Jury Unanimity and “Any Firearm” Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g): Means vs. Elements Clarified

Introduction

United States v. Johnathan Morris, 22-13764 (11th Cir. March 19, 2025), addresses a pivotal question under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): when a felon is found with more than one firearm or more than one piece of ammunition, must the jury unanimously agree on the specific weapon or rounds to convict? The Eleventh Circuit holds that § 922(g) criminalizes the possession of “any firearm or ammunition,” treating particular weapons or rounds as means of committing the crime rather than elements that require separate, unanimous jury findings. This commentary examines the background, court reasoning, key precedents, and broader impact of that holding.

Case Background and Key Issues

In Miami, Officer A observed Johnathan Morris run a stop sign. When ordered to pull over, Morris led police on a five-block chase. After officers detained him, they discovered:

A loaded 9 mm pistol and 18 rounds under the driver’s seat
A loaded .40 caliber pistol and 32 rounds under the passenger seat (found under warrant the next day)
An empty holster on Morris’s person, plus 9.3 g of crack cocaine and 0.26 g of fentanyl in his pocket

A jury convicted Morris on three counts:

Being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1))
Possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1))
Possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i))

On appeal Morris challenged, among other things, the district court’s refusal to include a special interrogatory requiring juror unanimity on which particular firearm he possessed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Morris’s convictions and 138-month sentence. It held that under § 922(g) the government need only prove that a felon possessed “any firearm or ammunition.” Specific identification of the exact weapon or rounds requires no separate element—such particulars are means of committing the offense. Consequently, the district court did not err in denying Morris’s requested special jury interrogatory.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s analysis centers on the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999). Richardson distinguished elements (which jurors must unanimously find) from means (methods of committing an element on which unanimous agreement is not required). In Richardson, the Court explained that juries need not unanimously agree on which knife, gun, or other instrument was used so long as they unanimously agree that force was threatened.

Several sister circuits had applied Richardson to § 922(g):

United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 1999)
United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2004)
United States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2007)
United States v. Pollock, 757 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2014)

All held that the statute’s focus on “any firearm” indicates that a particular firearm’s identity is not an element.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit followed Richardson’s three-factor approach:

Textual Analysis: Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The word “any” connotes a broad category, not distinct sub-elements. Unlike statutes listing discrete crimes or verbs as elements, § 922(g) uses a collective term for weapons and ammunition.
Statutory Structure & Comparisons: Other subsections of § 922(g) (covering aliens, domestic violence misdemeanants, etc.) likewise prohibit possession of “any firearm.” The corresponding penalty provisions in § 924 contain no enhancement based on number or type of weapons.
Risk of Unfairness: Classifying a particular gun or rounds as a separate element risks confusion when multiple weapons are present. It could allow a defendant to evade conviction if jurors disagree about which specific firearm was in his possession—even though they unanimously agree he illegally possessed a weapon.

Because possession of a particular firearm or ammunition is a means—not a discrete element—the district court properly instructed the jury that unanimity was required as to possession of a firearm or ammunition in general, but not which one.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This holding clarifies jury instruction requirements in § 922(g) prosecutions:

Trial courts need not craft verdict forms listing each discrete weapon or round; a general “any firearm or ammunition” verdict box suffices.
Defendants face a unified element—possession of any firearm/ammunition—preventing jury‐forged acquittals when multiple weapons are found.
Prosecutors can present evidence of several firearms without worrying that juror disagreements about identity will invalidate a conviction.

More broadly, the decision reinforces the means versus elements doctrine from Richardson and underscores courts’ authority to streamline jury forms under “any” or “all” language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Element vs. Means:

Element: A fact defined in the statute itself (e.g., “possession of a firearm by a felon”). Juries must unanimously agree that each element is satisfied.
Means: The particular way the element is satisfied (e.g., which gun was used). Unanimity on means is not required if all jurors agree the element occurred.

Why It Matters: In a multi-gun case, if each gun were a separate element, 12 jurors would need to agree on every weapon. Under the “means” approach, as long as they agree the defendant possessed at least one prohibited weapon, the verdict is valid.

Conclusion

United States v. Morris establishes a clear rule: under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), jury unanimity is required only as to the overarching element—possession of “any firearm or ammunition”—and not as to which particular weapon or rounds were possessed. The decision aligns with Richardson’s framework, promotes jury efficiency, and ensures that multi-weapon prosecutions reliably result in convictions when the government proves the core fact of prohibited possession.