Jus Soli, Not Domicile: First Circuit Reaffirms Birthright Citizenship and Clarifies Injunctive Scope in Doe v. Trump

Introduction

In Doe v. Trump, the First Circuit confronted Executive Order 14160, “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which sought to deny birthright citizenship to certain children born in the United States after the EO’s effective date. The EO targeted newborns whose fathers were not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and whose mothers were either in the United States unlawfully or on temporary status.

Two sets of plaintiffs challenged the EO: (1) an expectant mother proceeding under a pseudonym (O. Doe) and two community organizations (Brazilian Worker Center and La Colaborativa), and (2) a coalition of states and the City and County of San Francisco. The district court preliminarily enjoined implementation and enforcement of the EO, finding that plaintiffs were “exceedingly likely” to succeed on claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a).

On appeal, the Government argued lack of standing (particularly for the states), asserted limits on third-party standing, challenged the breadth of the injunction (especially in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc.), and defended the EO on the merits by urging a domicile-based limitation on birthright citizenship. The First Circuit rejected those arguments, largely affirmed the preliminary injunctions, clarified their permissible scope against officials (not agencies), and provided a comprehensive reaffirmation of the jus soli principle and of United States v. Wong Kim Ark as controlling constitutional law.

Summary of the Opinion

Standing: The court held that individual, organizational (associational), and state plaintiffs are likely to have Article III standing. For the states, the court relied on direct loss of federal funds tied to federal-state cooperative programs and analogized to Biden v. Nebraska’s treatment of MOHELA’s lost servicing fees.
Third-Party Standing: The court rejected the Government’s parens patriae framing and concluded prudential third-party standing was waived and, independently, satisfied because enforcement against the states would prevent them from extending legally-entitled services to eligible children (citing Department of Labor v. Triplett).
Merits—Statutory (§ 1401(a)): Interpreting § 1401(a) according to its 1952 understanding, the court concluded the statute codifies broad birthright citizenship consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1940 Nationality Act’s history, covering children born on U.S. soil irrespective of parents’ immigration status, subject only to narrow, historically recognized exceptions.
Merits—Constitutional (Citizenship Clause): The court held Wong Kim Ark forecloses a domicile-based restriction. “Subject to the jurisdiction” reflects the common-law jus soli rule as informed by The Schooner Exchange, with limited exceptions (children of foreign diplomats, enemy occupation, foreign public ships, and historically Native American tribal members).
Equitable Factors: The court affirmed the district court’s irreparable harm findings and concluded the balance of equities and public interest favor the injunctions.
Scope of Relief: In light of CASA, the court upheld the district court’s “universal” relief for the state plaintiffs as necessary for complete relief where narrower alternatives were not shown workable. However, the court vacated the injunctions insofar as they ran against agencies rather than officers, consistent with sovereign immunity and officer-suit principles.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Core Citizenship and Common-Law Framework

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): The cornerstone. The First Circuit reads Wong Kim Ark to reaffirm jus soli and to tie “subject to the jurisdiction” to the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction as elaborated in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (Marshall, C.J.). The court emphasizes that Wong Kim Ark identifies narrow exceptions—children of foreign diplomats, alien enemies during hostile occupation, births on foreign public ships, and the then-recognized exception for members of Native American tribes—none of which turn on parental domicile.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812): Defines the United States’ “exclusive and absolute” territorial jurisdiction, with specific classes enjoying immunity by sovereign waiver (foreign sovereigns, ministers, friendly armies, public ships). The First Circuit uses this to elucidate “subject to the jurisdiction” as generally satisfied by mere presence within the sovereign’s territory, absent a recognized immunity.
Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Explains the historical carve-out for members of Native American tribes, grounded in their quasi-sovereign status and partial immunities, not in domicile. The First Circuit treats Elk as the “single additional” historical exception recognized in Wong Kim Ark.
Plyler v. Doe (1982): Describes the Citizenship Clause’s jurisdictional phrase as “predominantly geographic,” rejecting distinctions between lawful and unlawful presence for jurisdictional purposes. Supports the First Circuit’s rejection of the Government’s domicile theory.
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to repudiate Dred Scott; the First Circuit underscores the Amendment’s broad, textually general language—“All persons born”—as decisive.

2) Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History

Nationality Act of 1940 and the 1952 INA: A presidential committee’s work and executive practice (especially State Department regulations) consistently construed “subject to the jurisdiction” to implement jus soli, not domicile. Committee commentary on the 1940 Act expressly identified the narrow common-law exceptions and stated domicile of parents is irrelevant to birthright citizenship.
United States v. Kozminski (1988); George v. McDonough (2022): The court uses time-of-enactment meaning and the “old soil” principle. It holds § 1401(a) should be read as understood in 1952, which tracked the 1940 Act’s understanding and longstanding executive practice.

3) Standing and Remedial Cases

Biden v. Nebraska (2023): The First Circuit analogizes the states’ financial injury to MOHELA’s lost servicing fees—here, the EO would directly reduce federally reimbursable program participation (EAB, Medicaid, CHIP, IDEA, Title IV‑E), thus reducing federal payments to states.
United States v. Texas (2023): The Government’s reliance on a footnote suggesting indirect fiscal effects are insufficient was rejected because the states here alleged direct loss of federal reimbursements flowing from the EO’s operation.
Singleton v. Wulff (1976): Supports direct financial injury where federal reimbursement is denied by a challenged measure.
Department of Commerce v. New York (2019): Deference to district court’s fact-finding on causal chains; here, the Government conceded below that federal funds would be lost if the EO were enforced.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977): Applied for associational standing of organizational plaintiffs.
Kowalski v. Tesmer (2004); Warth v. Seldin (1975); Department of Labor v. Triplett (1990); June Medical Services v. Russo (2020): Address prudential third-party standing. The First Circuit deems prudential limitations waived and, in any event, satisfied because enforcing the EO against the states would prevent them from extending federally reimbursable services to children whose legal entitlement turns on recognized citizenship status.
Trump v. CASA, Inc. (2025): The Supreme Court restricted universal injunctions but preserved complete-relief injunctions. The First Circuit adheres to CASA, upholding broad relief where narrower options weren’t shown workable to afford complete relief to the states.
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center (2015); FDIC v. Meyer (1994): Clarify that injunctive relief runs against officers rather than agencies absent waiver of sovereign immunity; the First Circuit vacates the injunctions only to that extent.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standing

Individual plaintiff (O. Doe): The court finds straightforward injury-in-fact: imminent denial of recognition of her child’s U.S. citizenship, passport, and SSN through EAB, with cascading harms.
Organizational plaintiffs: Associational standing satisfied under Hunt: identified members face imminent injury; citizenship interests are germane to organizational missions; claims do not require individualized member participation.
State plaintiffs: The court credits evidence and Government concessions that the EO’s directives would directly cause loss of federal reimbursements/payments across multiple programs where eligibility is tied to citizenship. It distinguishes Texas and Mellon as involving indirect or speculative fiscal effects; relies on Nebraska and Singleton to recognize direct injury from lost federal payments. Traceability is bolstered by the EO’s text and agency implementation plans (e.g., SSA’s EAB guidance requiring parental status inquiry). Redressability follows from enjoining implementation/enforcement.
Third-party standing: Not parens patriae; the states assert their own injuries and are proper litigants because enforcement against them would prevent provision of services to persons with legal entitlement. Prudential limits were waived and satisfied (Triplett’s “enforcement against litigant prevents third party relationship” principle).

2) Merits—Statutory (§ 1401(a))

Time-of-enactment meaning (1952): The court reads “subject to the jurisdiction” as understood when Congress reenacted the clause in the INA, affirming the 1940 Nationality Act’s codification of the common-law jus soli rule and decades of consistent DOS/DOJ practice. Domicile of parents is irrelevant; narrow exceptions apply.
Legislative/administrative backdrop: Presidential committee commentary (1930s) and DOS regulations confirm a broad jus soli understanding; Congress’s 1952 recodification “carried forward” that scope. Scattered contrary sources were either conclusory, predated Wong Kim Ark, or were outweighed by the settled understanding.

3) Merits—Constitutional (Fourteenth Amendment)

Wong Kim Ark controls: The court thoroughly canvasses Wong Kim Ark’s historical grounding and interpretive methodology. “Subject to the jurisdiction” aligns with The Schooner Exchange’s framework of exclusive territorial jurisdiction, subject only to recognized immunities/waivers. The Amendment’s text and structure focus on the child’s birth within U.S. territory; the Government’s domicile theory is inconsistent with the case’s reasoning and the Clause’s language.
Rejection of Government’s reliance on domicile: References to “domicile” in Wong Kim Ark were descriptive of the factual stipulation and the narrower rules applicable to foreign-born children of U.S. citizens, not a substantive limitation on jus soli. Later Supreme Court usages consistently refer to children born to unlawfully present parents as U.S. citizens.

4) Equitable Factors

Irreparable harm: For O. Doe and organizational members, loss of citizenship recognition causes immediate, profound, and difficult-to-remedy harms (identity documents, access to health care, risk of removal). For the states, systemic “administrative upheaval” and unrecoverable costs from overhauling eligibility systems (verification redesigns, training, policy updates) are irreparable pending final judgment.
Balance of equities and public interest: The Government’s generalized interest in enforcing the EO yields to the public’s paramount interest in constitutional compliance and recognition of citizens as such. The court notes that enjoining an unlawful executive action does not irreparably injure the Government.

5) Scope of Relief

Universal versus complete-relief injunctions: After CASA, courts may not extend injunctions to non-parties, but may administer complete relief to plaintiffs. The district court found nationwide relief necessary to protect the state plaintiffs from administrative and fiscal harm given interstate mobility and program operations; the Government failed below to propose a workable narrower alternative. The First Circuit therefore declines to disturb the breadth of the state injunction.
Officer-only injunctions: The court vacates the injunctions to the extent they run against agencies themselves, reaffirming that equitable relief properly runs against officers in their official capacities absent sovereign immunity waivers.

Impact

Constitutional bedrock reaffirmed: The decision cements that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a) establish birthright citizenship on a jus soli basis, regardless of parental immigration status, subject only to narrow historical exceptions.
Limits on executive power: Efforts to alter birthright citizenship via executive action are foreclosed; any change would require constitutional amendment or legislation consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment as construed in Wong Kim Ark.
Statutory interpretation takeaway: When Congress borrows constitutional text into a statute, courts may apply time-of-enactment meaning, especially where Congress reenacts a settled understanding developed through prior codification and agency practice.
State standing doctrine: The opinion strengthens states’ ability to establish Article III standing where federal action directly reduces federal reimbursements in cooperative programs. The Nebraska analogy will likely reverberate in future federalism and administrative law disputes.
Third-party standing and program administration: Where enforcement against a state impedes the state’s ability to extend federally reimbursable services to eligible persons, prudential third-party standing may be satisfied.
Injunction-scope jurisprudence post-CASA: The decision models how to preserve complete relief through broad (but not universal-to-nonparties) injunctions when narrower alternatives are not shown feasible. Defendants bear a burden to concretely propose workable narrowing.
Operational implications: Agencies such as SSA, DOS, DHS, and HHS cannot operationalize parental-status screens to withhold citizenship-dependent documents or benefits for covered children within the First Circuit’s jurisdiction while the injunctions stand. States can avoid costly system overhauls tied to the EO.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jus soli vs. jus sanguinis: Jus soli confers citizenship by birthplace (the U.S. rule since the Founding, reaffirmed in 1868). Jus sanguinis confers citizenship by parentage (used by many other nations). The Fourteenth Amendment and § 1401(a) embed jus soli with narrow exceptions.
“Subject to the jurisdiction thereof”: This does not mean “lawfully present” or “domiciled”; it means being within the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction (owing at least temporary and local allegiance), unless covered by a recognized immunity (e.g., foreign diplomats, enemy occupation, foreign public ships). Historically, Native American tribal members were excluded until Congress conferred citizenship by statute in 1924.
Domicile vs. residence vs. presence: Domicile is a person’s fixed, permanent home (requires intent to remain indefinitely). Residence is where a person lives (can be temporary). Presence is physical location. Citizenship by birth does not turn on parental domicile under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Associational standing: An organization can sue for its members if at least one member would have standing, the interests are germane to the organization, and individual participation is unnecessary.
Third-party standing: Ordinarily, parties litigate their own rights, but exceptions exist—e.g., when enforcement against a litigant prevents a third party from forming a legally protected relationship with that litigant (as when state enforcement prevents states from extending federally reimbursable services to eligible children).
Universal injunction vs. complete relief: After CASA, courts generally cannot extend injunctions to non-parties. But courts may issue relief broad enough to fully protect the actual plaintiffs. Where narrower tailoring is not feasible to provide complete relief, geographically broad injunctions may persist.
Officer-only injunctions: Absent waiver of sovereign immunity, federal agencies cannot be sued directly for equitable relief; suits must target officers in their official capacities to enjoin unlawful action.
Enumeration at Birth (EAB): A program through which states transmit newborn data so SSA can issue SSNs based on birth certificates. The EO sought to interpose parental status checks to block SSNs to covered children; the court’s ruling halts that implementation.

Conclusion

Doe v. Trump is a sweeping reaffirmation that the Constitution’s Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a) embrace the common-law rule of jus soli. The First Circuit methodically rejects the Government’s invitation to graft a domicile requirement onto the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction,” demonstrating that such a limitation is incompatible with Wong Kim Ark, with the Clause’s text and history, with Congress’s 1940 codification and 1952 reenactment, and with modern Supreme Court dicta recognizing the citizenship of U.S.-born children of unlawfully present parents.

The opinion also clarifies contemporary doctrines beyond citizenship. It solidifies state standing where federal action directly pares back federal reimbursements; it recognizes third-party standing where enforcement against states prevents them from extending services to persons with legal entitlements; it implements CASA’s limits by endorsing broad relief where necessary to afford complete redress; and it reiterates that injunctions must run against officers, not agencies.

In a field where constitutional text, historical practice, and precedent align, Doe v. Trump underscores that birthright citizenship cannot be undone by executive fiat. The ruling safeguards the settled status of U.S.-born children, preserves the integrity of federal-state program administration, and provides a careful roadmap for tailoring injunctive relief in nationwide controversies. Its lasting significance lies in both the stability it brings to citizenship doctrine and the clarity it brings to remedial and standing principles that recur across modern public law litigation.