Juror Exposure to Media Reports of the Trial Judge’s Perjury Arrest of a Key Witness Constitutes Structural Error Requiring Reversal

Introduction

In Kevon Lawless v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed murder and burglary convictions and remanded for a new trial after concluding that the jury had been tainted by extra-judicial information: a media report that the trial judge had a key Commonwealth witness taken into custody for alleged perjury during the trial. The Court, per Justice Thompson, held that this contamination produced structural error—undermining the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury—such that an admonition and substitution of a single juror could not cure the harm. The Court also held that any claims concerning exclusion of the death penalty and a requested continuance of the penalty hearing were moot, and it reaffirmed that under Bullington v. Missouri and Brown v. Commonwealth, the death penalty cannot be sought on retrial where it was not imposed after a full capital sentencing proceeding in the first trial.

The case arose from the 2020 murders of Brandon Waddles and his three-year-old daughter, Trinity Randolph, in Jefferson County. The Commonwealth’s case relied heavily on two cooperating witnesses, Akoi Reclow and Evan Ross, who had pled to facilitation to murder. After Ross testified, the trial court—outside the jury’s presence but in a public courtroom with media present—announced that Ross would be taken into custody based on probable cause that he had lied under oath. During deliberations, a juror told fellow jurors that they had seen a television report of Ross’s arrest “for lying on the stand,” prompting a juror to report to the court that they could no longer decide the case based solely on the evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that:

The jury’s exposure during deliberations to extra-judicial information that the trial judge had arrested a key Commonwealth witness for perjury was inherently prejudicial and constituted structural error that compromised the defendant’s Sixth Amendment and Kentucky constitutional right to an impartial jury.
The trial court’s limited admonition and replacement of one juror were inadequate given the nature of the information, the role of the witness, and the court’s failure to conduct individualized inquiry to determine the scope and effect of the contamination.
Because the jury had the opportunity to impose the death penalty but returned life without the possibility of parole, double jeopardy bars the Commonwealth from seeking death on retrial; therefore, the defendant’s arguments regarding exclusion of the death penalty and a continuance of the penalty hearing were moot.

Justice Bisig, joined by Justice Keller, dissented. The dissent agreed there was error in jurors learning of the arrest but would affirm under harmless-error review, emphasizing the curative steps taken, the presumption that jurors follow admonitions, and the strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Informed the Decision

Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1985) — Establishes that a mistrial is an extreme remedy, appropriate only upon “manifest necessity” or an “urgent or real necessity.” The Court acknowledges this demanding standard but finds it met where jury impartiality is compromised by extra-judicial information of a uniquely prejudicial kind.
Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1996) — Provides the framework for handling juror exposure to extra-judicial information: trial courts should inquire into the nature and effect of exposure and decide whether an admonition suffices or a mistrial is required. Gould stresses juror questioning beyond a “magic question.” The Court here finds the trial court’s inquiry insufficient under Gould because it failed to identify the source juror, trace the flow of information, or assess its effect juror-by-juror.
Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1998) and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430 (Ky. 2003) (with Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1993)) — While jurors are presumed to follow admonitions, that presumption can be rebutted where there is an overwhelming probability the jury cannot follow the admonition and where the inadmissible matter would be devastating to the defendant. The Court finds both conditions present: the information conveyed that the judge found a key witness committed perjury, which goes to the heart of credibility determinations reserved for jurors.
Commonwealth v. Douglas, 553 S.W.3d 795 (Ky. 2018) — Confirms that denial of an impartial jury is structural error not amenable to harmless-error analysis. The Court uses Douglas to reframe the Gould inquiry in this context: when juror impartiality is compromised, prejudice is presumed and reversal is required.
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017) — Explains that structural errors generally entitle a defendant to automatic reversal on direct appeal when the issue was preserved. The Court invokes Weaver to underscore that impartial-jury violations are structural and not subject to harmless-error balancing.
United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996) and Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988) — Federal appellate authority applying a presumption of prejudice to extra-judicial contacts and assigning to the government the burden to prove no reasonable possibility of influence (Dickson’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” formulation). The Court cites these to illuminate how other courts assess jury contamination.
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933) and King v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. 2015) — Witness credibility is for the jury, and judicial commentary on credibility is highly prejudicial. While the trial court did not intend the jury to hear its views, the media report that the court had arrested Ross for perjury communicated a judicial credibility determination to the jury, intruding on the jury’s exclusive province.
Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2010), relying on Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) — Once a capital sentencing jury has the opportunity to impose death but does not, double jeopardy bars the death penalty on retrial. Applied here to render the death-penalty issues moot and to bar death on remand.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning turns on the nature of the extra-judicial information and the inadequacy of the trial court’s response.

Nature of the contamination. The jury did not merely encounter a rumor or neutral fact. They learned, via a media report, that the presiding judge had ordered a key Commonwealth witness—Evan Ross—detained for perjury, accompanied by the judge’s statements that Ross “clearly lied.” This information unavoidably communicated a judicial assessment of credibility. Because credibility of witnesses is an issue assigned to the jury alone, the information strikes at the core of the jury function and undermines impartial deliberations.
Scope and uncertainty. The trial court did not identify the juror who brought the information into the jury room, what precisely was conveyed, how extensively it was discussed, or which jurors were influenced. One juror reported that they could no longer decide the case “truthfully” after hearing of Ross’s arrest, and another juror who raised concerns was replaced. But without individualized voir dire, the record cannot dispel the risk that deliberations were skewed, that other jurors were influenced, or that at least one juror who might have held out for acquittal was lost.
Admonition inadequate. Given the content—an apparent judicial perjury determination concerning a pivotal witness—and the unknown extent of the contamination, the Court concluded there was an “overwhelming probability” that jurors could not unring the bell, and the effect was potentially “devastating to the defendant,” defeating the normal presumption that jurors follow admonitions. Under these circumstances, admonition and substitution of a single juror were not sufficient.
Structural error frame. Because juror impartiality was compromised, the Court treated the violation as structural error under Douglas and Weaver. Structural error affects the framework of the trial and defies harmless-error analysis. Although Weaver acknowledges limited exceptions, the Court deemed this record an obvious case of prejudice given Ross’s role as the sole witness tying Lawless to the vehicle at the crime scene and the determinative significance of his credibility.
Result. The failure to declare a mistrial once the contamination was revealed was reversible error. The convictions were vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. On remand, the death penalty is barred under Brown/Bullington because the original jury declined to impose it after a capital penalty phase.

Points of Divergence with the Dissent

The dissent would apply harmless-error review, emphasizing:

The trial court promptly admonished the jury and replaced the one juror who said they could not decide based solely on the evidence, instructing the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew.
Defense counsel had already attacked Ross’s credibility—calling him a liar in closing—making the extra-judicial information cumulative in effect.
The Commonwealth’s evidence was strong (videos, phone records, eyewitness corroboration, accomplice testimony, and post-crime conduct), rendering any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority rejected this approach, holding that when the right to an impartial jury is compromised the error is structural and not subject to harmless-error balancing—particularly where the extra-judicial information communicates the judge’s own adverse credibility assessment of a key witness and the scope of contamination is unclear.

Impact and Practical Implications

The opinion has immediate and concrete implications for criminal trials in Kentucky, especially high-profile cases with intense media coverage.

Reframing extra-judicial jury exposure. Where extra-judicial information compromises juror impartiality—especially information conveying the court’s own views about witness credibility—the error will be treated as structural, with reversal generally required if properly preserved.
Trial courts must conduct robust, individualized inquiry. Upon learning of possible juror contamination, trial judges should:
- Individually question each juror, on the record, about exposure, content, timing, and effect.
- Identify the source juror(s) and determine how the information spread within the jury.
- Assess whether any juror’s deliberative posture changed as a result and whether the panel can remain impartial.
- Recognize that in certain circumstances, admonitions and substitution will not suffice and a mistrial will be necessary.
Judicial actions that may be reported. Judges must be alert to the risk that in-court actions (such as ordering the arrest of a witness for perjury) will be reported and reach jurors. Where such action is necessary, courts should take every reasonable step to minimize the risk of juror exposure, including timing and the manner of pronouncement, and consider sequestering jurors or conducting necessary proceedings outside their presence and outside media view when consistent with law and transparency obligations.
Sequestration and admonitions. In cases of intense publicity, sequestration or enhanced admonitions may be warranted. Alternates should remain available and under admonition throughout deliberations, as the trial court prudently did here.
Burden dynamics. The Court’s discussion of Cheek and Dickson signals receptivity to a presumption of prejudice when jurors are exposed to extraneous information, with the burden on the Commonwealth to demonstrate no reasonable possibility of influence. While not adopting a bright-line federal standard, the Court’s analysis points toward heightened scrutiny.
Capital exposure on retrial. Because the original jury declined to impose death after a capital penalty phase, the Commonwealth is barred from seeking death on retrial under Brown and Bullington. This clarifies the retrial landscape in capital-eligible cases where the first jury fixes a lesser sentence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Structural error vs. trial error: Structural errors affect the basic framework of a trial (e.g., denial of an impartial jury). They are not subject to harmless-error analysis; reversal is generally automatic on direct appeal if preserved. Trial errors are discrete mistakes within the trial process; courts ask whether they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Extra-judicial information: Information reaching jurors from outside the courtroom proceedings (news stories, social media, personal research). If such information bears on core trial issues—especially conveying a judge’s credibility assessment—it threatens jury impartiality.
Mistrial: Termination of a trial without a verdict due to fundamental error or necessity. It requires “manifest necessity,” but when juror impartiality is compromised in ways that cannot be cured, it is warranted.
Admonitions: Instructions directing jurors to disregard certain information. Courts presume jurors follow them, but the presumption fails where jurors likely cannot disregard the information and the effect would be devastating to a party.
Credibility determinations: Assessing whether a witness is telling the truth is exclusively for the jury. Judicial comments—or, as here, extra-judicial reports implying the judge’s view—intrude on that function.
PFO-2 enhancement: In Kentucky, a Persistent Felony Offender in the second degree can face enhanced penalties upon conviction for a new offense, based on prior felonies.
KRS 532.025 and KRS 532.135: KRS 532.025 governs aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing; KRS 532.135 is Kentucky’s statutory vehicle for excluding the death penalty based on certain mental-health conditions. These issues became moot here given the structural error and the bar on death at retrial.
Bullington rule: Once a jury, after a full capital sentencing proceeding, declines to impose death, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from seeking death upon retrial for the same offense.

Practical Takeaways

When jurors are exposed to extra-judicial information that communicates the trial judge’s view of a witness’s veracity, the error is inherently prejudicial and will likely be deemed structural, compelling reversal.
Trial courts must promptly conduct individualized, on-the-record inquiry to map the extent and effect of contamination; failure to do so will doom the verdict.
In high-profile trials, proactively manage the risk of jury exposure to media reports, including sequestration where appropriate, strict and repeated admonitions, and careful handling of sensitive judicial actions.
Defense counsel should immediately move for mistrial upon learning of contamination, preserve the issue, and request individualized juror questioning.
On remand in capital-eligible cases where a jury declined death after a penalty phase, the death penalty is categorically off the table.

Conclusion

Lawless v. Commonwealth marks a significant clarification in Kentucky law: when jurors learn via extra-judicial sources that the trial judge has had a key witness arrested for perjury, the contamination is inherently prejudicial, implicates the constitutional right to an impartial jury, and constitutes structural error requiring reversal. The opinion tightens the standards governing trial court responses to jury contamination, insisting on thorough individualized inquiry and recognizing the limits of curative admonitions in the face of uniquely prejudicial information—especially judicial credibility determinations. It also solidifies the double-jeopardy bar on seeking the death penalty on retrial when a capital sentencing jury has already declined to impose it. Going forward, Kentucky trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel must treat juror exposure to such extra-judicial information with utmost seriousness, recognizing that if impartiality is compromised, the only adequate remedy may be a new trial.

Case: Kevon Lawless v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Supreme Court of Kentucky, No. 2022-SC-0507-MR, rendered October 23, 2025. Opinion by Justice Thompson; Chief Justice Lambert and Justices Conley, Goodwine, and Nickell concur; Justice Bisig dissents, joined by Justice Keller.