Judicial Determination of Duty as a Question of Law and LPRA Fee Entitlement in Gomez v. Galman

Introduction

Gomez v. Galman (5th Cir. 2025) arises from a violent confrontation on July 24, 2018, when two off-duty New Orleans police officers—John Galman and Spencer Sutton—engaged in a brawl with bar patron Jorge Gomez. The altercation ended with Gomez in the emergency room and both officers criminally charged. One year later, Gomez invoked the Louisiana Public Records Act (LPRA) to obtain records relating to the incident and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers, negligent hiring and supervision claims against the City of New Orleans, and LPRA claims against the City for failing to produce public records. On appeal from the district court’s adverse jury verdict (which had improperly submitted the legal question of “duty” to the jury) and mixed rulings on the LPRA claims, the Fifth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion reversing in part, affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding.

Key issues:

Whether the existence of a duty in Louisiana negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims is a question of law for the court rather than a question of fact for the jury.
Whether the district court correctly awarded actual damages, civil penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs under the LPRA.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit’s decision can be broken into two main parts:

Negligence Claims (Duty Issue): The court held that under Louisiana law, whether an employer (here, the City) owes a duty in negligent hiring, retention, or supervision is a question of law for the judge to decide. Because the district court erroneously submitted that legal question to the jury (and conflated “duty” with other elements), the panel reversed the jury’s defense verdict on those state-law claims and remanded for a new trial with correct instructions.
LPRA Claims:
- Actual Damages and Civil Penalties: The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the City’s delay in producing records—though regrettable—was not arbitrary or capricious under the Act, and that Gomez failed to prove actual monetary harm from the delay.
- Attorney’s Fees and Costs: Because the district court did not apply the correct test for full or partial success under the LPRA (which entitles a requestor who obtains records by mandamus to attorneys’ fees as a matter of course), the panel vacated the fee and cost award and remanded for reconsideration consistent with the LPRA’s fee provisions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Kelley v. Dyson, 10 So. 3d 283 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2009): Established that an employer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting an employee who has a “unique opportunity” to commit a tort.
Griffin v. Kmart Corp., 776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000): Reiterated that the existence of duty in negligence is a question of law.
Evans v. Abubaker, Inc., 384 So. 3d 853 (La. 2024): Confirmed that duty is a threshold, legal issue and clarified negligence elements.
Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991): Acknowledged state’s duty in negligent hiring/supervision of off-duty officers.
Roper v. City of Baton Rouge, 244 So. 3d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2018): Defined “arbitrary or capricious” under the LPRA and the standards for actual damages and civil penalties.
Mercato Elisio, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, 259 So. 3d 1235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2018): Held that a records requestor who obtains records after filing suit has “completely prevailed” and is entitled to fees.

Legal Reasoning

1. Duty as a Court Question: Under Louisiana’s duty-risk framework, the “duty” element—whether the defendant owes a legal obligation of care to the plaintiff—is exclusively a judicial determination. When an employee’s role gives a “unique opportunity” to commit a tort (for example, a police officer’s access to authority and weapons), that alone establishes the employer’s duty. The district court recognized the duty in its instructions but then asked the jury to decide whether this particular officer had that “unique opportunity,” injecting a factual question into what Louisiana law and Fifth Circuit precedent uniformly treat as law. The conflation of duty and other negligence elements (especially the “scope of protection” inquiry) misled jurors and warranted reversal.

2. Impact on § 1983 and State-Law Claims: Because the § 1983 “color of law” and state-law negligence arguments were tried in parallel, and the court instructed jurors to proceed on negligence even if they found against Gomez on the § 1983 claims, the erroneous charge could have affected both dispositions. The appellate court refused to treat the jury’s § 1983 finding as a backdoor cure of the negligence error.

3. LPRA Remedies:

Actual Damages & Civil Penalties: Absent willful, unreasoning conduct by the custodian, a delay caused by voluminous requests does not amount to an “arbitrary or capricious” violation. Likewise, speculative claims of litigation‐cost avoidance do not establish concrete harm.
Attorney’s Fees & Costs: By statute, a requestor who “prevails”—i.e., obtains records after filing suit—“shall be awarded” fees and costs. The district court’s refusal to award fees because suit was filed prior to the expiration of response deadlines was contrary to Louisiana appellate authority and the LPRA’s fee mandate.

Impact

The Fifth Circuit’s decision reinforces two critical principles:

Duty-Law Rule: Louisiana negligence duty questions must be decided by judges, not juries. Trial courts in Louisiana—and federal courts applying Louisiana law—must carefully craft jury charges to separate duty from factual negligence elements (breach, causation, scope, damages).
LPRA Fee Entitlement: Government custodians cannot evade the mandatory fee‐shifting provisions of the LPRA by delaying production until after a suit is filed. Requestors who succeed in obtaining records through mandamus are presumptively entitled to fees and costs, regardless of the custodian’s motives.

Going forward, litigation over negligent hiring and LPRA compliance is likely to emphasize judicial gatekeeping on duty issues and close adherence to the LPRA’s timeline and fee provisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Duty vs. Breach vs. Scope of Protection:
- Duty: A legal question of whether the law imposes care. In negligent hiring cases, an employee’s “unique opportunity” to harm auto-triggers duty.
- Breach: A factual question of whether the defendant failed to meet that legal duty.
- Scope of Protection: A legal/factual question of whether the harm suffered falls within the risks the duty was meant to prevent.
“Arbitrary or Capricious” under LPRA: Means willful, unreasoning action or disregard of facts—mere delay due to volume or administrative hurdles is not enough if the custodian acts in good faith.
“Prevailing” for LPRA Fees: A requestor is deemed to have prevailed when a court compels the production of records. Fees and costs are statutory and mandatory once records are obtained post‐mandamus.

Conclusion

Gomez v. Galman establishes a clear procedural rule: in Louisiana negligence claims, the existence of a duty is a matter of law—trial judges must decide it before sending any fact questions to juries. It also clarifies the LPRA’s remedial scheme, confirming that attorneys’ fees are mandatory for requestors who secure records via litigation. Trial courts must revise jury charges to unambiguously segregate legal duties from factual issues and adhere strictly to the LPRA’s timelines and fee mandates. This decision will guide future negligence and public‐records litigation, ensuring consistent application of Louisiana’s duty doctrine and robust enforcement of public‐records rights.