Introduction

In State v. Smith, 2025 UT 45, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a recurring procedural problem in criminal cases: who decides statute-of-limitations disputes and under what standard? The case arose from allegations that Jamison Smith sexually abused his sister, C.R., between 1988 and 1990. The State charged Smith in 2022, prompting a statute-of-limitations challenge focused on whether C.R. had, in the late 1980s, made a “report of the offense to law enforcement officials” sufficient to trigger the short one-year limitations clock under the 1983 version of Utah Code § 76-1-303.

The district court held evidentiary hearings but, invoking State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reserved the limitations issue for the jury because material facts were disputed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Utah Code § 76-1-306 requires the judge—acting as factfinder—to decide statute-of-limitations issues by a preponderance of the evidence. In so ruling, the Court clarified that § 76-1-306 supersedes Pierce’s jury-submission procedure and reaffirmed that the State bears the burden to prove a prosecution is timely when the defense properly raises a limitations issue.

Beyond the procedural ruling, the opinion frames how Utah courts should navigate the complex timeline of statutory changes to the limitations period for sexual abuse of a child: the 1983 regime (one year after report, subject to an eight-year outer cap), the 1991 extension (four years after report), and the 2008 elimination of the limitations period. The outcome in this and future cases will often turn on whether a historic communication qualifies as a “report to law enforcement officials” and whether that report occurred early enough to have time-barred the case before later legislative enlargements took effect.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the district court’s order that reserved the statute-of-limitations question for the jury and remanded for the judge to decide the limitations issue under Utah Code § 76-1-306.

• Key holding: When “an issue concerning the statute of limitations is raised,” § 76-1-306 requires the judge to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the prosecution is barred. The district court erred by following Pierce’s now-superseded procedure of sending disputed limitations issues to the jury.
• Burden of proof: Although § 76-1-306 sets the standard and assigns the decisionmaker, it does not speak to which party bears the burden. Preexisting case law—specifically Pierce—remains controlling on that point: the State bears the burden to prove the prosecution is not time-barred.
• Merits not resolved: The Court declined to decide whether C.R.’s seventh-grade communication was a qualifying “report to law enforcement officials.” Because the district court did not make the necessary factual findings under the correct standard, the Supreme Court remanded for the judge to make those findings and to decide timeliness.
• Statutory framework reaffirmed: The Court reiterated that enlargements of a limitations period (1991 and 2008) apply to offenses already committed if the original limitations period had not expired when the enlargement took effect, but cannot revive a prosecution that was already time-barred (reaffirming State v. Lusk and State v. Green).

Analysis

1. Precedents and Statutes Cited

• Utah Code § 76-1-306 (enacted 1998): Provides that when a statute-of-limitations issue is raised in a criminal case, “the judge shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the prosecution is barred.” This statute controls procedure and standard of proof for limitations disputes and supersedes any conflicting judicial precedent (such as aspects of Pierce).
• State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989): Before § 76-1-306, Pierce held that the State bears the burden to prove the action is not time-barred, and set a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, allowing the issue to go to the jury if not resolvable “as a matter of law.” Smith clarifies that § 76-1-306 supersedes Pierce’s standard of proof and jury-submission procedure but leaves intact Pierce’s allocation of the burden to the State (because § 76-1-306 is silent on burden).
• Utah Code § 76-1-303 (1983): The limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged abuse required prosecutions for sexual abuse of a child to be commenced within one year after a “report of the offense to law enforcement officials,” so long as no more than eight years had elapsed since the offense. Smith proceeds on the parties’ shared understanding that, if no report occurred, an eight-year period applied from the offense date.
• Utah Code § 76-1-303 (1991): Amended the limitations period for sexual abuse of a child to “within four years after the report of the offense to a law enforcement agency.”
• Utah Code § 76-1-301 (2008): Eliminated the limitations period altogether for sexual abuse of a child, permitting prosecution “at any time.” The current code continues to provide no limitations period for this offense. See § 76-1-301(2)(n) (2025).
• State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶ 26, 37 P.3d 1103: An amendment cannot resurrect a prosecution if the limitations period had already expired before the amendment took effect. Smith reaffirms Lusk.
• State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, ¶ 20, 108 P.3d 710: An enlargement of a limitations period applies to crimes already committed if the original period has not yet run at the time of the amendment. Smith applies this principle to the 1991 and 2008 changes.
• Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 37, 266 P.3d 828: A statute supersedes prior case law to the extent of any conflict. Smith uses Patterson to explain why § 76-1-306 displaces Pierce’s conflicting procedural directive.
• Standards of review: Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 12 (statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness); Univ. of Utah v. Tullis, 2025 UT 17, ¶ 13 (interpretation of caselaw reviewed for correctness).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

1. Triggering § 76-1-306: The district court concluded—and the parties did not dispute on appeal—that Smith “raised” a statute-of-limitations issue by relying on C.R.’s statement that, in seventh grade, she was pulled from class and asked about the sexual abuse. Although § 76-1-306 does not define “raise,” the Court accepted the State’s concession and did not further construe the term. Once the issue is raised, § 76-1-306 applies.
2. Who decides and under what standard: Section 76-1-306 states that “the judge shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the prosecution is barred.” The Supreme Court emphasized two consequences:
   • The judge acts as factfinder and decides both factual and legal aspects of the timeliness defense. Disputed facts do not send the issue to the jury; they oblige the judge to resolve them.
   • The governing standard is preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
   The district court erred by applying Pierce’s now-superseded approach that allowed sending the limitations question to the jury when the evidence did not permit resolution “as a matter of law.”
3. Burden allocation remains with the State: Although § 76-1-306 addresses decisionmaker and standard of proof, it is silent on burden allocation. Pre-1998 appellate precedent (Pierce) placed the burden on the State to prove the prosecution is timely when the defense properly raises the issue. Because § 76-1-306 does not speak to burden, that aspect of Pierce remains in force. Thus, on remand, the State must prove by a preponderance that the prosecution is not time-barred.

3. The Statutory Timeline and How It Matters Here

The Court situated the dispute in the evolving statutory landscape:

• 1983 regime: Sexual abuse of a child prosecutions must be commenced within one year after a “report of the offense to law enforcement officials,” so long as no more than eight years have elapsed since the offense. The parties and Court proceeded on the understanding that, absent a report, an eight-year period ran from the offense.
• 1991 amendment: Extended the period to permit prosecution within four years after a report to law enforcement.
• 2008 amendment: Removed the limitations period for this offense entirely, permitting prosecution “at any time.”

Two controlling principles govern how later enlargements interact with earlier periods:

• If the original limitations period had not expired when an enlargement took effect, the enlargement applies (Green).
• If the original limitations period had expired before the enlargement, the enlargement cannot revive the prosecution (Lusk).

In Smith, everything turns on whether C.R.’s seventh-grade communication was a qualifying “report to law enforcement officials” in or around 1988. If yes, the 1983 regime’s one-year clock likely expired in 1989, before the 1991 and 2008 changes—rendering the 2022 charges time-barred under Lusk’s non-revival rule. If no, the initial eight-year period would not have expired before 1991, so the 1991 enlargement (and later the 2008 elimination) would apply, leaving the charges timely.

4. Why the Court Remanded Rather Than Dismissing

Smith urged dismissal on the theory that the State failed to carry its burden and that the district court effectively said so by finding the evidence insufficient “as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court disagreed. The district court’s statement was not a merits determination under § 76-1-306; it simply reflected the court’s reliance on Pierce’s erroneous procedure (i.e., sending disputed limitations issues to the jury). Because the court never made factual findings or a preponderance determination as § 76-1-306 requires, the Supreme Court remanded for the judge to do so—and left to the district court whether to take additional evidence.

5. Anticipated Issues on Remand

The merits determination will hinge on two factual-legal questions:

• Did a seventh-grade “report” occur? The record reflects that C.R. was pulled from class and “asked about the sexual abuse.” The judge must decide whether, in substance, a “report of the offense” occurred and whether C.R. made statements sufficient to constitute a report.
• Was the report made “to law enforcement officials”? Evidence suggested C.R. believed she spoke with child services employees—not police. The 1983 statute uses the phrase “law enforcement officials.” On remand, the court must determine whether the recipients of C.R.’s communication were law enforcement, and if not, whether any cross-reporting or contemporaneous referral placed law enforcement on notice.

The State, bearing the burden, must prove by a preponderance that the prosecution is timely. In practice, that means either persuading the judge that no qualifying law-enforcement report occurred before the 1991 extension (and thus the enlargements apply), or that even if there was a school-based conversation, it did not amount to a law-enforcement report under the 1983 statute.

6. Likely Impact on Utah Criminal Practice

• Procedural realignment: Statute-of-limitations disputes in criminal cases are judge-decided, pretrial factual determinations under a preponderance standard. Trial courts should conduct evidentiary hearings, make explicit findings of fact, and enter conclusions of law on timeliness. Jury instructions on limitations for the charged offenses are no longer appropriate.
• Burden clarity: The State carries the burden to show timeliness once the defense raises the issue. If the evidence is in equipoise, the State loses the limitations contest.
• Record-building in historical cases: This opinion highlights the evidentiary realities of very old cases (microfiche, incomplete school or police documentation, DCFS retention policies). Parties should anticipate using custodians of records, testimony about record-keeping practices, and evidence of the absence of records to address whether a historic report to law enforcement occurred.
• Substantive focus on “report to law enforcement officials”: Expect more litigation on what constitutes a “report” and who qualifies as “law enforcement officials” under the 1983 statute. School-based interviews, child protective investigations, and cross-reporting protocols may become focal points.
• Legislative changes and non-revival: Smith reiterates the non-revival rule (Lusk) and the permissibility of applying enlargements to not-yet-barred offenses (Green). Prosecutors and defense counsel must carefully map alleged offense dates against the successive statutory regimes to assess timeliness.
• Appellate posture: Because § 76-1-306 requires judicial findings, appellate courts will review correctness of legal interpretations and defer to factual findings where appropriate. Interlocutory appeals may be appropriate where the district court misapplies § 76-1-306, as occurred here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Statute of limitations (criminal): A time limit within which the State must commence a prosecution. Once the period expires, the prosecution is barred.
• “Report of the offense to law enforcement officials” (1983 statute): A report that triggers the short one-year filing window, subject to an eight-year outer cap from the offense date. On remand, the court must decide whether a school-based interview with apparent child services personnel qualifies as a report “to law enforcement officials.”
• Preponderance of the evidence: The factfinder decides an issue based on what is more likely than not (greater than 50% likelihood). This is far lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Beyond a reasonable doubt: The highest standard of proof, used for elements of charged offenses at trial. Pierce applied this to limitations issues before § 76-1-306, but Smith clarifies that limitations issues are now decided by judges under the preponderance standard.
• Judge vs. jury as factfinder: Ordinarily, juries decide disputed facts at trial. But § 76-1-306 assigns the judge to decide statute-of-limitations disputes, including resolving factual disputes, at the pretrial stage.
• Enlarging vs. reviving limitations periods:
  • Enlarging: Extending the time to prosecute for offenses not yet time-barred is generally permissible and applies to already-committed offenses if the original period has not run (Green).
  • Reviving: Attempting to prosecute after the original limitations period has expired is not permitted; later amendments cannot resurrect already time-barred offenses (Lusk).
• “Raised” under § 76-1-306: The statute says the judge decides a limitations issue “when” it is “raised,” but it does not define what suffices to raise the issue. Smith leaves this question open because the State conceded the issue was raised.

Practical Guidance for Litigants and Courts

• For prosecutors (burden-bearing party):
  • Be prepared to present comprehensive evidence on whether a qualifying law-enforcement report occurred, including testimony from records custodians and investigators, and evidence of agency record-retention practices from the relevant time period.
  • Where records are missing due to age, consider testimony establishing the thoroughness of searches and the plausibility that no law-enforcement report was created or retained, especially when historic practice suggests “no case” files were not documented.
  • Distinguish DCFS or school administrative interviews from law-enforcement reports unless there is evidence of contemporaneous referral or joint investigation with police.
• For defendants:
  • To “raise” the issue, identify specific historical communications that could qualify as reports and marshal evidence (witness recollections, school records, DCFS or law-enforcement contacts) that place the State to its proof.
  • Emphasize ambiguities (e.g., whether a school or DCFS interview involved law enforcement) and the State’s inability to show more-likely-than-not that no qualifying report occurred if the evidence is in equipoise.
• For trial courts:
  • Conduct a § 76-1-306 evidentiary hearing when the issue is raised; make express findings on whether a qualifying report occurred and on the applicable statutory regime based on offense dates.
  • Apply Green and Lusk to determine whether later enlargements apply or whether the prosecution was already time-barred and thus not revivable.
  • Enter a written decision resolving both factual and legal components of the timeliness defense to facilitate appellate review.

Conclusion

State v. Smith establishes a clear, statewide procedural rule: when a criminal statute-of-limitations issue is raised, the judge—not the jury—must decide the issue by a preponderance of the evidence under Utah Code § 76-1-306. In clarifying that § 76-1-306 supersedes Pierce’s jury-submission procedure and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, the Court also preserves Pierce’s allocation of the burden to the State. The decision reaffirms Utah’s consistent approach to evolving limitations statutes: enlargements apply to not-yet-barred offenses (Green), but cannot revive prosecutions that were already time-barred (Lusk).

The ruling will reshape pretrial practice in Utah criminal courts. Judges must hold evidentiary hearings and make findings on whether a qualifying “report to law enforcement officials” occurred—an inquiry that will often be central in historical sexual-abuse cases given the 1983 statute’s one-year-after-report trigger and eight-year outer cap. By placing responsibility squarely on the judge and clarifying the governing standard, Smith promotes uniformity, provides procedural clarity, and ensures that timeliness disputes are resolved on a developed factual record before trial.

On remand in Smith, the district court must determine whether C.R.’s seventh-grade communication constituted a qualifying report to law enforcement. That factual and legal determination will ultimately dictate whether the 2022 charges are barred under the 1983 regime or remain viable under the later enlargements culminating in the 2008 elimination of the limitations period. Whatever the outcome, Smith will stand as the governing precedent on how Utah courts must adjudicate criminal statute-of-limitations challenges going forward.