Juvenile Speedy-Trial Rights: Excluding Pre-Petition Voluntary Treatment from Delay Calculations

Introduction

In Matter of L.S., Youth (2025 MT 77), the Supreme Court of Montana considered whether a juvenile’s right to a speedy trial was violated when 1,057 days elapsed between first informal contact with the Youth Court and the youth’s admission of the allegations. L.S., then 13, faced a petition for delinquency based on alleged sexual assault of his four-year-old half-sister. Between October 2019 and January 2022, L.S.’s mother voluntarily placed him in four different residential treatment centers. Only on January 3, 2022, did the State file a formal petition. L.S. moved to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, arguing that the period of informal monitoring at treatment centers triggered the speedy-trial clock. The District Court denied dismissal without a formal speedy-trial analysis. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that:

The speedy-trial period for a juvenile delinquency petition begins only when a youth becomes “accused”—here, on January 3, 2022, when the State filed a formal petition alleging conduct equivalent to adult felony sexual assault.
The 728 days L.S. spent in voluntary residential treatment prior to filing were not attributable to the State and therefore do not count toward speedy-trial delay.
The total delay from petition (January 3, 2022) to admission (November 28, 2022) was 329 days—129 days beyond the 200-day trigger but not so excessive as to require dismissal under the four-factor speedy-trial balancing test.
Applying the factors—length of delay, reason for delay, the youth’s response, and prejudice—the Court concluded no constitutional or statutory speedy-trial violation occurred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

In re A.G. (2002 MT 111) – Defines the commencement of the speedy-trial clock in youth court when the juvenile becomes “accused.”
State v. Ariegwe (2007 MT 204) – Establishes the four-factor test for speedy-trial analysis (length, reasons, accused’s response, prejudice) and allocates burden of proof.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) – Sixth Amendment protection attaches at formal indictment or arrest, not pre-accusation investigation.
State v. Butterfly (2016 MT 195) – Confirms juveniles enjoy the same speedy-trial rights as adults under Article II § 15 and § 24 of the Montana Constitution.
State v. Zimmerman (2014 MT 173) – Discusses how delay beyond the 200-day threshold presumes prejudice and shifts the State’s burden to justify delay.
State v. Couture (2010 MT 201) – Considers complexity and seriousness of charged offenses in weighing oppressive pretrial incarceration.
State v. Chambers (2020 MT 271) – Differentiates institutional delay from negligent or bad-faith delay.

Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeded through the four-factor Ariegwe test:

Length of Delay
Only the 329 days from formal petition to admission were counted. The 200-day trigger was exceeded by 129 days, creating a moderate presumption of prejudice.
Reasons for Delay
- Institutional delays (investigation, scheduling) totaled 256 days—slightly against the State.
- Seventy-three days of delay resulted from the State’s negligence in late disclosure of a serology report—moderately against the State.
Accused’s Response
L.S. consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial, but also sought continuances and eventually acknowledged trial was unlikely—an inconsistent strategy that weighed against him.
Prejudice
- No oppressive pretrial incarceration: L.S. spent 206 days detained under youth-detention conditions deemed appropriate.
- No proof of extraordinary anxiety or concern specifically caused by State delays.
- No demonstrating of impaired ability to defend: no lost witnesses or evidence and no showing the delay undermined his defense.

Balancing these factors, the Court found that the moderate delay and institutional causes did not outweigh the lack of demonstrated prejudice. Consequently, there was no speedy-trial violation.

Impact

This decision clarifies juvenile delinquency procedure in Montana:

It confirms that voluntary pre-petition placements in treatment facilities, undertaken by parents, are not “restraints” that trigger speedy-trial protections.
It reinforces that the speedy-trial clock runs from the filing of the juvenile petition, not from initial informal Youth Court contact.
It guides prosecutors to file formal petitions promptly once informal monitoring ends, if treatment is not successful, to avoid delay.
It provides trial courts with a clear application of Ariegwe’s four-factor test when youth court counsel raises speedy-trial objections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Accused” in Juvenile Court: A youth becomes “accused” when a formal petition is filed—mere referral or informal oversight does not start the speedy-trial clock.
Institutional vs. Negligent Delay: Routine court scheduling or investigation time weighs less harshly than delays caused by bad faith or careless discovery practices.
Trigger Date (200 days): Once 200 days pass from petition to trial or resolution, a presumption of prejudice arises, shifting burden to the State to justify delays.
Motions vs. Waiver: Seeking dismissal for speedy-trial violation and seeking continuances can be inconsistent—courts will look at overall strategy, not just formal motions.

Conclusion

Matter of L.S. establishes a precise rule for juvenile speedy-trial rights in Montana: only time following a formal delinquency petition counts toward the speedy-trial period. Voluntary parental placement in treatment centers—even if lengthy—does not constitute State-imposed delay. By affirming the District Court’s application of the four-factor balancing test, the Supreme Court ensures that juvenile defendants maintain their constitutional protections without penalizing informal, treatment-focused interventions that precede formal court action.