Judicial Determination of Felony Status as a Question of Law: United States v. Steven Fulton

Introduction

United States v. Steven Fulton, decided May 6, 2025 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, clarifies an important procedural rule in federal firearms prosecutions: whether a prior conviction is punishable by more than one year in prison—and thus constitutes a “felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)—is a legal question for the judge, not a factual question for the jury. The case arose after a federal district court overturned a jury’s guilty verdict against Fulton for knowingly making a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer, concluding that the government had not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Fulton’s 2007 New Jersey conviction was, in fact, a felony. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the acquittal and vacated a conditionally-granted new trial, reinstating the jury verdict and establishing firm guidance on the roles of court and jury in determining felony status.

Key parties and procedural posture:

• Plaintiff–Appellant: United States of America
• Defendant–Appellee: Steven Nicholas Fulton
• District Court: Eastern District of North Carolina (Judge Terrence W. Boyle)
• Court of Appeals: Fourth Circuit (Judges Rushing, Agee, Quattlebaum)
• Central Issue: Did the government present sufficient evidence that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony (punishable by more than one year) so that his denial on the firearm‐purchase form was knowingly false?

Summary of the Judgment

Fulton, a convicted felon with a prior New Jersey weapons‐possession conviction, attempted eleven times in 2023 to purchase firearms from licensed dealers. Each time he answered “No” to the background‐check question asking if he had any felony convictions or crimes punishable by more than one year in jail. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) denied each attempt. After Fulton’s eleventh attempt, the government charged him under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) & 924 for knowingly making a material false statement.

At trial, the government introduced Fulton’s certified New Jersey judgment showing a third-degree unlawful‐possession conviction punished by probation (no express statutory range printed). An ATF agent testified, over defense objection, that New Jersey third-degree offenses are felonies punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. The jury returned a guilty verdict, but the district court granted a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal, reasoning no evidence proved the statutory penalty range or felony label, and conditionally granted a new trial for lack of proof that Fulton understood his own felony status.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held:

• The question whether a prior conviction is punishable by more than one year in prison is a question of law for the judge, not a jury fact question; the district court was free to consult New Jersey statutes and case law.
• As a matter of New Jersey law, Fulton’s third-degree weapons conviction is a felony punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, satisfying the falsity element of § 922(a)(6).
• The district court erred in granting judgment of acquittal and in conditionally granting a new trial; substantial evidence supported both the falsity of Fulton’s statement and his knowledge of felony status.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal, vacated the conditional new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): Standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence under Rule 29—verdict must stand if any rational trier of fact could find essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
• United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 573 U.S. 169 (2014): Elements of § 922(a)(6) offense (knowingly false statement, materiality, intent to deceive) and government’s burden.
• United States v. Jenkins, 792 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015): Holding that determining whether a prior crime is punishable by more than one year is a legal question for the court.
• United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530 (10th Cir. 1994): Similar federal circuits holding the maximum penalty question is for the judge.
• United States v. Hopkins, 310 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2002): Treated predicate offense penalty range as a question of law.

Legal Reasoning

1. Falsity Element
To prove a § 922(a)(6) offense, the government must show the defendant knowingly made a false or fictitious statement material to the lawful sale of a firearm. Here, the allegedly false response was “No” to having any felony convictions or crimes punishable by more than one year. The district court required the government to present evidence at trial of the exact statutory penalty range for the New Jersey offense. The Fourth Circuit rejected that approach, holding that whether a crime carries a statutory maximum exceeding one year is a legal determination for the court under Rule 29 and settled federal precedent.

2. Judicial Notice and Legal Questions
The appellate panel emphasized that federal judges may consider sources outside the trial record—New Jersey statutes, case law, or treatises—to resolve purely legal issues. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and its advisory committee notes confirm judges’ unrestricted authority to investigate and conclude on matters of domestic law. No jury instruction or admission of the penalty statute in evidence was required.

3. Knowledge and Intent
The circuit court also reviewed the district court’s conditional grant of a new trial under Rule 33 for the alleged lack of proof that Fulton knew he was a felon. The Fourth Circuit found ample evidence of knowledge:

• Fulton’s own conviction made him a felon—a fact a person ordinarily knows.
• An ATF agent personally informed Fulton on two occasions (June 23 and July 11, 2023) that he was prohibited from purchasing a firearm as a felon, and Fulton appeared to understand.
• Ten prior failed background checks over different stores and sales associates—circumstantial proof Fulton knew the reason for denial.

The district court had not weighed this evidence globally against the record or found that the jury verdict was unjust in light of it. As a result, the court abused its discretion in awarding a new trial.

Impact on Future Cases and Area of Law

United States v. Fulton establishes binding Fourth Circuit precedent—and aligns with other circuits—that:

• The characterization of a prior offense’s severity (whether punishable by more than one year) is a question of law for the judge, not a fact question for the jury.
• District courts may consult state statutes, case law, and secondary materials without formal admission into evidence or judicial‐notice requests.
• In firearms‐related prosecutions under § 922(a)(6), courts need not burden the jury with statutory penalty assessments, ensuring consistent application across cases.

The decision streamlines prosecutions for false statements in firearm acquisitions, reducing evidentiary complexity and safeguarding jury focus on core factual questions (e.g., did the defendant mark “No,” and did he intend to deceive?).

On the broader criminal‐procedure front, Fulton reinforces established principles on Rule 29 sufficiency review and Rule 33 new‐trial standards, reminding lower courts that:

• Rule 29 legal‐question determinations transcend the evidentiary record’s “four corners.”
• Rule 33 new‐trial motions on weight‐of‐evidence grounds demand a rare showing that the verdict is “unjust” or a “serious miscarriage of justice.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felony vs. Misdemeanor: Federal law bars firearm purchases by anyone convicted of a “felony” or “any crime punishable by more than one year in prison.” Determining whether a state‐law offense qualifies requires examining the maximum statutory penalty, not the sentence actually imposed.
• Rule 29 (Acquittal Motion): After the government rests, a defendant can move to acquit on the ground the evidence is legally insufficient. The judge views evidence in the light most favorable to the government and asks if any rational jury could convict.
• Rule 33 (New Trial Motion): Even after a guilty verdict, a judge may grant a new trial if the interests of justice demand it—commonly if the verdict “weighs so heavily against the evidence” that it would be unjust to let it stand.
• Judicial Notice of State Law: Federal judges may independently examine state statutes or authoritative sources without formal admission to resolve legal issues about state law.

Conclusion

United States v. Steven Fulton clarifies and cements the judicial–jury divide in § 922(a)(6) prosecutions: the felony‐status inquiry is a legal question for the judge, who may consult state law directly, while the jury decides whether the defendant actually made a false statement and intended to deceive. The Fourth Circuit’s decision reverses an erroneous acquittal and improperly granted new trial, reaffirms the proper application of Rules 29 and 33, and promotes uniformity and efficiency in federal firearms prosecutions.

By streamlining proof of the statutory‐maximum‐penalty element and reinforcing the high threshold for upsetting jury verdicts on sufficiency and weight‐of‐evidence grounds, Fulton will guide future courts in adjudicating similar cases and help ensure that criminal justice is administered consistently and predictably.