Judicial Reliance on Common Sense in Sentencing Upheld: United States v. Brenes-Colon

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Eric Brenes-Colon, __F.4th__, No. 24-10355 (11th Cir. May 19, 2025), clarifies the scope of a sentencing court’s discretion to draw on its institutional experience, common sense, and general knowledge when imposing a sentence. The appellant, Eric Brenes-Colon, was convicted of federal drug-trafficking offenses involving large quantities of cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana. On appeal, he argued that the district court plainly erred by relying on a “clearly erroneous fact”—its statement that illegal drugs are “the number one killer of Americans between 18 and 35”—in reaching a within-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that contention, affirming the sentence and reinforcing that district judges need not confine their remarks strictly to empirical data in the record when highlighting the seriousness of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Summary of the Judgment

The panel, per curiam, affirmed the district court’s sentence. It held that:

There was no procedural error in the court’s reference to the deadly impact of illegal drugs, because sentencing judges are permitted to rely on institutional knowledge, common sense, and experience rather than limiting themselves to statistical evidence in the record.
Even if such a comment were deemed erroneous, it would not qualify as “plain error” under the four-part test (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and serious effect on the fairness of proceedings). No binding statute or precedent expressly prohibits a judge from observing general societal harms.
The appellant failed to show any reasonable probability that, absent the remark, he would have received a lower sentence, given that the district court repeatedly emphasized the large volume of drugs involved as the primary sentencing factor.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009): Held that sentencing courts need not limit consideration to citation-backed empirical evidence when they rely on broad institutional knowledge.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Confirmed that district courts may draw on “common sense and good judgment” in sentencing.
United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2013): Acknowledged that inferences based on “common sense and ordinary human experience” are permissible at sentencing.
United States v. Cotchery, 834 F. App’x 555 (11th Cir. 2020): Upheld a sentence where the judge commented on community dangers of drugs without record support.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Recognized district courts’ institutional advantage in marshalling facts and assessing their import at sentencing, including matters beyond the record.
United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023): Reiterated the abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing review and the shift to plain-error review when no timely objection is made.
United States v. Steiger, 107 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2024): Clarified the plain-error framework in the sentencing context.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in four steps:

No Procedural Error:
The district court’s observation that illegal drugs are “the number one killer of Americans between 18 and 35” was traced to its own sentencing experience and common sense, not to record evidence. Under Shaw and Rosales-Bruno, a sentencing court may rely on institutional knowledge and general societal observations without citing formal studies.
Plain Error Analysis:
Because Brenes-Colon did not object below, the appellate court applied the four-part plain error test. No statute or controlling precedent directly prohibits a judge from making general observations about drug-related harms.
Substantial Rights:
The record showed the district court’s primary sentencing rationale was the sheer volume of drugs trafficked (over 500 grams of cocaine and substantial quantities of other narcotics), not the comment on drug lethality. The judge expressly tied the lengthier sentence to the quantity of drugs, and Brenes-Colon identified no reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the remark.
Fairness of Proceedings:
Because any alleged error was peripheral to the sentencing calculus and did not affect the outcome, the court concluded fair proceedings were not compromised.

Impact

This decision reinforces district courts’ broad discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to:

Rely on “experience sentencing criminals,” “common sense,” and “good judgment” when assessing the seriousness of offenses and the need for deterrence and public protection.
Make general observations about societal harms—even if unsupported by precise data in the record—without risking procedural error so long as those comments are not central to the sentencing determination.

Future appellants challenging sentences as procedurally unreasonable will face difficulty in demonstrating that a court’s broader, experience-based observations were “plain error” affecting substantial rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Reasonableness: The requirement that a judge follow proper sentencing steps and consider relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature of the offense and the need for deterrence.
Plain Error Review: A four-pronged test applied on appeal when a defendant fails to object at trial. The defendant must show (1) an error occurred, (2) it was clear or obvious (“plain”), (3) it affected his substantial rights, and (4) it seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Institutional Knowledge: The collective experience and familiarity that judges acquire from presiding over numerous cases, which can inform their understanding of crime and punishment.

Conclusion

United States v. Brenes-Colon reaffirms that district courts enjoy considerable latitude to draw on their institutional experience and common sense in highlighting the seriousness of criminal conduct. Absent a controlling rule or precedent to the contrary, judges need not confine sentencing remarks to empirical studies or data contained in the record. Moreover, peripheral comments grounded in judicial experience are unlikely to constitute “plain error” or to affect substantial rights when the sentence is primarily driven by clear Guidelines calculations and the undisputed facts of the case. This decision thus strengthens the sentencing bench’s ability to address the real-world harms of crime in language informed by years of adjudicative service.