Introduction

This decision arises from the long-running Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (“ESPA”) administration dispute in which senior surface-water users—organized as the Surface Water Coalition (“SWC”)—have maintained a delivery call since 2005 against junior groundwater pumpers. The appellants here are the City of Idaho Falls, City of Pocatello, and the “Coalition of Cities” (collectively, “the Cities”), all junior groundwater right holders in the ESPA.

The immediate controversy concerned the Idaho Department of Water Resources Director’s evolving methodology orders used to determine “material injury” to senior rights and, by extension, whether curtailment or mitigation is required. After an administrative hearing on the Director’s Fifth Amended Final Order Regarding Methodology for Determining Material Injury to Reasonable In-Season Demand and Reasonable Carryover (“Fifth Methodology Order”), the Director issued a Post-Hearing Order Regarding Fifth Amended Methodology Order that “affirm[ed]” the Fifth Methodology Order with modifications and simultaneously issued a superseding Sixth Final Order Regarding Methodology for Determining Material Injury to Reasonable In-Season Demand and Reasonable Carryover (“Sixth Methodology Order”).

The key issue before the Supreme Court was not the scientific adequacy of the ESPA modeling or the evidentiary standards applied to challenges; it was jurisdictional: whether the Cities properly invoked judicial review procedures by timely challenging the operative agency order. The Court held they did not.

Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Cities’ petition for judicial review in the SRBA district court identified and challenged only the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, while the only order “currently in effect” was the Sixth Methodology Order, which expressly “supersedes all previously issued methodology orders.”

Under Idaho Code section 67-5273(2), a petition for judicial review must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the service date of the final order. Because the Cities did not timely petition for review of the Sixth Methodology Order (the operative order), the Court could not remand it—and remand of the Post-Hearing Order would provide no effective relief, rendering the appeal jurisdictionally infirm.

The Court also awarded attorney fees to IDWR under Idaho Code section 12-117(1) because the appeal lacked a reasonable basis: it challenged the wrong order. The Court denied fees to the SWC because, as an intervenor aligned with the agency’s position, it was not “adverse” to the governmental entity as required to recover under section 12-117(1). Costs were awarded to both IDWR and the SWC.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court’s dismissal rests on a line of Idaho administrative-law and appellate-jurisdiction cases emphasizing that timely and precise identification of the challenged final order is jurisdictional.

• S. Valley Ground Water Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 173 Idaho 762, 797, 548 P.3d 734, 769 (2024)
  Role in this case: The Court treats I.C. § 67-5273(2) as a strict jurisdictional gatekeeper that “confines the courts’ jurisdiction” to timely petitions directed at the specific order under review. The opinion uses South Valley as the closest analogue: appellants there, like the Cities here, petitioned for review of one agency order but attempted to challenge a different order on appeal.
• City of Eagle v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 150 Idaho 449, 454, 247 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2011)
  Role in this case: Cited (via South Valley) for the proposition that failure to timely challenge a final order is “jurisdictional,” barring review entirely.
• A&B Irrigation District v. Spackman, 155 Idaho 640, 654–55, 315 P.3d 828, 842–43 (2013)
  Role in this case: The Court relies on A&B for the practical procedural lesson in methodology-order litigation: when the Director issues a subsequent final order that incorporates post-hearing “refinements,” a party must petition for review of the operative final order within 28 days. The opinion underscores that even the SWC previously lost on a similar preservation/timeliness failure, reinforcing the rule’s even-handed application.
• Clear Spring Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011) (quoting Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007))
  Role in this case: Used to reaffirm issue-preservation doctrine on judicial review: the Supreme Court will not consider issues not raised before the district court, even if raised in the administrative proceeding. This principle complements (but is distinct from) the timeliness/identification requirement at the heart of the dismissal.
• Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2022-36), 171 Idaho 692, 695, 525 P.3d 730, 733 (2023)
  Role in this case: Cited for the standard that jurisdiction is a question of law freely reviewed.
• State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010); Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2024-04), 174 Idaho, 401, 412–13, 555 P.3d 1091, 1102–03 (2024) (quoting Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524, 148 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2006))
  Role in this case: These cases support the Court’s power—and duty—to raise justiciability issues (including mootness) sua sponte. While the Court frames the problem primarily as failure to appeal the operative order, it also describes the consequence in classic mootness terms: if the appealed-from order is no longer in effect, effective relief cannot be granted.
• Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798, 804, 367 P.3d 193, 199 (2016), abrogated on other grounds by 3G AG LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 170 Idaho 251, 509 P.3d 1180 (2022)
  Role in this case: Provides the general posture of judicial review: the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently to assess whether the district court correctly decided the issues. Importantly, the Court never reaches that merits posture here because jurisdiction fails first.
• Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 161 Idaho 508, 525–26, 387 P.3d 761, 778–79 (2015) (quoting Nation v. State, Dep't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007)); S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County, 170 Idaho 282, 313, 510 P.3d 635, 666 (2022)
  Role in this case: These cases inform the “without a reasonable basis in fact or law” and “frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation” standards governing attorney-fee awards under I.C. § 12-117(1).
• 3G AG LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 170 Idaho 251, 266, 509 P.3d 1180, 1195 (2022)
  Role in this case: Applied to explain that the fee inquiry focuses on the substance of the legal arguments; here, because the Court cannot reach the merits due to the Cities’ failure to appeal the operative order, the appeal is characterized as quintessentially unreasonable.
• Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant v. Bonner Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 168 Idaho 705, 720–21, 486 P.3d 515, 530–31 (2021); Sullivan v. Blaine County, 174 Idaho 459, 469–70, 556 P.3d 1282, 1292–93 (2024); Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 177, 207 P.3d 149, 153 (2009)
  Role in this case: These decisions shape the “adversity” requirement for an intervenor’s recovery of fees under I.C. § 12-117(1). Because the SWC argued the same position as IDWR—the “most obvious indicator” of non-adversity—fees were denied to the SWC.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is formal but forceful: administrative appeals are creatures of statute, and Idaho’s APA imposes strict conditions on judicial review jurisdiction. Two statutory pillars drive the outcome:

• Idaho Code § 67-5273(2): requires a petition for judicial review of a final order to be filed within 28 days of service; and, critically, the petition must identify the order being challenged.
• Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)–(4): supplies standards for reviewing agency action and prejudice to substantial rights—standards the Court does not reach because the prerequisite for jurisdiction was not met.

The facts that mattered most were procedural and chronological:

• The Director issued both the Post-Hearing Order and the Sixth Methodology Order on July 19, 2023.
• The Sixth Methodology Order expressly provided that it “supersedes all previously issued methodology orders.”
• The Cities’ petition for judicial review (filed August 16, 2023) framed the case as a challenge to the Post-Hearing Order Regarding Fifth Amended Methodology Order, mentioning the Sixth Methodology Order only once as background.
• On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cities sought remand of both the Post-Hearing Order and the Sixth Methodology Order.

From those premises, the Court draws a straightforward conclusion: the only operative (“currently in effect”) methodology order is the Sixth Methodology Order. An appellate court cannot grant effective relief by remanding a non-operative order while leaving the operative order untouched—especially when the operative order was never properly placed before the courts via a timely petition.

The Cities attempted a pragmatic argument—asserting the Fifth and Sixth orders have identical “errors,” so remanding one would effectively address the other. The Court rejected that approach as incompatible with appellate fundamentals: relief must run against the order that actually governs. In administrative law terms, a superseding final order is the legal target; in appellate terms, a court cannot reverse or remand an order that is not properly before it.

3. Impact

This opinion’s practical impact is procedural but substantial, particularly in high-frequency, technical agency regimes (like ESPA water administration) where the agency may issue layered orders (methodology orders, as-applied forecast orders, post-hearing orders, superseding final orders):

• Operative-order discipline: Parties must identify and timely petition for review of the operative final order—especially when a later order “supersedes” prior methodology orders.
• No “functional equivalence” workaround: Even minimal differences between successive orders will not justify judicial review of an unappealed operative order on the theory that the issues “make no practical difference.”
• Litigation strategy in water cases: Water-rights disputes often proceed on parallel tracks (methodology vs. as-applied forecasts vs. mitigation plans). This case highlights the risk of mislabeling the challenged agency action and losing merits review entirely.
• Fee exposure for procedural missteps: The attorney-fee award to IDWR under I.C. § 12-117(1) signals that jurisdictional errors—appealing the wrong order—can be deemed “without a reasonable basis,” increasing financial risk for appellants.
• Intervenor fee limits clarified: The denial of fees to the SWC reinforces that intervenors aligned with the agency generally cannot recover under I.C. § 12-117(1) absent true adversity to the government entity, even when they prevail.

Notably, the Court explicitly declined to address consequential merits issues—such as the continued application of the “clear and convincing evidence” standard in methodology challenges by junior users—because jurisdiction failed. The message for future litigants is clear: procedural precision is a prerequisite to doctrinal change.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Methodology order”: An agency decision establishing how it will measure and decide a recurring technical question—in this context, the models, data, and calculations used to decide “material injury” in response to a delivery call.
• “Post-Hearing Order” vs. “Sixth Methodology Order”: The Post-Hearing Order explains the Director’s hearing-based modifications; the Sixth Methodology Order is the final, operative instrument that adopts those modifications and supersedes earlier methodology orders.
• “Operative order”: The order that is legally in force at the time of judicial review. If a new order supersedes older ones, the older orders are no longer operative.
• “Petition for judicial review” and the 28-day rule (I.C. § 67-5273(2)): The document that starts a court challenge to an agency final order. It must be filed within 28 days of service and must identify the order being challenged; missing the target (or the deadline) deprives courts of jurisdiction.
• “Jurisdiction”: The court’s legal power to decide a dispute. If jurisdiction is missing, the court must dismiss even if the appellant’s arguments might otherwise be persuasive.
• “Mootness”: A case is moot when the court can no longer grant effective relief. Here, because the Cities appealed an order no longer in effect while the operative order was unappealed, the requested remedy could not be granted.
• Attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117(1): A prevailing party can recover fees if the losing party acted “without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” But an intervenor (like the SWC) generally cannot recover if it is not “adverse” to the government agency in the appeal.

Conclusion

City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR establishes a sharp procedural rule with significant consequences in Idaho administrative water litigation: courts lack jurisdiction to grant relief when the appellant fails to timely petition for review of the operative, superseding final order. The decision reinforces that the statutory requirements of I.C. § 67-5273(2) are not technicalities but jurisdictional prerequisites.

The opinion also underscores two secondary lessons: (1) jurisdictional missteps can justify attorney fees to the agency under I.C. § 12-117(1), and (2) prevailing intervenors aligned with the agency generally cannot obtain fees absent true adversity to the governmental entity. The Court’s refusal to reach the merits—despite acknowledging the importance of the underlying methodology and evidentiary questions—highlights the overarching takeaway: in agency appeals, the path to substantive review begins with correctly identifying and timely appealing the order that governs.