JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Stern (2025): Clarifying the Dual-Burden Framework for RPAPL §1304 Compliance in Mortgage-Foreclosure Summary-Judgment Motions

Introduction

The Second Department’s decision in JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Stern, 2025 NY Slip Op 03800 (June 25 2025), refines the procedural landscape for residential-mortgage foreclosure actions in New York. The dispute stems from JPMorgan’s attempt to foreclose on Kreindy Stern’s Rockland County property. At center stage is the 90-day pre-foreclosure notice mandated by Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) §1304, the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s mailing proof, and—crucially—the reciprocal burden placed upon defendants who seek dismissal on the same ground.

After a winding procedural history—including initial summary-judgment motions, a motion to reargue, and dueling appellate contentions—the appellate court reached a nuanced outcome:

The bank lost its entitlement to summary judgment and an order of reference because it failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL §1304.
The borrower likewise failed to obtain dismissal because her own affidavit was “bare and conclusory,” insufficient to establish the bank’s non-compliance as a matter of law.
Consequently, the matter proceeds on the merits, underscoring a “dual-deficiencies” doctrine: both sides of the “v” must satisfy their respective prima facie burdens when RPAPL §1304 is litigated at the summary-judgment stage.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order as follows:

It affirmed the denial of JPMorgan’s summary-judgment motion and request for an order of reference—holding the bank’s proof of mailing insufficient under RPAPL §1304.
It reinstated the Supreme Court’s original denial of Stern’s cross-motion to dismiss—ruling that her competing evidence did not meet the evidentiary threshold.
It agreed that leave to reargue was properly granted given a misapprehension of RPAPL §1304, even though the motion was technically untimely under CPLR 2221(d)(3).

Thus, neither party met its burden, and the foreclosure action remains pending.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court relied heavily on a constellation of recent Second-Department decisions interpreting RPAPL §1304:

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Palomaria (2023)
Reaffirmed that strict compliance with §1304 is a condition precedent and detailed acceptable proof—either the actual business records or competent testimony establishing a standard mailing practice.
Citibank, N.A. v. Conti-Scheurer (2019) & U.S. Bank N.A. v. Pickering-Robinson (2021)
Clarified that plaintiffs may rely on a “standard-office-procedure” theory, but the affiant must demonstrate personal knowledge of that procedure.
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Healey (2024) & Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Gordon (2019)
Emphasized that a foundational affidavit is insufficient unless accompanied by the underlying business records.
Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Raja (2022)
Quoted to show that a mortgagor’s conclusory affidavit cannot, by itself, secure dismissal for §1304 non-compliance.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Halls (2012)
Provided authority that courts may entertain reargument motions even if untimely when an error of law is apparent.

Collectively, these precedents served two functions: (i) setting a high evidentiary bar for foreclosing plaintiffs, and (ii) preventing defendants from prevailing without concrete evidence. Stern synthesizes both lines of authority into a single dual-burden rubric.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three analytical steps:

Reargument Standard. Although Stern’s reargument motion was past the statutory 30-day window, the court exercised its inherent power to correct a misapprehension of law concerning RPAPL §1304, citing HSBC v. Halls.
Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Failure. JPMorgan relied on a vice president’s affidavit referencing unspecified business records. However, the affiant:
- Did not append the referenced records (e.g., the USPS tracking pages, mailing logs, or internal delivery reports);
- Did not attest to familiarity with the bank’s mailing procedures—a critical element under Palomaria.
The court held that the affidavit, devoid of the underlying documentation, constituted inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, JPMorgan failed to establish strict compliance with §1304 as a matter of law.
Defendant’s Reciprocal Failure. Conversely, Stern’s sole evidence was a “bare and conclusory” affidavit asserting non-receipt of the notice. Under Raja, such a denial is insufficient to warrant dismissal. Because Stern sought affirmative relief (dismissal), she bore the initial burden of proof; she did not carry it.

This symmetrical application of summary-judgment burdens forms the backbone of the court’s holding.

3. Impact on Future Litigation

The decision’s significance is two-fold:

Elevated Evidentiary Expectations. Foreclosing plaintiffs must produce either (a) the business records evidencing mailing (envelopes, certified-mail receipts, USPS “track & confirm,” vendor manifests, etc.), or (b) an affidavit from a witness with personal knowledge of the bank’s routine mailing procedures. “Tracking numbers on the notice” alone are insufficient.
No “Free Pass” for Borrowers. Borrowers cannot secure dismissal by simply averring that they never received a §1304 notice. They must submit affirmative proof (e.g., USPS records, return-to-sender envelopes, deposition transcripts, or discovery responses) demonstrating non-mailing.

Practically, Stern will:

Encourage more robust motion practice, including tailored discovery requests for mailing logs and deposition testimony of mailing personnel.
Prompt lenders and servicers to overhaul internal record-keeping so that mailing evidence is readily admissible.
Deter reflexive borrower motions to dismiss that lack corroborating evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment: A procedural device allowing a court to resolve a claim without trial when no “material fact” is disputed and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
RPAPL §1304 Notice: A 90-day pre-foreclosure notice informing a homeowner that they are in default and listing counseling agencies. It must be mailed by both certified and first-class mail to every borrower at their last known address.
Condition Precedent: A prerequisite that must be satisfied before a legal action can be commenced. Failure to satisfy it means the action is premature.
Prima Facie Burden: The initial burden on a moving party to produce evidence sufficient to establish its claim or defense prior to the opposing party’s response.
CPLR 2221(d)(3) – Reargument Time Limit: Generally, a motion for reargument must be made within 30 days after service of notice of entry of the order. Courts may overlook untimeliness to correct errors of law.
Standard Office Mailing Procedure: A business practice that reliably ensures mailings are properly addressed and sent. Evidence typically includes written policies, USPS manifests, or testimony from a witness with personal knowledge of the procedure.

Conclusion

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Stern sharpens the contours of RPAPL §1304 compliance litigation by announcing a clear, dual-burden framework:

Lenders seeking foreclosure must attach either the physical mailing records or an affidavit from a witness intimately familiar with mailing protocols.
Borrowers seeking dismissal must do more than deny receipt; they must produce affirmative evidence refuting mailing.

The ruling harmonizes seemingly divergent strands of case law: strict compliance for lenders, evidentiary sufficiency for borrowers. As foreclosure litigation continues to swell, Stern will serve as a lodestar for both bar and bench—ensuring that motions rise or fall on the strength of their underlying proof rather than on conclusory assertions.