Jurisdictional Limits on State Interlocutory Appeals Under Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 3(a)

Introduction

The case of State of Arkansas v. Ronald Russell (2025 Ark. 89) arises from a pretrial order in a criminal prosecution for internet stalking of a child. The State charged Ronald Russell with using the Whisper social-media application to seduce a fourteen-year-old persona for sexual activity. During discovery, the State produced only a subset of chat logs; Detective Ron Coble had deleted earlier, non-incriminating communications under his routine practice. Russell moved in limine to exclude the preserved messages as misleading and violative of due process. The Benton County Circuit Court granted that motion, applying the Supreme Court’s Trombetta/Youngblood due-process framework. The State appealed interlocutorily. The key issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court of Arkansas had jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Criminal to entertain the State’s interlocutory challenge to a motion in limine.

Summary of the Judgment

On May 29, 2025, the Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the State’s interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that under Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3(a), the State may appeal only:

a pretrial order granting a motion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 16.2 to suppress seized evidence;
an order suppressing a defendant’s confession; or
an order under Ark. R. Evid. 411(c) allowing evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct.

Because Russell’s motion in limine did not constitute a Rule 16.2 suppression motion of seized evidence—and the chats were not “seized” under Rule 10.1—the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Rule 3(a) Jurisdictional Framework: The Court repeatedly referenced Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3(a) and its limited categories for State interlocutory appeals.
State v. Siegel, 2018 Ark. 269, 555 S.W.3d 410: Reaffirmed that the State’s appeal rights are strictly statutory and that pretrial orders outside Rule 3(a) are nonappealable interlocutorily.
State v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 454, 427 S.W.3d 635: Confirmed the narrow path for State appeals and interpreted “seized evidence” under Rule 16.2 and 10.1.
Mhoon v. State, 369 Ark. 134, 251 S.W.3d 244 (2007): Distinguished motions in limine (admissibility) from motions to suppress (illegal obtainment).
State v. Russell, 271 Ark. 817, 611 S.W.2d 518 (1981): Dismissed a prior interlocutory appeal by the State from a grant of a motion in limine for lack of jurisdiction.
State v. Stuart, 306 Ark. 24, 810 S.W.2d 939 (1991): Dismissed a State interlocutory appeal from suppression of expert testimony due to timing, not a true illegal-evidence suppression.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s analysis turned on a textual and purposive reading of Rule 3(a) and its progenitor Rule 16.2:

Seized Evidence Requirement: Rule 3(a)(1) permits appeals only from orders “granting a motion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 16.2 to suppress seized evidence.” Rule 10.1(b) defines “seizure” as “the taking of any person or thing or the obtaining of information by an officer pursuant to a search or under other color of authority.” Here, the chat logs were preserved voluntarily by Detective Coble and not acquired via search warrant or legal compulsion until after Russell’s arrest. Thus, they were not “seized.”
Nature of the Motion: Rule 16.2(a) is explicitly limited to suppression of illegally obtained evidence—or evidence derived from such—as enumerated in its subsections. Russell’s motion in limine sought exclusion on completeness, prejudice (Rule 403), and due-process grounds under Trombetta/Youngblood. It did not challenge illegal obtainment.
Harmonizing Rule 16.2(d): The Court looked to Rule 16.2(d), which allows interlocutory appeals of suppression orders, but held these cross-references only operate when a defendant moves under the substantive Rule 16.2(a). The official comments underscore that 16.2(d) is tied to 16.2(a)’s scope.
Precedential Consistency: Prior cases have drawn a bright line between motions to suppress (illegal obtains) and motions in limine (admissibility). The Court echoed Mhoon’s distinction and reiterated that only illegally obtained items may be suppressed under Rule 16.2.

Impact on Future Cases

This decision provides important guidance:

Clarity on State Appeals: Prosecutors must carefully label and frame pretrial challenges. If they wish to reserve interlocutory appeal rights, they must bring a suppression motion under Rule 16.2 and meet “seizure” criteria.
Motion Strategy: Defense counsel can press motions in limine without fear of State interlocutory review, promoting trial-level resolution of admissibility disputes.
Rulemaking Considerations: Justice Wood’s concurring note invites review of whether Rule 3(a) is overly restrictive, signaling potential future amendments to expand State appeal rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal filed before the trial’s final verdict. Generally disfavored because it interrupts the trial process.
Motion in Limine: A pretrial request to exclude or admit evidence. It focuses on admissibility, not the legality of how evidence was obtained.
Motion to Suppress (“Rule 16.2”): A procedural device to exclude evidence on the ground it was illegally obtained (e.g., unlawful search or coerced confession).
“Seized” Evidence (Rule 10.1(b)): Information or tangible items taken under official authority or a warrant. Voluntary downloads or preserved copies do not qualify.
Trombetta/Youngblood Doctrine: A due-process rule requiring preservation of exculpatory evidence. Not at issue on appeal but central to the trial court’s original ruling.
Rule 403 (Unfair Prejudice): Bars evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue delay.
Rule 106 (Rule of Completeness): Allows introduction of omitted portions of a writing or recorded statement when necessary to understand context.

Conclusion

State of Arkansas v. Ronald Russell establishes that the State’s right to an interlocutory appeal is strictly confined to orders suppressing seized evidence under Rule 16.2, orders suppressing confessions, and orders under Rule 411(c). Motions in limine—even those excluding evidence on due-process grounds—fall outside this jurisdictional grant. Prosecutors must therefore invoke Rule 16.2 and “seize” evidence in proper form if they intend to preserve interlocutory appeal rights. The decision reinforces the division between admissibility and suppression and underscores the policy that most evidentiary disputes should be resolved at trial rather than in piecemeal appeals.