"Justice Requires" Can Extend Alimony Beyond the 50% Duration Guideline: Caregiving-Based Economic Injury and Property Division as Special Circumstances in New Hampshire

Introduction

In the Matter of Danielle Desmarais and Ryan Desmarais is a New Hampshire Supreme Court order that affirms a family court’s extension of term alimony far beyond the statutory guideline duration. The case centers on whether “justice requires” an upward deviation from the default maximum duration for term alimony—50% of the length of the marriage—under RSA 458:19-a, III–IV. The parties married in 2001, raised two children, and divorced in 2023. The wife left paid employment in 2005 to care for the children; the husband remained the sole or primary earner thereafter.

The trial court equalized the division of marital property but awarded alimony until 2045—roughly twice the guideline duration—based on the wife’s long-term economic injury from caregiving, her current and future employability compared to the husband’s, and the way the court structured the property division. On appeal, the husband challenged only the duration of alimony. The Supreme Court, applying a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, affirmed. One justice dissented, warning that the majority’s approach risks eroding the uniformity and purpose of the 2018 alimony reforms.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not commit an unsustainable exercise of discretion in extending alimony beyond the default maximum of 50% of the length of the marriage. The majority emphasized:

The standard of review is deferential: the court asks only whether the record provides an objective basis to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgment.
RSA 458:19-a, IV expressly authorizes adjustments from the guideline duration when “justice requires,” listing nonexclusive “special circumstances” including one spouse’s financial dependency, each party’s present and future employability, and the property awarded.
The trial court relied on these factors: the wife’s financial dependency due to years of caregiving; diminished employability and need for retraining to reenter engineering; and the choice to divide property equally (though an unequal division could have compensated for the wife’s economic injury).

Because those findings were grounded in the record and aligned with the statute’s adjustment factors, the Court affirmed the extended duration. Chief Justice MacDonald and Justices Donovan and Countway concurred. Justice Bassett dissented, arguing the trial court did not make (and the record did not support) findings showing that a roughly ten-year upward deviation beyond the statutory guideline was necessary to allow both parties to maintain a reasonable standard of living—the statutory purpose of term alimony.

Analysis

Statutory Framework

New Hampshire’s alimony scheme, substantially revised in 2018, structures term alimony around four key provisions of RSA 458:19-a:

Paragraph I: Authorizes term alimony to allow both parties to maintain a reasonable standard of living, and identifies threshold conditions for an award (e.g., need and ability to pay).
Paragraph II: Provides a formula framework for amount (not central here).
Paragraph III: Sets the default maximum duration: 50% of the marriage length, unless parties agree otherwise or “justice requires” an adjustment under Paragraph IV.
Paragraph IV: Lists nonexclusive “special circumstances” that may justify deviation, including financial dependency (IV(b)), present and future employability (IV(c)), property awarded (IV(f)), and any other material, relevant reason (IV(k)).

In practice, Paragraph IV empowers trial courts to tailor alimony when the default formula does not adequately address real-world inequities. The key appellate question is whether the trial court’s invocation of those circumstances is supported by the record.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

In the Matter of Routhier & Routhier, 175 N.H. 6 (2022): The Court reiterated the breadth of the trial court’s discretion in alimony matters and the centrality of income and need.
In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38 (2020): Articulates the “unsustainable exercise of discretion” standard. Appellate review is limited to whether the record objectively supports the trial court’s discretionary call; appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment.
RSA 458:19-a (Supp. 2024): The governing alimony statute, including the 50% duration guideline and the “justice requires” adjustment factors.
Dissent’s authorities: In the Matter of Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769 (2008) (characterizing alimony as rehabilitative, designed to encourage the recipient’s independence); Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159 (1987) (extended alimony in light of progressive debilitating illness); In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31 (2002) (extended alimony supported by age, education level, disability, length of marriage, fault, and income disparity). The dissent also invoked general interpretive principles from Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, 177 N.H. 55 (2024) (read statutes as a whole to effectuate overall purpose).

Legal Reasoning

The majority opinion is driven by two pillars: the deferential standard of review and the fit between the trial court’s findings and Paragraph IV’s special circumstances.

First, under Braunstein, the Supreme Court’s review is tightly cabined: it looks only for an “objective basis” in the record to sustain the exercise of discretion. It does not reweigh the equities. That standard is outcome-determinative here because the trial court explicitly connected its findings to several Paragraph IV factors, and the record contained evidence supporting each finding.

Second, the trial court’s rationale maps directly onto RSA 458:19-a, IV:

Financial dependency (IV(b)): The wife’s near-exclusive caregiving role left her financially dependent and economically injured compared to the husband, whose income tripled over 18 years.
Present and future employability (IV(c)): The wife had been out of engineering for 18 years; reentry would require additional education and training. This long absence depressed her current earning capacity and delayed potential future earnings.
Property awarded (IV(f)): Although the case could have warranted an unequal division to compensate for the wife’s economic injury, the court chose to divide property equally and use an extended alimony duration as the remedial tool to “balance the contributions of the parties and the economic injury suffered.”

The husband’s core appellate argument—that the court lacked findings proving the wife could not become self-supporting within the guideline period—did not carry the day. The majority held that no separate, explicit finding of non-self-sufficiency within the guideline period was required so long as the trial court made supported findings under Paragraph IV showing that “justice requires” deviation. In other words, the statute’s own list of special circumstances, coupled with record support and a reasoned connection to the remedy, sufficed.

The dissent would have imposed a more stringent framework. Reading the statute “as a whole,” it reasoned that any deviation in duration must further the core purpose of alimony in Paragraph I—maintaining a reasonable standard of living for both parties—and thus should be contingent upon express findings that the recipient cannot reach that standard within the guideline duration. On this record, the dissent viewed the wife’s education, work history, and current bookkeeping pursuits as evidence that she could rehabilitate within approximately eleven years.

What This Decision Clarifies

A trial court may extend alimony beyond the 50% guideline when it makes supported findings on Paragraph IV’s special circumstances, including caregiving-based economic injury, differential employability, and the structure of the property division.
Coordinating alimony duration with property division is permissible. Where an unequal property split could have compensated for economic injury, a court may instead maintain equal division and lengthen alimony to achieve equity.
No freestanding, explicit finding that the recipient cannot be self-supporting within the guideline period is necessary if the court’s Paragraph IV findings are supported and demonstrate why “justice requires” a longer term.
On appeal, the “unsustainable exercise of discretion” standard strongly insulates well-reasoned trial court deviations that are anchored in the record and the statute’s enumerated factors.

Potential Impact

On Trial Courts

This order endorses a structured, factor-based approach to deviations: identify specific RSA 458:19-a, IV factors; link them to concrete record evidence; explain why those circumstances render the guideline duration unjust in the case-specific context.
It affirms remedial flexibility: courts can choose between unequal property division or extended alimony (or some combination) to address long-term economic disparities stemming from caregiving.
It suggests that the absence of an explicit “non-self-sufficiency within 50% duration” finding will not doom a deviation if the Paragraph IV analysis is thorough and supported.

On Litigants

Spouses with prolonged workforce absences due to childcare or homemaking have a clearer path to extended duration alimony where evidence shows persistent earning-capacity harm.
Payor spouses face a higher bar on appeal; effective challenges will likely require demonstrating that the record lacks an objective basis tied to Paragraph IV factors, not merely disputing equities.
Settlement dynamics may shift: parties might trade longer alimony duration for equal property division, or vice versa, with more confidence in the sustainability of such arrangements.

On the 2018 Reforms and Uniformity

The dissent’s uniformity concern is real: if trial courts frequently extend durations near or beyond double the guideline based on broadly framed factors, the predictability intended by the 2018 reforms could erode. That said, the majority’s approach still requires a specific, supported Paragraph IV analysis; deviations are not automatic and must be justified. If future cases reveal divergent applications, legislative fine-tuning or a more detailed appellate framework could follow, perhaps clarifying the role of explicit “reasonable standard of living” findings in deviation cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Term alimony: Payments for a set period post-divorce, intended to allow both parties to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Not permanent by default.
50% duration guideline: Under RSA 458:19-a, III, the maximum default duration of term alimony is half the length of the marriage. A 22-year marriage yields an 11-year guideline cap.
“Justice requires” deviation: RSA 458:19-a, IV allows courts to depart from guideline amount/duration when special circumstances—like one spouse’s long-term financial dependency from caregiving or reduced employability—make the default unfair.
Unsustainable exercise of discretion: A highly deferential appellate standard. The Supreme Court asks only if the trial court had an “objective basis” in the record for its decision. If so, it will not reweigh facts or substitute its judgment.
Coordinating alimony and property division: Courts can offset economic injury either by granting more property or by extending alimony (or both). Here, the court chose equal property division and a longer alimony term to achieve fairness.
Caregiving-based economic injury: When a spouse leaves paid work for years to care for children, their earnings and career trajectory can suffer durably. That harm, if supported by evidence, can justify extended alimony.

Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s order in Desmarais confirms that trial courts may extend term alimony beyond the 50% duration guideline when “justice requires,” provided the court makes supported findings under RSA 458:19-a, IV. Caregiving-driven economic injury, differential employability after a long hiatus, and the chosen property division are all legitimate grounds for deviation. Importantly, the majority does not demand a separate, explicit finding that the recipient cannot become self-supporting within the guideline period; the touchstone is whether the Paragraph IV findings have objective support in the record.

The dissent cautions that this approach risks diluting the uniformity goals of the 2018 alimony reforms and the rehabilitative purpose of alimony. That tension is likely to shape future litigation, with trial courts encouraged to make robust, factor-by-factor findings and appellate courts adhering to deferential review. For now, the key takeaway is practical: a well-documented, factor-linked explanation of why the guideline duration would be unjust—especially in long-term caregiving scenarios—will sustain extended alimony awards in New Hampshire.