Khazin v. City of New York: Employer Awareness and But-For Causation in Title VII Retaliation Claims

Introduction

Background: In Khazin v. City of New York, Valentin Khazin—a former NYPD sergeant—claimed that the City of New York and various NYPD supervisors retaliated against him after he refused to discriminate against a Black subordinate and lodged Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. He invoked Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

Procedural Posture: Khazin sued in the Eastern District of New York. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and individual defendants. Khazin appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed on April 8, 2025, in a summary order.

Key Issues:

Whether Khazin’s refusal to follow instructions—allegedly to discriminate—constituted protected activity that the employer understood to be opposition to discrimination.
Whether Khazin established a causal link and “but-for” causation between his protected activity and any materially adverse employment actions.
Whether acts such as wait-listing him for training or investigating off-duty conduct met the “materially adverse” threshold.
Whether the district court erred in applying the standards for NYSHRL and NYCHRL retaliation claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a summary order, affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants. It held that Khazin:

Failed to show the employer was aware that his refusal to follow an order was a protest against racial discrimination by other NYPD officers.
Could not identify any materially adverse actions that a reasonable jury could link“but-for” to his protected conduct.
Relied on timing and conclusory affidavits insufficient to raise a genuine fact issue.
Offered no viable challenge to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL holdings, and thus waived those arguments.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

McDonnell Douglas v. Green (411 U.S. 792, 1973): Established the burden-shifting framework for Title VII retaliation claims.
Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. (716 F.3d 10, 2d Cir. 2013): Held that an employer must understand that the employee’s opposition is to conduct prohibited by Title VII.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (548 U.S. 53, 2006): Defined “materially adverse” actions as those likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining about discrimination.
Bey v. City of New York (999 F.3d 157, 2d Cir. 2021): Reiterated the de novo standard of review for summary judgment.
Zann Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC (737 F.3d 834, 2d Cir. 2013): Clarified that conclusory denials do not raise genuine issues where none exist.
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. (248 F.3d 87, 2d Cir. 2001): Held that timing alone, when adverse actions predate protected activity, cannot support an inference of retaliation.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court applied the three-step McDonnell Douglas framework:

Prima Facie Case: Khazin had to show (i) engagement in protected conduct, (ii) employer awareness, (iii) materially adverse actions, and (iv) causal connection.
Employer’s Rebuttal: The City presented legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons (disciplinary investigations for off-duty work and a baseless hit-and-run allegation).
Pretext / But-For Causation: Khazin needed evidence that retaliation was the but-for cause of each action. His evidence consisted largely of timing gaps and conclusory affidavits—insufficient under Second Circuit precedent.

On the question of employer awareness, the court emphasized that an employer cannot be held liable unless it understood that the employee’s conduct was specifically in protest of discrimination. Khazin never indicated that his refusal to enforce disciplinary measures against Officer Harge was based on her race or a Title VII complaint.

Regarding material adversity, the court distinguished between routine “petty slights” and genuinely adverse actions. Placing Khazin on a training waitlist or conducting off-duty employment inquiries fell into the former category when unconnected to protected activity.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision provides important clarifications:

Employers must understand the nature of protected opposition; mere insubordination without a clear discrimination protest is insufficient.
Summary orders, though non-precedential, can still furnish persuasive guidance on Title VII’s awareness and causation requirements.
Employees must build a robust record—beyond timing and broad assertions—to survive summary judgment on retaliation claims.
The “but-for” causation standard remains stringent; courts will not infer retaliation from mere sequence of events.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Protected Activity: Any lawful action opposing an employer’s discrimination. Here, refused orders—but the refusal was not clearly linked to racial discrimination.
Materially Adverse Action: A workplace action that would deter a reasonable employee from making a discrimination complaint. Minor inconveniences or routine investigations generally do not qualify.
But-For Causation: The plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity. Timing alone does not satisfy this.
Summary Judgment: A court decision without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary Orders: Dispositions that do not carry precedential weight but still illustrate how courts apply established law.

Conclusion

Khazin v. City of New York underscores the rigorous standards for retaliation claims under Title VII: employees must clearly communicate opposition to discrimination, and courts demand concrete evidence of but-for causation. While summary orders lack formal precedential force, this Second Circuit decision will guide practitioners in structuring and defending retaliation claims, reiterating that timing or conclusory statements alone cannot overcome summary judgment.