Jurisdictional Limits of W.R.Cr.P. 41(g) and Sovereign Immunity in Lost-Property Claims: Commentary on Scott Dearold Bressette v. State of Wyoming (2025 WY 125)

Jurisdictional Limits of W.R.Cr.P. 41(g) and Sovereign Immunity in Lost-Property Claims:
Commentary on Scott Dearold Bressette v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 125

I. Introduction

In Scott Dearold Bressette v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 125, the Wyoming Supreme Court confronted a recurring but underappreciated problem: what remedies, if any, are available when law enforcement seizes personal property in a criminal case, later relinquishes possession (here, to a tow company), and the property is ultimately lost or sold without meaningful notice to the owner?

The case arises from the seizure, search, and eventual loss of a pickup truck associated with drug charges. After the criminal case concluded, Scott Bressette filed a motion under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for return of the truck, or alternatively, for money damages equal to its value. The core issue was whether Rule 41(g) allows a court to:

  • order return of property no longer in the government’s possession, or
  • award monetary damages when the government has lost or disposed of the property.

The Court answered both questions in the negative, reaffirming and sharpening prior precedent—especially DeLoge v. State (“DeLoge IV”)—and emphasizing that:

  • a Rule 41(g) proceeding is essentially a replevin-style action, and
  • sovereign immunity bars money damages under Rule 41(g) where the State no longer has the property and the claimant has not complied with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA).

At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the alleged conduct may implicate due process concerns and made clear that the defendant is not necessarily without recourse—it must just be pursued via a separate civil action, not through Rule 41(g).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Investigation, Seizure, and Search of the Truck

On September 9, 2021, a confidential source reported to Special Agent Gallegos of the Albany County Sheriff's Office that he had broken into a black Ford pickup truck, stolen 15 grams of methamphetamine from the center console, and that roughly 65 grams of methamphetamine remained in the truck. The source identified the truck as belonging to Scott Bressette.

Agents located the truck in an apartment parking lot in Laramie. At the time, Bressette had an active arrest warrant. Surveillance showed him walking from an apartment to the back of the truck and then returning. When contacted by agents, he initially fled but was quickly apprehended. A search of his person yielded methamphetamine and heroin.

Agents then turned to the truck. A K9 unit alerted positively on the vehicle. Special Agent Gallegos called A1 Towing to move the truck to the Albany County Search and Rescue evidence bay. The next day, he obtained a warrant to search the truck. The search produced substances suspected to be methamphetamine and marijuana, which were seized; an inventory sheet recorded that A1 Towing had towed the vehicle.

After the search, Gallegos testified that the truck was “released back” to Bressette “in a way” by turning it over to A1 Towing, which would store it until the “owner” paid towing and storage fees. Typically, the defendant would be informed of the tow via booking paperwork, but Gallegos could not recall whether that occurred here. Critically, the State never retained physical custody of the vehicle after releasing it to the tow yard, and no formal court order governed its disposition.

B. Criminal Charges and Resolution

On the same day the truck was searched, the State charged Bressette with multiple drug-related offenses—both possession and possession with intent to deliver—based on the drugs found on his person and in his truck, and with interference with a peace officer.

Subsequent testing revealed that the substances seized from the truck were not controlled substances. The State accordingly filed an amended information on January 28, 2022, dropping all truck-related charges. Bressette ultimately pleaded guilty on March 3, 2022, to a single count of possession of a controlled substance; he received a three-to-five year sentence, split with all but 180 days suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation. By sentencing, he had already served 175 days in detention.

C. Discovery of the Tow and Loss of the Vehicle

Bressette learned the truck was with A1 Towing only in February 2022, while reviewing discovery with his attorney. After completing the custodial portion of his sentence in March 2022, he contacted A1 Towing, which informed him he owed $14,000 in towing and storage fees—an amount he could not afford. At some unknown later date, A1 Towing auctioned and sold the truck.

According to Bressette, no one ever advised him the truck could be sold to satisfy the towing and storage charges.

Ownership of the truck was not formally litigated; Bressette produced a bill of sale and assignment indicating he bought the truck in 2020, but the truck also contained a North Dakota registration listing “Nikki Johnson” as owner. The Court assumed, without deciding, that Bressette was the rightful owner.

D. Rule 41(g) Motion and District Court Ruling

On July 11, 2024, proceeding pro se, Bressette filed a motion for release and return of seized property under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). In the alternative, he sought compensation for the value of the truck and personal property stored in it, estimating:

  • $15,000 for the truck; and
  • $5,000 for personal property inside the truck.

The State responded that it no longer possessed the vehicle. It explained that the truck had been towed to A1 Towing and not seized for forfeiture. Consequently, the State argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order its return under Rule 41(g).

The district court appointed counsel for Bressette and held a hearing on February 18, 2025. After the hearing, the court denied the motion, holding:

  • it could not order return of the truck under Rule 41(g) because the State did not possess the vehicle after the search, and
  • it had no authority under Rule 41(g) to award money damages; the rule only authorizes return of property.

Bressette appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Rule 41(g) is limited to return of property still in the State’s possession.
    A motion under W.R.Cr.P. 41(g) is “essentially a replevin action.” As a general rule, courts lack jurisdiction to grant relief under Rule 41(g) where the government no longer possesses the property. Because the undisputed evidence showed that the truck had been released to A1 Towing and later sold, the State did not possess the vehicle and the district court could not order its return.
  2. Rule 41(g) does not authorize money damages for lost property; sovereign immunity bars such relief absent compliance with the WGCA.
    The Court reaffirmed DeLoge IV and aligned with the majority of federal courts: Rule 41(g) contains no waiver of sovereign immunity for monetary damages when the government no longer has the property. A claimant seeking compensation must proceed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), which requires statutory presentment and other procedural compliance. Because Bressette’s motion showed no compliance with the WGCA, his claim for damages was barred.
  3. Calling a tow truck and removing a vehicle constitutes a “seizure,” triggering statutory duties—regardless of later loss.
    Invoking federal authority, the Court held it is “self-evident” that police seize a vehicle when they call a tow truck to take it away. That seizure triggers obligations under Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-105 (recordkeeping, custody, and return procedures). Whether or not law enforcement complied with those obligations, however, does not expand the remedy available under Rule 41(g).
  4. Potential due process violations must be pursued in a separate civil action, not via Rule 41(g).
    The Court openly acknowledged that Bressette’s allegations—seizure of a legally parked truck, transfer to a tow yard, and sale without notice—may implicate due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the mechanism to litigate and obtain compensation for such violations is a civil action (likely under the WGCA), not a Rule 41(g) motion.
  5. Wyoming rejects the practice of converting a Rule 41(g) motion into a money-damages civil complaint.
    Some federal courts have suggested or permitted conversion of a Rule 41(g) motion into a civil action for damages when the property is lost. Wyoming explicitly rejects that approach, emphasizing the “numerous procedural difficulties” of conversion and preferring that claimants file a separate civil action.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Governing Legal Framework

1. Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-105 – Law Enforcement Custody of Seized Property

Wyoming Statute § 7-2-105 establishes a comprehensive framework for the custody, return, and disposition of property seized by peace officers. Key provisions include:

  • Delivery and custody: Seized property must be delivered to the appropriate law enforcement agency, whose head must maintain custody of the property pending a court’s order of disposal, unless released to the owner. § 7-2-105(b).
  • Recordkeeping: The agency must keep records of seized property, including the circumstances of seizure and identities of those with interests in the property.
  • Return to lawful owner: If the owner can be reasonably ascertained, and if the property is not needed as evidence, is not unlawful to possess, and ownership is undisputed, law enforcement must return the property “without judicial action.” § 7-2-105(c).
  • Judicial disposition: If property is lost, mislaid, abandoned, unclaimed, unlawful to possess, or subject to disputed ownership, the statute prescribes judicial procedures for its disposition. § 7-2-105(c)–(p).

The Court underscores that once law enforcement “seizes” property—here, by calling a tow truck—these statutory duties attach, including the duty to maintain custody until proper release or court-ordered disposition. Whether those duties were breached may be highly relevant in a later civil suit.

2. Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g)

Rule 41(g) provides:

(g) Motion for return of property. — A person aggrieved . . . by the deprivation of property may move the court in which charges are pending or if charges have not been filed the court from which the warrant issued for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and use of the property in subsequent proceedings. . . .

From this language and existing case law, the Court highlights several fundamental points:

  • The only relief expressly authorized is return of the property.
  • The proceeding is nominally filed within a criminal case, but is civil in nature.
  • The movant must show entitlement to lawful possession.
  • If the motion is filed after criminal proceedings end, the State bears a “heavy” burden to justify continued retention, but that burden is only by a preponderance of the evidence.

3. Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA)

The WGCA, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1‑39‑101 to ‑124, is Wyoming’s sovereign immunity waiver statute. It establishes:

  • the limited circumstances in which the State and its subdivisions may be sued for tort damages, and
  • strict procedural prerequisites—most importantly, timely written presentation of a claim to the governmental entity and satisfaction of statutory content requirements.

Compliance with the WGCA is typically jurisdictional; failure to present a proper claim within the statutory period bars suit. In Bressette, the motion under Rule 41(g) contained no indication that any WGCA claim had been filed, so the Court treated the damages request as barred by sovereign immunity.

B. Precedents Driving the Court’s Reasoning

1. Wyoming Cases

a. DeLoge v. State (“DeLoge III”), 2007 WY 71, 156 P.3d 1004

DeLoge III articulated Wyoming’s “general rule” for seized property:

Wyoming’s “general rule requires the return of seized property, other than contraband, to the rightful owner after the termination of criminal proceedings unless the government has a continuing interest in the property.”

Bressette reaffirms this baseline principle and re-situates Rule 41(g) as the mechanism by which an aggrieved person enforces the general rule of return when law enforcement refuses to surrender property after the criminal case has ended.

b. DeLoge v. State (“DeLoge IV”), 2010 WY 60, 231 P.3d 862

DeLoge IV is the linchpin for Bressette on two critical issues:

  1. Jurisdiction requires governmental possession.
    The Court in DeLoge IV held that when property has been transferred out of the State’s possession (there, to another state for investigation), Wyoming courts lack jurisdiction under Rule 41(e) (now 41(g)) to order its return. A Rule 41 motion is “essentially a replevin action,” and replevin presupposes that the defendant possesses the property.
  2. No money damages under Rule 41; sovereign immunity applies.
    After the district court in DeLoge IV found it lacked authority to order return, DeLoge sought monetary compensation. The Court surveyed federal cases and adopted the majority rule that Rule 41 does not waive sovereign immunity for monetary damages. It also emphasized that claims against the government must comply with the WGCA’s mandatory procedures.

Bressette expressly relies on these holdings and applies them almost mechanically to the new factual context of a vehicle auctioned by a tow company.

c. Bunten v. State, 2023 WY 105, 537 P.3d 763

Bunten supplied several structural points:

  • Source of authority: Seizure and retention of property are governed by § 7-2-105.
  • Recordkeeping: Agencies must maintain records of seized property, including circumstances and persons with interests.
  • Burden shifting post-conviction: After criminal proceedings end, the State bears the burden under Rule 41(g) to justify continued retention by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bressette uses Bunten primarily to restate the general regime but then distinguishes the present case on one determinative ground: here, the State had no property left to justify retaining.

d. Benedict v. State, 2024 WY 55, 548 P.3d 989

Benedict clarified:

  • the standard of review—abuse of discretion for Rule 41 rulings, but de novo review for underlying legal questions (like authority to order return), and
  • that Rule 41(g) proceedings are civil in nature, even though filed in the criminal case.

Bressette leans on Benedict for these methodological points and again for the proposition that, after criminal proceedings conclude, the State’s burden to justify retention is by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. Federal Authorities and Out-of-State Cases

a. Definition of “Seizure” – United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)

The Court quotes Jacobsen for the classic definition:

A “seizure” of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.

Applying this, the Court concludes it is “self-evident” that once police call a tow truck to remove a vehicle, the vehicle has been seized. This supports the finding that § 7-2-105 duties attached to the truck once it was towed.

b. Vehicle Seizure by Towing – United States v. Richards, 147 F. Supp. 2d 786 (E.D. Mich. 2001)

Richards holds that police seize a vehicle once they call a tow truck to remove it. Bressette adopts this reasoning, reinforcing the common-sense link between towing and seizure for Fourth Amendment and statutory purposes.

c. Rule 41 and Sovereign Immunity – Federal Circuit Split

DeLoge IV (and now Bressette) relied on and reaffirmed a series of federal decisions holding that Rule 41 does not waive sovereign immunity for money damages when the government no longer has the property. Those include:

  • Clymore v. United States, 415 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005);
  • Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2004);
  • Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2003);
  • United States v. Hall, 269 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2001);
  • United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2001);
  • United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2000);
  • United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2000);
  • Pena v. United States, 157 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1998).

The controlling theme is that Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 41, cannot be interpreted to waive sovereign immunity absent express authorization; silence on damages is treated as a non-waiver.

d. Conversion of Rule 41 Motions – United States v. Hall (8th Cir.) and United States v. Norwood (7th Cir.)

Two federal cases are particularly important to the Court’s approach:

  • Hall (8th Cir.). Suggested that, when the government no longer possesses property, the court should give a Rule 41 movant—especially a pro se one—the opportunity to amend or assert an alternative money-damages claim.
  • Norwood (7th Cir.). Stated that denial of Rule 41 relief “is not with prejudice” to filing a separate civil suit; indeed, denial “clears the deck” for such a suit and is “preferable” to contorting the Rule 41 motion into a civil complaint.

Wyoming explicitly sides with Norwood and rejects the Hall approach. The Court underscores that converting a criminal procedural motion into a civil complaint produces “numerous procedural difficulties” (service, filing fees, WGCA compliance, statute of limitations, proper parties, etc.). It prefers a clean separation: Rule 41 for return of existing property; separate civil suits for damages.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Characterizing the Nature of the Seizure and Possession

The Court first clarifies an important conceptual point: the district court had said the vehicle “was not seized by the State after the search.” The Supreme Court reads this as a reference to possession rather than literal seizure and corrects any potential confusion:

  • The truck was seized when law enforcement had it towed.
  • But after being searched, it was “released” to A1 Towing and thus left governmental possession.

This distinction—seizure vs. continued possession—is central. A Rule 41(g) remedy of return is logically available only where the defendant (the government) actually has the property and can restore it to the movant. Once the State has relinquished possession—however lawfully or unlawfully—Rule 41(g) ceases to be an effective mechanism.

The Court explicitly ties the moment of towing to a “seizure” in the Fourth Amendment/statutory sense, thereby triggering § 7-2-105. That statutory framework now looms in the background as the standard against which law enforcement’s behavior could later be measured in a civil suit (e.g., whether they properly maintained custody, gave appropriate notice, or lawfully authorized transfer to a tow company and sale).

2. Rule 41(g) as a Replevin‑Type Action: Jurisdiction Requires Possession

Building on DeLoge IV, the Court emphasizes that a Rule 41(g) motion is “essentially a replevin action.” In traditional replevin:

  • the plaintiff claims superior right to possession of specific property; and
  • the court orders the defendant to return that property.

Fundamentally, this presupposes that the defendant actually has the property or controls it. Accordingly:

“As a general rule, a court does not have jurisdiction to grant a Rule 41 motion for return of the property when the evidence establishes that the governmental defendant no longer has possession of the property.”

Because it was undisputed that the State no longer possessed the truck—having turned it over to A1 Towing, which sold it—the district court lacked jurisdiction to order its return. That conclusion is essentially compelled by the logic of replevin and prior Wyoming precedent.

3. Denial of Monetary Relief: Sovereign Immunity and the WGCA

Turning to the alternative request for money damages, the Court follows a two-step analysis:

  1. No textual basis in Rule 41(g) for damages.
    The rule speaks only of the “return” of property. It does not mention compensation or damages in the event the property is destroyed, lost, sold, or unlawfully disposed of.
  2. No waiver of sovereign immunity; WGCA compliance required.
    As reiterated from DeLoge IV and the majority federal rule, a procedural rule of court cannot be construed as a substantive waiver of sovereign immunity. Absent explicit statutory language waiving immunity for damages in this context, the State cannot be held monetarily liable via a Rule 41(g) motion. Instead, any claim sounding in tort or constitutional deprivation must be brought through a civil action complying with the WGCA.

In Bressette, the record was devoid of any indication that a WGCA claim had been filed, much less timely and properly presented. Therefore, sovereign immunity barred the damages claim, and the district court correctly refused to award compensation under Rule 41(g).

4. Due Process Concerns and the Proper Procedural Vehicle

A striking aspect of the opinion is its candor about possible constitutional issues. The Court states:

“Maybe so” that what occurred “violates his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and he should be compensated for the value of his property.”

Yet the Court immediately pivots: that may be, but those issues belong in a separate civil action invoking the WGCA (and potentially other constitutional or common-law theories), not in a Rule 41(g) motion. The Court cites Norwood for the proposition that denial of Rule 41 relief does not preclude later civil litigation for the loss of property; indeed, denial “clears the deck” for such a suit.

The Court thus deliberately cabins Rule 41(g) as a narrow procedural remedy within criminal proceedings, avoiding its evolution into a catch-all vehicle for damages when property is mishandled.

5. Rejection of Converting Rule 41 Motions into Civil Complaints

The Court addresses head-on the line of federal cases, exemplified by Hall, that suggest district courts should allow Rule 41 movants to pivot to money-damages claims when the government no longer possesses the property. Wyoming declines to follow that route:

“We disagree. Converting a motion in a criminal case into a civil complaint presents numerous procedural difficulties. We think the better practice is to require the defendant to file a separate civil action.”

This is arguably the clearest new procedural directive in the opinion: Wyoming courts should not recharacterize or expand a criminal-procedure motion into a civil tort or constitutional claim. Instead, litigants must affirmatively initiate a civil suit, complying with all jurisdictional, procedural, and statutory prerequisites, including those in the WGCA.

D. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

1. Implications for Criminal Defendants and Defense Counsel

Bressette has several immediate consequences for practice:

  • Rule 41(g) is only for still-existing property in government hands.
    Defense counsel must promptly ascertain whether property seized in a criminal case remains in law enforcement custody. If the property has been released to a third party (such as a tow yard) or lost, Rule 41(g) will not provide an effective remedy.
  • Early action is essential.
    The longer a defendant waits, the more likely property will be transferred, destroyed, or sold. Counsel should, where appropriate, file Rule 41(g) motions promptly after it becomes clear that the State’s legitimate interest in the property has ended (e.g., after testing, or when charges are dropped).
  • Damages claims must be pursued civilly and in compliance with the WGCA.
    If property is lost, sold, or destroyed, counsel must evaluate possible tort and constitutional claims, identify the proper governmental defendants, and strictly comply with WGCA presentment and filing deadlines.
  • Separate claims against private actors.
    Where a private tow company or storage facility has sold or otherwise disposed of the property, separate private claims (e.g., under lien statutes, conversion, or bailment theories) may be appropriate, in addition to any governmental claims.

2. Implications for Law Enforcement and Prosecutors

The opinion puts renewed emphasis on:

  • Compliance with § 7-2-105.
    Once property is towed, it is seized. Agencies must keep proper records, clearly establish chains of custody, track interests in the property, and ensure that any release or disposition is consistent with statutory directions and due process.
  • Notice to owners.
    Although the opinion does not decide the due process issue, the facts illustrate serious risk: releasing a vehicle to a tow yard, allowing massive storage fees to accrue, and enabling an eventual sale without effective notice exposes agencies to plausible WGCA and constitutional claims.
  • Coordination with towing companies.
    Agencies should revisit agreements and protocols with tow providers to ensure that owners receive timely and adequate notice and that sales or disposal procedures comport with applicable statutes and due process standards.

3. Implications for Courts

The decision provides clear guidance:

  • Rule 41(g) motions are constrained remedies; courts must confirm whether the State currently possesses the property before granting relief.
  • If the State lacks possession, courts should deny the motion, not attempt to morph it into a civil damages action or adjudicate WGCA compliance within the criminal case.
  • Denials of Rule 41(g) motions in such circumstances are without prejudice to separate civil litigation.

4. Systemic and Policy Considerations

At a broader level, Bressette spotlights common systemic issues:

  • Risk of practical “remedial gaps.”
    While the Court stresses that Bressette is not without recourse, as a practical matter many criminal defendants will lack resources, counsel, or time to pursue separate civil actions, especially after incarceration. This raises policy questions about whether the current division between criminal and civil remedies unintentionally leaves some victims of governmental mishandling effectively without relief.
  • Incentives for proper property handling.
    By channeling damages claims into WGCA actions, the Court preserves the threat of monetary liability as a deterrent against cavalier property practices by law enforcement, but it does so outside the context of criminal procedure.
  • Possible legislative responses.
    The legislature could, if it chose, clarify or expand remedies in § 7‑2‑105 for unauthorized transfer or loss of seized property, including mandated notice requirements or specific civil remedies. Currently, however, the WGCA and general tort/constitutional law remain the only routes.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Seizure” vs. “Possession”

  • Seizure: Happens when the government meaningfully interferes with a person’s possessory interests in property—e.g., when police have a car towed from where it was parked.
  • Possession (for Rule 41 purposes): Refers to whether the State (or a governmental defendant) still physically holds or controls the property. A property may have been seized, but if it is later given to a tow yard and sold, the State no longer possesses it.

Rule 41(g) hinges on current possession, not merely the fact of past seizure.

2. Replevin

Replevin is an old common-law action for the recovery of specific personal property wrongfully held by another. It seeks return of the thing itself, not money for its value (unless return is impossible, in which case damages may be awarded—but only where the court has proper jurisdiction and there is no sovereign immunity).

Rule 41(g) is functionally similar to replevin: the remedy it provides is return of the specific seized item. When the item cannot be returned because it is gone, the replevin-style remedy fails.

3. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is the doctrine that the State cannot be sued for money damages without its consent. That consent must come from a statute that clearly waives immunity, such as the WGCA, and must be strictly construed.

Because Rule 41(g) is a court rule and does not explicitly authorize damages, it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, even if the State behaved wrongfully regarding property, monetary compensation generally must be sought under a statute like the WGCA, not a criminal rule.

4. Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA)

The WGCA is Wyoming’s tort claims statute governing lawsuits against governmental entities and public employees. Key features include:

  • a limited waiver of immunity for certain types of negligence or wrongful acts;
  • a requirement that the claimant present a written claim to the governmental entity within a specific time (often within two years of the act, subject to detail in the statute);
  • specific content requirements for the claim (e.g., time, place, circumstances, amount of damages); and
  • only after proper presentment may a civil suit be filed in court.

Failure to comply with the WGCA usually results in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. In Bressette, the Court assumes no WGCA claim was filed and therefore treats the damages request as jurisdictionally barred.

5. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review in Rule 41(g) Proceedings

  • Burden of proof: After criminal proceedings end, the State must show it has a “legitimate reason” to retain property by a preponderance of the evidence. There is a presumption the person from whom property was taken has a right to its return.
  • Standard of review on appeal:
    • Abuse of discretion for the district court’s overall ruling on the motion; and
    • De novo (fresh) review for underlying legal conclusions, such as whether the court has authority or jurisdiction to order return or damages.

VI. Conclusion

Scott Dearold Bressette v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 125, reinforces and refines Wyoming’s law on return of seized property. The decision firmly establishes that:

  • W.R.Cr.P. 41(g) is a narrow remedy modeled on replevin, authorizing only the return of property still in the government’s possession.
  • Courts lack jurisdiction under Rule 41(g) to order return of property that the State no longer possesses—regardless of whether the State may have mishandled the property or violated statutory duties under § 7‑2‑105.
  • Rule 41(g) does not waive sovereign immunity for monetary relief; any claim for damages must proceed via the WGCA (and possibly other civil causes of action) in a separate civil case, with full compliance with statutory presentment requirements.
  • Calling a tow truck and removing a vehicle constitutes a “seizure,” triggering law enforcement’s statutory obligations for custody, recordkeeping, and disposition—but not expanding Rule 41(g)’s remedial scope.
  • Wyoming declines to follow federal decisions that encourage converting Rule 41 motions into civil complaints; instead, litigants must file separate civil suits if they seek compensation for lost or sold property.

Doctrinally, the opinion harmonizes Wyoming with the dominant federal view on Rule 41’s limited remedial reach and sovereign immunity, while also providing a practical roadmap: use Rule 41(g) to retrieve existing property; invoke the WGCA and civil litigation to seek compensation for property that the government has lost, destroyed, or allowed to be disposed of by third parties.

Although the Court leaves open—and even hints favorably at—the possibility that Bressette’s due process rights were infringed, it insists that such constitutional claims be channeled through the proper civil law mechanisms. In so doing, Bressette clarifies not only the contours of Rule 41(g), but also the broader procedural architecture governing governmental liability for mishandled seized property in Wyoming.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming

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