Judicial Estoppel as a Bar to Standing in Investor-Fraud Actions: Commentary on Meisels v. Bernstein

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Meisels v. Bernstein, 2025 NY Slip Op 06855 (Dec. 10, 2025), is a significant contribution to New York jurisprudence at the intersection of:

• Standing in fraud and aiding-and-abetting fraud claims;
• The doctrine of judicial estoppel where a plaintiff has taken inconsistent positions in prior foreign and domestic proceedings; and
• The demanding standard for finding “fraud on the court” sufficient to warrant sanctions and case-terminating relief.

At its core, the case addresses whether an individual (Moshe Meisels) who previously disclaimed personal ownership of certain investment funds in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding—and secured a favorable outcome on that basis—may later claim to be the injured party in a New York fraud action arising from those same funds. The Second Department answers “no,” holding that he is judicially estopped from asserting such standing. At the same time, the court refuses to characterize his contradictory statements as a “fraud on the court” warranting sanctions or striking the complaint.

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

• Plaintiffs/Respondents:
  • Primary individual plaintiff: Moshe Meisels.
  • Corporate plaintiff: Premier Estates NY, Inc. (“Premier Estates”).
• Appealing Defendants/Appellants:
  • Michael I. Bernstein; and
  • Michael I. Bernstein, P.A. (together, “Bernstein” or “the defendants”).

The action was brought in Supreme Court, Kings County, alleging, among other things, that Bernstein (a lawyer and his professional association) participated in a scheme with nonparty Eli Weinstein to induce Meisels to invest in a Miami property known as “Riverside Place” under false pretenses. The specific claims at issue on appeal were:

• First cause of action: fraud against Bernstein; and
• Second cause of action: aiding and abetting fraud against Bernstein.

Bernstein moved for:

• Summary judgment dismissing the fraud and aiding-and-abetting fraud claims for lack of standing;
• Striking the complaint under CPLR 3126 on the theory that plaintiffs committed fraud on the court; and
• Sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, again predicated on an alleged fraud on the court.

The Supreme Court denied these branches of the motion. Bernstein appealed. The Second Department:

• Reversed in part: granting summary judgment dismissing the fraud-based claims for lack of standing, largely on judicial estoppel grounds; and
• Affirmed in part: upholding the denial of sanctions and refusal to strike the complaint, finding no “fraud on the court” proven by clear and convincing evidence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Key Facts

The relevant factual matrix, as distilled by the court, is as follows:

1. In 2007, Meisels facilitated investments with nonparty Eli Weinstein, who was involved in a series of real estate dealings.
2. A London corporation, Rightmatch Ltd. (“Rightmatch”), wired approximately $2,412,163.50 to Weinstein’s attorney. This sum (the “transferred funds”) was crucial to all subsequent litigation.
3. According to a 2009 New Jersey complaint (the “Weinstein complaint”) filed by Meisels and others against Weinstein:
   • The transferred funds were initially invested in a New Jersey property called Berkeley Terrace;
   • After Weinstein told Meisels that Berkeley Terrace had been sold, Meisels allegedly directed that the transferred funds (plus supposed profits) be rolled into the purchase of Riverside Place, the Miami property at the center of this New York lawsuit.
4. Separately, in a 2012 London bankruptcy proceeding brought by Rightmatch (in receivership) against Meisels, Meisels submitted a witness statement averring that:
   • He had merely facilitated investments between Rightmatch and Weinstein in 2007;
   • The investments were not his personal investments, but rather belonged to Rightmatch.
   • The London court dismissed the petition against him based, in part, on these representations.

In the New York action, by contrast, Meisels and Premier Estates asserted that they were the injured parties with respect to the Riverside Place investment and sought to recover damages for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud against Bernstein.

B. Holdings

1. Lack of Standing – Summary Judgment Granted.
   The court held that plaintiffs (Meisels and Premier Estates) lacked standing to sue Bernstein for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud concerning the Riverside Place investment. This conclusion flows from:
   • Evidence showing that the investment funds originated from Rightmatch, not Meisels personally; and
   • Application of judicial estoppel based on Meisels’s prior sworn statements in the London proceeding disclaiming personal ownership of the funds and securing a favorable outcome on that basis.
2. No Standing Via Assignment to Premier Estates.
   Any purported assignment of Rightmatch’s interests to Premier Estates could not confer standing where, in this case, Meisels himself had taken the position that the Riverside Place money did not belong to Rightmatch.
3. No Fraud-on-the-Court – Sanctions and CPLR 3126 Relief Denied.
   Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in Meisels’s representations, the court held that the defendants failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Meisels had committed fraud on the court under the stringent standard set forth in CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307 (2014). Therefore:
   • The complaint would not be struck under CPLR 3126; and
   • Sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 would not be imposed.

Accordingly, the order was modified to grant summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action as to Bernstein, and otherwise affirmed as to sanctions and CPLR 3126 relief.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standing and the Injury-in-Fact Requirement

The court begins with the principle that on a summary judgment motion challenging standing, the moving defendant bears the initial burden:

“On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff's lack of standing, rather than on the plaintiff to affirmatively establish its standing in order for the motion to be denied” (Cenlar FSB v Lanzbom, 168 AD3d 670, 671; see Citibank, N.A. v Conti-Scheurer, 172 AD3d 17, 22).

This recapitulates settled New York law: it is the moving party who must first demonstrate that the plaintiff has no legally cognizable interest in the claim. Only then does the burden shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact.

The court then reiterates the definition of “injury in fact” as the core of standing:

“The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention” (Matter of Festa v Town of Oyster Bay, 210 AD3d 678, 679–680 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Daniels, 33 NY3d 44, 50).

These cases are rooted largely in public-law or quasi-public-law contexts (e.g., challenges to government action and issues involving Mental Hygiene Legal Service), but the Second Department applies the same injury-in-fact framework in this purely private, investor-fraud setting. Injury-in-fact here means that the plaintiffs must show that they themselves — not some third party — suffered the economic loss tied to the allegedly fraudulent investment.

2. Judicial Estoppel

The doctrine of judicial estoppel (also referred to as the “doctrine of inconsistent positions”) is central to the court’s analysis. The Second Department cites:

• Capital One, N.A. v Trubitsky, 206 AD3d 608, 610;
• Cussick v R.L. Baxter Bldg. Corp., 228 AD3d 614, 616; and
• Davis v Citibank, N.A., 116 AD3d 819, 821.

The governing articulation is:

“A party who assumes a certain position in a prior legal proceeding and secures a favorable judgment therein is precluded from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed” (Capital One, N.A. v Trubitsky, 206 AD3d 608, 610 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cussick v R.L. Baxter Bldg. Corp., 228 AD3d 614, 616).

The “twin purposes” of the doctrine are emphasized:

“The twin purposes of the doctrine are to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to protect judicial integrity by avoiding the risk of inconsistent results in two proceedings” (Cussick v R.L. Baxter Bldg. Corp., 228 AD3d at 616 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Davis v Citibank, N.A., 116 AD3d 819, 821).

These prior cases generally involved litigants who changed positions about ownership interests or obligations, often in related litigation, to gain advantage. Meisels extends and reinforces this line of authority in two notable ways:

1. It applies judicial estoppel to prior foreign proceedings (here, a London bankruptcy case), as long as:
   • The party took a position under oath;
   • That position was accepted by the foreign tribunal; and
   • The party benefitted by way of a favorable outcome (here, dismissal of the petition).
2. It uses judicial estoppel not merely to limit theories of liability or damages, but to negate standing altogether by precluding the plaintiff from claiming to be the injured party.

3. Agency and Contractual Standing

The court next cites agency principles to address whether Meisels, as agent or intermediary for Rightmatch, might nonetheless have standing to sue:

“A person making or purporting to make a contract with another as an agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract absent an agreement or indication to that effect” (Horn v Toback, 44 Misc 3d 42, 45 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists], quoting 2A NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 330).

And:

“As between a principal and agent, an agent may bring the action: ‘(1) when the contract was made in the agent's name’” (Airlines Reporting Corp. v S & N Travel, 238 AD2d 292, 293 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting College Mgt. Co. v Belcher Oil Co. of N.Y., 159 AD2d 339, 341; see CPLR 1004).

Thus, if an agent has signed a contract in his own name, or otherwise become a party to the contract, he may sue in his own capacity. But if he only acted for a disclosed principal, he typically lacks any direct contract claim.

The Second Department underscores that plaintiffs had already lost their contract claim against Bernstein (the Supreme Court granted summary judgment on that cause of action, and plaintiffs did not challenge that ruling on appeal). They also failed to produce any contract between Meisels and Bernstein, further undermining any theory that Meisels could sue as an agent who had himself become a party. The court cites:

Young v 101 Old Mamaroneck Rd. Owners Corp., 211 AD3d 771, 774 (failure to submit contract fatal to such claims).

4. Fraud on the Court and Sanctions

The defendants argued that Meisels’s contradictory positions—stating in London that he did not own the investment funds, and in New York effectively claiming he was the injured investor—constituted a fraud on the court warranting:

• Striking the complaint under CPLR 3126; and
• Imposing sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

The Second Department relies principally on CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307 (2014), and subsequent appellate decisions interpreting that case, including Bhim v Platz, 207 AD3d 511 (2d Dept 2022), and Sterling Trust Ltd. v Stern, 177 AD3d 928 (2d Dept 2019).

The standard is demanding:

“Misconduct amounting to a fraud on the court ‘involves wilful conduct that is deceitful and obstructionistic, which injects misrepresentations and false information into the judicial process so serious that it undermines the integrity of the proceeding’” (Bhim v Platz, 207 AD3d 511, 513, quoting CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307, 318).

And:

“[I]n order to demonstrate fraud on the court, the nonoffending party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the offending party has acted knowingly in an attempt to hinder the fact finder's fair adjudication of the case and his [or her] adversary's defense of the action” (CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d at 320 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bhim v Platz, 207 AD3d at 513).

Moreover, the fraudulent conduct must concern issues:

“that are central to the truth-finding process” (CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d at 320–321 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bhim v Platz, 207 AD3d at 513).

The Second Department concludes that although Meisels’s statements about his relationship with Rightmatch were indeed contradictory, this alone did not amount to a clear and convincing showing that he engaged in the sort of deliberate, obstructionist misconduct that undermines the judicial process itself. The court cites Sterling Trust Ltd. v Stern, 177 AD3d 928, 929, for the proposition that contradictions and even serious credibility issues often fall short of the “fraud on the court” threshold.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Prima Facie Showing of Lack of Standing

On the standing issue, the defendants submitted two pivotal pieces of evidence:

1. Wire transfer records showing that:
   • Rightmatch Ltd. (a London corporation) wired $2,412,163.50 to Weinstein’s attorney;
   • These funds were the capital ultimately associated with the Riverside Place investment.
2. The 2009 New Jersey Weinstein complaint, in which Meisels and others alleged:
   • The transferred funds were initially invested in a New Jersey property, Berkeley Terrace;
   • Following purported sale of Berkeley Terrace, Meisels directed Weinstein to apply those funds (plus profits) to invest in Riverside Place.

From this, the Second Department concludes that defendants made a prima facie showing that:

• The economic loss associated with Riverside Place was, in origin, Rightmatch’s loss; and
• The plaintiffs did not sustain “a concrete and particularized injury” in the sense required by standing doctrine.

In standing analysis, the injury must be personal to the plaintiff. The transfer records, viewed in light of the Weinstein complaint, made it appear that Rightmatch was the actual investor. Thus, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to raise a triable issue that:

• They were either the true beneficial owners of the funds; or
• They otherwise suffered a direct, concrete, and non-speculative injury from the alleged fraud.

2. Judicial Estoppel and the London Witness Statement

The critical piece of rebuttal to any such argument is the London bankruptcy witness statement of Meisels. There, he swore that:

• The 2007 investments with Weinstein were Rightmatch’s investments;
• They were explicitly not his personal investments.

The London court, relying in part on these statements, dismissed the petition against him. Thus, he:

• Took a clear position regarding ownership of the funds (Rightmatch, not him);
• Prevailed in that proceeding, avoiding potential liability to Rightmatch’s estate.

Now, in New York, Meisels seeks to claim that he, not Rightmatch, was the injured investor, or that Rightmatch was merely a “nominee” for his investment. The Second Department holds that he is judicially estopped from doing so:

“Therefore, Meisels is judicially estopped from contending that he has standing because Rightmatch wired the transferred funds as a mere nominee (see Cussick v R.L. Baxter Bldg. Corp., 228 AD3d at 616).”

In other words, having represented to the London court that he was not the party whose money was at stake—and having benefited from that representation—he cannot change his story in a later, separate proceeding merely because his interests now favor a different narrative. Allowing that kind of shift would:

• Invite manipulation of the judicial system;
• Risk inconsistent judicial determinations (e.g., is Meisels the investor or is Rightmatch?);
• Undermine the integrity and reliability of sworn testimony and formal legal positions.

What is especially noteworthy is that the Second Department does not merely use judicial estoppel to bar a particular legal theory; it applies the doctrine to deprive the plaintiff of standing by blocking him from claiming to be the injured investor.

3. Agency and Absence of a Direct Contract Claim

The court addresses the possibility that, even if Rightmatch was the nominal investor, Meisels might sue under agency principles, perhaps as someone who was more than a mere conduit. The court rejects this for two reasons:

1. Disclosed principal rule. As the court explains via Horn v Toback:

   “[A] person making or purporting to make a contract with another as an agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract absent an agreement or indication to that effect.”

   If Meisels was simply acting on behalf of a known, disclosed principal (Rightmatch), then, absent specific contractual language to the contrary, he is not a party to any contract involving that principal and Weinstein or Bernstein.
2. No contract in his own name. The exception for agents suing in their own name (cited via Airlines Reporting Corp. v S & N Travel and College Mgt. Co. v Belcher Oil Co. of N.Y.) applies when “the contract was made in the agent’s name.” Plaintiffs:
   • Do not dispute that summary judgment was properly granted dismissing the breach of contract cause of action against Bernstein; and
   • Failed to produce any contract between Meisels and Bernstein.
   Thus, there is no basis to treat Meisels as a contract-party with a direct claim.

4. Assignment to Premier Estates

Plaintiffs attempted to salvage standing via an alleged assignment of Rightmatch’s interests to the corporate plaintiff, Premier Estates. In general, an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor: if the assignor had a claim, the assignee may bring it; if not, the assignment conveys nothing.

The Second Department rejects this route to standing for a simple but powerful reason:

• Meisels himself, in opposing defendants’ motion, averred that the money invested in Riverside Place did not belong to Rightmatch.

If Rightmatch had no actual right or interest in the Riverside Place investment (as Meisels now contends), then there was nothing for it to assign to Premier Estates. The assignment therefore could not cure the plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

This creates a kind of self-defeating loop for plaintiffs:

• To argue that they, rather than Rightmatch, had standing, they must say the money did not belong to Rightmatch; but
• If the money did not belong to Rightmatch, then an assignment from Rightmatch conveys no rights to Premier Estates.

Either way, plaintiffs cannot establish that they are the proper parties to bring the fraud claims.

5. No Fraud on the Court – The High Bar Under CDR Créances

On the sanctions and CPLR 3126 branches of the motion, the defendants urged that Meisels’s contradictory positions regarding ownership of the funds amounted to a fraud on the court. The Second Department acknowledges that:

• There were contradictions in Meisels’s representations about his relationship with Rightmatch; and
• Those contradictions were serious enough to invoke judicial estoppel and to warrant dismissal for lack of standing.

However, the court holds that they did not cross the stringent line into “fraud on the court.” Relying on CDR Créances and Bhim v Platz, the court emphasizes:

• The need for clear and convincing evidence of intentional, obstructionist conduct designed to undermine the truth-finding process; and
• The requirement that the misconduct be central to the integrity of the proceeding itself.

The court finds that the defendants did not meet this burden:

“Here, while Meisels's representations regarding the nature of his relationship with Rightmatch were contradictory, the defendants failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Meisels engaged in conduct that would constitute a fraud on the court (see Sterling Trust Ltd. v Stern, 177 AD3d 928, 929).”

Hence:

• No striking of the complaint under CPLR 3126; and
• No sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

This demonstrates a careful calibration: the judicial system will protect its integrity by estopping inconsistent factual positions, but it will reserve the label “fraud on the court” for truly egregious conduct, such as wholesale fabrication of evidence or systematic perjury, as in CDR Créances.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Strengthening Judicial Estoppel as a Tool to Police Inconsistent Positions

Meisels v. Bernstein reinforces and sharpens the use of judicial estoppel in New York, especially where:

• A litigant has taken a sworn position in a prior proceeding—here, abroad (“the funds weren’t mine”);
• Obtained a favorable outcome (dismissal of a foreign bankruptcy petition); and
• Seeks later to assert the opposite (“the funds were mine / I am the injured investor”) in New York litigation.

The decision confirms that:

• Judicial estoppel may be applied to foreign proceedings, so long as the core elements—position, acceptance, and advantage—are satisfied.
• The doctrine may not only bar particular theories but can be deployed as a threshold standing device, foreclosing the plaintiff’s ability to claim injury-in-fact.

Future investor-fraud, commercial, and cross-border litigation in New York will likely see defendants combing prior foreign or domestic proceedings for sworn statements by plaintiffs that are inconsistent with their current positions. Foreign witness statements, pleadings, and affidavits will become more potent tools in challenging standing and credibility.

2. Clarification on Assignment-Based Standing

The court’s treatment of the purported assignment to Premier Estates clarifies that:

• Assignments cannot manufacture standing out of thin air; they can transfer only such rights as the assignor actually possesses.
• Where a plaintiff’s own sworn statements disavow the assignor’s ownership (e.g., saying the money did not belong to Rightmatch), an assignment from that entity cannot validly confer standing.

This is especially significant for entities that use assignment chains or nominee structures in complex investment schemes. New York courts will scrutinize whether the economic reality matches the paper trail and whether litigants have taken inconsistent positions over time about who really owned what.

3. Maintaining a High Threshold for “Fraud on the Court”

Equally important is the Second Department’s reaffirmation of the high standard for finding “fraud on the court.” The decision:

• Signals that **not every serious inconsistency or misrepresentation justifies the draconian sanctions** associated with fraud on the court;
• Preserves the distinction between:
  • Conduct warranting doctrinal consequences (like judicial estoppel, adverse inferences, summary judgment), and
  • Conduct so egregious that it justifies terminating sanctions and punitive measures.

In practical terms, this will:

• Encourage litigants to continue raising robust, aggressive defenses (including judicial estoppel) when faced with inconsistent statements;
• But caution them that obtaining the more severe remedy of sanctions or striking pleadings requires clear and convincing proof of a systemic fraud aimed at corrupting the adjudicative process itself.

4. Confirmation of the Defendant’s Burden on Standing in Summary Judgment

By reiterating that the moving defendant bears the initial burden of showing lack of standing, the court confirms:

• Defendants must marshal affirmative evidence (such as financial records, prior pleadings, sworn testimony) to demonstrate that plaintiffs were not injured parties;
• Once that is done, plaintiffs cannot survive simply by assertion—they must present admissible evidence raising a triable issue.

In investor-fraud contexts, this likely means defendants will increasingly rely on:

• Bank and wire transfer records;
• Corporate and trust documentation; and
• Pleadings and testimony from prior lawsuits across jurisdictions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is “Standing” and “Injury in Fact”?

Standing is the legal concept that asks: Are you the right person to bring this lawsuit? To have standing in New York, a plaintiff must show:

• They have an “injury in fact” – a real, concrete harm, not something hypothetical or speculative.
• That injury is personal to them, not just generally shared with the public or suffered only by someone else.

In Meisels, the court concluded that the harm from the failed investment—loss of the $2.4+ million—was suffered by Rightmatch (the entity that wired the money), not by Meisels personally or by Premier Estates. Since standing requires that you yourself are the one hurt, Meisels and Premier Estates lacked it.

B. What is Judicial Estoppel?

Judicial estoppel prevents a person from saying one thing in a court case and then saying the opposite in a different case, if:

1. They convinced the first court to accept their original position; and
2. They benefited from that position (for example, by winning the case or getting a dismissal).

The idea is to stop people from “speaking out of both sides of their mouth” in litigation—telling one court one story and another court a different story, simply to get whatever outcome is most convenient at the time.

In Meisels:

• In London, Meisels said: “The investments were not my personal investments; they belonged to Rightmatch.” The court believed him and dismissed the petition against him.
• In New York, to sue for fraud, he effectively had to say: “I (or my company) was the true injured investor.”

Judicial estoppel prevented him from changing his story this way. He was stuck with his London position for purposes of the New York case.

C. What is “Fraud on the Court”?

Fraud on the court is not just ordinary lying or even regular fraud. It refers to conduct so serious that it:

• Directly attacks the integrity of the judicial process;
• Involves deliberate, willful deception—such as fabricated evidence or orchestrated perjury;
• Is aimed at obstructing the court’s ability to find the truth fairly.

New York courts require “clear and convincing evidence” of this type of misconduct before imposing the harshest remedies, such as:

• Striking a party’s pleadings; or
• Imposing severe monetary sanctions.

In Meisels, although there were serious contradictions, the court did not find enough proof that Meisels was deliberately trying to corrupt the New York court’s process in the sense required by CDR Créances. The contradictions could be dealt with through:

• Judicial estoppel (blocking his claim);
• Adverse credibility inferences at trial (if it had proceeded).

But they were not enough to label his conduct a “fraud on the court” and impose the most drastic sanctions.

D. Agency and Disclosed Principal

When someone (an agent) makes a contract on behalf of someone else (a principal), the law treats them differently depending on whether the principal is:

• Disclosed: everyone knows who the principal is; or
• Undisclosed: the other party believes it is dealing only with the agent.

If the principal is disclosed, then:

• The contract is usually between the principal and the other party;
• The agent is not personally a party to the contract, absent special agreement.

In Meisels, the court assumes that Rightmatch was the disclosed principal whose money was used for the investment. Without evidence that Meisels himself contracted in his own name or undertook personal obligations, he had no contractual basis to sue Bernstein for breach in his own right.

V. Conclusion

Meisels v. Bernstein is a carefully reasoned decision with substantial implications for commercial and investor-fraud litigation in New York, especially where:

• Multiple jurisdictions and foreign proceedings are involved;
• Complex agency and nominee structures obscure the identity of the true investor; and
• Litigants have taken divergent positions about ownership and responsibility over time.

The decision’s key contributions can be succinctly summarized:

1. Judicial Estoppel as a Standing Weapon:
   The court uses judicial estoppel—grounded in prior sworn testimony in a foreign proceeding—to bar a plaintiff from claiming an injury that he previously disclaimed, thereby defeating standing.
2. Assignments Cannot Cure Fundamental Standing Defects:
   Where a litigant’s own statements deny that an alleged assignor owned the relevant asset or claim, an assignment from that entity cannot confer standing.
3. Fraud on the Court Remains a High Bar:
   Serious inconsistencies may justify judicial estoppel and even summary judgment, but they do not automatically constitute the kind of systemic, deliberate deception that warrants sanctions or striking pleadings under CPLR 3126 and 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.
4. Burden on Defendants in Standing Challenges:
   The court reaffirms that defendants seeking summary judgment on standing must make a prima facie evidentiary showing (as Bernstein did with wire records and prior pleadings) before the burden shifts to plaintiffs.

In the broader legal landscape, Meisels v. Bernstein underscores that litigants are bound by the factual positions that have previously served them well in other courts—domestic or foreign. The integrity of the judicial process demands nothing less. At the same time, the decision preserves a clear, demanding boundary between tactical inconsistency—addressed through doctrines like judicial estoppel—and the rare, extreme wrongdoing that constitutes true “fraud on the court.”