Karpen v. Andrade: Defining When HSTPA’s Personal-Use Limitations Govern Pending Holdover Proceedings

Introduction

The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Matter of Karpen v. Andrade, 2025 NY Slip Op 03719 (June 18 2025), resolved a pivotal question left open since New York’s Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (“HSTPA”) dramatically overhauled rent-regulation statutes. The court confronted whether HSTPA’s tightened “personal use” exception—which limits landlords to recovering one unit upon a showing of “immediate and compelling necessity” for themselves or immediate family—applies to holdover proceedings that were already pending on the statute’s effective date but where no judgment of possession had yet been entered.

Three sets of tenants (the appellants) in a six-unit, rent-stabilized Brooklyn building received non-renewal and termination notices in 2017–2018 after landlord Shlomo Karpen announced plans to merge four units into his personal residence and combine the remaining space into a second dwelling. The tenants moved to dismiss, invoking the new HSTPA restrictions. The Civil Court agreed; the Appellate Term reversed; and now the Appellate Division has reinstated dismissal, firmly holding that HSTPA governs all cases pending on its enactment date absent a previously secured judgment of possession.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Department reversed the Appellate Term and affirmed the Civil Court’s dismissal of the landlord’s petitions.
It ruled that applying HSTPA’s personal-use amendments to these proceedings is not a prohibited retroactive application because the landlord had no vested right to possession before judgment.
Therefore, the “one-unit” and “immediate and compelling necessity” requirements apply, and Karpen’s multi-unit recovery petitions were facially deficient under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. DHCR, 35 NY3d 332 (2020).
• Held that applying HSTPA’s new rent-overcharge calculation retroactively was impermissible.
• The Appellate Term relied on Regina to resist retroactivity, but the Second Department distinguished it: Regina involved altering substantive liability for completed conduct, whereas personal-use cases involve prospective relief and no vested right.
Matter of Harris v. Israel, 191 AD3d 468 (1st Dep’t 2021).
• Found HSTPA inapplicable where the landlord had already obtained a judgment of possession pre-HSTPA.
• The Second Department agreed with Harris’ principle—that a judgment creates a vested right—but emphasized its factual dissimilarity: Karpen lacked such a judgment.
IG Second Generation Partners L.P. v. DHCR, 10 NY3d 474 (2008) and subsequent AD cases (4040 BA LLC, 300 Wadsworth).
• Stand for the notion that landlords have no vested right until definitive administrative or judicial relief is granted. The court applied this line directly to conclude that Karpen’s expectation of recovering units was not constitutionally protected.
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
• Provides the federal retroactivity framework adopted by New York. The majority borrowed Landgraf’s language to show HSTPA merely regulates future relief, not past conduct.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The ruling unfolds in two analytical steps:

Characterizing the Statute’s Application. The court first determined that HSTPA’s section limiting personal-use recovery is, by its own terms (Part I §5), intended to apply to “any tenant in possession at or after” the effective date. Because the tenants remained in possession on June 14 2019, legislative intent favored application.
Retroactivity vs. Prospective Application. Relying on Landgraf/Regina criteria, the panel asked whether applying the statute “impair[s] rights a party possessed” or “impose[s] new duties” regarding completed transactions. Noting that no judgment of possession existed, the court held Karpen’s interest was inchoate; therefore, the amendments regulated only the prospective relief he sought. Because no vested right was disturbed, constitutional due-process or retroactivity concerns were absent.

3. Anticipated Impact

Landlord Strategies. Landlords initiating personal-use holds must now expect HSTPA compliance unless they already hold a judgment of possession. Multi-unit recovery schemes, common in building conversions, will face near-certain dismissal.
Tenant Advocacy. Tenants’ counsel gain a clear procedural defense: file a pre-answer motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) whenever the petition seeks >1 unit or lacks “immediate and compelling necessity.”
Judicial Economy. The decision encourages lower courts to dispose of non-compliant petitions at the pleading stage, reducing evidentiary hearings on necessity.
Appellate Uniformity. The opinion harmonizes divergent Appellate Term and First Department approaches, signaling to trial courts statewide that Harris is limited to cases with judgments in hand.
Legislative Deference. The court underscores that clear statutory language (“shall apply…”) will be honored absent constitutional infringement, reinforcing legislative primacy in rent regulation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rent Stabilization Law (RSL): New York City’s framework controlling rent increases and eviction protections for certain apartments built before 1974.
Personal-Use Exception: A narrow circumstance allowing landlords to refuse renewal when they genuinely need the apartment as a primary residence for themselves or immediate family. Post-HSTPA, capped at one unit and conditioned on “immediate and compelling necessity.”
Judgment of Possession: A court order formally granting a landlord the right to evict a tenant. Until entered, the landlord’s desire to regain the unit is merely an expectation, not a legal entitlement.
Retroactivity: Whether a new law governs events or rights that occurred before its enactment. Courts weigh legislative intent and possible impairment of vested rights.
Vested Right: A right so firmly established that the legislature cannot revoke it without violating due process—usually crystallizing upon final judgment, not upon filing or serving process.

Conclusion

Karpen v. Andrade cements a straightforward rule: HSTPA’s stricter personal-use provisions automatically apply to any holdover proceeding still awaiting a judgment of possession on June 14 2019 or thereafter. The decision clarifies the boundary between permissible prospective application and impermissible retroactivity, affirms tenants’ enhanced protections, and signals that landlords cannot bank on pre-HSTPA strategies unless they already “crossed the finish line” by securing a judgment. In the broader legal landscape, the case fortifies legislative authority in rent regulation while delineating the constitutional concept of vested rights, offering a roadmap for future courts confronting post-enactment procedural shifts.