Introduction

In State ex rel. Allah-U-Akbar v. Schroeder, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5003, the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously affirmed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief filed by Odraye Jones (now known as Malik Allah-U-Akbar). Jones sought writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent Ashtabula County Common Pleas Judge David A. Schroeder from conducting a new penalty-phase proceeding and resentencing him after federal habeas relief vacated his death sentence. The Court held that Jones had, or has, adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law by direct appeal and that none of his asserted grounds demonstrated that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed.

The decision consolidates and clarifies several strands of Ohio law:

• Indictment defects and verdict-form errors do not strip a trial court of jurisdiction and must be pursued on direct appeal, not via prohibition or mandamus.
• The dismissal of a predicate felony count does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction over a capital specification predicated on that felony, nor must the predicate offense be separately charged.
• When a federal court vacates a death sentence but leaves the underlying conviction intact, Ohio trial courts retain jurisdiction to conduct resentencing, and challenges to resentencing are reviewable on appeal.

The parties were:

• Relator-Appellant: Odraye Jones (a.k.a. Malik Allah-U-Akbar), convicted in 1998 of aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications.
• Respondent-Appellee: Judge David A. Schroeder, Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas.

Key issues included whether alleged defects in Jones’s indictment and verdict form, the dismissal of a related aggravated-robbery charge, and the federal habeas vacatur of his death sentence deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and warranted extraordinary writs to halt further proceedings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) of Jones’s petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Court held:

• Prohibition: Jones had or has adequate remedies at law (direct appeal from his original conviction and forthcoming appeal from any new sentence). Therefore, he could prevail only by showing that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. He failed to do so.
• Mandamus: Jones neither established a clear legal right to the relief nor a clear legal duty on the trial judge’s part, and he had adequate remedies at law. In any event, much of the requested relief sought to prevent action, which is not a proper use of mandamus.
• Substantive claims:
  • The “repealed” statute claim failed: amendments changing “peace officer” to “law enforcement officer” in R.C. 2929.04(A)(6) did not erase the offense; any mismatch between the indictment’s language and the statute is, at most, a nonjurisdictional defect subject to appeal.
  • The dismissal of the aggravated-robbery charge did not divest the court of jurisdiction over the aggravated-murder conviction or specifications; sufficiency and charging decisions go to merits, not jurisdiction, and the state need not indict the predicate offense separately.
  • Any verdict-form deficiency under R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is not jurisdictional and must be addressed on direct appeal, not in prohibition.
• Motions: The Court
  • Granted Jones’s first motion for “judicial notice” by treating it as a post-brief citation to new authority (Hewitt v. United States) under S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.08.
  • Denied a motion to sanction and strike the judge’s brief (arguments not frivolous; supplemental briefing not permitted).
  • Denied a second “judicial notice” motion that attempted to inject new substantive arguments (Evid.R. 201 permits notice of indisputable adjudicative facts, not new arguments).
  • Denied a motion to stay the underlying proceedings.

Bottom line: The trial court retains jurisdiction to conduct resentencing in Jones’s criminal case, and any alleged errors are properly remedied on appeal, not through extraordinary writs.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Adequate remedies at law defeat extraordinary writs:
  • State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex (2020-Ohio-411) and State ex rel. White v. Woods (2019-Ohio-1893) underscore that direct appeal from a conviction or a resentencing order is an adequate remedy that precludes prohibition or mandamus.
  • State v. Roberts (2017-Ohio-2998) and State v. Ketterer (2014-Ohio-3973) exemplify the availability of appeals following capital resentencing, reinforcing that ordinary appellate review exists here.
• Indictment and verdict-form errors are nonjurisdictional:
  • State ex rel. Martre v. Cheney (2023-Ohio-4594) and State ex rel. Martre v. Watson (2023-Ohio-749) hold that defects in an indictment do not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction; prohibition is not a vehicle to attack indictment validity.
  • State ex rel. Dodson v. Smith (2025-Ohio-1878) confirms that errors in a jury’s verdict form do not strip jurisdiction; such issues belong on direct appeal.
  • State ex rel. King v. Watson (2023-Ohio-4189) clarifies that even violations of R.C. 2945.75(A) do not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Predicate-offense charging in specifications:
  • State ex rel. Myles v. Goering (2023-Ohio-483) states there is no requirement that the state charge the predicate offense as a separate count to support a death-penalty specification.
  • Cornell v. Schotten (1994-Ohio-74) distinguishes sufficiency-of-evidence contentions (merits) from jurisdictional arguments, signaling that disputes over a predicate offense’s status are not jurisdictional.
• Dismissal-based jurisdictional challenges:
  • State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew (2005-Ohio-4382) and State ex rel. Hunt v. Thompson (63 Ohio St.3d 182) stand for the narrow proposition that after an unconditional dismissal of a case, a trial court plainly lacks jurisdiction to proceed. The Supreme Court distinguishes these, because no such dismissal occurred for the aggravated-murder count at issue here.
• Standards governing motions and review:
  • State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum (2017-Ohio-9141) and State ex rel. Gideon v. Page (2024-Ohio-4867) guide de novo review of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissals, and the “no set of facts” standard when presuming petition allegations true.
  • Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C. (2020-Ohio-4193) supports accepting factual allegations as true at the pleadings stage.
  • State ex rel. Cherry v. Breaux (2022-Ohio-1885) restates the three mandamus elements; State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (2008-Ohio-1593) clarifies mandamus cannot be used to prevent an action.
  • State ex rel. Macksyn v. Spencer (2025-Ohio-2116) articulates Evid.R. 201’s limits: judicial notice is confined to indisputable adjudicative facts.
  • S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.08 permits post-brief citations to new authority; S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) guides sanctions for frivolous practice (not warranted here).
• Substantive statutory and case references:
  • R.C. 2929.04(A)(6) (formerly using “peace officer,” amended to “law enforcement officer” effective Sept. 16, 1997); the Court treats indictment wording mismatches as nonjurisdictional defects.
  • R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) (specification for killing to escape detection/apprehension for another offense).
  • R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) (verdict-form rule for offenses elevated by additional elements).
  • R.C. 2929.05(A) (capital-sentencing appellate review).
  • State v. Thomas (40 Ohio St.3d 213) (involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of aggravated murder), cited by Jones but ultimately immaterial to jurisdiction.
  • Federal backdrop: Jones v. Bradshaw (46 F.4th 459, 6th Cir. 2022) vacating only the death sentence for penalty-phase ineffective assistance and authorizing a new penalty phase; subsequent district court orders clarified the conviction stands and rearrest/resentencing is permissible.

Legal Reasoning

The Court begins by setting the threshold for extraordinary relief. A writ of prohibition lies only to prevent an unauthorized exercise of judicial power and is unavailable when the relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, unless the respondent court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. A writ of mandamus demands a clear legal right, a clear legal duty, and the absence of adequate legal remedies; it does not operate to prevent action.

Applying these standards, the Court reasons:

1. Adequate remedy by appeal forecloses extraordinary writs.

   Jones previously had a direct appeal from his conviction and death sentence, where he could have raised indictment or verdict-form issues. He will also have an appeal from any new sentence imposed after the penalty-phase proceeding under R.C. 2929.05(A). These appellate avenues are adequate remedies that defeat both prohibition and mandamus as vehicles to litigate his claims.

2. No patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction appears.

   To overcome the adequate-remedy bar in prohibition, Jones had to show the trial court plainly lacks jurisdiction. The Court concludes he did not.

   • The “repealed” statute argument fails. Although the General Assembly amended R.C. 2929.04(A)(6) to change “peace officer” to “law enforcement officer” (and, per Ohio Const. art. II, § 15(D), “repealed” the prior text as part of the amendment), the specification itself continued to exist at the time of offense, indictment, and conviction. The indictment’s use of the superseded phrase “peace officer” may be an imprecision, but indictment defects do not deprive jurisdiction. Likewise, any verdict-form mismatch would be error in the case, not a jurisdictional void. These concerns are for direct appeal.
   • The dismissal of the aggravated-robbery count does not strip jurisdiction. The aggravated-murder count was neither dismissed nor vacated. Even assuming the aggravated-robbery charge was dismissed before sentencing (the record shows it was dismissed afterwards), such a dismissal would go to proof of the specification, not to the court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, Ohio law does not require the state to indict and convict a defendant of the predicate felony as a separate count to sustain a capital specification predicated on that felony.
   • The verdict-form claim under R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. Even if the verdict form did not state the elevated degree or the additional elements, that contention raises an appealable error, not a jurisdictional defect warranting prohibition.
3. Mandamus is improper and independently barred.

   Jones’s petition largely sought to prevent the trial judge from proceeding, relief foreign to mandamus. He did not demonstrate a clear legal right to a judgment of acquittal, nor a clear legal duty on the judge’s part to enter one. And adequate remedies by appeal independently bar mandamus relief.

4. Ancillary motions are resolved according to settled practice rules.

   Treating Jones’s first “judicial notice” motion as a permitted post-brief citation to new authority under S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.08, the Court granted it. His motion to sanction and strike the judge’s brief was denied: supplemental briefing is not allowed and the arguments were not frivolous under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A). His second “judicial notice” motion improperly presented new arguments rather than indisputable adjudicative facts under Evid.R. 201 and was denied. A stay of the underlying proceedings was also denied.

Impact

This opinion carries immediate and systemic consequences in Ohio criminal practice, particularly in capital litigation:

• Capital resentencing after federal habeas: The Court confirms that when federal habeas relief vacates only the sentence, Ohio trial courts retain jurisdiction to conduct a new penalty-phase proceeding and resentence on the still-valid conviction. Attempts to halt such proceedings via prohibition or mandamus will fail absent a true jurisdictional defect.
• Extraordinary-writ gatekeeping: The decision reaffirms that extraordinary writs cannot be used as substitutes for appeal. Defendants must channel challenges to indictment wording, verdict forms, and predicate-offense sufficiency through the appellate process.
• Prosecutorial and drafting practice: While imprecise statutory terminology in indictments (e.g., using superseded terms) does not void jurisdiction, it remains best practice to track current statutory language. Still, the Court’s reiteration that such defects are nonjurisdictional reduces the risk of collateral attacks derailing proceedings.
• Specifications and predicate offenses: The reaffirmation that the state need not separately indict and convict for a predicate offense to support a specification will influence charging strategies and defense appellate issues, clarifying that challenges to the predicate offense affect merits, not jurisdiction.
• Pro se litigation management: For courts and counsel, this opinion provides a clear roadmap for disposing of common pro se writ petitions that seek to repackage appealable errors as jurisdictional defects, promoting efficient judicial administration.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Prohibition:
  • A court order preventing a lower court or official from exercising power not authorized by law.
  • Unavailable if the party can pursue an adequate appeal, unless the lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.
• Writ of Mandamus:
  • A court order compelling a public official to perform a clear legal duty owed to the relator.
  • Requires a clear right, a clear duty, and no adequate remedy at law. Not used to stop actions; that is the domain of prohibition.
• Adequate Remedy at Law:
  • Typically, the ability to bring a direct appeal. If you can appeal, you generally cannot obtain extraordinary writs.
• Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction:
  • An obvious, facial absence of power to act, such as proceeding after a case has been unconditionally dismissed.
  • Disagreements over evidence, pleadings, or errors usually do not qualify.
• Indictment and Verdict-Form Errors vs. Jurisdiction:
  • Errors in how an indictment is worded or how a verdict form is completed are “errors in the case” that are raised on appeal.
  • They do not deprive a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
• Amending Statutes and “Repeal” in Ohio:
  • When the General Assembly amends a section, the prior text is formally “repealed” as part of the amendment process (Ohio Const., art. II, § 15(D)).
  • This does not mean the offense or specification ceases to exist; it means the language has been updated.
• Death-Penalty Specifications and Predicate Offenses:
  • Capital specifications (e.g., killing to escape detection of another crime) can be predicated on another offense without a separate indictment and conviction for that predicate offense.
  • Whether the predicate offense is proved is a merits question for trial and appeal, not a jurisdictional bar.
• R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) (Verdict Forms):
  • When additional elements elevate an offense’s degree, the verdict must either state the degree of the offense or the existence of the additional elements.
  • Noncompliance can be reversible error, but it does not destroy the court’s jurisdiction; it is reviewed on direct appeal.
• Federal Habeas Relief Limited to Sentencing:
  • When federal courts vacate a sentence but affirm the conviction, the conviction remains valid in state court.
  • State trial courts retain jurisdiction to resentence; claims related to resentencing are addressed on appeal.
• Judicial Notice vs. New Arguments:
  • Evid.R. 201 allows courts to accept indisputable facts without proof.
  • It does not permit parties to add new legal arguments under the guise of “judicial notice.”

Conclusion

State ex rel. Allah-U-Akbar v. Schroeder reaffirms and synthesizes core Ohio doctrines governing extraordinary writs in criminal cases, especially in the capital context. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Extraordinary writs cannot be used to halt a capital resentencing after federal habeas relief vacates only the sentence; trial courts retain jurisdiction to proceed.
• Alleged indictment defects, verdict-form errors under R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), and the dismissal or noncharging of a predicate felony for a capital specification are nonjurisdictional issues that must be raised on direct appeal.
• Because Jones had, and has, adequate remedies by appeal, neither prohibition nor mandamus lies. No patent and unambiguous jurisdictional defect was shown.

The opinion’s significance lies in its clear message to litigants and courts: jurisdictional challenges must be grounded in true jurisdictional defects, not in appealable trial-level errors. For capital practitioners, the Court underscores that federal habeas relief limited to sentencing does not unsettle the conviction’s validity in state court, and state resentencing may proceed, with any claimed errors preserved for ordinary appellate review.