Keith v. Griffiths: Material Factual Disputes Bar Qualified and Statutory Immunity in Deadly Force §1983 Claims

Introduction

Rita Keith, as administrator of the estate of her son Arthur Keith, sued Officer James Griffiths under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Arthur’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, and asserted related Ohio state‐law claims for wrongful death and survivorship. The dispute arose after Griffiths, responding to reports of a suspicious vehicle, shot and killed Arthur Keith during an encounter in a housing‐authority parking lot in November 2020. At summary judgment the district court concluded that Griffiths was entitled to qualified immunity (federal) and statutory immunity (Ohio), but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that genuine disputes of material fact about whether Keith turned and pointed a gun at the officer barred immunity at that stage.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. It applied the familiar two‐step qualified immunity test (Harlow v. Fitzgerald) and Ohio’s immunity statute (Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03). On the critical question—did Keith pose an immediate deadly threat by turning and pointing a gun at Griffiths?—the officer’s testimony conflicted with two juvenile eyewitnesses. Under Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, deadly force is reasonable only when an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a serious threat. Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court held that a jury could credit the eyewitnesses and find that Keith never pointed his weapon at Griffiths. Because that dispute was material to both federal and state immunity defenses, summary judgment was improper. The case was reversed and remanded for trial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) – established the qualified immunity framework.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) – set the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard for force.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) – held that deadly force is reasonable only when there is probable cause the suspect poses a serious harm threat.
Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) – clarified the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis when force is used.
Burnette v. Gee, 137 F. App’x 806 (6th Cir. 2005) – noted caution when an officer is the lone survivor but did not mandate summary judgment in every such case.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) – provides that state immunity does not apply to acts done with “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”

Legal Reasoning

1. Qualified Immunity Analysis Under Harlow, a public official is immune unless (a) the officer violated a constitutional right; and (b) that right was clearly established. The Sixth Circuit viewed all evidence and drew inferences in the plaintiff’s favor (Matsushita; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby). Because the juvenile witnesses testified that Keith never turned and pointed a gun—and a reasonable jury could credit them—the court held there was a genuine issue whether Griffiths’s use of deadly force was “objectively reasonable” under Graham and Garner.

2. Physical Facts Rule The district court attempted to apply a “physical facts” rule to disregard contradictory witness testimony, but the Sixth Circuit explained that this rule applies only when undisputed physical evidence conclusively refutes testimony. Here, the autopsy and DNA evidence showed Keith had a gun, but did not resolve whether he pointed it at Griffiths. Thus credibility remained a jury question.

3. Ohio Statutory Immunity Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03 shields public employees from tort liability absent “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Because the same material fact—whether Keith pointed a gun at Griffiths—governed both excessive‐force reasonableness and recklessness, the state immunity defense rose or fell with federal qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to both.

Impact

This decision carries several implications:

It reinforces that summary judgment on qualified immunity is improper where eyewitness accounts create genuine disputes about whether a suspect posed an immediate deadly threat.
It clarifies that Ohio statutory immunity under § 2744.03 aligns with federal qualified immunity’s fact‐sensitive framework, including exceptions for reckless conduct.
Counsel will need to marshal credible eyewitness and physical‐facts evidence to defend or oppose immunity motions in excessive‐force cases.
Law enforcement agencies may revisit training and reporting to ensure clarity in high‐stress encounters and to document threat perceptions contemporaneously.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A doctrine that shields government officials from civil damages unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.
Statutory Immunity (Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03): Covers public employees unless their conduct is malicious, in bad faith, or wanton/reckless.
Objective Reasonableness: The Fourth Amendment test (from Graham) asking whether an officer’s use of force is reasonable under the circumstances, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.
Physical Facts Rule: A limited principle that excludes witness testimony only when indisputable physical evidence conclusively contradicts it.
Deadly Force Standard: Under Garner, an officer may use deadly force only when there is probable cause to believe the suspect poses a serious threat of harm.

Conclusion

In Keith v. Griffiths, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that summary judgment on immunity defenses is inappropriate when factual disputes persist about whether a suspect posed an immediate threat. The ruling underscores the jury’s role in resolving credibility and factual inferences, and aligns Ohio’s statutory immunity exceptions with federal qualified immunity. The decision strengthens constitutional protections against excessive force while clarifying immunity doctrines in state and federal law.