Jurisdictional Discovery Sanctions and the Limits of Collateral Estoppel in Diversity Cases: Commentary on Brown v. Montgomery

Commentary on: Kimberly Jean Brown v. Michelle Montgomery, et al., No. 25-1220, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Dec. 18, 2025) (nonprecedential order).

I. Introduction

This Seventh Circuit order in Brown v. Montgomery occupies a procedurally unusual but doctrinally important corner of civil practice. The court confronts the question: what may a federal district court do when it cannot determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction because a party refuses to comply with jurisdictional discovery?

Kimberly Brown, an Illinois-licensed attorney attempting to build an estate-planning business, sued several business associates and related entities in federal court after her business failed. She alleged a variety of state-law tort claims, including claims tied to the failure of her business and alleged defamation. Subject-matter jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, based on Brown’s assertion that she was a citizen of North Carolina and that all defendants were citizens of Illinois or California.

The district court initially accepted jurisdiction, ruled on the merits, and dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). But while the case was on appeal, Brown herself challenged subject-matter jurisdiction, pointing to a different federal case in which another district judge had found that she was a citizen of Illinois as of September 2020. That prior finding raised a serious question whether complete diversity actually existed at the time she filed this August 2020 action.

The Seventh Circuit remanded for the limited purpose of determining subject-matter jurisdiction, expressly authorizing reasonable jurisdictional discovery. On remand, the defendants served straightforward interrogatories aimed at establishing Brown’s state citizenship on the date she filed suit (where she lived, owned property, and was registered to vote). Brown—an attorney—refused to answer substantively, lodged only objections, ignored extended deadlines, and offered no meaningful explanation for her noncompliance.

The district court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice as a Rule 37 discovery sanction. In this appeal, Brown raises several core challenges:

that the district court lacked power to order discovery or impose sanctions without first confirming subject-matter jurisdiction;
that collateral estoppel from her earlier case, Brown v. Gartner, precluded further inquiry into her citizenship;
that ordering jurisdictional discovery and imposing dismissal as a sanction were abuses of discretion; and
that the underlying Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the merits was erroneous.

The Seventh Circuit (Judges Easterbrook, Sykes, and Scudder) rejects all of Brown’s arguments and affirms. Although designated as a “Nonprecedential Disposition” under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, the order is a detailed, coherent synthesis of several strands of doctrine: the “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction,” the scope of collateral estoppel, the time-of-filing rule for diversity citizenship, and the standards governing Rule 37 dismissal sanctions—especially in the context of jurisdictional discovery.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

Brown filed a diversity action in August 2020 in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that she was a North Carolina citizen. The district court accepted jurisdiction, reached the merits, and dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Brown appealed. While that appeal was pending, she moved in the district court to vacate the judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing a separate case, Brown v. Gartner, in which another judge had found that she was an Illinois citizen as of September 2020.

The Seventh Circuit, in an earlier order, remanded the Montgomery case to enable the district court to decide whether diversity jurisdiction existed at the time of filing and explicitly stated that defendants could pursue “reasonable discovery” on jurisdiction. On remand, the district judge ordered jurisdictional discovery, but Brown refused to comply despite clear warnings. As a sanction under Rule 37, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. Brown appealed from that sanction dismissal.

B. Holdings

The Seventh Circuit’s key determinations are:

Power to order jurisdictional discovery and impose sanctions.
A federal district court has authority to order and manage jurisdictional discovery and to sanction parties—including through dismissal with prejudice—for noncompliance, even when subject-matter jurisdiction has not yet been conclusively established. This flows from the principle that “federal judges have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction” and that sanctions for misconduct in jurisdictional discovery are collateral to the merits.
Collateral estoppel does not bar jurisdictional discovery.
Brown’s reliance on Brown v. Gartner fails for two independent reasons: (a) the defendants in Montgomery were not parties to the earlier litigation and had no “full and fair opportunity” to litigate her citizenship; and (b) the issue is not identical, because diversity jurisdiction here turns on Brown’s citizenship at the August 2020 filing date, whereas Gartner involved her citizenship as of September 2020.
No abuse of discretion in ordering discovery or selecting dismissal as sanction.
The court finds that the interrogatories were plainly relevant and not burdensome, and that Brown’s repeated failures to comply—despite explicit warnings and without credible justification—amounted to “fault” or “willfulness” sufficient to justify dismissal under Rule 37. The panel emphasizes that dismissal is severe but appropriate here given:
- Brown’s pattern of noncompliance and personal responsibility;
- prejudice to defendants and the court’s ability to determine jurisdiction; and
- the limited availability or effectiveness of lesser sanctions, especially because the court could not simply presume jurisdiction as a penalty.
No review of the Rule 12(b)(6) merits dismissal.
Because the case is properly dismissed as a sanction and jurisdiction cannot be confirmed without the discovery Brown refused to provide, neither the Seventh Circuit nor the district court can reach the merits of Brown’s claims. The prior merits ruling therefore remains beyond reach.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction and Sanctions Power

The panel relies heavily on a line of cases codifying the notion that courts possess “jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.”

Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest, 111 F.4th 814 (7th Cir. 2024)
Cited for the proposition that federal judges may inquire into and determine their own subject-matter jurisdiction. This principle justifies jurisdictional discovery: a court must be able to gather facts necessary to resolve jurisdictional questions, including ordering discovery targeted at those facts.
Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2008)
Described as confirming that “jurisdictional discovery is an essential exercise” of the court’s power to determine jurisdiction. It also supports the panel’s concluding observation that when parties frustrate jurisdictional discovery, neither the district court nor the appellate court can proceed to the merits.
Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 881 (7th Cir. 2005)
This case affirms that courts retain authority to sanction litigants (e.g., under Rule 11 or Rule 37) for conduct in the litigation even if the court ultimately concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Sanction orders are regarded as “collateral” to the merits. The Brown panel extends this logic to misconduct specifically in jurisdictional discovery.

Taken together, these authorities ground the panel’s rejection of Brown’s threshold argument that the court lacked power to order discovery or impose sanctions before conclusively establishing jurisdiction.

2. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)

On collateral estoppel, the panel draws from Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent to emphasize: (i) that issue preclusion binds only parties (or those in privity with them), and (ii) that it applies only where the precise issue was actually litigated, necessarily decided, and identical in both cases.

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)
Provides the canonical standard: collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue of fact or law that was “actually and necessarily determined” by a valid and final judgment.
Our Country Home Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r, 855 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2017)
Restates and applies the Montana formulation within the Seventh Circuit.
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–95 (2008)
Clarifies that, with limited exceptions, issue preclusion does not apply against nonparties. The Court rejects broad “virtual representation,” reinforcing that a person should generally not be bound by a judgment in litigation to which they were not a party and had no opportunity to be heard.
Carter v. Comm’r, 746 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2014)
Emphasizes that collateral estoppel requires that the party to be bound have had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

The panel’s application is straightforward: the defendants in Montgomery were not parties to Brown v. Gartner and had no chance to litigate Brown’s citizenship. Thus, Brown cannot invoke collateral estoppel offensively to bind them to a finding made in a separate case.

3. Time-of-Filing Rule for Diversity Jurisdiction

Denlinger v. Brennan, 87 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1996)
Quoted for the rule that “[j]urisdiction depends on citizenship at the time a case begins.” This “time-of-filing” rule is central in diversity cases: later changes in domicile do not affect the existence (or nonexistence) of jurisdiction at the outset.

The panel crucially notes that a finding that Brown was an Illinois citizen in September 2020 (in Gartner) does not conclusively resolve whether she was an Illinois or North Carolina citizen in August 2020 (when she filed Montgomery). Even if she did not physically leave Illinois in that interval, her intent to remain (a critical component of domicile) could have crystallized after one filing but before the other. This temporal distinction defeats her argument that the prior judgment in Gartner answers the jurisdictional question here.

4. Discovery Management and Standard of Review

Beathard v. Lyons, 129 F.4th 1027, 1036 (7th Cir. 2025)
Cited for the broad discretion district judges enjoy over discovery, including scope and management. Appellate review is deferential.
Pable v. Chicago Transit Auth., 145 F.4th 712, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2025)
Articulates the “abuse of discretion” standard for reviewing sanctions and encapsulates it as overturning only if “no reasonable person would agree” that the sanction was appropriate.
Pendell v. City of Peoria, 799 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 2015)
Enumerates factors courts should consider before imposing dismissal as a sanction: (1) the plaintiff’s pattern of and personal responsibility for violating orders; (2) prejudice to other parties from noncompliance; (3) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; and (4) any demonstrated merit in the underlying suit.
e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2011)
Rejects the notion that “bad faith” is the only basis for dismissal sanctions. Dismissal may also be appropriate for “willfulness” or “fault,” concepts that capture reckless disregard or repeated noncompliance even without proof of subjective malice.

5. Rule 37 and Discovery Sanctions

Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2016)
Explains that incomplete or evasive interrogatory responses are treated as “no response at all” under Rule 37 and may justify sanctions, including dismissal.

The panel also refers explicitly to:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d)(2)
Objections to interrogatories do not excuse a failure to answer; a party must answer what it can and use proper procedures to resolve disputes.
Rule 37 sanctions spectrum
Including dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v) for failure to obey discovery orders.

6. Jurisdiction Cannot Be Created by Sanction or Adverse Inference

In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 248 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2001)
Used for the proposition that a court cannot use an “adverse inference” to create jurisdiction as a sanction for a party’s misconduct. Jurisdiction must be real, not presumed.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–95 (1998)
Foundational case rejecting “hypothetical jurisdiction”; a court may not assume jurisdiction to reach the merits. Jurisdictional issues must be resolved first and cannot be bypassed, even for efficiency.

These authorities explain why lesser sanctions such as presuming jurisdiction (and thus allowing the merits to proceed) were not available to the district court. The judge could not, as a punitive measure for Brown’s noncooperation, simply deem diversity satisfied. That constraint sharply narrows reasonable sanction options and supports the use of dismissal with prejudice in this particular context.

B. Core Legal Reasoning

1. Courts’ Power Over Jurisdictional Discovery and Sanctions

Brown’s central jurisdictional argument is that, because subject-matter jurisdiction was still in doubt, the district court lacked authority to: (1) order jurisdictional discovery, and (2) dismiss her case as a discovery sanction. The panel rejects this argument by distinguishing between:

the impermissible practice of deciding the merits without confirming jurisdiction (Steel Co.), and
the permissible and necessary practice of issuing orders—including discovery and sanctions—to determine whether jurisdiction exists.

In other words, “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” entails the power to:

require parties to provide information bearing on jurisdiction (such as domicile facts for diversity);
compel compliance with such orders; and
sanction disobedience, because without enforcement authority, jurisdictional inquiries would be toothless.

The panel’s citation to Am. Nat’l Bank underscores that sanctions are collateral to the merits: even if the court ultimately has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying claims, it may still adjudicate and enforce sanctions against parties whose litigation conduct abuses the judicial process. This doctrine preserves judicial authority to manage proceedings without placing sanctions power at the mercy of later jurisdictional determinations.

2. Why Collateral Estoppel Does Not Short-Circuit Jurisdictional Discovery

Brown attempts to avoid jurisdictional discovery altogether by invoking collateral estoppel. She points to Brown v. Gartner, in which a court determined she was a citizen of Illinois as of September 2020, and argues that this finding should bind the present defendants and compel the district court to declare that diversity was lacking.

The panel offers two independent reasons why this fails.

a. Different Parties, No “Full and Fair Opportunity”

Under Montana and Taylor, collateral estoppel generally applies only to parties (or their privies) in the prior case. Here:

The defendants in Montgomery were not parties in Gartner.
They had no opportunity to contest Brown’s claimed domicile in the earlier litigation.

To bind them to that prior finding would deny them the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” required by Carter. The panel is thus faithful to the Supreme Court’s insistence in Taylor that nonparties are rarely bound by prior judgments.

b. Different Issue: August vs. September 2020 Citizenship

Even setting aside party identity, the issue must be “identical” in both proceedings. It is not.

In Gartner, the relevant date was September 2020; in Montgomery, it is August 2020—the date of filing, as required by Denlinger. A person’s domicile (and thus state citizenship) turns on both physical presence and intent to remain. Intent can crystallize or change over time even without a physical move. The panel explicitly notes that Brown may have acquired an “intent to remain” in Illinois between the August and September filings. That possibility prevents the September finding from resolving the August question. The issues are therefore not “identical” for collateral-estoppel purposes.

Accordingly, the district court was correct to treat the jurisdictional question here as unsettled and to require fresh evidence focused on the relevant time.

3. Propriety of Ordering Jurisdictional Discovery

Brown further argues that the district judge abused her discretion simply by ordering jurisdictional discovery and by issuing discovery orders with which Brown disagreed. The panel characterizes this argument as “frivolous.”

The remand order from the Seventh Circuit explicitly authorized the defendants to seek “reasonable discovery” to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed. Jurisdictional discovery into domicile—asking where Brown lived, owned property, and was registered to vote as of the filing date—is a paradigmatic example of permissible, narrowly focused discovery. Under Beathard, district courts have “broad discretion” in such matters. There is no suggestion here of overbreadth, undue burden, or harassment.

Moreover, Brown’s belief that she had strong legal objections to the interrogatories did not entitle her to simply refuse to answer. Rule 37(d)(2) makes clear that objections do not excuse failure to respond: she was obliged to answer what she could and properly raise disputes through motions, not unilateral defiance. The judge’s directives were thus well within the scope of her discovery-management authority.

4. Justifying Dismissal with Prejudice as a Rule 37 Sanction

The toughest question, doctrinally, is whether dismissing the case with prejudice was a proportionate sanction. The panel applies the abuse-of-discretion framework from Pendell and Pable.

a. Brown’s Pattern of Noncompliance and Fault

The record described in the order shows:

Brown initially responded only with objections and no substantive answers.
The judge held a conference, explained that objections did not satisfy her obligations, and extended the deadline—with a clear warning that no further extensions would be granted.
Brown missed the extended deadline without responding or formally seeking an extension.
Only after the defendants moved again to compel did Brown mention that she had tried to set a meeting four days after the deadline to request more time.
She still declined to explain why she could not either answer the interrogatories or timely request an extension before the deadline.

The panel notes that Rule 37 treats incomplete, evasive, or entirely missing answers as “no response at all” (Ramirez), and that Brown’s unexplained failure to comply with two clear orders—after explicit warnings—constitutes “fault” under e360 Insight. No showing of “bad faith” is required to sustain dismissal; willful or reckless disregard for court orders is sufficient.

Brown’s status as an Illinois-licensed attorney is also relevant, though not expressly highlighted in the sanctions analysis. An attorney is presumed to understand the rules of procedure and the consequences of defying explicit court orders. The refusal to comply appears deliberate rather than inadvertent.

b. Prejudice and the Limited Availability of Lesser Sanctions

The prejudice to defendants and to the court is concrete: without basic jurisdictional facts, the litigation could not move forward in any forum. Defendants were stuck in limbo—facing a federal suit whose legitimacy they could not challenge fully because the plaintiff refused to furnish the very information relevant to jurisdiction.

The panel also underscores a subtle but important constraint: the court could not adopt a “lesser sanction” that assumed or manufactured jurisdiction. Cases like In re Brand Name and Steel Co. forbid courts from:

assuming the facts necessary for jurisdiction as a punitive inference; or
proceeding to the merits based on a hypothetical jurisdictional finding.

Thus, the district judge could not say, in effect:

“Because Brown will not answer, I will infer that she is a North Carolina citizen and that diversity exists, and I will then rule against her on the merits.”

Nor would indefinite stays or repeated contempt proceedings be appropriate; they would merely drag out a case in which the plaintiff herself blocked the threshold jurisdictional determination. Given these constraints, dismissal with prejudice was within the range of reasonable measures.

C. No Review of the Merits Without Jurisdiction

Finally, Brown attempts to revisit the original Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The panel, however, explains that once the case is properly dismissed as a discovery sanction, and where jurisdiction cannot be ascertained because of Brown’s refusal to provide information, the appellate court cannot reach the merits.

This conclusion follows naturally from Steel Co. and Craig: without jurisdiction, courts cannot issue binding merits rulings. Because Brown herself rendered a jurisdictional determination impossible by defying discovery orders, she cannot obtain appellate review of the merits she wants the court to revisit. The sanction dismissal is the final, and only, operative judgment.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Diversity of Citizenship

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a type of case. In federal court, the most common grants of jurisdiction are:

Federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331): cases “arising under” the Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties.
Diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332): cases between citizens of different states, with a sufficient amount in controversy (currently over $75,000).

In a diversity case:

There must be complete diversity—no plaintiff can share a state of citizenship with any defendant.
Citizenship is determined by domicile, which requires:
- physical presence in a state; and
- intent to remain there indefinitely (to make it one’s “home”).
Time-of-filing rule: Citizenship is assessed on the date the complaint is filed and does not change as the case proceeds.

That is why the distinction between Brown’s citizenship in August 2020 and September 2020 matters; only the August citizenship is relevant to jurisdiction in Montgomery.

2. Jurisdictional Discovery

Jurisdictional discovery is discovery limited to issues bearing on whether the court has jurisdiction. Instead of asking for documents or testimony on the merits, parties may seek information about:

the parties’ citizenship or domicile;
the amount in controversy;
facts relevant to standing (e.g., injury, causation);
contacts with the forum state (for personal jurisdiction).

Because courts must be certain they have jurisdiction before deciding a case, they are permitted—even required—to order such discovery where the facts are unclear. Refusal to participate in jurisdictional discovery, as in this case, can be sanctionable.

3. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) prevents parties from relitigating an issue that has already been decided in a prior case. It generally requires:

The same issue of fact or law;
Actually litigated and determined in the prior case;
Essential to the judgment there;
A valid, final judgment; and
The party to be bound had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.

It typically binds only the parties to the earlier case (or their privies). A person who was not a party to the prior case cannot usually be forced to accept the earlier result, especially if it would be unfair to do so.

4. Dismissal “With Prejudice” as a Sanction

A dismissal with prejudice ends the case permanently; the claims cannot be refiled. By contrast, a dismissal without prejudice allows the plaintiff to bring the claims again (subject to limitations periods and other constraints).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, courts can impose a range of sanctions for failure to obey discovery orders, including:

ordering the matters deemed established;
prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing claims or defenses;
striking pleadings;
staying proceedings;
default judgment or dismissal.

Because dismissal with prejudice is severe, courts consider factors like pattern of noncompliance, prejudice, and the adequacy of lesser sanctions. But as e360 Insight makes clear, it does not require proof of subjective bad faith; repeated, unexplained failures to obey court orders can constitute sufficient “fault” or “willfulness.”

5. Abuse of Discretion Review

On appeal, decisions about discovery and sanctions are reviewed under a deferential standard called abuse of discretion. The question is not whether the appellate court would have made the same decision, but whether the decision was unreasonable or arbitrary—so far outside the range of acceptable choices that “no reasonable person would agree” with it.

Given the options available to the district judge here and the constraints imposed by jurisdictional doctrine, the panel concludes that dismissal was within that permissible range.

6. Nonprecedential Disposition and Rule 32.1

The order is expressly labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” and notes that it may be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. This means:

The decision is not binding precedent within the Seventh Circuit; future panels are not obliged to follow it.
It may still be cited as persuasive authority (subject to local rules), especially on similar fact patterns or procedural questions.

Even as a nonprecedential decision, Brown v. Montgomery is a useful consolidation of the circuit’s approach to jurisdictional discovery and sanctions.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For Litigants in Diversity Cases

The order sends a clear practical message to parties—especially repeat litigants and attorneys acting pro se:

If you invoke federal diversity jurisdiction (or contest it), you must cooperate with reasonable jurisdictional discovery.
You cannot obstruct the jurisdictional inquiry and then expect review of the merits.
Repeated, unexplained failure to comply with clear discovery orders on jurisdictional issues can lead to dismissal with prejudice, even before jurisdiction is fully resolved.

Parties who seek to challenge jurisdiction must do so through regular motion practice, not through unilateral refusal to provide jurisdictional facts.

2. Clarifying the Use of Prior Citizenship Findings

The case illustrates that a finding of domicile in one case—even by a federal court—does not automatically resolve citizenship in another, absent identical parties and identical time frames. Each diversity case has its own jurisdictional “snapshot” at filing. Thus:

Plaintiffs cannot use prior favorable domicile findings to block new defendants from litigating jurisdiction.
Defendants cannot simply rely on past determinations if time frames differ or if the parties differ.

This reinforces the importance of precise facts and dates in domicile disputes and may discourage strategic “forum shopping” based on prior domicile rulings.

3. Sanctions and the Integrity of Jurisdictional Inquiry

The opinion also contributes to the broader jurisprudence on sanctions in the context of jurisdiction:

Courts have meaningful power to ensure that jurisdictional disputes are litigated fairly and efficiently.
Litigants cannot paralyze a jurisdictional inquiry by withholding basic information and then complain that the court lacks jurisdiction to impose consequences.
At the same time, sanctions may not be used to “manufacture” jurisdiction; the panel carefully respects the line drawn by Steel Co. and related cases.

This balance preserves both the constitutional limits on federal judicial power and the courts’ institutional ability to manage abusive conduct.

4. Procedural Strategy and Risk for Plaintiffs

Finally, the case highlights a strategic risk: Brown’s own challenge to jurisdiction, combined with her refusal to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery, led not to a simple jurisdictional dismissal (which might have been without prejudice and allowed refiling in state court) but to a dismissal with prejudice as a sanction.

For plaintiffs, this underscores:

Challenging jurisdiction midstream is serious business; it should be done in good faith and with full participation in the fact-finding process.
Using jurisdictional objections as leverage, delay, or gamesmanship can backfire severely.

VI. Conclusion

Brown v. Montgomery, though nonprecedential, offers a clear and structured reaffirmation of several important doctrines:

Federal courts possess and must exercise the power to determine their own jurisdiction, including ordering and enforcing jurisdictional discovery.
Issue preclusion cannot be used offensively against new parties to bind them to prior domicile findings, particularly where the relevant time period differs.
Dismissal with prejudice as a Rule 37 sanction is available—even at the jurisdictional stage—where a party willfully refuses to comply with reasonable discovery orders and no lesser sanction would be effective or lawful.
Courts cannot create or presume subject-matter jurisdiction as a sanction; jurisdictional facts must be established, not inferred punitively.

In the broader legal landscape, this decision serves as a cautionary tale about litigants’ obligations in jurisdictional disputes and underscores that procedural rules governing discovery and sanctions apply with full force even when the very existence of jurisdiction is under investigation. It also demonstrates the judiciary’s commitment to maintaining both the integrity of jurisdictional boundaries and the orderly administration of justice.

Jurisdictional Discovery, Sanctions, and Collateral Estoppel in Diversity Litigation: Commentary on Brown v. Montgomery