Jurisdictional Limits on Appeals of Consent Judgment Interpretations: Nunez v. City of New York

Introduction

Nunez v. City of New York, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 30, 2025, addresses an appeal by an interested party, Ronald Colson, who challenged a district court order interpreting the scope of a 2015 consent judgment in the class action Nunez v. New York City Department of Corrections. The underlying class action arose from allegations of pervasive excessive force by corrections officers. After entry of the consent judgment in 2015, which instituted a monitorship to oversee compliance, Colson—an individual prisoner in separate litigation—sought to call the deputy monitor as a witness in his civil-rights suit under Monell. Chief Judge Swain of the Southern District of New York issued an order clarifying that confidentiality and non-testimony provisions of the consent judgment applied equally to the deputy monitor and her team. Colson appealed that interpretive order, arguing it was final, appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, or appealable as an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The Second Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held, unanimously, that it lacked jurisdiction to review Chief Judge Swain’s interpretive order for three reasons:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the order was not a “final decision” because it merely interpreted a consent judgment rather than conclusively disposing of any claim.
The collateral-order doctrine did not apply because the order was reviewable in the ongoing Colson proceeding (appealable after final judgment in that case) and therefore was not effectively unreviewable.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the order was not an injunction but a clarification of existing obligations within the consent judgment, and such interpretive rulings are not appealable interlocutory injunctions.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956): Recognized the federal policy against piecemeal appeals and guided the practical approach to “finality” under § 1291.
In re Tronox Inc., 855 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2017): Applied the same concerns with successive appeals in the context of injunctive relief and interpreted § 1291’s finality requirement.
Amara v. Cigna Corp., 53 F.4th 241 (2d Cir. 2022): Emphasized a “practical rather than technical construction” of finality under § 1291.
Belya v. Kapral, 45 F.4th 621 (2d Cir. 2022): Clarified the narrow scope of the collateral‐order doctrine.
JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, 91 F.4th 91 (2d Cir. 2024): Held that orders “merely clarifying or interpreting injunctions” do not fall within § 1292(a)(1).

These precedents shaped the court’s view that interpretive rulings—whether in injunctions or consent decrees—must generally await final disposition of the underlying litigation before appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s analysis unfolded in three sequential steps:

Finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Section 1291 grants jurisdiction over final decisions terminating litigation. The court analogized interpretive orders in consent judgments to enforcement rulings in injunctions, which are non‐final and thus not appealable. Absent a termination of a discrete proceeding or a grant/dissolution of an injunction, piecemeal appeals would undermine judicial efficiency.
Collateral‐Order Doctrine: To qualify, an order must (1) be conclusive, (2) resolve important questions separate from the merits, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. Because Judge Clarke’s later summary‐judgment decision in Colson directly relied on the interpretive order—and because a future appeal from the final Colson judgment could review that reliance—the order was not “effectively unreviewable” now.
Interlocutory Injunctions under § 1292(a)(1): That statute covers orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,” not orders that simply interpret an existing injunction or consent decree. The court found no substantive modification or new injunction, only a clarification of confidentiality and non‐testimony provisions originally agreed to by the parties.

Impact

This decision reinforces several key principles regarding appellate jurisdiction:

District courts’ interpretive rulings on consent judgments, even when binding on third‐party litigants, must generally await final judgment for appellate review.
Parties should anticipate that non‐testimony and confidentiality provisions in consent decrees will be construed strictly by the court and not easily bypassed by interested parties.
Future litigants in collateral proceedings must challenge restrictive provisions at the final judgment stage or seek advance authorization from the court that approved the consent decree.
The decision may guide other circuits in harmonizing approaches to piecemeal appeals of consent‐decree interpretations and ensures that § 1292(a)(1) remains focused on substantive injunction changes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Final Decision (§ 1291): A “final decision” ends a discrete claim or litigation. Orders that only interpret or enforce an existing court order, without ending proceedings, are not final.
Collateral‐Order Doctrine: An exception allowing immediate appeal of orders that (1) conclusively determine an issue, (2) concern important rights apart from the merits, and (3) would be unreviewable if delayed until final judgment. It is narrowly applied to prevent fragmented appeals.
Interlocutory Injunctions (§ 1292(a)(1)): Orders that grant, change, or dissolve an injunction before the final resolution of a case. Plainly interpretive or clarificatory orders do not fall into this category.
Consent Judgment: A binding court order reflecting a negotiated agreement between litigants. It has the force of a judgment and is enforceable as such.

Conclusion

Nunez v. City of New York clarifies that district‐court interpretations of consent judgments—particularly those concerning confidentiality and non‐testimony provisions—do not produce immediately appealable orders under § 1291, the collateral‐order doctrine, or § 1292(a)(1). This ruling underscores the judiciary’s commitment to avoiding piecemeal appellate review and preserves the narrow scope of interlocutory appeals. Practitioners should take heed: challenges to the scope of consent decrees and injunctive orders are best pursued at the final judgment stage or by seeking explicit court authorization in the originating proceeding.