Judicial Discretion in Sentencing: Upward Variances for Criminal History Beyond Category VI and Non-Comparable Codefendants

Introduction

In United States v. Jarvis Hoskins (No. 24-10242), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the substantive reasonableness of a 48-month prison sentence imposed on Jarvis Hoskins for conspiracy to commit bank larceny and possession of stolen bank funds (18 U.S.C. § 371). Hoskins, with two co-defendants, robbed a Brink’s armored‐car van in Sandy Springs, Georgia, seizing $134,000 in cash. After pleading guilty to the conspiracy count, Hoskins was sentenced above the guideline range (30–37 months) based on his extensive criminal history, which exceeded the maximum criminal‐history points recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines (Category VI). On appeal, Hoskins challenged the upward variance as substantively unreasonable and asserted an unwarranted disparity with a co-defendant’s sentence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s upward variance. Key points of the appellate decision:

Standard of review: abuse of discretion for substantive reasonableness (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Butler, 39 F.4th 1349).
The sentencing court may impose an upward variance even when it relies on conduct or factors (e.g., extensive criminal history) already accounted for in the guideline range calculation (Moran, 778 F.3d 942).
Disparity analysis requires a true “apples‐to‐apples” comparison of co-defendants. The court found Hoskins and his co-defendant Hollins were not similarly situated because Hoskins had a far more extensive, recent, and repeated record of theft and fraud (Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091; Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018).
Affirmation that the district court considered all § 3553(a) factors, weighed mitigating evidence (letters, educational efforts) against the need to protect the public, deter future crimes, and account for Hoskins’s “fervent dedication to criminal activity.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Butler (39 F.4th 1349): Establishes that a sentence is substantively reasonable if it falls within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” and that sentencing variances can be based on factors already accounted for in guidelines.
Moran (778 F.3d 942): Confirms a court may consider the same conduct in imposing a variance that was used in guidelines calculations.
Sarras (575 F.3d 1191): Holds that acknowledgment of § 3553(a) factors and parties’ arguments suffices so long as the court provides enough reasoning.
Gonzalez (550 F.3d 1319): Places the burden on the appellant to show the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Cavallo (790 F.3d 1202): Confirms that co-defendant sentencing disparities are not per se unreasonable unless defendants truly are “similarly situated.”
Docampo (573 F.3d 1091) and Azmat (805 F.3d 1018): Emphasize the need for detailed comparison—more than offense and sentence length—before finding an unwarranted disparity.
Irey (612 F.3d 1160): Identifies three forms of substantive reasonableness error—failure to consider a significant factor, reliance on an irrelevant factor, or unreasonable weighing of factors.
Rosales-Bruno (789 F.3d 1249): Guides the appellate review standard under “abuse of discretion.”

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning followed a structured § 3553(a) analysis:

Nature and Circumstances of the Offense: A premeditated heist of a Brink’s van for personal gratification via luxury purchases. Not a crime of necessity.
History and Characteristics of the Defendant: Twenty‐three criminal‐history points—ten of which exceed the thirteen‐point cap for Category VI—demonstrate repeated theft, burglary, firearms offenses, and fraud. The sentencing guidelines range (30–37 months) did not capture the full seriousness of this pattern.
Need for Adequate Deterrence and Public Protection: Despite multiple prison terms, Hoskins re-offended, indicating only a stricter sentence would protect the public and deter future crimes.
Avoiding Unwarranted Disparities: Co-defendant Hollins’s criminal history was far less extensive. The court properly concluded that they were not similarly situated and that comparing their sentences would be “apples to oranges.”
Weighing Mitigation: Letters from family and in-custody educational achievements were considered but given minimal weight relative to the depth and recency of Hoskins’s criminal record.

After hearing argument, the district court exercised its discretion to impose a 48-month term—above the guideline cap—to achieve a just, deterrent, and protective sentence.

Impact

United States v. Hoskins clarifies and reinforces several sentencing principles:

Excess Criminal‐History Points: Sentencing courts may impose variances based on criminal‐history points beyond the maximum recognized guideline category without double‐counting concerns.
“Apples‐to‐Apples” Disparity Analysis: Mere guideline‐range similarity or co-defendant status does not guarantee similarity. Detailed fact‐specific comparison is required.
Weight of Mitigation vs. Public Protection: Although rehabilitative efforts and family support are relevant, they may be outweighed by a demonstrated pattern of recidivism.
Affirmation of Sentencing Discretion: Upward variances remain a viable tool when a district court, after considering all § 3553(a) factors, finds the guidelines insufficient.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Guideline Range & Category VI: Sentencing Guidelines assign “offense levels” and “criminal‐history categories” (I–VI). Category VI is the top bracket; any points beyond the category’s threshold have no further effect on the range calculation.
Upward Variance: A sentence above the calculated guidelines range, imposed when the court finds the range too low in light of § 3553(a) factors.
Substantive Reasonableness: An appellate standard asking whether the sentence lies within a broad range of reasonable outcomes, not whether another sentence might also be reasonable.
Unwarranted Disparity: A sentence disparity is “unwarranted” only if similarly situated defendants (in all relevant respects) receive substantially different treatment without justification.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hoskins underscores the breadth of judicial discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It affirms that:

District courts may impose upward variances grounded in excess criminal‐history points and public‐protection concerns, even when those factors already inform the guideline range.
Sentencing comparisons must be precise—co-defendants are not ipso facto “similarly situated.”
Mitigating evidence, including rehabilitative efforts, may be outweighed by an entrenched pattern of criminal conduct.

By reaffirming these principles, the court preserves a sentencing framework that balances individualized justice, deterrence, and public safety.