Kelly Rainey v. Jesse Lewis: Clarifying Probable Cause Requirements in §1983 Claims for Arrest and No-Knock Warrant Issuance

Introduction

In Kelly Rainey v. Jesse Lewis, No. 24-2068 (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025), the Seventh Circuit addressed whether law-enforcement officers and an investigator violated the Fourth Amendment by arresting Kelly Rainey without probable cause and obtaining a no-knock search warrant based on allegedly misleading affidavits. Rainey—after spending 19 months in jail on drug and conspiracy charges that were later dropped—brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against two Racine County officers and Investigator Jesse Lewis. The core issues were (1) whether the pre-arrest information and controlled buys established probable cause for arrest, and (2) whether the search-warrant affidavit contained knowingly false or recklessly omitted statements so as to invalidate the warrant under Franks v. Delaware.

Summary of the Judgment

The district court (magistrate judge by consent) granted summary judgment for defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court held:

• Probable cause existed for Rainey’s arrest based on four controlled buys in which a pre-searched confidential informant obtained cocaine from Rainey’s home under audio/video surveillance.
• The no-knock search warrant was supported by probable cause—Investigator Lewis personally received cocaine from the residence—and Rainey failed to show any material, intentional or reckless falsehoods or omissions in the warrant affidavit.
• Rainey’s Franks challenge lacked evidence that the affidavit’s statements about firearm risk or informant credibility were knowingly false or necessary to probable-cause findings.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013): Probable cause is evaluated by whether the facts available—viewed under totality of the circumstances—warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe evidence is present.
• Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): A search warrant is invalid if an affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth includes false statements or omits material facts necessary to establish probable cause.
• United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2014): Reversal of a warrant when the affiant relied solely on an informant’s unchecked statements and omitted exculpatory information.
• Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997): Framework for evaluating no-knock entries, requiring reasonable suspicion that announcing presence would be dangerous or futile.
• Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013): Probable cause to arrest demands a fair probability of criminal activity under the totality of circumstances.
• United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2006) & United States v. Bacon, 991 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2021): Controlled buys and the “fair probability” standard for establishing probable cause at entry and arrest.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the totality-of-circumstances test for probable cause. On arrest, four documented controlled buys—where the informant was searched, recorded, monitored, and delivered cocaine—constituted a “fair probability” that Rainey was distributing drugs. Eyewitness testimony by police was unnecessary; direct receipt of contraband by the affiant fortified the probable-cause conclusion.

On the search warrant, Investigator Lewis’s affidavit recited personal involvement in receiving cocaine from Rainey’s home. Rainey’s attempt to undermine probable cause through a Franks challenge failed because he produced no evidence that Lewis knowingly or recklessly misrepresented facts about informant reliability or the potential presence of weapons. The Seventh Circuit distinguished this from Glover, where the affiant’s exclusive reliance on an informant—absent corroboration—warranted invalidation.

3. Impact

This decision reaffirms key points for § 1983 litigants and law enforcement:

• Controlled Buys: Properly conducted buys—searching informants, employing surveillance, and obtaining contraband—provide strong probable cause evidence.
• Affidavit Corroboration: Personal confirmation by an affiant that they received contraband reduces the risk that courts will find material omissions or falsehoods under Franks.
• No-Knock Warrants: The framework of Richards remains applicable; officers must show reasonable suspicion of danger or destruction of evidence when seeking no-knock authority.

Lower courts will likely cite this case to underscore that § 1983 plaintiffs challenging probable cause need concrete evidence of intentional falsehoods or reckless omissions, not mere speculation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A practical, non-technical standard requiring a fair probability—more than mere suspicion—that evidence of a crime is present.
• Franks Hearing: A hearing in which a defendant can challenge the veracity of statements in a warrant affidavit; success requires proof of deliberate or reckless falsehoods or omissions essential to probable cause.
• Controlled Buy: A law-enforcement operation where an informant, searched and monitored by police, purchases contraband to establish evidence of illegal activity.
• No-Knock Warrant: A warrant permitting officers to enter without announcing their presence, justified only when announcing would be dangerous, futile, or allow destruction of evidence.

Conclusion

In Kelly Rainey v. Jesse Lewis, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that well-executed controlled buys, combined with direct affiant corroboration, satisfy probable-cause requirements for arrests and search warrants. It also clarified that a Franks challenge demands concrete proof of intentional or reckless misrepresentations essential to the probable-cause analysis. This ruling strengthens law-enforcement procedures in drug investigations while setting a high bar for § 1983 litigants seeking to overturn arrests and warrants on the basis of alleged affidavit defects.