Kellogg v. Nichols: The Second Circuit Bars § 1983 Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Against State Judges Serving as Firearms Licensing Officers

1. Introduction

Kellogg v. Nichols, No. 23-8093-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2025), arose after two New York residents—Jeremy Kellogg and Jonathan Harmon—were denied concealed-carry licenses by County Court Judge Jonathan D. Nichols acting as a statutory “licensing officer” under New York Penal Law § 400.00. The applicants filed a federal civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They sued Judge Nichols in both his individual capacity (seeking nominal damages) and official capacity (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would invalidate large portions of New York’s firearms licensing and possession scheme).

The district court (Hurd, J.) dismissed all federal claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, setting two important precedents:

1. Reaffirmation that state judges acting on firearms license applications function in a judicial capacity and therefore enjoy absolute judicial immunity from money-damage claims.
2. For the first time, a holding that Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement bars § 1983 declaratory and injunctive relief against those judges because they lack an adversarial stake in defending the challenged licensing statute.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel (Lohier, J.; Raggi & Wesley, JJ.), the court held:

• Under Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo, judges deciding firearm applications act as judges, not administrators; thus absolute judicial immunity bars individual-capacity claims for damages.
• Article III jurisdiction is absent for official-capacity claims because no “live case or controversy” exists between an applicant challenging the statute and a judge neutrally applying it. Consequently, both the declaratory and injunctive components of the suit must be dismissed.

The panel purposely declined to decide whether plaintiffs could instead sue enforcement officers (e.g., sheriffs or police commissioners) who both adjudicate and enforce licensing decisions, reserving that issue for future cases.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2020) — Established that New York judges have absolute judicial immunity when denying pistol permits. Role here: controlled the immunity question; the panel refused to overturn it.
• N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) — Mentioned as abrogating Libertarian Party on the substantive Second Amendment analysis, but not on judicial-immunity grounds; thus the immunity portion remains binding.
• Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976) — Earlier Second Circuit authority that dismissed a § 1983 suit against a state judge for lack of Article III adversity. Provided direct precedent for the “no controversy” principle.
• In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.) — Widely followed for the rule that judges applying a statute are not proper defendants for declaratory-judgment challenges to that statute. Relied on for the functional/adversity analysis.
• Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) — Noted caveat where injunctive relief can sometimes issue against judges, but only if Article III adversity exists and § 1983’s special limitation is met. The panel distinguished Pulliam.
• Peripheral circuit precedents: Allen v. DeBello (3d Cir.), Lindke v. Tomlinson (6th Cir.), Bauer v. Texas (5th Cir.) — Used to support the “functional approach” in deciding whether a judge is an adjudicator or enforcer.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Absolute Judicial Immunity (Individual-Capacity Claims)

1. Functional Approach: The key inquiry is whether the challenged acts are judicial in nature. Here, Judge Nichols reviewed evidence, applied statutory criteria, and issued written rulings—quintessential judicial functions.
2. Binding Precedent: Libertarian Party already determined that identical activities by firearms licensing officers are judicial. Under the Second Circuit’s law-of-the-circuit doctrine, only the Supreme Court or the en banc court may overrule that holding.
3. Result: Damages claims cannot proceed; they are barred by absolute immunity.

b) Article III “Case or Controversy” (Official-Capacity Claims)

1. Adversity Requirement: For declaratory or injunctive relief, the defendant must have interests adverse to plaintiff. Judges, as neutral arbiters, lack personal or institutional stakes in defending statutory schemes.
2. No Enforcement Power: New York’s licensing judges do not initiate prosecutions or enforce § 265 criminal provisions. Enforcement lies with the State’s executive branch (district attorneys, police).
3. Functional Factors: The court examined whether Judge Nichols could (i) initiate proceedings, (ii) enforce outcomes, (iii) set or change license criteria, or (iv) otherwise benefit from the statute. All answers were negative.
4. Scope of Holding: Because there is no adversity, federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims for either declaratory or injunctive relief against the judge.
5. § 1983 Injunction Bar: The panel noted, but did not rely on, § 1983’s built-in restriction on injunctive relief against judicial officers (“unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”). By resolving the issue on Article III grounds, the court ended the matter one step earlier.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Suing the Wrong Defendant: Would-be plaintiffs challenging New York’s firearms regime must now direct § 1983 claims against officials who enforce the law (e.g., police commissioners, sheriffs, prosecutors), not against the state judges issuing or denying licenses.
• Broader Judicial-Immunity Shield: The decision clarifies that when legislatures assign licensing-type decisions to judges, those judges retain immunity so long as their role remains adjudicatory, not administrative.
• Article III Clarity Beyond Guns: While the facts concern firearms, the holding applies to any licensing or regulatory system in which a state judge functions as a neutral decision-maker—procedures governing professional licenses, child-custody determinations, election certifications, etc.
• Strategic Litigation Shift: Civil-rights litigators must carefully select defendants who possess both a direct enforcement role and an adverse stake, or risk outright dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
• Federal-State Comity:** By limiting federal suits against state judges, the ruling reinforces respect for state judicial independence and channels constitutional challenges into suits against executive actors or into state-court channels.