Judicial Power Ends Where Mootness Begins: In re Carlson and Mandamus Relief in PRPRPA Contested Cases

Judicial Power Ends Where Mootness Begins: In re Carlson and Mandamus Relief in PRPRPA Contested Cases

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in In re Carlson, No. 24‑0081 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025), is a short but revealing opinion at the intersection of Texas administrative law, property-rights litigation under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA), and the constitutional limits of judicial power.

Tom and Becky Carlson, the relators, challenged the Texas Comptroller’s approval of a wind turbine project in Callahan County, alleging that the project diminished the value and enjoyment of their land and thus effected a compensable “taking” under Chapter 2007 of the Government Code (the PRPRPA). Exercising their statutory right, they filed a “contested case” before the Comptroller, which was referred to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH).

What should have been a relatively straightforward path to judicial review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Chapter 2001 of the Government Code, devolved into the “procedural morass” the Court describes—over a basic threshold question: Was the SOAH Administrative Law Judge’s dismissal order a final, appealable agency decision, or merely a proposal that required a final order from the Comptroller?

The Carlsons, after explicitly seeking guidance from SOAH, followed the path the government initially told them was correct. The Comptroller then insisted the opposite—that SOAH’s order was final and that the Carlsons had missed their chance to appeal. Only after the dispute reached the Texas Supreme Court, complete with full briefing and oral argument, did the Comptroller reverse course and issue the very “final order” the Carlsons had been requesting since mid‑2023.

Faced with this late reversal, the Court—speaking through Chief Justice Blacklock—held that the mandamus proceeding was moot. Although the opinion does not resolve the underlying administrative-law confusion it vividly describes, it makes an important institutional point: the Court’s role is to resolve concrete disputes, not to issue advisory opinions simply to clarify confused procedural regimes. That insistence on mootness as a jurisdictional limitation is framed explicitly as a limit of the “judicial power.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

  • Statutory framework:
    • The PRPRPA authorizes property owners to initiate a “contested case” with a state agency to determine whether the agency’s action results in a taking. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.022(a).
    • These contested cases are subject to the APA (Chapter 2001) except where the PRPRPA conflicts with it. Id. § 2007.022(c).
    • After the contested case, the property owner has a right to judicial review in district court. Id. §§ 2001.171, 2007.025(b).
  • The Carlsons’ contested case:
    • In 2022, the Carlsons filed a PRPRPA contested case against the Comptroller, alleging that approval of a wind-turbine project constituted a taking of their property.
    • The Comptroller referred the matter to SOAH. At SOAH, the Comptroller moved to dismiss as untimely.
    • The SOAH ALJ agreed, issuing an “Order Granting Motion to Dismiss” on May 19, 2023, concluding the petition was untimely and that the Comptroller and/or SOAH lacked jurisdiction. The order cited 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.503(d)(1)(A) (authorizing dismissal where the referring agency lacks jurisdiction).
  • Competing views on “finality”:
    • SOAH’s view. On June 6, 2023, the Carlsons asked SOAH whether the ALJ’s order was final and appealable or merely a step requiring further agency action. SOAH’s general counsel responded that the order was not final; because Comptroller cases are “PFD” (proposal-for-decision) cases, the matter would return to the Comptroller for any further action, such as a final order or motion for rehearing.
    • The Comptroller’s view. When the Carlsons later pressed the Comptroller to issue a final order, the Comptroller first said an order would issue “within the next couple of days,” but then reversed itself. It asserted that the SOAH order was a “FINAL SOAH ‘Order Granting Motion to Dismiss’” and that, because the Comptroller lacked jurisdiction, it had no basis to issue any further order. It insisted the Carlsons’ remedy was to seek rehearing from SOAH under SOAH Rule 155.509(b) and Government Code Chapter 2001, Subchapter F.
    • The Comptroller refused to issue a final order and “stood upon the SOAH Order as issued.”
  • Mandamus in the Supreme Court:
    • The Carlsons filed an original mandamus petition directly in the Supreme Court of Texas, seeking only to compel the Comptroller to issue a final order that would allow judicial review.
    • Under In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2020), and TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c), the Supreme Court has exclusive mandamus jurisdiction over the Comptroller. The State did not dispute jurisdiction.
    • The Court requested full merits briefing and heard oral argument. The State defended the position that SOAH’s dismissal order was final and that the Carlsons had missed their appellate deadlines.
    • Because SOAH’s earlier communication conflicted with the Comptroller’s litigation position, the Court asked the State to advise whether SOAH and the Comptroller were now of one mind. The State said it would respond by letter.
  • The last-minute reversal:
    • Instead of clarifying the agencies’ unified view, the Attorney General informed the Court on February 21, 2025, that the Comptroller had, a week earlier (February 14), issued the very “final decision” the Carlsons had been seeking since 2023.
    • The letter did not explain how the Comptroller’s new action squared with its long‑maintained position that it could not issue a final decision because SOAH had already done so.
    • The State argued that this new final decision mooted the mandamus proceeding. The Court solicited the Carlsons’ view; they agreed that the case was moot because they now had the relief they had asked for.

B. Holding

The Court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus as moot for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that:

  • The only relief sought was an order compelling the Comptroller to issue a final, appealable decision in the contested case.
  • Once the Comptroller issued that final decision, “the dispute that gave rise to this mandamus petition” was extinguished.
  • Under Texas mootness doctrine, a case is moot “when a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2022).
  • The Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to proceed further. It dismissed “without prejudice” to the Carlsons’ ability to seek relief again if necessary.

Chief Justice Blacklock emphasized that the Court’s institutional desire to clarify “regrettable” ambiguities in the law does not grant it power to issue advisory opinions:

“Resolution of ambiguity in the law is often a welcome consequence, we hope, of our resolution of disputes between parties. But our desire to resolve ambiguity in the law does not give us the power to do so. Only a genuine controversy between parties gives us that power, the judicial power, which is the power to resolve disputes.”

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, 593 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2019)

The opinion opens with an extended citation to Mosley, specifically Chief Justice Blacklock’s concurring opinion, which had described modern administrative procedure as an “elaborate minefield” in which even attorneys struggle to determine when agency decisions are “final” and how to secure judicial review. In Mosley:

  • The plaintiff, Mosley, was denied access to judicial review because she was deemed to have failed to exhaust administrative remedies—even though she had followed the directions the agency itself gave her.
  • The Court ultimately vindicated her due‑process rights, recognizing that litigants cannot reasonably be penalized for relying on official (but erroneous) procedural guidance.
  • Chief Justice Blacklock’s concurrence stressed the systemic unfairness of a regime where “following the government’s instructions” can result in losing access to the courts.

In re Carlson invokes Mosley as a cautionary analogy:

  • The Carlsons, like Mosley, asked the government (here SOAH) for clear guidance on how to proceed—specifically, whether the ALJ’s dismissal was the final order or whether they should await Comptroller action.
  • SOAH answered that the ALJ’s order was not final and that the matter would return to the Comptroller.
  • The Comptroller later took the opposite view and used that retroactive interpretation to try to defeat the Carlsons’ access to judicial review.

Unlike Mosley, however, the Court in Carlson does not reach any due‑process holding; the case ends on mootness grounds before the Court can decide whether the State’s contradictory advice and shifting positions violated the Carlsons’ rights. Thus Mosley serves here more as a prudential and rhetorical backdrop than as a direct source of controlling doctrine.

B. In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2020)

The Court briefly cites In re Lester to explain why the mandamus proceeding was filed originally in the Supreme Court rather than in a court of appeals. In Lester, the Court held that:

  • TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c) gives the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against statewide executive officers, including the Comptroller.
  • Thus, mandamus relief compelling or restraining the Comptroller’s official actions must be sought directly in the Supreme Court as an original proceeding.

Carlson relies on this precedent only for the jurisdictional pathway, not for any substantive standard. There is no discussion of the usual mandamus requirements (a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal) because the case is dismissed before those standards are applied.

C. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. 2022)

The decision’s core doctrinal anchor is N.J., which summarizes Texas mootness law:

“A case is moot when a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

N.J. involved termination of parental rights and addressed whether a live controversy remained after certain events had overtaken the litigation. Carlson imports from N.J. the general test for mootness and applies it straightforwardly:

  • Before February 14, 2025, there was a live controversy: the Comptroller refused to issue a final order, and the Carlsons sought mandamus relief compelling that action.
  • After the Comptroller issued the final decision, the Court could no longer grant meaningful relief on that request; the controversy was extinguished.

Notably, the Court does not explore any potential exceptions to mootness—such as issues “capable of repetition yet evading review,” voluntary cessation, or collateral consequences—suggesting that, in this procedural posture, none were argued or deemed applicable.

D. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

  • Texas Constitution art. IV, § 22: The Attorney General “shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party.” The opinion cites this to explain why the Court looked to the State (through the Attorney General) for a unified position on the finality question across SOAH and the Comptroller.
  • TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c): Grants the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction to mandamus statewide executive officers, including the Comptroller (as applied in Lester and referenced in Carlson).
  • PRPRPA provisions – Chapter 2007:
    • § 2007.022(a): Authorizes a “contested case” before a state agency to determine whether a governmental action constitutes a taking.
    • § 2007.022(c): Subjects these contested cases to the APA (Chapter 2001), except where the PRPRPA conflicts.
    • § 2007.025(b): Provides for judicial review in district court of adverse final decisions in PRPRPA contested cases.
  • APA provisions – Chapter 2001:
    • § 2001.171 (and related sections in Subchapter G): Provide for judicial review of final decisions in contested cases.
    • Subchapter F (Motions for Rehearing): Sets procedures and deadlines that often determine when an agency decision is “final and appealable.”
  • SOAH Rules – 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE:
    • § 155.503(d)(1)(A): Authorizes the ALJ to dismiss a matter from SOAH’s docket when the referring agency lacks jurisdiction over the matter. The ALJ relied on this rule to dismiss the Carlsons’ case as untimely.
    • § 155.509(b): Governs motions for rehearing of certain SOAH decisions that are final. The Comptroller originally invoked this rule to argue that the Carlsons should have sought rehearing from SOAH, not awaited Comptroller action.

IV. Legal Reasoning in In re Carlson

A. Identifying the Controversy

The Court begins by carefully defining the actual dispute before it. The Carlsons did not seek a ruling on:

  • Whether their contested case was timely filed;
  • Whether the Comptroller’s approval of the wind-turbine project amounted to a compensable taking; or
  • Who—SOAH or the Comptroller—was correct on the question of administrative “finality.”

Instead, their mandamus petition sought one thing only: to compel the Comptroller to issue a final agency decision from which they could appeal to district court. The Court’s jurisdiction thus depended on the existence of a live, concrete dispute over that particular relief.

B. The Comptroller’s Late-Issued Final Decision

Once the Comptroller issued a final decision on February 14, 2025, the factual predicate of the mandamus claim disappeared. The Court emphasizes that the State itself took the position that this action mooted the case, and the Carlsons concurred.

This concurrence is doctrinally significant: it forecloses any claim that the parties still had a “legally cognizable interest” in the Court’s resolution of the mandamus petition. Whatever broader interests they (or the Court) might have in clarifying the law, those interests were no longer tied to any dispute over the Comptroller’s duty to issue a final order in this case.

C. Mootness as a Limit of Judicial Power

The core of the reasoning is constitutional and structural. The Court draws an explicit connection between mootness and the scope of “judicial power”:

“[A] court’s job is to resolve genuine disputes between parties about their legal rights, not to resolve abstract questions about legal rights when a genuine dispute no longer exists.”

This echoes longstanding Texas jurisprudence, which—unlike some federal courts—has consistently rejected “advisory opinions.” Courts do not sit to answer legal questions in the abstract, even when those questions are important, frequently recurring, or urgently in need of clarification. They decide concrete cases; any clarifying effect on the broader legal landscape is consequential rather than primary.

In Carlson, this principle operates in a somewhat unsatisfying way from a policy perspective:

  • The Court acknowledges that “regrettable” confusion remains about the finality of SOAH orders in PRPRPA cases and the correct path to judicial review.
  • It recognizes that, as in Mosley, litigants can suffer serious prejudice when they follow conflicting or erroneous government guidance.
  • Yet it insists that these systemic issues cannot be resolved unless they arise in a live dispute over concrete relief the Court can still grant.

That insistence reinforces the Court’s self‑conception as a court of law rather than a policy‑setting or supervisory body for the administrative state.

D. Dismissal Without Prejudice

The Court dismisses the mandamus petition “for lack of jurisdiction” and specifies that its disposition is “without prejudice to the Carlsons’ ability to again seek relief in this Court if necessary.”

That reservation has two implications:

  • If, after issuing the final decision, the Comptroller or another agency actor were to impede the Carlsons’ access to judicial review (e.g., by refusing to process a motion for rehearing or obstructing an appeal), they could return to the Supreme Court with a new mandamus petition based on a new, concrete controversy.
  • The Court’s dismissal carries no conclusive determination regarding either the timeliness of their contested case or the correctness of the Comptroller’s earlier jurisdictional position.

E. What the Court Deliberately Does Not Decide

Equally important is what the opinion leaves unresolved:

  • Finality of SOAH ALJ orders in PRPRPA cases: The Court never decides whether the ALJ’s dismissal order was properly treated as a final, appealable decision or as a non‑final proposal for decision.
  • Effect of conflicting agency guidance: The Court does not revisit Mosley’s holding in the context of property-rights contested cases or address whether due process would require courts to protect litigants who rely on SOAH counsel’s interpretation of finality.
  • Scope of SOAH’s “final decision” authority: While SOAH’s general counsel said the case was a “PFD case” (implying that final authority rests with the Comptroller), the Court does not opine on how SOAH’s enabling statutes and rules interact with specific referring statutes like the PRPRPA.
  • Mandamus merits: Because of mootness, the Court never applies the usual mandamus standards (clear abuse of discretion and lack of adequate remedy by appeal) to the Comptroller’s refusal to issue a final order.

The unresolved questions are likely to reappear in future litigation, as discussed below.

V. Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

A. Immediate Consequences for the Carlsons

Practically, the Carlsons have now obtained what they sought through mandamus: a final agency decision by the Comptroller. This enables them to:

  • Pursue any required motion for rehearing under the APA’s Subchapter F and applicable rules, preserving their right to judicial review; and
  • File an APA/PRPRPA appeal in district court under Government Code §§ 2001.171 and 2007.025(b).

As Chief Justice Blacklock notes, “While they cannot get the last year and a half back, it appears they will at last get the judicial review the law offers them.” The opinion thus acknowledges the cost—delay, uncertainty, and expense—of the State’s shifting positions, even though that cost does not keep the case from becoming moot.

B. Systemic Effects on PRPRPA Litigation

The opinion highlights, but does not resolve, pervasive uncertainty about contested-case procedure under the PRPRPA. Some likely consequences:

  • Heightened caution for property owners: Litigants invoking PRPRPA will need to be especially careful in tracking:
    • Which entity’s order is considered “final” (SOAH or the referring agency);
    • What triggers deadlines for motions for rehearing and judicial review; and
    • How to respond when agencies give conflicting guidance.
  • Incentive for legislative or regulatory clarification: The Court implicitly invites the Legislature and the relevant agencies to address these uncertainties through:
    • Statutory amendment clarifying whether PRPRPA contested cases referred to SOAH are “PFD” cases requiring a final agency order, or whether SOAH can enter final decisions in such matters; and
    • Rulemaking by SOAH and the Comptroller to harmonize their views on finality, rehearing, and referral procedures.
  • Future test cases likely: Because Carlson decides only mootness, the core administrative-law issues remain live for future litigants. Another PRPRPA case with slightly different facts could present:
    • A direct question on whether an ALJ dismissal is a final “agency decision” under the APA; or
    • A due-process challenge under Mosley where litigants again rely on contradictory official guidance and suffer prejudice.

C. Administrative Litigation Strategy and “Strategic Mooting”

An important practical subtext is the State’s litigation behavior:

  • The Comptroller maintained, for nearly twenty months, that it lacked authority to issue a final order because the ALJ’s dismissal was final.
  • It reaffirmed that position in this Court as late as oral argument.
  • Only after the case was fully briefed and argued did the Comptroller issue a final decision, effectively adopting the position the Carlsons had urged from the beginning and mooting the case.

While the Court does not expressly criticize this reversal as “strategic mooting,” the sequence raises familiar concerns:

  • Agencies can avoid potentially adverse precedents by voluntarily changing course at the last minute; and
  • The underlying legal uncertainty then persists, to the detriment of similarly situated litigants who lack the resources or fortitude to press a case to the Supreme Court.

Texas courts have, in some contexts, applied a “voluntary cessation” doctrine to resist mootness when a defendant’s change in conduct is temporary or appears calculated to evade judicial review. Carlson does not discuss that doctrine, likely because:

  • The only relief in this proceeding was the issuance of a final order, a discrete act that has now irrevocably occurred; and
  • Both parties agreed that all requested relief had been provided, making it difficult to claim a continuing personal stake in the mandamus claim.

Nonetheless, the case may prompt future litigants to argue more forcefully for mootness exceptions when agencies repeatedly oscillate on procedural positions to short‑circuit appellate review.

D. Reaffirmation of a Strict Mootness Regime

More broadly, In re Carlson is another data point in the Texas Supreme Court’s consistent application of a strict mootness doctrine:

  • Courts cannot decide abstract legal questions, regardless of their importance, in the absence of a live, concrete dispute.
  • The desire to clarify unsettled areas of law—here, the “minefield” of administrative procedures for PRPRPA contested cases—does not itself create jurisdiction.

This strictness shapes how litigants and agencies should approach high‑stakes administrative disputes:

  • Litigants must frame their requests for relief carefully and preserve live issues that remain justiciable even if some agency actions change mid‑litigation (for example, by seeking declaratory relief on ongoing practices rather than only mandamus to compel a single act).
  • Agencies should expect that last‑minute course corrections will often result in dismissal, not substantive judicial endorsement of their new position.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Mandamus in Texas

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary court order directing a lower court or a public official to perform (or refrain from performing) a particular act. In Texas:

  • It is available only when the relator shows (1) a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a legal duty, and (2) no adequate remedy by appeal.
  • When the respondent is a statewide executive officer (such as the Comptroller), only the Supreme Court of Texas can issue the writ, and only in an original proceeding filed directly there. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c).

In Carlson, the relators sought mandamus to compel the Comptroller to perform what they argued was a nondiscretionary legal duty: issuing a final order in a contested case so they could seek judicial review.

B. Mootness and Justiciable Controversy

“Mootness” is a doctrine that prevents courts from deciding cases where there is no longer a real dispute between the parties. A case can become moot when:

  • Events occur after the lawsuit is filed that resolve the dispute (for example, the defendant voluntarily grants the relief requested); or
  • The parties no longer have any personal stake in the outcome.

A “justiciable controversy” requires:

  • Adverse parties with real, concrete interests; and
  • A court order that can make a practical difference to their legal rights or obligations.

Once the Comptroller issued the final decision, the Court could not order any additional, meaningful relief with respect to the narrow mandamus claim, and the case became moot.

C. Contested Cases, Final Orders, and Proposals for Decision

Under the Texas APA, a “contested case” is a proceeding where a state agency determines a person’s legal rights after an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing. In many contested cases:

  • SOAH ALJs conduct the hearing and issue a proposal for decision (PFD) to the referring agency.
  • The referring agency then issues the final order, often after considering exceptions to the PFD.

A “final order” is important because:

  • It triggers deadlines for filing a motion for rehearing (if required), which in turn affects when the order becomes final and appealable.
  • Only final, appealable orders may be challenged in court under § 2001.171.

The core confusion in Carlson was whether the ALJ’s dismissal was:

  • A final order (making SOAH the “agency” whose decision was appealable); or
  • Merely a step in the process (a PFD), requiring the Comptroller to issue the final order.

SOAH and the Comptroller initially took opposite positions on that question, creating precisely the kind of procedural trap the Court had criticized in Mosley.

D. The Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA)

The PRPRPA (Chapter 2007 of the Government Code) is a state‑law mechanism for property owners to challenge governmental actions that allegedly “take” private property by diminishing its value or restricting its use, even if those actions might not qualify as takings under federal constitutional standards.

Key features include:

  • The right to initiate a contested case with the relevant agency to determine whether a “taking” has occurred.
  • Integration of these proceedings into the APA framework, with judicial review available in district court.
  • Remedies that may include invalidation of the governmental action or compensation measures, depending on the circumstances.

What remains unsettled after Carlson is how, precisely, PRPRPA contested cases referred to SOAH are to be processed procedurally—who issues the final order and how litigants should navigate conflicting signals from SOAH and the referring agency.

VII. Conclusion

In re Carlson is not a sweeping doctrinal landmark; it is, rather, a pointed reaffirmation of a foundational principle: Texas courts exercise “judicial power” only when there is a live controversy between adverse parties, and that power ends when the case becomes moot, even in the face of pressing systemic confusion.

The opinion:

  • Reiterates the difficulties litigants face in navigating “the elaborate minefield of modern administrative procedure,” particularly in the context of the PRPRPA and APA;
  • Highlights the dangers of contradictory procedural guidance from different arms of the State (here, SOAH and the Comptroller), echoing concerns previously voiced in Mosley;
  • Refuses to resolve important questions about the finality of SOAH ALJ orders in PRPRPA cases because those questions came to the Court in a procedurally moot posture; and
  • Dismisses the mandamus petition without prejudice, enabling the Carlsons to proceed to judicial review while preserving the possibility of future mandamus if new obstacles arise.

For practitioners, the key lessons are practical as well as doctrinal:

  • Always identify precisely what relief is being sought and whether subsequent events have undermined the existence of a live dispute;
  • Treat agency pronouncements on procedural matters cautiously, especially when different agencies (or different offices within the same government) may not be aligned;
  • Recognize that the Supreme Court of Texas will not use an otherwise-moot case as a vehicle to “clean up” systemic confusion, no matter how much that might seem desirable.

In the broader legal landscape, In re Carlson serves as a sober reminder that the judiciary’s power to clarify the law is constrained not by the importance of the issues presented, but by the constitutional requirement of an ongoing, concrete controversy. The unresolved questions surrounding PRPRPA contested cases and SOAH finality will almost certainly return to the courts—or to the Legislature—but they will have to do so in a case that remains alive all the way to judgment.

This commentary is for informational and analytical purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Texas

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