Judicial Immunity Persists Despite Alleged Appellate Divestiture of Trial-Court Authority Under Pa. R.A.P. 1701

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a federal civil-rights and tort action filed by Walter A. Bernard and Wynton A. Bernard (the “Bernards”) against numerous defendants, including Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge Philip A. Ignelzi. The Bernards’ nineteen claims (including under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986) traced back to state-court collection and discovery proceedings following a confessed judgment entered against them as rent guarantors.

The immediate controversy centered on contempt enforcement measures—specifically arrest and custody—used to compel compliance with discovery in aid of executing a confessed judgment. The key federal issue was narrow: whether Judge Ignelzi could be sued in his individual capacity, or whether absolute judicial immunity barred the claims because the challenged acts were judicial and not taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Parties and procedural posture

• Plaintiffs-Appellants: Walter A. Bernard; Wynton A. Bernard.
• Defendant-Appellee (sole remaining on appeal): Philip A. Ignelzi (official and individual capacities below; only individual-capacity immunity at issue on appeal).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. It held that even if Pennsylvania appellate rules (Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a)) arguably curtailed the trial court’s authority while appeals were pending, Judge Ignelzi did not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Because the Court of Common Pleas has broad original jurisdiction over such civil matters and inherent power to enforce orders through civil contempt, the judge’s contempt and enforcement actions—at most—would be in excess of authority, not beyond jurisdiction. Absolute judicial immunity therefore barred the suit.

The panel declined to reach an alternative argument (Younger abstention) because immunity alone disposed of the case.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Foundational Supreme Court immunity cases

• Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam): The opinion relies on Mireles for the canonical two exceptions to judicial immunity from money damages: (1) nonjudicial actions (not taken in judicial capacity), and (2) judicial actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. The court uses Mireles as the doctrinal gateway and frames the Bernards’ challenge squarely under exception (2).
• Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978): Stump supplies two key points: (a) jurisdiction is construed broadly for immunity purposes, and (b) a judge is not deprived of immunity for actions in error, malicious, or in excess of authority—only when acting in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” The panel also quotes Stump’s illustrative footnote distinguishing excess of jurisdiction from clear absence (probate judge trying criminal case vs. criminal judge convicting of a nonexistent crime).
• Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872): Cited through Stump for the historic formulation of “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” reinforcing the high bar plaintiffs must meet.

Third Circuit applications of immunity doctrine

• Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000): This is the opinion’s operational anchor. It states that a judge does not act in clear absence of jurisdiction where the judge has “the power to manage the case and dispose of any issues relating to jurisdiction,” even if the judge’s jurisdictional determination is wrong. The panel uses Figueroa to treat the Bernards’ Pa. R.A.P. 1701 argument as, at most, a claim of legal error/excess authority—insufficient to defeat immunity.
• Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 2017): Cited for the proposition that judges are also generally immune from suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (absent an exception not raised below). While the Bernards on appeal targeted individual-capacity damages immunity, Allen situates the case within a broader immunity shield.

Procedural and pleading standards (supporting posture, not the core rule)

• Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009): Standard of review (plenary) for dismissal.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Plausibility pleading standard.
• Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 962 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2020): Construing facts in the non-movant’s favor on a motion to dismiss.
• Laurel Gardens, LLC v. Mckenna, 948 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2020): Appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
• United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2023): Used to enforce forfeiture: the Bernards’ argument that the judge “acted as law enforcement” in supervising the sheriff during an arrest was not raised below and therefore was forfeited.

Pennsylvania authorities used to establish the judge’s jurisdictional foundation

• Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC, 252 A.3d 628 (Pa. 2021): Cited to underscore that courts of common pleas have “unlimited original jurisdiction” absent statutory limitation.
• County of Fulton v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 292 A.3d 974 (Pa. 2023): Cited for the inherent power to enforce lawful orders through civil contempt.
• 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a): Statutory confirmation of broad original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The Bernards’ theory: Pa. R.A.P. 1701 divested jurisdiction

The Bernards argued that pending appeals—identified as the “Second Appeal” (a challenge to a discovery-related order) and the “Third Appeal” (appealing a contempt order)—divested Judge Ignelzi of jurisdiction under Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a), which generally provides that “after an appeal is taken … the trial court … may no longer proceed further in the matter.”

They contended that because jurisdiction was allegedly divested, the judge’s contempt enforcement (including authorizing custody/arrest) was taken in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction,” defeating immunity.

(b) The court’s move: even if divestiture applied, immunity still holds absent “clear absence”

The Third Circuit did not decide whether Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a) actually divested authority, nor whether exceptions such as Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(2) (enforcement of orders not superseded) or Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(6) (non-appealable interlocutory orders) preserved authority. Instead, it treated that dispute as immaterial to immunity.

The reasoning proceeds as follows:

1. Judicial immunity’s bar is jurisdictional in a special sense. Under Mireles v. Waco and Stump v. Sparkman, the relevant question is not whether the judge made a legal error or exceeded authority, but whether the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
2. “Jurisdiction” is construed broadly for immunity purposes. Stump v. Sparkman requires broad construction; Figueroa v. Blackburn adds that if the judge has power to manage the case and determine jurisdictional issues, the correctness of the jurisdictional determination is “simply irrelevant” to immunity.
3. The Court of Common Pleas plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the category of dispute and contempt. The panel cites 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a) and Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC to establish broad jurisdiction over civil actions, and County of Fulton v. Sec'y of Commonwealth to ground inherent contempt authority to enforce lawful orders.
4. Therefore, any Pa. R.A.P. 1701 problem would be “excess of authority,” not “clear absence.” Even assuming the appeals limited what the judge should do, the judge was not akin to a probate judge trying a criminal case (the “clear absence” example from Stump). Instead, this would be a judge in a case he is empowered to manage making a contested call about what he may do while an appeal is pending—precisely the type of scenario where immunity remains intact.

(c) Forfeiture narrows the inquiry to the jurisdiction exception

The panel notes in a footnote that the Bernards also claimed Judge Ignelzi acted as a law enforcement officer by directing and supervising the Sheriff’s Office in the First Arrest. Because that argument was not raised in the District Court, it was forfeited under United States v. Dowdell. This matters because it foreclosed a potential route to contest immunity under the “nonjudicial act” exception from Mireles v. Waco.

3.3 Impact

Practical effect on civil-rights suits arising from state contempt enforcement

The opinion reinforces a stringent boundary: litigants generally cannot convert alleged violations of state appellate divestiture rules into federal damages claims against judges. Even if a trial judge mistakenly proceeds while an appeal is pending (or misapplies exceptions like Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(2) or 1701(b)(6)), that is treated as, at most, an act “in excess of authority” within a court that still has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute type—thus preserving absolute judicial immunity.

Channeling principle: remedies lie in appellate process, not damages actions

By emphasizing Figueroa and the breadth of common pleas jurisdiction, the decision channels aggrieved parties toward state appellate remedies (motions to quash, supersedeas, emergency applications, mandamus where available, and contempt appeal procedures), rather than collateral federal suits against the presiding judge.

Doctrinal signal (even if nonprecedential)

Though “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion illustrates how the Third Circuit is likely to analyze similar attempts to plead around judicial immunity by relabeling alleged legal error (including alleged jurisdictional divestiture during appeal) as “no jurisdiction.” The court’s method—avoiding the merits of the state jurisdictional question and resolving on the “clear absence” standard—may be persuasive to district courts facing analogous pleadings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Absolute judicial immunity: A rule protecting judges from being sued for damages for actions taken as a judge. It is designed to preserve decisional independence by preventing later retaliation through litigation.
• Two exceptions (from Mireles):
  • Nonjudicial acts: conduct not performed as part of judging (e.g., purely administrative or personal conduct).
  • Clear absence of all jurisdiction: the judge acts outside any power the court could possibly have over the type of case—something more extreme than making a mistake.
• “Excess of authority” vs. “clear absence of jurisdiction”: If a judge has a case that belongs in their court type but makes a serious legal error (even about jurisdiction), immunity typically still applies. Immunity is lost only when the judge acts like a judge of one kind of court trying a matter that no law ever allows that court to handle.
• Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a) divestiture: A Pennsylvania procedural rule that generally pauses trial-court proceedings after an appeal is taken. Importantly for this case, even if the rule is violated, that usually means the judge acted wrongly—not that the judge had no jurisdiction in the immunity sense.
• Civil contempt (enforcement): A mechanism to coerce compliance with court orders (e.g., discovery). Custody can be used as leverage until the person complies (“purges” the contempt), subject to due process constraints.

5. Conclusion

Walter Bernard v. Philip Ignelzi reaffirms a hard line in judicial-immunity doctrine: alleged trial-court overreach during the pendency of an appeal—such as proceeding despite Pa. R.A.P. 1701(a)—does not, without more, amount to action taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Where the court has broad subject-matter jurisdiction over the case category and inherent contempt authority, a judge’s contested jurisdictional call is insulated from individual-capacity civil liability. The practical takeaway is that challenges to contempt enforcement and alleged divestiture errors must be pursued through appellate and procedural remedies, not damages suits against the presiding judge.