Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure v. Wingate: Writs of Prohibition, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and Statutes of Limitation in Declaratory Actions Against Administrative Agencies

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s unpublished memorandum opinion in Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure v. Hon. Thomas D. Wingate, 2025-SC-0246-MR (Dec. 18, 2025), arises from an administrative discipline matter involving a physician, Dr. Pragya B. Gupta, and a subsequent collateral attack on the resulting agreed orders. Although designated “Not to Be Published” under RAP 40(D), the decision is informative on several procedural points:

• the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and particular-case jurisdiction when statutes of limitation are at issue;
• the strict limits on obtaining a writ of prohibition to short-circuit ordinary litigation in circuit court;
• the role of declaratory judgment actions in challenging administrative disciplinary resolutions; and
• the narrowness of writ practice and the collateral order doctrine as substitutes for interlocutory appeal.

At its core, the case addresses whether the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure (the “Board”) could use a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the Franklin Circuit Court from hearing Dr. Gupta’s declaratory judgment action, on the theory that the action was untimely and thus outside the court’s jurisdiction. The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied the writ; the Board appealed; and the Supreme Court affirmed, reinforcing the exceptional nature of writ relief and clarifying that limitations-based challenges belong in the trial and appellate process—not in writ proceedings.

Because this is an unpublished opinion, it is not binding precedent in Kentucky courts under RAP 40(D). However, it may be cited for consideration when no published opinion adequately addresses the issue, and its reasoning is likely to influence litigants and courts in the recurring context of challenges to agency orders and the use of extraordinary writs.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ denial of the Board’s petition for a writ of prohibition against Franklin Circuit Judge Thomas D. Wingate. The Board had sought to prevent the circuit court from proceeding with Dr. Gupta’s declaratory judgment and injunction action challenging an amended agreed order that resolved Board disciplinary charges.

The Court held:

1. No first-class writ (jurisdictional writ): The Franklin Circuit Court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions under KRS 418.040. Whether Dr. Gupta’s petition was filed within the applicable statute of limitations concerns particular-case jurisdiction
2. No second-class writ (erroneous-act writ): The Board had an adequate remedy by appeal. Being required to litigate and incur time and expense does not constitute “great and irreparable injury” justifying a writ. The circuit court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and its decision to permit discovery on limitations issues, can be reviewed after a final judgment.
3. Collateral order doctrine not satisfied: The Board’s attempt to characterize its position as suitable for an interlocutory appeal (via writ) failed. The statute-of-limitations issues were not separate from the merits, were reviewable on final appeal, and did not implicate a substantial public interest that would be imperiled by waiting.
4. Other defenses reserved: The Court explicitly declined to address the Board’s additional arguments—res judicata, venue under KRS 452.005, the nature of agreed orders as final agency action, and the constitutionality of the regulation—as those are not properly resolved in an appeal from the denial of a writ.

In short, the Supreme Court confirmed that the circuit court may proceed with Dr. Gupta’s case, including discovery on factual issues related to timeliness and alleged continuous injury. The Board’s statute-of-limitations and other defenses must be litigated and, if necessary, reviewed through the ordinary appellate process.

III. Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Grievance and Board Proceedings

The dispute traces back to a patient grievance filed against Dr. Gupta in January 2023. The patient alleged that Dr. Gupta allowed his medical assistant to insert an IV line and administer anesthesia—conduct that, if true, would involve unlicensed practice of medicine by the assistant and substandard care by Dr. Gupta.

On April 11, 2023, the same patient filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Kenton Circuit Court, represented by attorney Kristin Turner. Importantly:

• Turner was at that time a member of the Board, and
• she was also the patient’s niece by marriage.

The Board’s expert review concluded that Dr. Gupta had allowed his staff to practice medicine without a license. Inquiry Panel B of the Board held a hearing. At that hearing, Dr. Gupta advised that he had effectively closed his solo Kentucky practice, transferred his patients, ceased performing Kentucky procedures, and was preparing to move to California. Although he wished to maintain his Kentucky license, the panel concluded that:

• the problems identified in the investigation were not correctable by remedial education or monitoring, and
• Dr. Gupta should not practice in an independent setting in Kentucky.

To resolve the matter, Dr. Gupta entered into an agreed order with the Board in June 2023, later amended in August 2023. In these orders, he stipulated that:

• his medical assistant started at least one IV line for the grievant-patient;
• his diagnosis and treatment fell below the minimum standard of care; and
• his uncertified assistant engaged in the unlicensed practice of medicine.

B. Discovery of Alleged Contradictions and Conflicts

In May 2024, during the patient’s deposition in the malpractice case, Dr. Gupta alleges that the patient testified the medical assistant never placed her IV—contradicting assertions in the original grievance that underpinned the Board action. Dr. Gupta also discovered that:

• Turner, serving simultaneously as a Board member and the patient’s counsel, had assisted in filing the grievance; and
• Turner was related to the patient (niece by marriage), raising concerns about a conflict of interest and potential bias in the Board process.

These new developments led Dr. Gupta to file a motion with the Board on August 15, 2024, to vacate or amend the amended agreed order, based on:

• the alleged inconsistency between the grievance and deposition testimony; and
• the alleged conflict and bias involving Board member Turner.

On August 20, 2024, the Board’s executive director responded by letter, denying Dr. Gupta’s request and refusing to submit the matter or the new evidence to the full Board for review. The Board disputed Dr. Gupta’s characterization of the deposition testimony.

C. Dr. Gupta’s Declaratory Judgment Action

In response, Dr. Gupta filed a petition in Franklin Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. He sought, among other things:

1. A declaration that the Board’s actions violated his state and federal constitutional rights.
2. A declaration that 201 KAR 9:082 (the opinion mistakenly cites “201 KAR19:082”) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of disciplinary authority to the Board’s general counsel through informal proceedings.
3. A declaration that the executive director’s refusal to present his motion to amend or vacate the agreed order to the Board was an unconstitutional usurpation of the Board’s statutory authority and a violation of his rights.
4. A declaration that the entire disciplinary process was fundamentally unfair due to bias, conflicts of interest, and related concerns.
5. A declaration that the agreed and amended agreed orders were substantively unconscionable, unfair, and void as against public policy.
6. Judgment in his favor for violation of state and federal constitutional rights.
7. Permanent injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the amended agreed order.

In essence, Dr. Gupta mounted a collateral attack on the final agreed disciplinary orders based on alleged new evidence, conflicts of interest, and constitutional/fairness concerns.

D. The Board’s Motion to Dismiss and the Circuit Court’s Ruling

The Board responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting (in summary):

• The petition was untimely under:
  • the 30-day statute of limitations for judicial review of final agency orders under KRS 13B.140 (the opinion refers to “KRS213.B.140”); and
  • the one-year limitation for federal civil rights claims (the opinion cites “41 U.S.C.3 § 1983,” clearly referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
• The Board acted within its statutory authority at all times.
• The constitutional challenge to 201 KAR 9:082 was moot, because that regulation was not applied to Dr. Gupta.
• The Board and individual respondents were immune from suit.
• No legally cognizable conflict of interest had been demonstrated.

The Franklin Circuit Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that:

• the pleadings raised factual disputes requiring discovery (including disputes about continuous injury and timeliness),
• the statute-of-limitations defense could not be resolved without development of the record, and
• Dr. Gupta possessed standing to pursue the action.

The Board moved for reconsideration, characterizing the statute of limitations as a jurisdictional bar that should be decided purely on the face of the pleadings. The circuit court again rejected the Board’s argument, emphasizing that Dr. Gupta’s claim of a continuous course of conduct by the Board created factual questions about limitations that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

E. The Writ Petition and Appellate Proceedings

Rather than proceed through discovery and trial, the Board turned to the appellate courts, filing a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals. The Board argued:

• The circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case was filed outside both the KRS 13B.140 30-day window and the one-year § 1983 limitations period.
• The Board lacked an adequate remedy on appeal, as it would incur the burdens and costs of defending litigation that was time-barred.

The Court of Appeals denied the writ, reasoning:

• The circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction under KRS 418.040 to hear declaratory judgment actions.
• Limitations challenges go to compliance with statutory requirements and jurisdictional facts—not to subject-matter jurisdiction—and thus fall within the trial court’s province.
• The Board had an adequate remedy by appeal; the mere burden of litigation does not justify extraordinary writ relief.

The Board then appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, pressing six arguments, primarily focused on jurisdiction, timeliness, the nature of agreed orders, venue, and res judicata. The Supreme Court confined its review to the two central writ issues (jurisdiction and adequacy of remedy) and affirmed the denial of the writ.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. Standard of Review for Writ Denials – Appalachian Racing

The Court begins by reiterating the three-part standard from Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 504 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2016):

1. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are reviewed for clear error.
2. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
3. The ultimate decision to issue or deny a writ is reviewed for abuse of discretion—i.e., whether the ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.

This framing underscores that writ relief is discretionary and extraordinary, not a routine procedural tool.

B. Writs of Prohibition: First-Class vs. Second-Class

Kentucky law, as summarized in Appalachian Racing, recognizes two types of writs of prohibition:

1. First-class writ: where the lower court is proceeding (or about to proceed) outside its jurisdiction, and there is no remedy via application to an intermediate court.
2. Second-class writ: where the lower court is acting (or about to act) erroneously yet within its jurisdiction, and:
   • there is no adequate remedy by appeal, and
   • great and irreparable injury will result without the writ.

These categories are crucial to the Court’s analysis:

• The Board sought a first-class writ by framing the limitations issue as one of subject-matter jurisdiction.
• It also sought a second-class writ by arguing that the burden of ongoing litigation constituted irreparable harm and that appellate review would be inadequate.

C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Particular-Case Jurisdiction

The opinion leans heavily on recent Kentucky jurisprudence distinguishing subject-matter jurisdiction from what it calls particular-case jurisdiction (or “jurisdictional facts”):

• S.I.A. Ltd., Inc. v. Wingate, 677 S.W.3d 487 (Ky. 2023), quoting Basin Energy Co. v. Howard, 447 S.W.3d 179 (Ky. App. 2014), holds that subject-matter jurisdiction:
  • must be determined without reference to case-specific factual disputes; and
  • “either exists or it does not,” and cannot be waived.
• Louisville Historical League, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 709 S.W.3d 213 (Ky. 2025), quoting Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733 (Ky. 2007), emphasizes that questions about compliance with statutory requirements and “jurisdictional facts” involve particular-case jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction.

This doctrinal line is critical: the Court uses it to reject the Board’s attempt to recast a limitations defense as a total absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.

D. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction – Davis v. Wingate

In Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720 (Ky. 2014), the Court held that KRS 418.040 authorizes “a claim for a declaration of rights to be brought in any court of record in the Commonwealth.” The Court relies on this to conclude that:

• Franklin Circuit Court plainly has subject-matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions like Dr. Gupta’s,
• even if the specific case may ultimately be dismissed for other reasons (limitations, res judicata, immunity, etc.).

E. Adequate Remedy by Appeal and Irreparable Injury – S.I.A. Ltd. and Ridgeway

On the second-class writ analysis, the Court again cites S.I.A. Ltd. and Ridgeway Nursing & Rehab. Facility, LLC v. Lane, 415 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2013), to articulate the standard:

• “No adequate remedy by appeal” means that the injury cannot be corrected in later proceedings or on appeal.
• “Great and irreparable injury” is something more than the normal costs and burdens of litigation; it must be “of a ruinous nature,” involving “incalculable damage” or “far-reaching and conjectural consequences.”

The Court uses this framework to reject the Board’s argument that the inconvenience and cost of continued litigation amount to irreparable harm.

F. Collateral Order Doctrine – Romines v. Coleman

Finally, the Court invokes Romines v. Coleman, 671 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2023), to underscore that a writ petition cannot serve as a backdoor interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss, except in the rare situation where the collateral order doctrine applies. Under Romines, the collateral order doctrine requires:

1. conclusive resolution of an important issue separate from the merits;
2. an order that would be effectively unreviewable on appeal after final judgment; and
3. an issue involving a substantial public interest that would be imperiled absent immediate review.

The Court concludes that the Board’s limitations challenge does not satisfy any of these criteria.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. First-Class Writ: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Exists

The Board’s principal argument for a first-class writ was that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Dr. Gupta’s action was not filed within:

• the 30-day period for judicial review of final agency decisions under KRS 13B.140; or
• the one-year limitations period applicable to civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which the opinion references as “41 U.S.C.3 § 1983”).

The Supreme Court rejected this argument by drawing a clear line between:

• Subject-matter jurisdiction — the power of the court to hear and decide the kind or class of case (here, a declaratory judgment action); and
• Particular-case jurisdiction / jurisdictional facts — whether the specific plaintiff brought the case in compliance with statutory requirements (including limitations) and whether factual circumstances (like continuous injury) affect timeliness.

Key steps in the Court’s reasoning:

1. KRS 418.040 confers subject-matter jurisdiction.
   Under Davis v. Wingate, KRS 418.040 authorizes courts of record to hear declaratory judgment actions. Dr. Gupta’s suit is styled as a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief action—exactly the type of case KRS 418.040 contemplates. Thus, the Franklin Circuit Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such an action.
2. Limitations issues are case-specific, not jurisdictional in the subject-matter sense.
   Whether a particular petition is filed within a limitations period is a question of case-specific statutory compliance and “jurisdictional facts,” as discussed in Louisville Historical League and Nordike. Such questions fall squarely within the trial court’s role to decide in the first instance.
3. Continuous injury allegations require factual development.
   Dr. Gupta alleges the Board engaged in a continuous course of conduct causing ongoing injury, which may affect the running of the statute of limitations. The circuit court agreed that this creates a factual dispute that must be explored through discovery, not resolved purely on the pleadings.

Because the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction, and because limitations concerns implicate particular-case jurisdiction rather than the court’s core authority, a first-class writ is unavailable. The Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in so holding.

B. Second-Class Writ: Adequate Remedy by Appeal and No Irreparable Harm

The Board sought a second-class writ by arguing that:

• it lacked an adequate remedy by appeal, since it would bear the burdens of litigation in a time-barred case; and
• it would suffer “great and irreparable injury” if not relieved from defending the suit immediately.

The Supreme Court rejected this as well, echoing its prior holdings:

1. Appeal is an adequate remedy for denial of a motion to dismiss.
   The circuit court’s refusal to dismiss the case and decision to permit discovery can be addressed in the ordinary course:
   • through pretrial motion practice and factual development; and
   • on appeal from any final judgment, if one is ultimately entered against the Board.
   Thus, the Board has an adequate remedy by appeal.
2. Litigation burden is not “great and irreparable injury.”
   Under S.I.A. Ltd. and Ridgeway, the costs and time associated with litigation—even in a case the defendant believes is clearly barred—are not enough. “Great and irreparable injury” requires harm of a ruinous or incalculable nature. Merely being forced to defend the case does not meet that threshold.

Accordingly, the Board failed to demonstrate the requisite absence of alternative remedies or the presence of great and irreparable injury to justify a second-class writ.

C. Collateral Order Doctrine: No Basis for Interlocutory Review

The Court notes that the Board’s petition is, in practical terms, an attempt at an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss—an approach permitted only under the stringent collateral order doctrine described in Romines v. Coleman.

Applying Romines, the Court finds:

• Not separate from the merits: Whether the action is time-barred (and whether a continuous course of conduct or continuing injury affects limitation) is intertwined with the merits and the factual context, rather than being wholly collateral.
• Not effectively unreviewable later: If the circuit court’s limitations ruling is erroneous, it can be fully corrected on appeal after final judgment. The Board’s interests are not irreparably lost by waiting.
• No substantial public interest imperiled: The Board invoked its statutory role in regulating medicine and the importance of finality in agreed orders, asserting that allowing such suits threatens the system of informal resolution. The Court found this asserted public interest neither sufficiently substantial nor imperiled by allowing the litigation to proceed. The mere fact that an agency must defend a particular lawsuit does not undermine its broader regulatory mission.

Thus, this case does not fit within the narrow category of interlocutory orders subject to immediate appellate review under the collateral order doctrine, and it is inappropriate to use a writ as a surrogate for such an appeal.

D. Declining to Reach the Board’s Substantive Defenses

Having concluded that neither a first-class nor a second-class writ is appropriate, the Court expressly declined to address the Board’s remaining arguments:

• that the agreed and amended agreed orders are final, enforceable settlements and therefore final agency actions;
• that KRS 452.005, a venue statute, does not authorize a new cause of action;
• that venue provisions somehow affect subject-matter jurisdiction; and
• that res judicata bars Dr. Gupta’s claims.

The Court emphasizes these issues are not properly before it in an appeal from the denial of a writ. If they remain relevant after the circuit court issues a final judgment, the Board may raise them on direct appeal.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Writ of Prohibition

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy by which a higher court orders a lower court to stop doing something:

• First-class writ: Used when the lower court has no legal power to hear the case at all.
• Second-class writ: Used when the lower court has power over the case but is alleged to be acting wrongly in a way that cannot be fixed later.

Because writs can interrupt cases midstream, courts are cautious; they reserve them for truly exceptional circumstances.

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Particular-Case Jurisdiction

• Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear a type of case (e.g., criminal, civil, declaratory judgment). It is set by constitution and statute and:
  • cannot be created by consent;
  • cannot be waived; and
  • does not depend on the particular facts of a given case.
• Particular-case jurisdiction (sometimes called “jurisdictional facts”) refers to whether the court can hear this specific case:
  • Was the complaint filed on time?
  • Is there a continuing injury that affects the running of a statute of limitations?
  • Were all necessary procedural steps properly taken?

In this case, the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgments is clear. The real question is whether, in this particular case, Dr. Gupta satisfied limitations and related statutory prerequisites—a matter for the trial court and later appellate review, not a reason to say the court has no jurisdiction at all.

C. Statute of Limitations vs. Jurisdiction

A statute of limitations sets a deadline for filing a lawsuit or appeal. Missing the deadline may:

• bar the claim;
• serve as a defense that must be pleaded and proven; but
• does not necessarily deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the category of case.

Kentucky law, as reflected here, treats limitations as affecting the particular case, not the court’s inherent power to adjudicate such matters.

D. Declaratory Judgment Actions

A declaratory judgment is a civil action in which a party asks the court to:

• declare the parties’ rights, status, or legal relations; and sometimes
• enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unlawful or unconstitutional act.

KRS 418.040 permits such actions in any court of record, making them a common vehicle for challenging the legality or constitutionality of government actions, including administrative disciplinary proceedings.

E. Continuous Course of Conduct / Continuing Injury

The opinion briefly alludes to Dr. Gupta’s claim that the Board engaged in a “continuous course of conduct,” suggesting:

• the harm from the Board’s actions did not end with the issuance of the agreed orders;
• the ongoing enforcement or collateral consequences of those orders may constitute continuing injury that either:
  • extends or tolls the limitations period; or
  • starts the clock anew as new harm accrues.

Whether such a theory is correct in this case is a fact-intensive question that must be developed in the circuit court and is precisely why dismissal at the pleadings stage was deemed premature.

F. Collateral Order Doctrine

The collateral order doctrine is a narrow exception to the rule that only final judgments are appealable. An interlocutory order is immediately appealable only if it:

1. conclusively resolves a dispute that is separate from the merits of the underlying case;
2. would be effectively unreviewable if the parties had to wait for a final judgment; and
3. involves an important public interest that would be jeopardized without immediate review.

In this case, the timeliness and limitations issues are not separate from the merits and are reviewable after final judgment. Consequently, the collateral order doctrine does not apply.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Administrative Agencies and Licensing Boards

This opinion sends a clear message to administrative agencies, including professional licensing boards:

• Writs are not a shortcut to avoid defending collateral challenges in circuit court.
• Agencies that enter into informal resolutions (e.g., agreed orders) may still face:
  • constitutional challenges,
  • conflict-of-interest claims,
  • assertions of bias or unfair process, and
  • attempts to revisit settlements based on newly discovered evidence.
• Defenses such as:
  • statutes of limitation,
  • res judicata,
  • finality of agreed orders,
  • immunity, and
  • venue objections
  must generally be litigated and preserved for appeal instead of being resolved via extraordinary writ.

The decision also addresses—and rejects as overstated—the Board’s claimed public interest in preserving strict finality of administrative settlements as a basis for immediate writ relief. The Court suggests that requiring the Board to defend a lawsuit does not “obliterate” its capacity to resolve cases informally.

B. For Regulated Professionals and Licensees

For professionals subject to discipline (e.g., physicians), the opinion underscores:

• Declaratory judgment actions are a viable tool to challenge disciplinary proceedings on constitutional or procedural grounds, even after agreed orders, provided:
  • timeliness issues can be overcome or reasonably disputed; and
  • there are plausible allegations of ongoing injury, bias, or newly discovered evidence.
• The trial court, not the Board, will typically be the forum for litigating whether such challenges are timely or barred by preclusion doctrines.

However, the Supreme Court did not endorse Dr. Gupta’s underlying claims; it simply left them open for factual and legal development in the circuit court. The ultimate fate of his challenge remains to be seen.

C. For Trial Courts

The decision reinforces for circuit courts that:

• They have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions challenging administrative actions, including professional discipline.
• They may:
  • permit discovery to resolve factual disputes regarding limitations, continuing injury, and alleged ongoing conduct;
  • defer ruling on statute-of-limitations defenses until after the record is more fully developed.
• They should view writ petitions from agencies skeptically when those petitions seek to re-characterize fact-intensive limitations defenses as jurisdictional defects.

D. For Appellate Practice and Writ Strategy

On a broader procedural level, the opinion:

• Reaffirms the rarity of successful writ petitions, especially where:
  • subject-matter jurisdiction is plainly conferred by statute; and
  • the alleged error (e.g., denial of a motion to dismiss) is fully correctable on appeal.
• Warns against treating writ proceedings as:
  • a routine alternative to interlocutory appeal, or
  • a vehicle to have the Supreme Court resolve time-bar or res judicata issues prematurely.
• Clarifies the narrowness of the collateral order doctrine in Kentucky, reinforcing that only truly collateral, unreviewable, and publicly significant questions qualify.

E. The Unpublished Nature of the Opinion

Although designated “Not to Be Published” under RAP 40(D), the opinion:

• is not binding precedent in Kentucky courts;
• may nonetheless be cited for consideration when no published opinion adequately addresses the issue, provided the opinion is attached and properly identified as unpublished;
• adds to a growing body of case law refining the line between subject-matter jurisdiction and limitations-based particular-case jurisdiction.

In practice, litigants in similar writ and administrative contexts may find this opinion persuasive, especially when combined with published cases like S.I.A. Ltd., Louisville Historical League, Davis, and Romines.

VIII. Conclusion

Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure v. Wingate stands as a careful, though unpublished, reaffirmation of several important principles in Kentucky procedure and administrative law:

• Subject-matter jurisdiction arises from statutory and constitutional grants (here, KRS 418.040) and is distinct from limitations-based questions about a particular case.
• Statutes of limitation and related timeliness defenses typically involve case-specific factual issues—such as continuous injury—and are to be addressed in the trial court and, if needed, on appeal, not via writ of prohibition.
• Writs of prohibition remain an exceptional remedy:
  • First-class writs are reserved for clear absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Second-class writs require both lack of an adequate remedy by appeal and great, irreparable harm—far more than litigation burdens.
• The collateral order doctrine is narrow and does not permit interlocutory review of routine denials of motions to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds.

For agencies, licensees, and courts, this decision underscores that final administrative settlements and limitations defenses do not categorically insulate agencies from collateral judicial scrutiny. Instead, those questions are to be worked out, in the first instance, in the circuit court, with ordinary appellate review available later. Writ practice is not a substitute for that process.