Judicial Power, Mootness, and Administrative Finality: Commentary on In re Carlson (Tex. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in In re Carlson, No. 24‑0081 (Apr. 25, 2025), is a short but telling opinion about the limits of judicial power in the face of strategic shifts by state agencies. The case arises out of a contested case filed under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA) and highlights:

Persistent confusion over when an administrative order is “final” for purposes of judicial review;
The risk to private parties when different arms of the State give conflicting instructions about how to obtain that review; and
The constitutional constraint that courts may not resolve such ambiguities once the underlying dispute between the parties has disappeared.

Tom and Becky Carlson alleged that a Comptroller-approved wind turbine project in Callahan County caused a compensable taking of their property under the PRPRPA. Their case was referred to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH), where an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the case as untimely and for lack of jurisdiction. When the Carlsons tried to figure out how to appeal, SOAH and the Comptroller gave them diametrically opposed guidance on whether the ALJ’s dismissal was a final, appealable order.

To salvage their right to judicial review, the Carlsons sought a writ of mandamus directly from the Supreme Court of Texas, asking the Court to compel the Comptroller to issue a final order from which they could appeal. After nearly two years of hard-fought litigation, including full briefing and oral argument, the Comptroller abruptly issued exactly that final order—thereby giving the Carlsons all the relief they had requested in their mandamus petition.

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Blacklock, held that this turnabout rendered the mandamus proceeding moot and therefore outside the Court’s jurisdiction. While the opinion does not resolve the underlying administrative-procedure puzzle, it strongly reaffirms a core constitutional principle: Texas courts possess only the “judicial power” to decide live disputes between parties, not to issue abstract clarifications of the law, no matter how useful those clarifications might be.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s disposition can be distilled into a few key points:

Jurisdictional posture. Because the Comptroller is a statewide executive officer, the Supreme Court of Texas has exclusive original mandamus jurisdiction over him. (In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c)). The State did not dispute jurisdiction on this ground.
Relief requested. The Carlsons’ mandamus petition sought only one form of relief: an order compelling the Comptroller to issue a final decision in their contested case so that they could pursue judicial review in district court.
Agency reversal and voluntary compliance. Shortly after oral argument and at the Court’s request for clarification of the State’s unified position, the Comptroller suddenly issued a final decision on February 14, 2025—nearly twenty months after the ALJ’s dismissal and after the State had long insisted it could not lawfully do so.
Mootness. Because the Comptroller’s final decision granted the Carlsons all the relief they had requested in this mandamus proceeding, there was no longer a “justiciable controversy” between the parties. The Court applied its standard mootness doctrine: “A case is moot when a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2022)).
No advisory opinions. Although the case spotlighted serious confusion about agency finality and the appellate path for PRPRPA cases, the Court emphasized that it lacked power to decide those abstract questions once the concrete dispute had ended. Judicial clarification of the law is only a byproduct of resolving real cases, not an independent power.
Disposition. The Court dismissed the mandamus petition “for lack of jurisdiction” as moot, expressly “without prejudice” to the Carlsons’ ability to seek mandamus again if necessary.

In short, In re Carlson does not settle the contested question of when SOAH orders are “final” in these settings. Instead, it reaffirms that Texas courts cannot decide such questions in the absence of a live dispute, even when state agencies have created confusion with conflicting and shifting positions.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The PRPRPA and the Carlsons’ Contested Case

The Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA), codified in Chapter 2007 of the Government Code, provides a mechanism for property owners to challenge governmental actions that allegedly “take” private real property without compensation.

Under TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.022(a):

“A private real property owner may file a contested case with a state agency to determine whether a governmental action of the state agency results in a taking under this chapter.”

These contested cases are expressly made “subject to Chapter 2001,” the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “except to the extent of a conflict with [the PRPRPA].” § 2007.022(c). After a contested case is resolved, property owners have a statutory right to judicial review in district court. See §§ 2001.171, 2007.025(b).

In 2022, Tom and Becky Carlson invoked this mechanism, filing a contested case against the Texas Comptroller. They alleged that the Comptroller’s approval of a wind turbine project in Callahan County diminished the value and enjoyment of their property, amounting to a “taking” under the PRPRPA.

The Comptroller referred the case to SOAH, the central administrative tribunal that conducts contested case hearings for numerous agencies.

B. The ALJ’s Dismissal for Untimeliness and Lack of Jurisdiction

At SOAH, the Comptroller moved to dismiss the Carlsons’ contested case as untimely under the PRPRPA. The ALJ agreed, concluding:

“The ALJ concludes Petitioners failed to timely file the contested case in accordance with the requirements of the Act. Therefore, for the reasons stated, the ALJ finds that the Comptroller and/or SOAH do not have jurisdiction … to conduct a contested case hearing in this matter under the provisions of the Act. It is therefore ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction under 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.503(d)(1)(A).”

The ALJ signed this “Order Granting Motion to Dismiss” on May 19, 2023.

The key regulatory hook is 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.503(d)(1)(A), which authorizes an ALJ to dismiss a referred case when there is “lack of jurisdiction over the matter by the referring agency.” The ALJ invoked this rule to conclude that neither the Comptroller nor SOAH had jurisdiction to hear the case, and ordered dismissal from SOAH’s docket.

C. Conflicting Guidance: SOAH vs. Comptroller

The ALJ’s order created immediate uncertainty about what the Carlsons were required to do next to preserve their right to judicial review. The order was styled as a dismissal “for lack of jurisdiction” under SOAH’s rules and concluded with an “ORDERED” paragraph, but it did not explicitly say whether it was merely a recommendation (a “proposal for decision” or PFD) to the Comptroller or a final, appealable agency decision.

To avoid procedural missteps, the Carlsons did what any careful litigant should do: they asked SOAH for clarification. On June 6, 2023, they wrote to SOAH noting that:

The language of the order “appears to be a final decision” because it did not contemplate further action; but
They could not find clarity in the APA or SOAH rules about how to treat such an order, and whether the Comptroller still needed to issue a final order.

SOAH’s general counsel replied on June 8 with an unequivocal answer: SOAH’s order was not a final decision. Instead, SOAH stated:

“All cases referred by the Comptroller are PFD cases, so the case goes back to the CPA now for any further action, (final order, motion for rehearing, etc.) SOAH only has final decision authority for a very limited number of case types …”

Relying on this official communication, the Carlsons reasonably waited for the Comptroller to issue a final order.

On July 26, 2023, after hearing nothing, the Carlsons emailed the Comptroller to ask whether it intended to issue a final order. The Comptroller initially replied that the Carlsons would have the order “within the next couple of days.”

But the next day, after “further review,” the Comptroller reversed course. In a July 27 email, the Comptroller stated:

“We believe [your assertions] are in error. The ALJ issued a FINAL SOAH ‘Order Granting Motion to Dismiss’….”

“Because our Agency lacks jurisdiction over the matter, there is no justification for issuing an Order or Comptroller decision relating to the Carlson case.”

“Given the unambiguous language set out in the ALJ’s Order, we believe an appeal by the Petitioners would fall under SOAH Rule 155.509(b). This Rule requires the Petitioners to timely file a Motion for Rehearing of the ALJ’s Order under Gov’t Code Chapter 2001, Subchapter F.”

In other words:

SOAH (through its general counsel) told the Carlsons the ALJ’s order was not final and that the Comptroller would issue the final order;
The Comptroller told the Carlsons the ALJ’s order was final and that no further Comptroller order would issue; and
The Comptroller asserted that the Carlsons should have filed a motion for rehearing at SOAH to preserve their right of appeal, under SOAH Rule 155.509(b) and the APA.

When the Carlsons informed the Comptroller of SOAH’s contrary position, the Comptroller’s response was terse: “We are going to stand upon the SOAH Order as issued.”

At that point, the Carlsons appeared trapped: if the Comptroller was right, they had missed the deadline to seek rehearing and judicial review. If SOAH was right, there was no final order to appeal.

D. The Mandamus Petition to the Supreme Court of Texas

Faced with this “procedural morass,” the Carlsons filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly in the Supreme Court of Texas. As the Court notes, it has exclusive original jurisdiction to mandamus the Comptroller as an executive officer of the State. See In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d at 472 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c)).

The mandamus request was narrow: they did not ask the Court to decide whether the ALJ’s order was “final” or whether SOAH or the Comptroller had the better reading of the APA and PRPRPA. Rather, they asked the Court to compel the Comptroller to issue a final order from which they could appeal—thereby aligning the process with what SOAH had originally told them.

The Court called for full merits briefing and set the case for oral argument. During argument, the State “continued to defend” the Comptroller’s position that:

The ALJ’s dismissal was the final, appealable decision in the contested case; and
The Carlsons had missed their deadline to appeal by waiting for the Comptroller to issue its own final decision.

Because SOAH’s correspondence to the Carlsons directly contradicted the Comptroller’s stance, the Court asked the Attorney General (who represents the State in the Supreme Court) whether the State had achieved a unified position between SOAH and the Comptroller. The State said it would inform the Court by letter.

E. The Comptroller’s Late-Issued Final Order and Mootness

The promised letter never arrived. Instead, on February 21, 2025, the State informed the Court that:

The Comptroller had issued a final decision in the Carlson contested case on February 14; and
This final decision granted the Carlsons the very relief they had been seeking in their mandamus petition.

The State argued that this action extinguished any live controversy, rendering the mandamus case moot. The Court solicited the Carlsons’ views; they agreed that the case had become moot because they had finally received the relief they sought—a final Comptroller decision they could take to district court.

With both sides in agreement that there was no longer a live dispute over the relief requested in the mandamus petition, the Supreme Court addressed only whether mootness deprived it of jurisdiction, and if so, how to dispose of the case.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, 593 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2019)

Chief Justice Blacklock opens the opinion by invoking his own concurring opinion in Mosley, a due-process case involving administrative exhaustion traps. In Mosley, an agency claimant followed the government’s instructions on how to seek review, only to be told later that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and thus was not entitled to judicial review. The Court vindicated her due-process claim.

The Mosley concurrence is quoted for two broad points:

Complexity and uncertainty of administrative finality. The opinion references the “elaborate minefield of modern administrative procedure” and notes that questions about “finality of agency-level decision-making and the availability and timing of judicial review can be difficult questions even for lawyers to get right.”
Wrongful reliance on official guidance. The Court notes that in Mosley, a woman “followed the government’s instructions ‘only to be informed that in so doing she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and was not entitled to judicial review.’”

These themes are consciously paralleled in In re Carlson: the Carlsons, like Mosley, relied on what the government told them (SOAH’s general counsel and, initially, the Comptroller) about how to proceed, only to be told that their reliance was allegedly mistaken and that they had forfeited judicial review. The Carlsons’ situation thus sits squarely within the concern that Mosley highlighted: agency-created procedural traps that impair access to judicial review.

However, because of mootness, the Court in In re Carlson stops short of determining whether these circumstances give rise to a due-process violation or any substantive remedy. Mosley functions primarily as context: a reminder that the law of administrative exhaustion and finality is confusing and sometimes unfair.

B. In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2020)

The Court briefly cites In re Lester to confirm its original jurisdiction to mandamus the Comptroller. Under TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c), the Supreme Court has exclusive authority to issue writs of mandamus against statewide executive officers. Lester applied that provision to the Comptroller, thereby framing the procedural vehicle used by the Carlsons.

This precedent is uncontested and primarily jurisdictional; it does not affect the mootness analysis directly.

C. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. 2022)

The Court relies on N.J. for the central definition of mootness:

“A case is moot when a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 644 S.W.3d at 192.

This standard is uncontroversial and reflects longstanding Texas doctrine that courts lack jurisdiction over moot cases. The Court applies this rule straightforwardly: once the Comptroller issued the final decision the Carlsons sought, there was no remaining “legally cognizable interest” in additional mandamus relief in this proceeding.

N.J. also implicates broader doctrines such as exceptions to mootness (e.g., collateral consequences, capable of repetition yet evading review, or voluntary cessation), though those are not expressly discussed in In re Carlson.

V. Legal Reasoning in In re Carlson

A. Nature of the Relief and the “Complete Relief” Test

The Court’s reasoning turns on the alignment between:

The relief requested in the mandamus petition; and
The relief afforded by the Comptroller’s belated final decision.

The mandamus petition did not seek a declaration about the proper interpretation of the APA or SOAH rules. It did not seek reinstatement of the Carlson’s contested case on the merits. It did not allege a constitutional due-process violation. It sought only this:

“to compel the Comptroller to issue a final order, from which they could appeal to district court.”

Once the Comptroller issued that final order on February 14, 2025, the Carlsons had—by their own framing—received “all the relief they sought.” The Court therefore concluded that no live dispute remained for it to adjudicate.

This is essentially the “complete relief” principle: when the defendant voluntarily provides the plaintiff with everything the plaintiff has asked the court to order, the case normally becomes moot, absent some recognized exception.

B. Mootness as a Limit on Judicial Power

Chief Justice Blacklock emphasizes that the Court’s authority is not a free-ranging power to clarify the law. Rather, it is the “judicial power,” understood as the power to resolve disputes between parties. Without such a dispute, the Court cannot act, even when the law is confusing and in need of guidance:

“Resolution of ambiguity in the law is often a welcome consequence, we hope, of our resolution of disputes between parties. But our desire to resolve ambiguity in the law does not give us the power to do so. Only a genuine controversy between parties gives us that power, the judicial power, which is the power to resolve disputes.”

Thus, the Court:

Acknowledges the “regrettable lack of clarity in the law that remains in the wake of the government’s shifting positions”; but
Concludes that this concern, however serious, does not create jurisdiction where none exists.

This framing also implicitly links to the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure. Texas courts, like federal courts, are not permitted to issue advisory opinions. The opinion in In re Carlson can be read as a reaffirmation of that constraint in the specific context of administrative law and mandamus.

C. No Discussion of Mootness Exceptions

The Court does not explore potential exceptions to mootness, such as:

Voluntary cessation (where a defendant changes behavior to avoid a ruling but can resume the challenged conduct later); or
Capable of repetition yet evading review (where the issue repeatedly arises but always becomes moot before appellate resolution).

Why not? Two practical reasons are apparent from the opinion:

Consent of the relators. The Carlsons themselves agreed that the case had become moot and did not ask the Court to apply any exception. They were primarily interested in securing their judicial-review rights, not in establishing a broad precedent.
Nature of the relief. The relief sought was entirely forward-looking and specific: get a final order. Once that occurred, no ongoing injury or recurring practice was presented within the four corners of this proceeding.

The Court’s silence on the exceptions should not be read as a rejection of their applicability in other cases. Rather, it reflects the constrained posture and the parties’ agreement that the case was moot.

D. Dismissal Without Prejudice

The Court explicitly notes that dismissal is:

“without prejudice to the Carlsons’ ability to again seek relief in this Court if necessary.”

This preserves the possibility of future mandamus proceedings if, for example, the Comptroller or another state actor were to obstruct the Carlsons’ pursuit of judicial review despite the issuance of the final order. It also underscores that the dismissal is jurisdictional rather than a ruling on the merits of any procedural or substantive issue.

VI. What the Opinion Leaves Unresolved

The Court’s jurisdictional dismissal leaves several important questions unanswered—questions that future litigants, agencies, and courts will need to confront.

A. Who Issues the Final Order in PRPRPA Contested Cases Referred by the Comptroller?

SOAH’s general counsel stated that “all cases referred by the Comptroller are PFD cases,” meaning:

The ALJ’s role is to issue a proposal for decision (PFD); and
The Comptroller must then issue the final order, after which a motion for rehearing and judicial review can follow under the APA.

The Comptroller, by contrast, initially asserted that:

The ALJ’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (under 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.503(d)(1)(A)) was itself the final, appealable decision; and
Therefore, no separate Comptroller order was needed or permissible.

Although the Comptroller’s eventual issuance of a final order in February 2025 seems to align with SOAH’s earlier position, the opinion does not hold that SOAH was correct and the Comptroller was wrong. It simply notes that the State has “reversed course” and adopted, as to the Carlsons, the path the Carlsons had advocated.

As a result, there is still no authoritative answer to questions like:

Is every SOAH order in a Comptroller-referred PRPRPA case merely a PFD, regardless of its form?
Can an ALJ’s dismissal of a contested case for lack of the referring agency’s jurisdiction ever be a final order, or must the referring agency always issue its own final order?

B. Must Parties File Motions for Rehearing at SOAH, at the Agency, or Both?

The Comptroller’s July 27 email invoked SOAH Rule 155.509(b) and the APA’s motion-for-rehearing provisions (Gov’t Code ch. 2001, subch. F) to argue that the Carlsons should have filed a motion for rehearing of the ALJ’s order at SOAH. This suggests that in the Comptroller’s view, the ALJ’s dismissal triggered the APA’s rehearing and judicial-review deadlines directly.

By contrast, SOAH’s view—that all Comptroller-referred cases are PFD cases—implies:

The ALJ issues a PFD (even if labeled “Order”);
The Comptroller issues the agency’s final order; and
Any motion for rehearing is directed to the Comptroller, not to SOAH.

In re Carlson leaves open how practitioners should navigate this in close cases. In the absence of clarification, cautious litigants may feel compelled to file:

A motion for rehearing at SOAH (in case the ALJ’s action is deemed final), and
A separate motion for rehearing at the referring agency after it issues a final order (in case only the agency’s order is viewed as final).

Such “belt and suspenders” practice is costly and inefficient, but without clear rules, it may be the safest course.

C. Due Process Concerns and Reliance on Official Guidance

The Court’s invocation of Mosley makes clear that it is aware of the due-process implications when litigants are misled by the government about their procedural obligations. In both Mosley and Carlson:

A citizen sought guidance from the government about how to preserve her rights;
The government’s guidance was confusing or misleading; and
The government then argued that the citizen had forfeited her rights by following that guidance.

In Mosley, the Court reached the merits and concluded that due process was violated; in Carlson, the Court lacks jurisdiction to ask whether similar principles apply. Thus, Carlson signals, but does not resolve, the potential constitutional stakes of agency-created procedural traps in the PRPRPA/APA context.

D. Strategic Mootness by State Agencies

From an institutional perspective, the timeline suggests that the Comptroller’s issuance of a final order was triggered by the scrutiny of Supreme Court review:

For roughly twenty months, the Comptroller insisted that no final order could or should be issued because the ALJ’s dismissal was final;
Shortly after oral argument and the Court’s request for a unified state position, the Comptroller did an about-face and issued the desired final order; and
The State then argued that this action mooted the case.

The opinion does not accuse the State of strategic behavior, nor does it discuss whether “voluntary cessation” doctrines might ever prevent a defendant (public or private) from mooting a case by last-minute compliance. But the optics are unavoidable: the State avoided a precedential ruling on a thorny area of administrative law by belatedly conceding the specific relief sought by the relators.

Future cases might raise the question more squarely: when, if ever, should a court decline to find mootness where a government defendant appears to be altering its conduct solely to avoid judicial clarification?

VII. Potential Impact of In re Carlson

A. For Property Owners and Administrative Litigants

Although In re Carlson does not announce new doctrinal rules on administrative finality, it sends practical signals to parties challenging state agency actions:

Do not assume consistent guidance from different government actors. SOAH and referring agencies may take different views about who issues the final order and when appeal deadlines begin.
Seek written clarification, but understand its limits. The Carlsons did the right thing by obtaining SOAH’s written view, but that did not prevent the Comptroller from asserting a contradictory position.
Consider protective filings when in doubt. Where there is uncertainty about whether an order is final or whether a motion for rehearing is required, cautious litigants may file motions in multiple fora and consider “protective” petitions for judicial review to prevent forfeiture arguments.
Mandamus remains available, but narrow. Mandamus can be used to compel an agency to take a discrete, non-discretionary action—such as issuing a final order—but that relief will be narrowly tied to the specific request. Once the agency does the act, the mandamus case will likely become moot.

B. For Agencies and SOAH

The case should prompt agencies and SOAH to more carefully coordinate their rules and communications. The Court expressly notes the “government’s shifting positions” and the “regrettable lack of clarity in the law” that remains. To minimize future disputes:

SOAH and referring agencies may need to clarify, by rule or joint guidance, in which categories of cases SOAH has final decision-making authority versus merely issuing PFDs;
Agencies should ensure that their internal practices align with their published rules and with SOAH’s understanding; and
The Attorney General, as the State’s representative before the Supreme Court, may need to more proactively harmonize divergent positions among client agencies before litigation reaches a crisis point.

C. For the Courts and the Doctrine of Mootness

On the doctrinal side, In re Carlson reinforces that:

Mootness is jurisdictional. Once there is no longer a live controversy, the Court must dismiss, even if important issues of law would otherwise benefit from resolution.
The Court’s role is reactive, not advisory. The opinion underscores that clarifying the law is a consequence of deciding cases, not an independent power to issue advisory opinions.

In future cases where an agency’s voluntary change of position is less complete or where plaintiffs seek broader relief (e.g., declarations, damages, or systemwide injunctions), the Court may need to examine more fully whether voluntary cessation or other mootness exceptions apply. In re Carlson does not foreclose that possibility; it simply does not address it in this narrow, agreed mootness posture.

VIII. Key Concepts Simplified

To make the opinion more accessible, it helps to translate several technical terms:

Contested case. A formal administrative proceeding, much like a trial, in which legal rights, duties, or privileges are determined after an opportunity for hearing (see APA, Chapter 2001). Here, the Carlsons’ PRPRPA claim was a contested case.
SOAH (State Office of Administrative Hearings). An independent agency that supplies ALJs to conduct contested case hearings for other agencies. Often, SOAH ALJs issue proposals for decision, and the referring agency issues the final order.
Proposal for decision (PFD). A written recommendation from an ALJ to the referring agency, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The agency then decides whether to adopt, modify, or reject the PFD in its final order.
Final order / final decision. The agency’s official, binding resolution of a contested case. Once final (often after denial of a motion for rehearing), it can usually be appealed to a district court. Confusion in this case centered on whether the ALJ’s dismissal was such a final order.
Motion for rehearing. A request asking the agency (or, in some contexts, SOAH) to reconsider its decision. In many APA-governed cases, filing a timely motion for rehearing is a prerequisite to judicial review.
Judicial review. A court’s power to review and potentially set aside or modify an agency’s final decision. For APA-governed contested cases, review typically goes first to a state district court.
Mandamus. An extraordinary writ by which a higher court orders a lower court or a public official to perform a ministerial (nondiscretionary) duty that the law clearly requires. Here, the Carlsons sought mandamus to force the Comptroller to issue a final order.
Mootness. A jurisdictional doctrine that bars courts from deciding cases where there is no longer a real dispute between the parties or no legally cognizable interest at stake. If events after filing eliminate the controversy, the case becomes moot and must be dismissed.

IX. Conclusion

In re Carlson is not the sweeping administrative-law clarification some might have hoped for. It does not answer whether SOAH ALJ dismissals in PRPRPA cases referred by the Comptroller are final, whether motions for rehearing must be filed at SOAH or the agency, or whether due process is violated when citizens are misled by conflicting agency guidance.

Instead, the opinion does something more fundamental. It:

Reaffirms that the Supreme Court of Texas, like all Texas courts, can act only when a live controversy exists between the parties;
Applies the mootness doctrine to dismiss a mandamus petition once the State voluntarily provided the specific relief requested; and
Highlights, by negative example, the serious practical and constitutional concerns that arise when agencies give inconsistent procedural directions that jeopardize access to judicial review.

For litigants, Carlson is a cautionary tale about the perils of navigating the “minefield” of administrative procedure and the need for protective strategies when finality is unclear. For agencies and the Attorney General, it is a prod to harmonize positions and clarify the path to judicial review in PRPRPA and similar contested cases. For the law more broadly, it stands as a reminder that even pressing systemic confusion cannot expand the judicial power beyond the adjudication of actual, ongoing disputes.

Ultimately, In re Carlson is less about what the Court can do for litigants trapped by administrative ambiguity than about what it cannot do—issue advisory pronouncements once the underlying controversy has vanished. Any more robust solution to the confusion highlighted in this case will likely have to come from future litigation with a live controversy, from coordinated agency rulemaking, or from legislative clarification of the PRPRPA–APA interface.