Jurisdictional Limits on Reviewing Discretionary Denials of Cancellation of Removal After Patel and Wilkinson: Commentary on Flowers v. Bondi

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Jeannette Loretta Flowers v. Pamela J. Bondi is a textbook illustration of how narrow federal appellate review has become in the context of discretionary immigration relief, especially after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Patel v. Garland and Wilkinson v. Garland.

Although the facts are sympathetic—a long-time, law-abiding, abused noncitizen and caretaker of multiple U.S.-citizen family members—the panel ultimately holds that it lacks authority to second-guess the immigration courts’ discretionary denial of cancellation of removal and their refusal to reopen proceedings. The decision showcases:

The two-step structure of cancellation of removal (statutory eligibility plus discretionary judgment), and the agency’s ability to skip the eligibility step.
The sharp jurisdictional line between reviewable “questions of law” and unreviewable discretionary weighing of equities.
The harsh collateral consequences of false claims to U.S. citizenship on future adjustment-of-status eligibility.
How waiver and procedural framing can be outcome-determinative on petition for review.

Though explicitly labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION,” the case is nonetheless instructive. It demonstrates how the courts apply the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to real human situations and how strictly they enforce limits on their own power, even where the equities lean heavily in favor of the petitioner.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Flowers’s Entry and Life in the United States

Jeannette Flowers, a native of Belize, entered the United States without authorization in 1987 at age eighteen. Nearly forty years later, at the time of the opinion, she had:

Lived continuously in the United States for decades.
Raised five U.S.-citizen children, four of whom lived with her.
Cared for a grandchild who also lived in her household.
Served as the primary caretaker of her elderly father while he was still alive.
Maintained continuous employment at the same restaurant since at least 2006.
Accumulated no criminal convictions.

Her family members and employer described her as hard-working, caring, and central to the stability of her family unit. Two of her children had particular vulnerabilities: her youngest daughter, age nine at the time of the merits hearing and entirely dependent on her, and her seventeen-year-old son with ADHD and serious problems attending school, work, and counseling.

B. Initiation of Removal Proceedings

In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) arrested Flowers’s abusive former partner, Glen Gillett, who was also the father of two of her children. Flowers was “swept up in the raid,” and DHS charged her as a removable alien. She conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), the form of relief available to certain non–lawful permanent residents.

C. False Claims to U.S. Citizenship

Critical to the outcome were two episodes from 2001 and 2005:

2001: Flowers obtained a fake U.S. passport and used it to reenter the United States after a trip to Belize.
2005: At the U.S.–Mexico border, she verbally represented to a border patrol agent that she was a U.S. citizen (apparently without using the fake passport).

Flowers testified that Gillett compelled these trips and forced her to leave and reenter with him, implying a context of coercion and abuse. Neither incident resulted in arrest or conviction, but Flowers admitted

D. The Immigration Judge’s Denial of Cancellation

At the cancellation hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) received extensive testimony and documentary evidence from Flowers, her children, her sister, and her employer. The IJ acknowledged:

Flowers’s long residence in the United States.
Her strong family and community ties.
Her history of steady employment.
Her role as primary caretaker for multiple U.S.-citizen dependents and her father.
Her account that Gillett’s abuse and coercion prompted the false citizenship claims.

However, instead of deciding whether Flowers met the statutory criteria for cancellation under § 1229b(b)(1), the IJ proceeded directly to the discretionary prong. The IJ concluded that, regardless of statutory eligibility, Flowers did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion, principally because:

Her two false representations of U.S. citizenship were “abhorrent and serious” and outweighed the positive equities.

On that basis, the IJ “denied her application for cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion,” expressly declining to resolve the statutory eligibility elements.

E. BIA’s Affirmance and Motion to Reopen

Flowers appealed, arguing primarily that the IJ failed to give proper weight to the circumstances surrounding her false claims—namely, Gillett’s abuse and coercion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA):

Adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.
Noted that the IJ had indeed mentioned the abuse evidence and that the Board also considered it.
Held that, because Flowers was denied as a matter of discretion, it was unnecessary to rule on her statutory eligibility.

Later, Flowers filed a motion to reopen on two grounds:

Her U.S.-citizen child had filed or was filing an I-130 petition (family-based immigrant visa petition) on her behalf—potentially opening a path to adjustment of status.
Her youngest daughter had recently been diagnosed with ADHD, intensifying hardship and making relief even more compelling.

The BIA denied reopening on two independent bases:

Insufficient documentation of the I-130 petition.
Statutory ineligibility for adjustment of status because Flowers’s false citizenship claims triggered inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), (ii)(I).

F. Consolidated Petitions for Review

Flowers filed timely petitions for review from:

The BIA’s affirmance of the discretionary denial of cancellation, and
The BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen.

The Seventh Circuit consolidated the petitions. While openly sympathetic to Flowers’s situation, the court ultimately denied both petitions, emphasizing the strict limits on its jurisdiction to review discretionary immigration decisions.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit’s order makes several key determinations:

No legal error in skipping statutory eligibility. The IJ and the BIA were legally permitted to deny cancellation of removal solely on discretionary grounds without first deciding whether Flowers met the statutory criteria under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). This is consistent with INS v. Bagamasbad and Patel v. Garland.
Jurisdictional limits on reviewing discretionary judgments. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and Patel, the court lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of relief, including complaints that the agency placed insufficient weight on certain evidence (such as domestic abuse and hardship).
No failure to consider a “swath” of evidence. Although Flowers argued that her abuse evidence was ignored, the record showed that both the IJ and BIA acknowledged and discussed it. Her disagreement with the weight given to that evidence is not a reviewable legal error under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Denial of motion to reopen upheld. The BIA acted within its discretion in denying reopening based on:
- Lack of adequate documentation of the I‑130 petition, and
- Flowers’s statutory ineligibility for adjustment of status due to her false citizenship claims—an independent, dispositive ground she did not challenge in her petition for review, resulting in waiver.
Result: petitions denied. The court, constrained by statute and Supreme Court precedent, denied both petitions, noting that any further relief would have to come through prosecutorial discretion rather than judicial review.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards and Scope of Review

1. Dual Review of IJ and BIA Decisions – Bathula v. Holder

The court explains that when the BIA both:

Adopts the IJ’s reasoning, and
Adds its own analysis,

the reviewing court looks at both decisions. Quoting Bathula v. Holder, 723 F.3d 889, 897 (7th Cir. 2013), the panel confirms that its analysis encompasses:

The IJ’s reasoning, to the extent incorporated by the BIA; and
The BIA’s independent reasoning.

2. De Novo Review of Legal Questions – Meraz-Saucedo and Wilkinson

Claims of “legal error” are reviewed de novo. Citing Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir. 2021), the court stresses that pure legal questions—interpretations of statutes or the application of controlling legal standards—are within its authority. The opinion then ties this to Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserve judicial review for:

Constitutional claims, and
Questions of law (including, per Wilkinson, certain mixed questions like the application of hardship standards).

3. Abuse-of-Discretion Review for Motions to Reopen – Yusev and Cruz-Velasco

For motions to reopen, the standard is highly deferential. Under Yusev v. Sessions, 851 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2017), and Cruz-Velasco v. Garland, 58 F.4th 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2023), the BIA abuses its discretion only where its decision:

Lacks a rational explanation,
Departs inexplicably from established policies, or
Rests on an impermissible basis (e.g., discrimination).

This is an intentionally narrow, deferential standard, reflecting Congress’s decision to vest primary responsibility for reopening decisions in the agency itself.

4. The Jurisdictional Bar on Reviewing Discretionary Relief – Patel

The opinion emphasizes that review of discretionary immigration relief is “very limited,” quoting Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), courts lack jurisdiction to review:

Any judgment regarding the granting of relief under certain discretionary provisions

including cancellation of removal. Patel made clear that this bar reaches not just the ultimate exercise of discretion, but also factual determinations underlying eligibility, subject only to the carve-out in § 1252(a)(2)(D) for constitutional and legal questions.

The panel reinforces this framework by citing:

Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 976 (7th Cir. 2021), emphasizing the narrowness of review.
Aparicio-Brito v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 674, 687 (7th Cir. 2016), precluding reweighing of equities.

B. The Two-Step Cancellation Framework and Bagamasbad/Patel

Cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) involves two distinct steps:

Statutory eligibility – The noncitizen must prove:
- Ten years’ continuous physical presence.
- Good moral character during that period.
- No disqualifying convictions.
- That removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative.
Favorable exercise of discretion – Even if statutorily eligible, the noncitizen must persuade the IJ to grant relief as a matter of discretion, balancing positive and negative equities.

The panel emphasizes that this framework is not rigidly sequential. Relying on:

INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1976) (per curiam), and
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. at 332,

the court notes:

“[I]f the judge decides that denial would be appropriate regardless of eligibility, the judge need not address eligibility at all.”

The IJ precisely followed that approach: she assumed (for argument’s sake) that even if Flowers was statutorily eligible, the serious adverse factor of false citizenship claims outweighed her strong equities, justifying a discretionary denial. The BIA agreed, and the Seventh Circuit held this method legally permissible.

This is an important doctrinal point: the agency can reserve or bypass statutory eligibility questions if it is prepared to deny in the exercise of discretion. That makes it harder for petitioners to frame arguments as “legal errors” concerning statutory criteria, because the agency may simply rest on discretion alone.

C. Abuse Evidence and the Limits of Judicial Review – Martinez-Baez and Aparicio-Brito

Flowers’s central argument on the merits was that the IJ and BIA failed to properly consider—or essentially ignored—the role of Gillett’s abuse in causing her to make false citizenship claims. She attempted to characterize this as a legal error, in order to fit within § 1252(a)(2)(D)’s exception.

The Seventh Circuit draws an important distinction, drawing on Martinez-Baez:

Courts lack jurisdiction over challenges claiming that the agency failed to “conduct a thorough review of the record” (which is essentially a challenge to how the agency weighed evidence); but
Courts may review whether the agency “ignored an entire swath of pertinent evidence”—that is, completely failed to consider a category of material evidence.

Applied here:

The record showed the IJ expressly referenced Flowers’s account of abuse and coercion in connection with the false citizenship claims.
The BIA also noted and considered this evidence.

Because the evidence was clearly acknowledged and discussed, the court concluded that:

The agency did not ignore a “swath” of pertinent evidence; it merely gave that evidence less weight than Flowers believed appropriate.
Disagreements about weight, as opposed to existence or consideration of evidence, fall squarely within the realm of unreviewable discretionary judgment.

Cases like Aparicio-Brito reinforce this: appellate courts cannot reweigh equities or substitute their judgment for that of the IJ or BIA on how positive and negative factors balance.

The result is that, even where there is strong and sympathetic evidence (e.g., domestic violence and coercion), federal courts cannot intervene unless they identify:

A true legal error (misinterpretation of statute/regulation, failure to apply correct standard), or
A genuine failure to consider entire categories of relevant evidence.

D. Motion to Reopen: Evidence, Waiver, and Abuse of Discretion

Motions to reopen are disfavored and subject to stringent standards. Flowers’s motion was grounded in:

An asserted I‑130 petition filed by her child; and
Her youngest daughter’s new ADHD diagnosis, ostensibly intensifying hardship.

The BIA denied reopening for two distinct reasons:

Documentary insufficiency regarding the I‑130. Flowers did not supply sufficient documentation to establish that a proper, approvable I‑130 had been filed.
Statutory ineligibility for adjustment. Independently, because Flowers had admitted making false claims to U.S. citizenship, she was inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), (ii)(I).

On petition for review, Flowers challenged only the first rationale (insufficient documentation of the I‑130). Crucially, she did not address the BIA’s independent holding that she was legally ineligible for adjustment because of her false citizenship claims.

The Seventh Circuit applies standard waiver doctrine, citing Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023): when a party fails to challenge an independent, dispositive ground of decision, that failure constitutes waiver. As a result:

Even if Flowers had prevailed on her challenge to the I‑130 documentation issue, she would still lose, because the unchallenged inadmissibility finding independently sustains the BIA’s denial.
Thus, review is foreclosed by her own failure to contest that basis.

The court then adds that, “waiver aside,” the BIA’s decision would still stand because Flowers had not shown:

That the BIA lacked a rational explanation,
That it deviated from established policies, or
That it acted on an impermissible basis,

as required to demonstrate an abuse of discretion under Cruz-Velasco. Nor did she argue that the new evidence would have compelled the BIA to exercise discretion differently, separate from legal eligibility.

E. The Jurisdiction-Stripping Framework: Patel and Wilkinson in Practice

The opinion is also an application of the modern jurisdictional framework shaped by two recent Supreme Court decisions:

Patel v. Garland (2022) – broadly interpreting § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to bar review of factual determinations underlying discretionary relief decisions, including threshold eligibility determinations; and
Wilkinson v. Garland (2024) – clarifying that § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves judicial review of “questions of law,” including certain mixed questions such as whether facts satisfy the statutory hardship standard.

In Flowers, the panel reflects this balance by:

Affirming its lack of jurisdiction to review the IJ’s and BIA’s discretionary weighing of equities, including how they assessed abuse evidence and positive equities.
Acknowledging that it could review genuine legal errors (e.g., misinterpretation of hardship standard, failure to apply relevant statutes), but finding no such error here.

In effect, the court says:

“We can check the legal framework and ensure the agency did not ignore entire categories of relevant evidence.”
“We cannot redo the discretionary balancing, no matter how sympathetic the facts, because Congress has ‘stripped us of the authority’ to do so.”

That is the core jurisdictional lesson of Flowers: even where a petitioner’s equities are strong and the hardship severe, the federal court’s power is structurally limited.

F. Fraud and False Claims of Citizenship: A Legal Dead-End for Adjustment

A critical statutory piece is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), particularly:

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i): Inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact to procure a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I): A separate, often harsher bar for “false claim to U.S. citizenship,” typically with fewer and narrower waivers than standard fraud/misrepresentation.

Because Flowers admitted:

Using a fake U.S. passport to re-enter in 2001; and
Verbally claiming U.S. citizenship to a border patrol agent in 2005,

the BIA concluded she was inadmissible under these provisions and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status. The Seventh Circuit:

Notes this determination.
Observes that Flowers did not contest it on appeal, thereby waiving any argument about possible exceptions or waivers.

This legal bar illustrates the severe long-term consequences of false citizenship claims, even those made without arrest or conviction and within a context of abuse and coercion. Once admitted, they can foreclose future avenues of lawful status.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Cancellation of Removal (Non-LPR Cancellation)

Cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) is a discretionary form of relief that, if granted, allows certain undocumented noncitizens (who are not lawful permanent residents) to:

Have their removal “canceled,” and
Obtain lawful permanent resident (green card) status.

To qualify, an applicant must prove, among other things:

Long residence (typically 10 years).
Good moral character.
No disqualifying criminal convictions.
Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying U.S.-citizen or lawful-permanent-resident relative.

Even if all criteria are met, the IJ still has broad discretion to say “no,” based on an overall balancing of equities.

2. Discretionary vs. Legal Issues

A legal issue typically involves:

What a statute or regulation means.
Whether the correct legal standard was applied.
Whether due process was observed.

A discretionary issue involves:

How the IJ weighs positive and negative factors.
Whether the IJ thinks the applicant “deserves” relief, assuming eligibility.

Federal courts can usually review legal issues but cannot second-guess discretionary judgments, especially in immigration, due to statutory bars on jurisdiction.

3. Motion to Reopen

A motion to reopen asks the BIA to re-open a concluded case to consider new facts or evidence (e.g., new family circumstances, new medical diagnoses, new eligibility). The standard is demanding:

The new evidence must be material and previously unavailable.
The movant must typically show a realistic chance of obtaining relief if the case is reopened.
The BIA has broad discretion and can deny even where the standard is met.

4. Adjustment of Status and I‑130 Petitions

Adjustment of status is the process by which certain noncitizens already in the United States apply to become lawful permanent residents without leaving the country.

An I‑130 petition, filed by a qualifying U.S.-citizen or lawful-permanent-resident family member, is often the first step in that process. As the opinion notes (quoting Souley v. Holder, 779 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2015)), the I‑130 does not itself grant status, but it establishes the qualifying relationship that may support later adjustment.

5. Prosecutorial Discretion

“Prosecutorial discretion” refers to the government’s power to:

Decide whether to initiate or continue removal proceedings,
Grant stays of removal,
Defer action in sympathetic or low-priority cases, and
Exercise leniency outside the courtroom context.

The panel closes by noting that “it appears that Flowers’s last option may depend on prosecutorial discretion,” underscoring that, after the courts exhaust their limited jurisdiction, executive branch discretion may be the only remaining path for relief.

VI. Likely Impact and Broader Significance

A. Reinforcement of a High Jurisdictional Wall

Although nonprecedential, Flowers v. Bondi is firmly in line with, and illustrative of, the post-Patel and post-Wilkinson landscape:

Appellate courts police their jurisdiction tightly and will not entertain challenges that are, in substance, requests to reweigh evidence or reconsider discretionary balances.
Practitioners must frame issues as genuine “questions of law” or constitutional errors if they hope to obtain judicial review.
Arguments that agency factfinders gave “insufficient weight” to favorable evidence will almost invariably be dismissed as unreviewable.

B. Strategy in Cancellation Cases: Beware of the Discretionary Shortcut

Because of Bagamasbad and Patel, IJs and the BIA are under no obligation to decide statutory eligibility if they would deny relief as a matter of discretion anyway. That has several practical consequences:

Petitioners lose the chance to create a record and ruling on whether their facts satisfy statutory standards like “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
Appellate review becomes more constrained because fewer legal questions (e.g., application of hardship standard) are decided below.
Litigation strategy must anticipate that an IJ may resolve a case purely on discretionary grounds, short-circuiting potential appellate issues.

C. Domestic Violence and Coerced Misconduct

Flowers starkly illustrates how:

Evidence that a noncitizen’s immigration violations were committed under coercion or abuse may be considered but is not guaranteed decisive weight.
Appellate courts cannot insist that the agency give such abuse “enough” weight; they can only check that it was not wholly ignored.

This may have a chilling or sobering effect for advocates representing survivors of abuse: even compelling abuse narratives may not be reviewable if the IJ acknowledges them but simply finds adverse factors (such as false citizenship claims) more important.

D. The Severity of False Claims to U.S. Citizenship

The decision also underscores the particularly harsh immigration consequences of false claims to U.S. citizenship:

Unlike many other grounds of inadmissibility, false citizenship claims often have limited or no waivers, especially outside very narrow statutory exceptions (not discussed in the opinion and, importantly, not raised by Flowers).
Even when there is no criminal conviction and the act occurred years earlier, an admission to the false claim can permanently foreclose adjustment-of-status options.
These consequences apply even where the act occurred under domestic violence or coercion, unless the statute or regulations provide specific relief (again, not at issue here).

E. Motions to Reopen: The Importance of Addressing Every Ground

For motions to reopen, the case is a reminder that:

If the BIA’s denial rests on multiple independent grounds, the petitioner must challenge each of them on petition for review.
Failure to address any independent, dispositive ground results in waiver and effectively forecloses appellate relief.
Practitioners must carefully identify and attack all aspects of the BIA’s rationale to preserve arguments for judicial review.

F. Policy Tension: Sympathetic Facts, Limited Judicial Power

The panel explicitly acknowledges its sympathy for Flowers:

She is described as a “law-abiding, hard-working, family-supporting, upstanding member of the community” who has overcome abuse.
Yet, the court emphasizes that Congress has stripped it of authority to second-guess discretionary denials, no matter how sympathetic the equities.

This underscores a central policy tension in current immigration law: Congress has chosen to tightly cabin judicial review in discretionary immigration matters, leaving many hard cases—like Flowers’s—essentially to the unreviewable discretion of agency officials and, ultimately, to executive prosecutorial discretion.

VII. Conclusion

Flowers v. Bondi is not a groundbreaking precedential decision, but it is an instructive application of contemporary immigration jurisprudence under Patel, Wilkinson, and longstanding principles like Bagamasbad. Its key takeaways include:

Two-step, but not two-stage: Cancellation of removal involves both eligibility and discretion, but the agency may deny solely on discretionary grounds without ever resolving eligibility.
Jurisdiction is narrow: Federal courts can review constitutional and legal questions but cannot revisit discretionary weighing of evidence or equities.
Evidence vs. weight: Courts may check whether key evidence (like abuse) was considered, but cannot require that the agency give it more weight.
False citizenship claims are devastating: Even without convictions, such admissions can permanently bar adjustment of status.
Waiver is fatal: Failure to challenge every independent ground of the BIA’s decision can doom a petition for review, regardless of the merits of other arguments.
Prosecutorial discretion as last resort: With judicial review so constrained, many sympathetic noncitizens must rely on the executive branch’s discretionary choices for any hope of remaining in the United States.

In the broader legal context, Flowers demonstrates how doctrinal developments at the Supreme Court level translate into concrete outcomes in the courts of appeals: a sympathetic, long-resident, noncriminal parent and survivor of abuse may still be removed because federal judges are structurally barred from second-guessing how immigration adjudicators balance the equities. It is a powerful reminder that, in modern U.S. immigration law, the limits of jurisdiction can matter as much as the merits.