I. Introduction

Keys v. State, No. 368, 2024 (Del. Dec. 9, 2025), is a significant Supreme Court of Delaware decision clarifying how courts should analyze the admissibility of rap music and social media content—particularly when prosecutors seek to use such material to suggest a defendant’s involvement in violent conduct.

The case arises from a series of shootings in Wilmington in January 2022, for which Kyair Keys was tried and ultimately convicted of attempted murder, first-degree assault, and related firearm offenses. One of the more controversial pieces of evidence at trial was an Instagram “live” video showing Keys driving a recently stolen Dodge Charger while a violent rap song played in the background. The song, not written or performed by Keys, included a line referencing a person called “Puff”—Keys’s known street nickname— allegedly depicting him as someone who would “let that draco up,” i.e., shoot people.

The core appellate issue was:

• whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the audio portion of that Instagram video (the rap song and its lyrics), and
• whether any error in admitting it warranted reversal of Keys’s convictions.

The Delaware Supreme Court held that the trial court did abuse its discretion in admitting the audio, but that this evidentiary error was harmless given the strength of the remaining evidence. The Court thus affirmed the convictions.

The opinion has two main strands of doctrinal importance:

• It tightens the understanding of when Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) actually applies and emphasizes that vague and interpretive references in third-party rap lyrics do not satisfy the “plain, clear, and conclusive” standard for “other acts” evidence.
• It reinforces that even if courts misapply Rule 404(b), convictions will stand if the properly admitted evidence is sufficient and the error is harmless—but warns against overreliance on inflammatory “cultural” evidence like violent music and lyrics.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The January 2022 Shootings and Arrest

The case stems from three shootings between January 14 and January 22, 2022, in Wilmington:

• January 14 – Daycare shooting:
  • Police responded to a ShotSpotter alert near a daycare.
  • They found numerous shell casings and shattered rear windows of the daycare building.
  • Surveillance video showed three individuals exiting a Hyundai and firing in the direction of two pedestrians.
  • The “middle shooter” wore clothing similar to items later recovered from Keys (black pants, black hoodie, black shoes), and carried a gun with a silver slide—matching a gun later recovered from the stolen Charger Keys was arrested in.
• January 20 – Lombard Street shooting:
  • Officers heard about 20 gunshots and pursued a fleeing Kia Optima with four suspects.
  • Only one suspect, Jahmir Morris-Whitt, was apprehended.
  • Keys was not charged in connection with this incident, but Morris-Whitt was later a codefendant with Keys in other counts.
• January 22 – BP gas station and 7th Street shootings:
  • Shortly after midnight, at a BP gas station, surveillance showed a Kia Soul fleeing while an individual chased it on foot firing a handgun.
  • A gray Mazda, blocking the Kia’s escape route, was sideswiped. Two occupants exited and fired at the Kia.
  • The driver of the Mazda wore distinctive clothing: gray pants with white stripes, white shirt, black hoodie, black shoes—later matched to Keys at arrest.
  • Later that morning in Philadelphia, security footage showed a gray Mazda rear-ending a parked white Dodge Charger in a Walmart parking lot; the Charger was then stolen and driven away, leaving the Mazda behind.
  • In the afternoon, surveillance in Wilmington captured a white Charger; a masked individual in black clothing (again similar to Keys’s) exited with a gun with a silver slide, went into a deli, then returned to the car.
  • Shortly after, another camera captured a person leaning out of the passenger side of the Charger and firing at pedestrians.

That evening, a Wilmington officer saw a white Charger matching the stolen vehicle’s plate. After a chase, he pinned the Charger against a guardrail. The driver fled into the woods; officers arrested other occupants and later found Keys hiding under logs nearby, wearing clothing that closely matched what had been seen in the earlier surveillance videos (black hoodie, white undershirt, gray pants with white stripes). Keys’s black pants were found in the area as well.

A search of the Charger revealed:

• a black 9mm Polymer80 behind the driver’s seat, and
• a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson with a silver slide in the front center console.

Ballistic testing tied:

• the .40 S&W with the silver slide to the January 14 daycare shooting, and
• the 9mm Polymer80 to the BP gas station shooting on January 22.

B. The Instagram “Live” Video and Rap Song

Several hours after the BP shooting and the Philadelphia car theft, a Wilmington officer operating a police Instagram account received a notification that Keys was “going live.” He screen-recorded the stream.

That recording—the central evidentiary issue on appeal—showed:

• Keys driving the stolen white Charger, and
• an aggressive rap song, “F*** Ya Dead Patnaz,” playing in the background.

The State claimed the lyrics:

• referred to “Puff” or “Puffy” in a line: “Puff in the back, don’t lack, he’ll let that draco up;”
• depicted shooting, chasing, and killing (“get out the car, hit a switch and light them up,” “chase a [racial slur] down,” “partners will end up in a ditch”) with gunshots audible in the track; and
• were “about violence in the city of Wilmington.”

“Puff” or “Puffy” was known to be Keys’s street nickname and how his name appeared in some contacts in others’ phones, including his codefendants.

C. Indictment and Trial

Keys was charged in 24 counts of a 44-count indictment, including:

• attempted murder,
• two counts of first-degree assault,
• possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and
• multiple counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (PFBPP), severed for a simultaneous bench trial.

Codefendants included:

• Jahmir Morris-Whitt for the January 14 incident, and
• Markel Richards and Walike Parham for the January 22 incidents.

Before trial, the State notified its intent to introduce the Instagram video. Initially, it appeared the State would use it to tie Keys to the Philadelphia carjacking, implicating Delaware Rule of Evidence (D.R.E.) 404(b) (other bad acts). The prosecutor later disavowed any intent to prove the carjacking itself and limited the purpose to:

• showing that Keys was inside the stolen Charger, and
• invoking the rap lyrics as evidence of Keys’s “motive” and “identity” as a shooter.

Defense counsel conceded the video portion (Keys in the Charger) might be admissible, but objected strongly to the audio (the rap music) as irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and improper character/propensity evidence.

An eight-day jury trial followed, with concurrent bench trial on PFBPP counts. The State’s case on identity relied on:

• surveillance video matching clothing, build, handedness, and presence of a silver-slide firearm to Keys,
• ballistics tying the firearms in the Charger to the earlier shootings,
• cell-site location data placing Keys’s phone at the shooting scenes and at the time of the Philadelphia theft, and
• contact patterns among Keys and codefendants’ phones.

Mid-trial, the Superior Court conducted a voir dire of two officers about the rap song:

• One confirmed “Puff/Puffy” as Keys’s nickname.
• Detective Wham traced the song to rapper Chaz Cowan (2019), with no known connection to Keys, and interpreted the key line as meaning “Puff is on our side; don’t let us catch you without your firearm; a ‘draco’ is a gun.”

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court (Traynor, J., for a unanimous panel) held:

1. The Superior Court abused its discretion by admitting the audio portion of the Instagram video (the rap song) under D.R.E. 404(b).
   • The lyrics did not clearly describe any “crime, wrong, or other act” committed by Keys.
   • They failed the Getz requirement that “other acts” be proved by evidence that is “plain, clear, and conclusive.”
   • Even treated simply as Rule 401/403 evidence, any marginal relevance to identity or motive was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and risk of confusion.
2. However, the error was harmless.
   • The error was not of constitutional magnitude; it was a discretionary evidentiary ruling.
   • Even excluding the rap audio, the remaining evidence—surveillance, ballistics, and cell data— was more than sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Keys was a shooter in the charged incidents.
   • Accordingly, the convictions could stand.

The Court therefore affirmed Keys’s convictions and 47-year sentence (plus probation), while making clear that the contested rap evidence should not have been admitted.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Rules Cited

1. General relevance and prejudice: D.R.E. 401 and 403

The Court began by situating the dispute within the basic framework of evidentiary law:

• D.R.E. 401: Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact “more or less probable” and that fact is “of consequence” in the case.
• D.R.E. 403: Even relevant evidence “may be excluded” if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or related concerns.

The Court cited Stickel v. State, 975 A.2d 780 (Del. 2009), for these bedrock propositions.

2. Other acts evidence: D.R.E. 404(b), Getz, and DeShields

The core doctrinal background comes from:

• D.R.E. 404(b)(1) – the prohibition:
  “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
• D.R.E. 404(b)(2) – the exceptions: such evidence may be admissible for other purposes (motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, lack of accident).

The landmark Delaware case Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988), provides a six-part test for admitting other acts evidence:

1. The other-acts evidence must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute.
2. It must be offered for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b) (or similar non-character purpose).
3. The other acts must be proved by evidence that is plain, clear, and conclusive.
4. The other acts must not be too remote in time.
5. The court must conduct a D.R.E. 403 balancing of probative value vs. unfair prejudice.
6. The jury must receive a limiting instruction explaining the restricted use of the evidence.

DeShields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del. 1998), refines the fifth Getz factor (the 403 balancing) by listing nine considerations, including:

• how disputed the point is,
• the adequacy and strength of proof of the prior conduct,
• the proponent’s need for the evidence and availability of less prejudicial proof,
• the inflammatory nature of the evidence, and
• whether limiting instructions will be effective.

These Getz/DeShields frameworks are central to the Court’s conclusion that the Superior Court misapplied 404(b).

3. Standard of review and abuse of discretion

Citing Morse v. State, 120 A.3d 1 (Del. 2015), and McGuiness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156 (Del. 2024), the Court reaffirmed that:

• Admission of 404(b) evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• An abuse of discretion occurs where a court:
  • “has exceeded the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances,” or
  • “so ignored recognized rules of law or practice as to produce injustice.”

4. Harmless error doctrine

For harmless error, the Court drew on Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1 (Del. 2018), and especially Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602 (Del. 2021), along with earlier cases like Johnson v. State and Dawson v. State.

The key principles:

• Not every error calls for reversal.
• For non-constitutional evidentiary errors:
  “Where the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, error in admitting the evidence is harmless.”
• For constitutional errors, the State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
• Extremely prejudicial use of evidence can amount to a due process violation in rare cases (Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295 (Del. 2006)), but this case did not cross that threshold.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Was 404(b) the right framework at all?

A central and novel aspect of the opinion is the Court’s skepticism that D.R.E. 404(b) should have governed this dispute in the first place. The Court noted:

• The rap song:
  • was written and performed by someone else (rapper Chaz Cowan),
  • pre-dated the charged crimes,
  • referred generically to violence in Wilmington, and
  • included a line mentioning “Puff in the back, don’t lack, he’ll let that draco up.”
• Detective Wham’s interpretation was that:
  • “Puff” meant Keys was “on our side;”
  • “don’t lack” meant “don’t let us catch you without your firearm;”
  • “draco” is slang for a gun.

Crucially, even taking the detective’s interpretation at face value, the Court found:

• the lyrics did not attribute any specific “crime, wrong, or other act” to Keys beyond suggesting that he might be armed or dangerous, and
• there was “no evidence that [Keys] did any of these other things except by reference in a song” created by someone else.

The prosecutor herself conceded that “there’s no prior bad act here” in the Getz sense. This admission is important: it undermines the justification for treating the evidence as 404(b) “other acts” at all.

The Supreme Court’s position:

• Because the song did not clearly describe actual criminal conduct by Keys, 404(b) was a poor fit.
• The trial judge should instead have asked:
  • Is the audio relevant under Rule 401 (does it make any fact of consequence more probable)?
  • If so, does its probative value survive 403 balancing, or is it substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and confusion?

This reframing is a critical contribution of the case: it warns against reflexively “forcing” ambiguous cultural evidence—like music or lyrics—into a 404(b) posture when it may not actually describe “other acts” at all.

2. Even under 401/403, the audio should have been excluded

The Court then considered, effectively, a pure relevance/prejudice analysis:

• Relevance (401):
  • The State argued that the song helped prove identity and motive because:
    • it mentioned “Puff” and depicted a person associated with violence; and
    • Keys was involved in a “week-long series” of shootings while using stolen cars—track themes that roughly paralleled the song’s content.
  • The Court expressed “grave doubts” that the rap lyrics, apart from propensity, truly made it more or less probable that Keys was the shooter in the charged incidents.
• Unfair Prejudice and Confusion (403):
  • Even assuming marginal relevance, the Court found that:
    • any probative value was “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice, and
    • the evidence risked confusing the issues by inviting the jury to focus on a speculative image of Keys as a violent street figure rather than on the concrete forensic and video evidence.

The Court concluded, in clear terms, that “the better approach” would have been to exclude the audio as either irrelevant or substantially more prejudicial than probative.

3. Misapplication of 404(b) and the Getz “plain, clear, and conclusive” requirement

Having questioned the use of 404(b) at all, the Court went on to show that, even if 404(b) applied, the trial court’s Getz analysis was fatally flawed.

The trial court:

• acknowledged that the lyrics did not refer to a “particular incident;”
• recognized there was no real evidence Keys had done the violent acts described in the song; but
• nonetheless concluded that Keys’s act of playing the song was “in a sense a confession” and that this made the lyrics “plain, clear, and conclusive” proof of other acts of violence by Keys.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected this logic:

• The Getz requirement is stringent: other acts must be established by plain, clear, and conclusive evidence.
• Here, the lyrics were:
  • third-party artistic expression,
  • vague and non-specific about who did what, when, or where, and
  • not tied to any particular prior or subsequent crime by Keys.
• Therefore, the Court “cannot square” the trial court’s own observations with its conclusion that the lyric amounted to plain, clear, and conclusive proof of other acts.

On the supposed 404(b) “identity” purpose, the Court found the probative force of the evidence especially weak:

• Read literally, the lyrics do not describe Keys participating in a shooting.
• Even as interpreted by the detective, the line about “Puff” says little more than:
  • Keys is part of some group; and
  • he might possess a firearm (“draco”).
• This does not meaningfully identify him as one of the shooters in the daycare, BP, or 7th Street shootings.

The Court also highlighted that, when pressed, the prosecutor effectively conceded the evidence was at least partially aimed at propensity: “I guess potential propensity.” That acknowledgment underscored the risk that the rap audio’s primary function was to depict Keys as the “kind of person” who shoots people—precisely the type of character reasoning 404(b) prohibits.

Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court’s 404(b) ruling rested “on shaky footing,” and constituted an abuse of discretion.

4. Limiting instructions were not enough to justify admission

The trial judge twice gave careful limiting instructions, telling jurors they:

• could not use the rap evidence to conclude that Keys had a bad character or a propensity to commit crime, and
• could only consider it as to identity and plan.

The Supreme Court did not criticize the wording of the instructions; however, it made clear that:

• the problem here was not that the judge failed to instruct, but that the underlying admission ruling was faulty;
• when evidence is of slight probative value and highly inflammatory, limiting instructions may not cure the initial 403 and 404(b) defects.

Still, in the harmless error analysis, the Court implicitly regarded the presence of limiting instructions as one factor that mitigated the overall impact of the error.

5. Harmless error: Why the convictions stand despite the abuse of discretion

After finding an abuse of discretion, the Court turned to whether the error justified reversal. It emphasized:

• This was an ordinary evidentiary error, not one of constitutional dimension.
• Thus, the standard is whether, excluding the improperly admitted evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

The Court found the State’s case against Keys to be robust even without the rap audio:

• Surveillance video:
  • Multiple videos captured the shooters’ clothing and physical build, matching Keys’s clothing at arrest and his body type.
  • One video showed a shooter wielding a silver-slide gun in his left hand; Keys is left-handed, and a silver-slide Smith & Wesson was found in the Charger at his arrest.
  • Footage linked the gray Mazda used at the BP station to the stolen Charger and then to Keys.
• Ballistics:
  • The .40 S&W in the Charger matched casings from the daycare shooting.
  • The 9mm Polymer80 in the Charger matched the BP station shooting.
  • Thus, the very guns in Keys’s immediate vicinity at arrest were the same guns used in the earlier shootings.
• Cell-site location data:
  • Placed Keys’s phone at the BP station at the time of that shooting.
  • Showed his phone moving in a way consistent with the subsequent chase.
  • Placed his phone in Philadelphia at the time of the Charger theft and near the 7th Street shooting.
• Cell communication patterns:
  • Showed frequent contacts among Keys and codefendants around the relevant times, corroborating the inference of joint participation (even though not individually dispositive).

The Court concluded this evidence was “sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Keys was a shooter in each of the charged incidents” and thus was sufficient to sustain the convictions irrespective of the improperly admitted rap audio.

Notably, the Court also emphasized that, for purposes of the DeShields balancing, even Keys himself had argued in his reply brief that the State “did not need the Instagram audio” given the strength of ballistics and other evidence. The Court agreed—using Keys’s own concession to bolster its harmless-error analysis.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is “propensity” evidence and why is it problematic?

“Propensity” evidence is material offered essentially to say: “This person is the kind of person who does bad things (or this specific type of bad thing), therefore they probably did the bad thing charged in this case.”

Courts distrust this type of reasoning because:

• it encourages decisions based on character judgments rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
• it risks punishing someone for prior conduct (or perceived identity) rather than the specific crime charged; and
• it can inflame juror bias—especially when the alleged “bad character” is tied to race, youth subculture, or other sensitive topics.

D.R.E. 404(b)(1) explicitly forbids using evidence of “crimes, wrongs, or other acts” to prove character in order to show that the person acted “in accordance with the character” on a particular occasion.

2. What is “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b)?

“Other acts” evidence refers to conduct separate from the charged offense: prior crimes, misconduct, or uncharged wrongdoing. For example:

• A prior robbery offered to show a defendant’s identity in a later robbery with a distinctive pattern.
• A past act of domestic violence offered to show motive or intent in a subsequent assault on the same victim.

This evidence may be admissible, but only if:

• it is genuinely offered for a non-propensity purpose (motive, identity, etc.), and
• the fact of the prior act is proved with “plain, clear, and conclusive” evidence (Getz).

In Keys, the Court stressed that vague, interpretive song lyrics about violence, written by a third party and only loosely linked to a defendant’s nickname, do not satisfy this demanding standard.

3. “Plain, clear, and conclusive” – what does that really mean?

This phrase from Getz reflects a high evidentiary threshold. It means:

• the prior act is not merely suspected; it must be clearly established;
• the evidence should leave little room for doubt that the defendant in fact engaged in that other conduct; and
• speculation or inference-on-inference is insufficient.

In Keys, the Supreme Court found:

• no specific prior crime by Keys was identified in the lyrics,
• no direct evidence tied any particular past shooting to Keys through the song, and
• thus, the “plain, clear, and conclusive” standard was not met.

4. What is “harmless error” in plain terms?

“Harmless error” means the trial court made a mistake (here, in admitting evidence), but that mistake did not affect the outcome. In effect:

• the appellate court recognizes the error,
• but concludes that the conviction would have been the same even without the improper evidence.

For ordinary evidentiary errors (like this one), the question is: “Is the properly admitted evidence, standing alone, sufficient to sustain the conviction?”

Because the State’s case against Keys was strong without the rap audio, the Court held the error harmless.

5. Why are rap lyrics and similar cultural evidence so contentious?

Although the Court does not engage in sociological commentary, decisions like Keys sit in a broader national debate over the admissibility of rap lyrics and similar expressive content:

• Rap lyrics often use hyperbole, metaphor, and “persona,” and may not be literal admissions of real-world conduct.
• There is a risk jurors will conflate musical bravado with actual criminal behavior.
• Lyrics about guns, gangs, or violence can trigger strong emotional reactions and bias, often interacting with racial stereotypes.

Keys reinforces that courts must factually and analytically scrutinize such evidence:

• Is it really describing this defendant’s conduct at all?
• Does it clearly connect to specific acts, or is it vague and generic?
• Is the risk of prejudice out of proportion to any legitimate probative value?

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying the scope of D.R.E. 404(b)

Keys v. State clarifies that:

• Not every piece of inflammatory or suggestive evidence belongs under Rule 404(b)’s “other acts” rubric.
• Before invoking 404(b), courts must ask:
  • Does this evidence truly describe a distinct “crime, wrong, or other act” by this defendant?
  • Is there “plain, clear, and conclusive” proof that the defendant actually engaged in that act?
• If the answer is “no,” the analysis should default to straightforward 401/403 relevance and prejudice, rather than attempting to shoehorn the evidence into a 404(b) identity or motive theory.

This is likely to constrain future attempts to use loosely interpretive cultural material (music, social media posts, memes, etc.) as quasi-404(b) proof of “who the defendant really is.”

B. Guidance on social media and rap music as evidence

The decision gives specific guidance on social media and rap audio:

• Seeing a defendant in a stolen car (as in the Instagram video) is plainly relevant—this aspect was not challenged on appeal.
• But overlaying that footage with violent music and lyrics, which are not authored by the defendant and only obliquely reference him, is far more problematic.
• Trial courts must carefully segregate:
  • legitimately probative, concrete content (e.g., location, presence in a vehicle), from
  • highly prejudicial expressive content (e.g., violent songs, bravado lyrics) whose link to the charged conduct is speculative.

Prosecutors in Delaware should expect stricter scrutiny when offering:

• rap lyrics as supposed admissions of violent character or behavior,
• social media content that trades heavily on street nicknames and symbolism, without concrete factual ties, and
• police “interpretations” of lyrics that require multiple inferential steps to connect to the defendant.

C. Emphasis on the strength of core forensic and digital evidence

Another practical impact of Keys is the Court’s implicit message that prosecutors do not need—and should not rely upon—inflammatory cultural evidence when they already have:

• clear surveillance images,
• direct ballistic matches between weapons and crime scenes,
• cell-site data placing the defendant at the scene, and
• documented ties to stolen vehicles and co-conspirators.

The Court’s harmless error analysis underscores that such traditional evidence can be sufficient to sustain serious convictions without resort to marginally relevant but highly prejudicial material.

D. For defense counsel: strategic lessons

Defense attorneys can draw several strategic points from Keys:

• Challenge whether the evidence truly describes an “other act” by the defendant before letting the court slide into a 404(b) framework.
• Emphasize the Getz “plain, clear, and conclusive” requirement where the alleged prior acts are inferred from art, lyrics, or social media bravado.
• Argue hard under D.R.E. 403 that violent or gang-themed music has immense prejudicial force and minimal additional probative value when the State already has robust identification evidence.
• Even if such evidence is admitted, insist on strong limiting instructions as a fallback.

E. Doctrinal consistency: harmless error as a safety valve

The case also illustrates how the harmless error doctrine functions as a “safety valve” in appellate review:

• The Supreme Court can candidly recognize that the trial judge made a legal mistake and “abused discretion,”
• while still avoiding the costs and burdens of retrial when the mistake did not materially affect the outcome.

This preserves both:

• accuracy (by acknowledging and clarifying the law), and
• finality (by avoiding unnecessary reversals where the verdict is well-supported by other evidence).

VII. Conclusion

Keys v. State is an important Delaware Supreme Court decision at the intersection of evidence law, digital media, and cultural expression. The Court held that:

• the Superior Court abused its discretion by admitting the audio portion of an Instagram video in which a third-party rap song, referencing Keys’s nickname and glorifying violence, played while Keys drove a stolen car;
• the rap lyrics did not constitute “other acts” by Keys proved in a “plain, clear, and conclusive” way, and should not have been deemed admissible under D.R.E. 404(b);
• even as simple relevance evidence, any marginal probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and confusion; but
• the error was harmless because the remaining surveillance, ballistic, and digital evidence overwhelmingly established Keys’s role as a shooter.

The decision refines Delaware’s approach to Rule 404(b) and underscores that:

• courts must not stretch vague artistic expressions into “other acts” evidence without firm factual grounding;
• cultural artifacts—especially rap music and social media—must be scrutinized for actual probative value, not assumed to show criminal propensity; and
• traditional forensic and digital evidence remain the appropriate backbone of serious criminal prosecutions.

Going forward, Keys will likely be cited whenever Delaware courts confront efforts to introduce rap lyrics or social media content to suggest that a defendant embraces or participates in violence. It stands for the proposition that such evidence, absent a clear and specific link to concrete acts, is more prejudicial than probative and should ordinarily be excluded—and that when it is improperly admitted, the question becomes whether the State’s legitimate evidence is strong enough to render the error harmless.