Judicial Limits on Post-Plea Charge Modification: State v. Partain

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Montana’s decision in State v. Partain (2025 MT 83) addresses fundamental questions about the boundaries of judicial authority after a defendant has entered and the court has accepted a guilty plea. The case arises from actions by the Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula County: sua sponte dismissing a felony charge of Sexual Abuse of Children (to which Jonathan Partain had pleaded guilty) and then reinstating and convicting him of a dismissed misdemeanor charge of Surreptitious Visual Observation or Recordation in a Residence. The State of Montana appealed, arguing that the district court lacked statutory authority to unilaterally alter the parties’ bargain, reinstate a dismissed charge and convict without a new plea. The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing statutory limits on post-plea charge modification and reinforcing separation-of-powers principles in criminal procedure.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson, framed the central issue: whether the district court lawfully sentenced Partain after revoking his plea, reinstating a dismissed charge without a prosecutor’s motion, and finding him guilty absent a new guilty plea. Key holdings include:

• The district court’s reliance on Montana Code Annotated § 46-16-702 (new trial and verdict modification statute) was misplaced because no trial occurred.
• The court could not apply § 46-13-401 (dismissal of complaint “in furtherance of justice”) to rescind a guilty plea and re-charge the defendant.
• The misdemeanor count was not a lesser-included offense of the felony count as charged, so the court had no authority under § 46-16-702(3)(c) to reduce the verdict.
• By reinstating and dismissing charges, the judge encroached on prosecutorial discretion in violation of separation-of-powers safeguards.
• The sentence imposed on the misdemeanor count (a two-year deferred sentence) was “contrary to law” under § 46-20-103(2)(h), MCA, and thus illegal.

The Supreme Court reversed the amended judgment and remanded for resentencing on the original felony conviction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• State v. Brummer, 1998 MT 11: Held a court may grant a new trial sua sponte absent legislative restriction.
• City of Billings ex rel. Friedt v. Billings Mun. Ct., 2008 MT 174: Clarified § 46-16-702 does not authorize sua sponte plea withdrawal when no trial occurred.
• State v. Curran, 2023 MT 118: Established de novo review for legality of a sentence.
• State v. Hafner, 2010 MT 233 & State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180: Limited review of sentencing to questions of law (legality).
• State ex rel. Fletcher v. Dist. Ct., 1993: Emphasized prosecutorial discretion in charging and dismissal.
• State v. Brown, 2022 MT 176: Defined “lesser-included offense” under § 46-1-202(9)(a), MCA, as an offense whose statutory elements are entirely contained within the greater offense.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s de novo review focused on statutory interpretation and separation-of-powers principles:

1. Statutory Limits on Post-Plea Modification:

   Section 46-16-702 governs verdict modification or new trials after a trial. Because Partain never went to trial but entered a plea, that statute could not empower the court to downgrade the crime or reinstate a dismissed count.

2. Authority to Dismiss vs. Authority to Amend:

   While § 46-13-401 authorizes dismissal of an information in furtherance of justice, it does not authorize re-filing, re-charging or finding guilt on a new offense without following procedural safeguards (e.g., prosecutor’s application, leave of court, proper plea or trial).

3. Plea-Agreement Rejection vs. Charge Modification:

   Upon rejecting a plea agreement under § 46-12-211(4), the court must inform the parties, allow plea withdrawal, and return the case to pre-bargain status. It cannot unilaterally rewrite the bargain by converting a felony plea into a misdemeanor conviction without the defendant’s consent.

4. Lesser-Included Offense Analysis:

   Surreptitious Visual Observation or Recordation (MCA § 45-5-223(1)(b)) requires elements—“hide, wait, loiter by remote device in a private dwelling”—that are not contained within the elements of Sexual Abuse of Children (MCA § 45-5-625). Accordingly, the misdemeanor was not a lesser-included offense.

5. Separation of Powers:

   The district court assumed both prosecutorial functions (fashioning and reinstating charges) and judicial functions (convicting without a plea or trial), violating Article III, § 1 of the Montana Constitution. Charging decisions rest exclusively with the prosecutor; conviction requires trial or valid plea.

Impact

This decision reinforces and clarifies several points of Montana criminal process:

• Judges may not modify or dismiss plea-based convictions under statutes intended for post-trial relief.
• Plea-agreement rejection cannot supplant prosecutor charging discretion or create new plea terms without defendant consent.
• Courts must respect the statutory schema for charging, plea withdrawal, trials and sentencing, preserving the constitutional separation of powers.
• Future litigants will rely on State v. Partain to challenge any judicial attempt to down-grade or re-invoke charges outside the statutory framework.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Guilty Plea vs. Verdict: A guilty plea is a judicial admission that replaces a jury or bench trial. Statutes about modifying a verdict post-trial do not apply to pleas.
• Lesser-Included Offense: An offense whose statutory elements are entirely contained within a greater offense. If even one element differs, it is not “lesser-included.”
• Deferred Sentence: A sentence imposed but not executed unless the defendant violates probation. It remains a “sentence” for purposes of appeal.
• Separation of Powers: Under the Montana Constitution, judges may not perform prosecutorial functions (charging, indicting) or legislative functions (creating new offenses) — they must follow the statutory scheme.
• Plea-Agreement Framework (§ 46-12-211 MCA):
  • (1)(b) agreements: Prosecutor and defendant agree on sentence recommendation.
  • If a court rejects such an agreement, it must allow plea withdrawal and rewind the case to pre-agreement status.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s reversal of the district court in State v. Partain underscores that judicial authority in criminal cases is strictly defined by statute and constitutional structure. Once a defendant enters and the court accepts a guilty plea, the judge may not sua sponte alter charges, downgrade convictions to unrelated offenses, or reinstate dismissed counts. The decision reaffirms prosecutorial discretion in charging, the procedural safeguards for plea withdrawal, and the constitutional separation of powers that prevent judges from assuming roles reserved to the executive branch. District courts must now ensure post-plea sentencing hearings focus on authorized dispositional alternatives rather than unsanctioned charge-rewriting.