate of appealability (COA) and in forma pauperis (IFP) status to habeas petitioner Alex Warren Klingler. Judge McHugh, writing for the panel (Judges Matheson, Phillips, and McHugh), affirms the federal district court’s denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The case arises from a violent confrontation during the execution of a search warrant, leading to multiple convictions in Oklahoma state court, including assault and battery with a deadly weapon, shooting with intent to kill, and maiming, with consecutive life sentences. On federal habeas, Klingler advanced four grounds:

• Sufficiency of the evidence in light of his affirmative defense of justifiable use of deadly force (defense of habitation/self-defense)
• Double jeopardy (and Oklahoma’s “double punishment” statute) based on overlapping convictions
• State-court lack of criminal jurisdiction due to Indian country and treaties with the Chickasaw Nation
• Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising jurisdiction

The decision is significant for three reasons:

• It reemphasizes the “double deference” imposed at the COA stage for sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims: deference to the jury under Jackson v. Virginia and to the state appellate court under AEDPA.
• It confirms the continued vitality of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta and Tenth Circuit precedent requiring a habeas petitioner to prove “Indian status” to oust state criminal jurisdiction for crimes in Indian country.
• It illustrates strict issue-preservation rules in COA practice, including waiver of treaty-based arguments and new ineffective-assistance theories not raised below.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denies a COA on all four claims and denies IFP:

• Sufficiency of the evidence: The OCCA reasonably found the State disproved defense of habitation; under AEDPA and Jackson, the federal courts will not reweigh conflicting evidence. No COA.
• Double jeopardy: Federal habeas does not correct state-law errors; under Blockburger, assault and battery with a deadly weapon and maiming each requires a distinct element; no federal Double Jeopardy Clause violation. No COA.
• Jurisdiction (Indian country): Absent proof that the defendant or victims are “Indian,” Oklahoma retains jurisdiction; petitioner failed to show Indian status. Treaty arguments not preserved. No COA.
• Ineffective assistance: Counsel’s failure to press a meritless jurisdictional challenge is neither deficient nor prejudicial under Strickland. No COA.
• IFP: Denied for lack of any reasoned, nonfrivolous appellate argument.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Background

After an altercation with Katherine Gallagher that resulted in her injuries and allegations of attempted kidnapping, police sought and obtained a search warrant for Klingler’s home. Officers announced their presence repeatedly at the detached garage and main residence, attempted forced entry, and encountered gunfire from inside the home. One officer was severely injured. Evidence showed Klingler received text messages that police were present (“they got a warrant”), texted his grandson (“U need hide your keys”), and later told his granddaughter that police were coming in the front door because of his dispute with Ms. Gallagher. Klingler testified he was drowsy from pain medication, had hearing problems, did not perceive police announcements, believed intruders were breaking in, and fired to scare them away.

An Oklahoma jury convicted him of three counts of assault and battery with a deadly weapon, six counts of shooting with intent to kill, and one count of maiming, imposing consecutive life sentences. The OCCA affirmed on direct appeal and later affirmed denial of state post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied § 2254 relief and a COA. Klingler, proceeding pro se, sought a COA and to proceed IFP in the Tenth Circuit; both were denied in this order.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• COA and AEDPA standards:
  • Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322: COA requires showing that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution or that issues deserve encouragement to proceed further.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c): “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): Habeas relief when state decision is contrary to or unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, or rests on unreasonable factual determinations.
  • Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U.S. 91: State decision must be beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement to warrant relief.
  • Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362; Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193: Incorrect application is not enough; it must be unreasonable.
  • Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166; § 2254(e)(1): State factual determinations are presumed correct; rebuttal requires clear and convincing evidence.
  • Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935: Deferential treatment of state-court decisions under AEDPA.
• Sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework:
  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307: Could any rational trier of fact find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution?
  • Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483; Messer v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009: Federal habeas courts do not reweigh evidence and accept the jury’s resolution if within bounds of reason.
• Double jeopardy principles:
  • Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299: Same-elements test — each offense must require proof of a fact the other does not.
  • United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243; United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816: Application of Blockburger; offenses with distinct elements are not the “same offense.”
  • Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62; Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216: Federal habeas does not lie to correct state-law errors; review is confined to federal constitutional claims.
• Indian country jurisdiction:
  • Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629: States have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country; States, as sovereigns, have territorial jurisdiction unless preempted.
  • United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 1195: States possess exclusive jurisdiction where neither victim nor perpetrator is Indian; federal jurisdiction depends on Indian status (perpetrator or victim).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1152: General Crimes Act — federal jurisdiction over crimes in Indian country with Indian victim/perpetrator qualifications; tribal exclusive jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes preserved.
• Ineffective assistance:
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668: Deficient performance and prejudice; courts may resolve on prejudice alone (Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810).
• Issue preservation and pro se treatment:
  • Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106; Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836: Liberal construction for pro se filings, but pro se litigants must follow procedural rules; courts cannot act as counsel.
  • Owens v. Trammell, 792 F.3d 1234: New theories on appeal not raised below are not considered.
  • United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d 1214; McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992: General rule against raising new arguments for the first time on appeal, including in COA requests.
• IFP standard:
  • DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502; United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096: IFP requires financial inability and at least one reasoned, nonfrivolous argument in support of the appeal.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence and the “Double Deference” Constraint

Once Klingler raised defense of habitation (Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 733(A)(1)), the State had to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The OCCA acknowledged conflicting evidence but found substantial proof that Klingler knew officers were present (multiple “police, search warrant” announcements near his bedroom window; text exchanges reflecting police presence and a warrant; “hide your keys” message; gunfire tracking officers; his later statement to his granddaughter acknowledging police were entering because of the Gallagher incident). The Tenth Circuit, applying Jackson and AEDPA, refused to reweigh the record. Because a rational juror could convict, and because the OCCA’s affirmance was not an unreasonable application of Jackson, no COA issued on this ground.

2) Double Jeopardy: Distinct Elements, Distinct Offenses

Klingler argued that convictions for assault and battery with a deadly weapon (Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 652(C)) and maiming (Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 751) violated both Oklahoma’s double-punishment statute and the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. The Tenth Circuit would not review the state-law theory (Estelle/Swarthout), and on the federal claim, it applied Blockburger. The OUJI elements show each offense requires proof the other does not: assault-and-battery-with-a-deadly-weapon requires use of a deadly weapon; maiming requires an injury that disables/disfigures/diminishes vigor and intent to cause injury. As neither is a lesser-included offense of the other, multiple convictions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The OCCA’s application of Blockburger was reasonable; COA denied.

3) Jurisdiction in Indian Country: The Burden to Show Indian Status

Invoking “treaties” and the Chickasaw Nation, Klingler argued the state lacked jurisdiction. The OCCA and the federal district court noted he never alleged—much less proved—that he (or the victims) are Indian. Under Castro-Huerta and Langford:

• States have jurisdiction over crimes in Indian country unless preempted.
• Federal jurisdiction in Indian country generally turns on the presence of an Indian victim or perpetrator (with tribal exclusive jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes).
• States and federal government share concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indian-on-Indian crimes in Indian country.
• If neither perpetrator nor victim is Indian, the State has exclusive jurisdiction.

Because Klingler did not establish Indian status, his jurisdictional challenge failed. His late-raised, treaty-specific theories (Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek and Treaty of Washington) were not presented in the district court and were deemed waived on appeal (Owens). No COA issued.

4) Ineffective Assistance: No Deficiency or Prejudice from Omitting a Meritless Jurisdiction Claim

Under Strickland, counsel’s failure to raise a meritless jurisdictional argument could not be deficient or prejudicial. The state trial court addressed the merits and found no prejudice; the federal district court agreed. The Tenth Circuit likewise denied a COA. Additional ineffective-assistance theories (attacking the search warrant or alleging absence from critical stages), plus judicial-disqualification and prosecutorial-misconduct arguments, were raised for the first time in the COA application and treated as waived (Viera; McDonald).

5) IFP Denial

Because the record revealed no reasoned, nonfrivolous appellate issue, the court denied IFP under DeBardeleben/Silva (financial inability plus nonfrivolous issue required).

Impact and Practical Implications

• COA practice under AEDPA: This order is a strong reminder that sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims face “double deference.” Petitioners must show that no rational juror could convict and that the state appellate court’s application of Jackson was objectively unreasonable—an exceptionally high bar at the COA stage.
• Issue preservation: Treaty-specific arguments and new ineffective-assistance theories raised for the first time in the COA application will not be considered. Habeas counsel must fully develop and preserve federal theories in the district court record.
• Indian country jurisdiction: After Castro-Huerta and Langford, petitioners challenging state jurisdiction must plead and prove Indian status (of the defendant or victim) and address the concurrent/exclusive jurisdiction matrix. Mere invocation of “Indian country” or references to treaties, without proof of Indian status and preservation, will not sustain a § 2254 claim.
• Double jeopardy doctrine: Defense counsel should conduct an elements-based Blockburger analysis. Even where multiple counts arise from a single act, convictions may stand if each offense includes a distinct element (e.g., “deadly weapon” versus “disabling/disfiguring injury with intent”). State-law “double punishment” arguments rarely convert into federal habeas relief.
• Defense of habitation/self-defense: Where the record contains robust evidence of police announcements, contemporaneous texts referencing police presence and warrants, and post-incident admissions, a jury’s rejection of defense of habitation will typically survive Jackson/AEDPA review.
• IFP screening: Courts will deny IFP absent at least one nonfrivolous appellate issue. Petitioners should identify a concrete, preserved, debatable federal question to meet this threshold.
• Pro se litigants: The court reiterates liberal construction but strict adherence to procedural rules. Courts cannot develop arguments or search the record on a litigant’s behalf.
• Persuasive, not binding: Although nonprecedential, the order is citable for its persuasive value (FRAP 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1) and reflects the panel’s current application of AEDPA, Jackson, Blockburger, and Castro-Huerta in COA decisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certificate of Appealability (COA): A mandatory “gatekeeping” approval to appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition. It issues only if the petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right—i.e., reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution.
• AEDPA “double deference”: For sufficiency claims, federal courts defer to the jury’s verdict (Jackson) and to the state court’s adjudication of the claim (§ 2254(d)). The petitioner must overcome both layers to win a COA.
• Blockburger “same-elements” test: Two convictions from one act do not violate double jeopardy if each offense requires proof of an element the other does not—even if they arise from the same conduct.
• Indian country jurisdiction matrix:
  • Indian perpetrator vs. Indian victim: generally tribal/federal jurisdiction.
  • Non-Indian perpetrator vs. Indian victim: concurrent state and federal jurisdiction (Castro-Huerta).
  • Neither party Indian: exclusive state jurisdiction (Langford).
  • Bottom line: To oust state jurisdiction, the petitioner must show “Indian status” of at least one party.
• Strickland ineffective assistance: Two prongs—deficient performance and prejudice. Counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a losing argument; no prejudice exists if the omitted claim lacks merit.
• State-law errors on habeas: Federal habeas courts correct violations of the U.S. Constitution, laws, or treaties—not mere misapplications of state statutes or constitutions.
• Issue preservation: Appellate courts generally do not consider new issues or new legal theories not presented to the lower court—even for pro se litigants.

Conclusion

Klingler v. Bridges is a careful application of AEDPA’s constraints at the COA stage. The panel:

• Affirmed the OCCA’s rejection of a defense-of-habitation theory under “double deference,”
• Upheld separate convictions for assault and battery with a deadly weapon and maiming under Blockburger,
• Rejected a jurisdictional challenge for lack of proof of Indian status (and for failure to preserve treaty-based arguments),
• Found no Strickland violation because counsel did not omit a meritorious argument, and
• Denied IFP for want of any nonfrivolous appellate issue.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores the necessity of building and preserving federal claims in the district court, the steep hurdles of AEDPA deference—especially for sufficiency challenges—and the centrality of Indian status to any jurisdictional challenge in Indian country after Castro-Huerta. Though nonprecedential, the order offers a clear, persuasive roadmap of how the Tenth Circuit evaluates COA requests that hinge on Jackson, Blockburger, and Indian country jurisdiction in the post-Castro-Huerta landscape.