Judicial Power Ends with Mootness: In re Carlson and Voluntary Agency Compliance in Texas Mandamus Proceedings

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in In re Carlson, No. 24‑0081 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025), arises out of a highly technical dispute at the intersection of Texas administrative procedure, property-rights litigation under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA), and the jurisdictional boundaries between a referring agency and the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH).

Tom and Becky Carlson, the relators, alleged that the Texas Comptroller’s approval of a wind turbine project in Callahan County effected a compensable taking of their property under the PRPRPA. They pursued a “contested case” before SOAH, only to have the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the matter as untimely. A fundamental procedural question then emerged: was the ALJ’s dismissal a final, appealable agency decision, or merely a non-final step requiring a subsequent “final order” from the Comptroller?

The agencies themselves disagreed. SOAH’s general counsel told the Carlsons that SOAH lacked final decision authority in this type of case and that the matter would return to the Comptroller for final action. The Comptroller, however, later insisted that SOAH’s dismissal was itself the final order, that the Comptroller lacked jurisdiction to issue any further decision, and that the Carlsons had forfeited their right to judicial review by not treating the SOAH order as final.

The Carlsons requested mandamus relief directly from the Texas Supreme Court, seeking only to compel the Comptroller to issue a final order so they could pursue judicial review in district court. After full briefing and oral argument—and after the Court had explicitly called out the conflict between SOAH and the Comptroller—the Comptroller abruptly issued the very final order the Carlsons had been seeking for nearly twenty months. The State then argued that this mooted the mandamus proceeding.

Chief Justice Blacklock’s opinion, dismissing the petition as moot, does not resolve the underlying administrative-law puzzle about finality, SOAH authority, and PRPRPA procedure. Instead, the decision powerfully reaffirms a foundational but sometimes underestimated rule: Texas courts possess only the “judicial power” to resolve live disputes between parties. When a state agency voluntarily grants all the relief a relator sought in mandamus, the case becomes moot, and the court’s jurisdiction ends—even if complex and recurring legal questions remain unanswered.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background and Procedural Posture

The PRPRPA (Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 2007) authorizes property owners to challenge alleged regulatory takings by “fil[ing] a contested case with a state agency” to determine whether governmental action “results in a taking under this chapter.”¹ PRPRPA proceedings are “subject to” the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 2001, except where the two conflict, and the property owner has a statutory right of judicial review in district court after the contested case.²

In 2022, the Carlsons filed such a contested case against the Comptroller, asserting that the Comptroller’s approval of a wind project diminished both the value and enjoyment of their property, amounting to a “taking.” The Comptroller referred the matter to SOAH. At SOAH, the Comptroller moved to dismiss the case as untimely. The ALJ granted the motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.503(d)(1)(A), which allows dismissal from SOAH’s docket for “lack of jurisdiction over the matter by the referring agency.”

That dismissal order triggered a critical question: was this the “final decision” for purposes of APA judicial review, or was it equivalent to a proposal for decision that required the Comptroller to issue a final order?

B. Conflicting Agency Guidance and the Mandamus Petition

Attempting to avoid procedural pitfalls, the Carlsons prudently sought clarity from SOAH. In a June 6, 2023 email, they observed that the language of the ALJ’s order “appears to be a final decision” but noted that neither the APA nor SOAH’s rules clearly addressed what should happen procedurally after such a dismissal. They specifically asked whether the dismissal contemplated a remand back to the Comptroller for a final order.

SOAH’s general counsel responded unequivocally on June 8: SOAH’s order was not the final decision; because the Comptroller had referred the case as a “proposal for decision” (PFD) matter, “the case goes back to the CPA now for any further action (final order, motion for rehearing, etc.). SOAH only has final decision authority for a very limited number of case types.”

Relying on this guidance, the Carlsons waited for the Comptroller to issue a final order. When nothing happened, they contacted the Comptroller on July 26, 2023, asking whether and when it would issue the final order. Initially, a Comptroller representative wrote that the order would issue “within the next couple of days.” But the following day, the Comptroller reversed course, stating that:

The ALJ had issued a “FINAL SOAH ‘Order Granting Motion to Dismiss’”;
Because the ALJ dismissed for lack of jurisdiction “by the referring agency,” the Comptroller had no jurisdiction to issue any further order in the case; and
Any appeal had to proceed via a motion for rehearing directed to the SOAH order itself under SOAH Rule 155.509(b) and APA Subchapter F.

When the Carlsons pointed out SOAH’s contrary view—that SOAH lacked authority to issue a final order in their type of case—the Comptroller replied, “We are going to stand upon the SOAH Order as issued.”

With the Comptroller refusing to issue a final decision—and thereby effectively blocking judicial review—the Carlsons filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly in the Texas Supreme Court. They did not ask the Court to adjudicate the merits of their takings claim; they sought solely an order compelling the Comptroller to issue a final order they could appeal.

The Texas Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to issue mandamus against certain statewide executive officers, including the Comptroller, under Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c), as recognized in In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2020). The State did not dispute the Court’s mandamus jurisdiction.

C. The State’s Eleventh-Hour Reversal and the Mootness Question

The Court requested full briefing on the merits and held oral argument. At argument, the State—through the Attorney General—defended the Comptroller’s position that the SOAH dismissal order was a final, appealable decision and asserted that the Carlsons had missed their window to seek judicial review by waiting for a Comptroller order that would never come.

Recognizing an institutional problem, the Court pointed out that the Comptroller’s position conflicted with SOAH’s position, as communicated in writing to the Carlsons. It requested that the State file a post-argument letter clarifying whether the State’s agencies had reached a unified legal position.

Instead of a unified explanation, the Court received a February 21, 2025 letter from the State reporting that the Comptroller had, on February 14, 2025, issued the very “final decision” the Carlsons had been seeking since May 2023. The letter did not explain how that action squared with the Comptroller’s previous insistence that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a final decision. But the State argued that, by issuing a final decision, the Comptroller had mooted the mandamus petition.

The Court requested the Carlsons’ view, and they agreed that the petition was moot because they had obtained all the relief they requested: a final agency decision enabling them to seek judicial review.

D. Holding: Mandamus Dismissed as Moot for Lack of Jurisdiction

The Court held that the case was moot and thus outside its jurisdiction. Citing Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2022), the Court reiterated that:

“A case is moot when a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

Because the Comptroller had now provided the sole relief sought in the mandamus petition—the issuance of a final agency decision—and because both sides agreed that no live controversy remained, the Court concluded it lacked the judicial power to proceed further.

The petition for writ of mandamus was dismissed as moot, “without prejudice to the Carlsons’ ability to again seek relief in this Court if necessary.”

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission

The opinion opens with a striking quotation from Justice Blacklock’s concurrence in Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, 593 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2019):

“[W]ithin ‘the elaborate minefield of modern administrative procedure,’ the ‘finality of agency-level decision-making and the availability and timing of judicial review can be difficult questions even for lawyers to get right.’”

In Mosley, the Court addressed a due-process problem that arises when a person follows an agency’s instructions on how to obtain judicial review, only to be told later that those instructions led her to forfeit her rights. The opinion in In re Carlson describes Mosley as:

“vindicating the due-process claim of a woman who followed the government’s instructions ‘only to be informed that in so doing she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and was not entitled to judicial review.’”

Mosley thus stands for the proposition that due process can be violated when the government misleads a party about how to preserve access to the courts, particularly by giving incorrect information about the path to judicial review or the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

By invoking Mosley at the outset and explicitly comparing the Carlsons’ predicament to Mosley’s, the Court signals that, but for mootness, this case would have squarely raised similar due-process concerns: the Carlsons were told one thing by SOAH and something inconsistent by the Comptroller, then threatened with the loss of judicial review for having followed one of those sets of instructions.

However, the Court’s ultimate disposition leaves Mosley intact but unextended. The underlying due-process and exhaustion issues remain unresolved in the PRPRPA/SOAH context because the Court never reaches them.

B. In re Lester and Mandamus Jurisdiction

The Court cites In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. 2020), for the proposition that it has “exclusive jurisdiction to mandamus the Comptroller, as an executive officer of the State,” based on Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c). That statute grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and certain other writs against specific state officers.

In re Lester confirms that a mandamus action challenging the Comptroller’s refusal to act must be brought as an original proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court, not in lower appellate courts. In re Carlson simply applies that jurisdictional rule; the State did not contest it.

C. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J. and Mootness

As noted, the Court quotes N.J. for the standard definition of mootness. In N.J., the Court reaffirmed that a case becomes moot when there is no longer a live, justiciable controversy or when no party retains a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.

In re Carlson applies this black-letter rule to an original mandamus proceeding: once the Comptroller issued the final decision the relators sought, there was nothing left for the Court to order. The judicial power—defined by the existence of an actual dispute over legal rights—no longer applied.

D. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

The opinion also references:

Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22, which provides that the Attorney General “shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party….” This underscores the expectation that the Attorney General will present a unified legal position for the State, including its agencies.
Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 2001 (APA), governing contested cases, final orders, motions for rehearing, and judicial review.
Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 2007 (PRPRPA), authorizing takings-related contested cases and subsequent judicial review.
1 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 155.503, 155.509, which structure SOAH’s dismissal authority and the procedures for rehearing and appeals from SOAH orders.

Although the Court does not interpret these provisions in a binding way, they form the statutory backdrop against which the dispute—and the mootness ruling—must be understood.

IV. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

A. The Court’s Core Reasoning: The Limits of Judicial Power

The heart of the opinion is a clear and restrained reaffirmation of the classic justiciability principle: courts exist to resolve live disputes between adverse parties, not to issue advisory opinions or to clarify the law in the abstract.

The Court stresses that while one “welcome consequence” of judicial decisions is the clarification of ambiguous law, this is not the source of judicial authority:

“Despite the regrettable lack of clarity in the law that remains in the wake of the government’s shifting positions, a court’s job is to resolve genuine disputes between parties about their legal rights, not to resolve abstract questions about legal rights when a genuine dispute no longer exists.”

The “judicial power,” as the Court uses the term, is specifically the power “to resolve disputes.” Once the Comptroller issued a final decision, there was no dispute left about whether the Comptroller must issue that decision—the only question framed in the mandamus petition. The relators obtained all the relief they requested.

The opinion acknowledges that ambiguity in the law remains and that this ambiguity is problematic, particularly for property owners and lawyers trying to navigate administrative procedures. Nevertheless, the Court insists that its role does not extend to clarifying ambiguous administrative law for its own sake. Without a live controversy, any discussion of administrative-finality issues would be advisory and therefore outside the Court’s constitutional authority.

B. Mootness and Voluntary Agency Compliance in Mandamus

The posture of the case is important: the Comptroller’s belated issuance of a final decision was a classic example of a respondent voluntarily providing the relief sought in mandamus. The opinion does not expressly use the phrase “voluntary cessation,” but in practical terms, this is a variation of that scenario: the governmental actor changes its position and ceases the challenged conduct (here, refusal to issue a final decision) after litigation has progressed.

Unlike some federal cases where voluntary cessation does not automatically moot a case (because the defendant might resume its conduct after the litigation ends), In re Carlson treats the Comptroller’s action as fully mooting the controversy, largely because:

The mandamus petition sought only one form of relief: an order compelling issuance of a final decision.
That relief has been provided; there is no ongoing refusal or injury.
The relators agree the case is moot.
The Court explicitly dismisses “without prejudice” to a future petition if further obstruction occurs.

In this setting, the Court sees no need to analyze any exception to mootness. The combination of completed relief plus the parties’ agreement on mootness makes the case an uncontroversial application of N.J.’s definition of mootness.

It is important to note what the Court does not do:

It does not invoke any “public interest” or “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness, despite the evident systemic importance of the underlying administrative-law questions.
It does not suggest that the Comptroller’s behavior—reversing position after oral argument—is a reason to proceed notwithstanding mootness.
It does not undertake any analysis of whether the Comptroller could revert to its prior position in future cases (a typical concern in voluntary-cessation doctrine).

Instead, the Court maintains a firm line: once relief is provided and the parties acknowledge that no present dispute remains, the constitutional limits of the judicial power require dismissal.

C. The Unresolved Administrative-Law Question: Who Issues the Final Order?

Beneath the mootness holding lies a complex and unresolved question about the mechanics of PRPRPA contested cases and SOAH proceedings:

When SOAH dismisses a PRPRPA contested case on jurisdictional grounds under 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.503(d)(1)(A), is the ALJ’s order itself the final, appealable agency decision under the APA, or must the referring agency (here, the Comptroller) issue a separate final order?

The opinion recounts, in detail, the conflicting views:

SOAH’s view: For cases “referred by the Comptroller,” SOAH acts in a PFD capacity, and only the Comptroller can issue the final decision and entertain motions for rehearing. SOAH has final-decision authority only in a limited set of case types that do not include PRPRPA referrals from the Comptroller.
Comptroller’s prior view: Because the ALJ dismissed the case under a rule governing SOAH docket dismissal for lack of jurisdiction by the referring agency, the ALJ’s order was the final SOAH decision. Given its own lack of jurisdiction, the Comptroller had no legal basis to issue any further decision.

If the Comptroller’s earlier position were correct, then:

The Carlsons should have treated the SOAH order as a final agency decision,
They should have filed a timely motion for rehearing directed to that order under APA Subchapter F, and
Failure to do so might have forfeited their right of judicial review.

If SOAH’s view were correct, then:

The ALJ’s order was not the final agency decision;
The Comptroller had both the authority and the obligation to issue a final order; and
Any motion for rehearing and subsequent judicial review would track the Comptroller’s final decision, not the SOAH order.

In re Carlson deliberately leaves this conflict unresolved. The Court recounts the conflicting positions, flags the confusion, and acknowledges that the Comptroller ultimately reversed itself by issuing a final decision. But it never states whether the Comptroller was right or wrong at any stage.

That silence matters. Lawyers and agencies still lack authoritative guidance on whether:

Dismissals under 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.503(d)(1)(A) are final, appealable decisions in all SOAH dockets, or
Finality depends on the type of case and the delegation (or non-delegation) of final-order authority to SOAH by the referring agency.

Until a future case presents this issue in a non-moot posture, these questions remain open in Texas administrative law, particularly for PRPRPA claims.

D. Relationship to Mosley: Due Process and Reliance on Government Instructions

Though the Court does not resolve the merits, its framing of the case closely tracks the due-process concerns identified in Mosley. In both situations:

A private party faced a complex administrative scheme governing the path to judicial review.
The party sought guidance from the government about how to proceed.
After the party relied on the government’s instructions, the government (or another part of it) attempted to argue that the party’s reliance resulted in a forfeiture of the right to judicial review.

In Mosley, the Court “vindicat[ed] the due-process claim” of the aggrieved party. Given the parallels drawn in In re Carlson, it is reasonable to infer that:

Had the case not been mooted, the Court would likely have considered whether due process forbids the State from using contradictory agency guidance to trap litigants into losing judicial-review rights; and
Mosley would have been a central precedent in that analysis, potentially reinforcing or expanding its logic in the PRPRPA/SOAH context.

Instead, due-process doctrine remains where Mosley left it, with In re Carlson serving primarily as a cautionary case study rather than a doctrinal development.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Property Owners and PRPRPA Litigants

For property owners invoking the PRPRPA, In re Carlson sends mixed signals:

Positive: The Comptroller ultimately conceded that a final decision should issue, which allows the Carlsons to access judicial review. This suggests that, at least in this case, the State retreated from a position that would have permanently barred court review based on procedural confusion.
Negative: The decision does not clarify how future PRPRPA contested cases should proceed when SOAH dismisses for lack of jurisdiction. Parties still face uncertainty about whether the final decision comes from the ALJ or the referring agency.

Practically, property owners and their counsel would be wise to:

Closely scrutinize SOAH’s enabling statutes and rules, as well as the referring agency’s statutes and delegation orders, to determine who has final decision authority in a given case type.
Consider simultaneously preserving both potential avenues—treating a SOAH dismissal as final for purposes of a motion for rehearing and appeal, while also demanding a final order from the referring agency—where uncertainty exists.
Document any guidance provided by SOAH or the agency about the proper procedural path, with an eye toward potential due-process arguments under Mosley if the government later attempts to penalize reliance on its own instructions.

B. For Agencies and the Attorney General

The opinion implicitly criticizes the State’s handling of the case in two respects:

Inconsistent Agency Positions: SOAH and the Comptroller gave the Carlsons conflicting instructions on the crucial question of finality and jurisdiction, creating the very procedural trap that Mosley warns against.
Late-Stage Reversal: The Comptroller held fast to its position through briefing and oral argument in the Supreme Court, then reversed course after the Court pressed for a unified state position, thereby mooting the case without explanation.

The citation to Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22, which requires the Attorney General to represent “the State” in the Supreme Court, underscores that the AG is expected to harmonize the legal positions of state agencies where possible. In re Carlson illustrates the problems that arise when agencies speak with inconsistent voices—and how those inconsistencies can prolong litigation, undermine fairness, and erode confidence in the clarity of administrative law.

The decision thus encourages:

More careful coordination between referring agencies (like the Comptroller) and SOAH before and during litigation;
Clear, unified guidance to regulated parties regarding whether SOAH or the referring agency will issue the final decision; and
Prompt correction of erroneous positions, preferably before full-scale appellate litigation is underway.

C. For Texas Administrative Law More Broadly

Doctrinally, In re Carlson does not alter the law of mootness or mandamus. Its significance lies more in what it illustrates than in what it changes:

It reaffirms that Texas courts do not use important or recurring issues as a basis to escape the constitutional limits of justiciability. Even compelling reasons to clarify the law cannot substitute for a live controversy.
It highlights lingering uncertainty in the law of administrative finality, especially where SOAH serves both as a hearing forum and, in some cases, as a final-decision maker.
It underscores the need for careful statutory and rule-based analysis to determine who—the ALJ or the referring agency—issues the final “order” in a given contested case.

Going forward, we can expect that:

Future litigants will bring similar disputes in less easily mooted postures, perhaps seeking broader relief than a mere final order, to ensure the Court can reach the underlying legal questions.
Agencies and the Attorney General may proactively seek to prevent such conflicts by clarifying finality rules in regulations, guidance documents, or inter-agency agreements.
Mosley will remain a key precedent for challenging agency attempts to deny judicial review based on traps created by their own inconsistent or confusing instructions.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Contested Case” and the Texas APA

Under the Texas APA, a “contested case” is a proceeding in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing. It resembles a trial, but it takes place before an administrative tribunal rather than a court.

In many agencies, the hearing itself is conducted by a SOAH ALJ. Traditionally:

The ALJ hears evidence and arguments;
The ALJ issues a “proposal for decision” (PFD); and
The referring agency’s head (or commission) issues the final order, which is the decision subject to judicial review.

In some circumstances, however, the Legislature or the agency has given SOAH authority to issue the final decision itself, without a separate agency order. Whether that delegation exists in a given case type is a matter of statute and rule.

B. SOAH’s Dismissal Authority Under 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.503(d)(1)(A)

Rule 155.503(d)(1)(A) authorizes an ALJ to dismiss a case from SOAH’s docket when the referring agency lacks jurisdiction over the matter. This is a threshold determination: if the agency that sent the case to SOAH never had jurisdiction in the first place (for example, because the proceeding was filed too late, as the ALJ concluded here), then SOAH likewise lacks jurisdiction.

The unresolved question in In re Carlson is whether such a dismissal:

constitutes the final agency decision for purposes of appeal, or
must be followed by a separate agency decision adopting or acting upon the dismissal before judicial review is available.

C. Proposal for Decision vs. Final Order

A proposal for decision (PFD) is a recommended decision by the ALJ. It is not final; the referring agency can adopt, modify, or reject it, subject to statutory constraints.

A final order (or “final decision”) is the agency’s authoritative disposition of the contested case. Judicial review typically lies from this final order. The line between a PFD and a final order matters because:

Deadline calculations for motions for rehearing and appeals depend on when the final order issues.
A misunderstanding of whether an ALJ’s action is final or merely recommended can result in missed deadlines and potential loss of judicial-review rights.

D. Motion for Rehearing and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the APA, parties usually must file a motion for rehearing after a final order to preserve error and to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review in district court. Failure to properly file a motion for rehearing can bar a later suit, on the theory that the party did not give the agency an opportunity to correct its own errors.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies refers to the requirement that a party fully use available administrative procedures before turning to the courts. In some circumstances, failure to exhaust is jurisdictional—that is, it deprives the court of power to hear the case.

In Mosley, the Court recognized that due process may prevent the State from invoking exhaustion rules against a party who reasonably relied on defective or misleading agency instructions about the proper path to judicial review. In re Carlson echoes that concern but does not decide it.

E. Mootness and Justiciability

A case is moot when:

There is no longer an actual dispute between the parties, or
The parties no longer have a legally cognizable stake in the outcome.

Courts are limited to deciding live controversies. They do not issue rulings to “declare the law” in the abstract. When intervening events—such as a change in agency behavior—eliminate the dispute, the court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, unless a recognized exception to mootness applies.

In In re Carlson, the issuance of the Comptroller’s final decision extinguished the only live dispute presented in the mandamus: whether the Comptroller was obligated to issue that decision. Because both parties agreed that nothing more remained for the Court to order, the Court held that it lacked the judicial power to proceed.

F. Mandamus Relief

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that orders a public official (or lower court) to perform a ministerial act or to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In Texas, original mandamus jurisdiction over certain state officers, including the Comptroller, lies exclusively with the Supreme Court.

Here, the Carlsons sought mandamus to compel the Comptroller to take a non-discretionary step—issue a final decision—so that they could access ordinary judicial review. The Court never reached the traditional mandamus elements (such as “clear abuse of discretion” or “no adequate remedy by appeal”) because mootness precluded any merits analysis.

VII. Conclusion

In re Carlson is not a landmark case for new doctrine, but it is a revealing one. It reaffirms a central tenet of Texas constitutional law: the judicial power extends only to live disputes between parties. Even in the face of confusing administrative procedures, conflicting intra-governmental positions, and palpable due-process concerns reminiscent of Mosley, the Supreme Court will not decide abstract legal questions once the practical controversy has been extinguished.

The Comptroller’s belated issuance of a final decision granted the Carlsons all the relief they sought in mandamus. Under existing mootness principles, and with both sides acknowledging mootness, the Court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to say more. But the price of that jurisdictional restraint is that critical questions about PRPRPA procedure, SOAH’s final-order authority, and the interaction between dismissal orders and judicial-review rights remain unanswered.

For practitioners and affected property owners, In re Carlson underscores the need for vigilance when navigating contested cases:

Clarify who has final decision authority in your specific case type.
Preserve all plausible procedural paths (SOAH and agency) where the law is unclear.
Document and, if necessary, challenge inconsistent or misleading guidance from agencies, bearing in mind the due-process protections suggested by Mosley.

For agencies and the Attorney General, the opinion is a cautionary tale about the risks of inconsistent institutional positions and late-stage reversals that moot important disputes without clarifying the law. The decision invites—though it cannot compel—greater coordination and clearer procedural rules to prevent similarly “regrettable” confusion in the future.

Ultimately, In re Carlson illustrates both the rigor and the limits of judicial restraint. The Court’s refusal to overstep its bounds leaves the administrative law of PRPRPA contested cases in need of further clarification, which will have to come in a future case that remains live long enough for the Court to decide it.

Notes
1. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.022(a).
2. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2007.022(c), 2007.025(b), 2001.171.