Khazin v. City of New York: Reaffirming the Awareness Requirement and But-For Causation Standard in Title VII Retaliation Claims

Introduction

Khazin v. City of New York, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 8, 2025, involved a former New York City Police Department (NYPD) sergeant, Valentin Khazin, who alleged that his supervisors retaliated against him after he (1) refused to follow what he perceived as discriminatory orders against a Black subordinate officer and (2) filed several formal complaints with the NYPD’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO). Khazin sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), and also asserted a § 1983 claim and a Monell claim for municipal liability (the latter voluntarily withdrawn). The district court granted summary judgment to the City of New York and individual NYPD officers, and Khazin appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a summary order (which does not carry precedential effect), affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held:

Khazin failed to establish a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim based on his refusal to discipline a subordinate, because there was no evidence that his supervisors understood his refusal as opposition to discrimination.
Many of the alleged retaliation acts (e.g., waitlisting for training) were not “materially adverse” under Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.
For the actions deemed materially adverse, Khazin did not carry his burden to show “but-for” causation or that the City’s disciplinary explanations were pretextual.
His constructive discharge claim likewise lacked proof of a causal connection to protected activity.
Arguments regarding NYSHRL and NYCHRL adverse-action standards were waived for insufficient briefing.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning drew upon longstanding Title VII and summary‐judgment precedents:

McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973): Establishes the three‐step burden‐shifting framework for retaliation claims.
Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. (2013): Requires that an employer actually understand—or reasonably should have understood—that an employee’s conduct was in opposition to discrimination.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (2006): Defines “materially adverse” actions as those likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining.
Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC (2013): Emphasizes the plaintiff’s burden to show pretext once the employer articulates legitimate reasons.
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. (2001) and Burkybile v. Board of Education (2005): Reject temporal‐proximity inferences where adverse actions predate or long follow protected activity.

2. Legal Reasoning

Reviewing de novo, the Court applied Rule 56’s standard: summary judgment is proper if no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Under McDonnell Douglas, Khazin bore the initial burden to show:

Engagement in protected activity;
Employer awareness of that activity;
Materially adverse action;
Causal connection between the activity and the adverse action.

• On the “awareness” element, although Khazin disobeyed orders by allowing Officer Harge to take leave, he never signaled that his refusal was a protest against racial discrimination. • On “material adversity,” routine administrative inconveniences (like training waitlists) do not meet Burlington’s threshold of actions that would deter a reasonable employee. • Even where the court assumed material adversity, Khazin failed to show his EEO complaints were the but-for cause of disciplinary determinations. The City demonstrated that investigations into Khazin’s off-duty employment and an unfounded hit-and-run allegation began before or long after protected activity, undermining any inference of retaliation. • Conclusory affidavits and denials, without evidentiary support, could not establish pretext.

3. Impact

Though non‐precedential, this decision underscores and reaffirms key points of Title VII retaliation law:

An employee’s refusal to follow orders is not protected unless the employer knows it was motivated by discrimination concerns.
Plaintiffs must identify concrete, non-trivial adverse actions and marshal evidence that such actions were the but-for product of protected activity.
Temporal gaps and prior investigations can defeat causal inference absent direct evidence of retaliatory intent.

Future litigants should ensure that they clearly articulate when and how their employer understood particular conduct as opposing discrimination, and they should develop evidence tying adverse employer actions directly to protected complaints.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A pre‐trial ruling for one side if no factual disputes remain that require a jury’s decision.
Prima Facie Case: The initial showing a plaintiff must make to invoke the burden‐shifting framework.
Materially Adverse Action: Conduct by an employer likely to deter a reasonable worker from complaining of discrimination.
But-For Causation: The plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity.
Pretext: Demonstrating that the employer’s stated reason for an action is false and that discrimination or retaliation was the real motive.

Conclusion

Khazin v. City of New York reaffirms that Title VII retaliation plaintiffs must establish both employer awareness of their opposition to discrimination and a direct, but-for causal link to materially adverse actions. Conclusory assertions, temporal proximity alone, or minor workplace slights will not suffice. While this summary order is not binding precedent, it powerfully illustrates the evidentiary rigor required to survive summary judgment in retaliation cases under federal and analogous state and local human rights statutes.