Jones-Stage Objections Preserve Challenges to Supervised-Release Conditions; Minor-Contact Restrictions Upheld in SORNA Failure-to-Register Sentences

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Bernard Louis‑Jean (No. 23‑12360), affirming a 48‑month term of imprisonment and a 10‑year term of supervised release—along with a special condition restricting unsupervised contact with minors—following the defendant’s guilty plea to failing to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).

The appeal presented two principal issues:

• Whether the district court procedurally erred by relying on unadjudicated, disputed facts about a 2022 domestic incident when imposing a special supervised‑release condition restricting contact with minors.
• Whether the upward variance to 48 months and a 10‑year supervised‑release term was substantively unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and alleged sentencing disparities.

The case arose after the defendant—who at age 15 had been convicted as an adult in Florida of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under 12—failed to keep current with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) and accrued two prior failure‑to‑register convictions (2012, 2016). In 2022, a domestic altercation in Georgia drew law enforcement attention, ultimately leading to the federal § 2250(a) charge. At sentencing, the district court adopted the Guidelines range (27–33 months) but varied upward to 48 months; it also imposed a 10‑year supervised‑release term with special and standard conditions, including a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors without probation approval.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full. On the procedural challenge to the special condition:

• The court treated the defendant’s in‑court objection after pronouncement of sentence (a Jones colloquy objection) as sufficient to preserve his challenge to the supervised‑release condition—even though he had not objected to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) beforehand—because the district court did not reject the objection as untimely and invited objections at the end of the hearing.
• On the merits, the court accepted the district judge’s explicit statement that the sentence and conditions were not based on unadjudicated 2022 allegations; any arguable Rule 32 issue was, in any event, harmless because the special condition was substantively reasonable given the defendant’s qualifying sex offense and repeated failures to register.

On substantive reasonableness, the panel held that the 48‑month upward variance and the 10‑year supervised‑release term were within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes,” considering the defendant’s recidivism in failing to register, the need for deterrence and protection of the public, and the court’s discretion to weigh criminal history—including the underlying sex offense—more heavily.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Two‑step sentencing review and abuse‑of‑discretion standard:
  • United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016) (procedural then substantive reasonableness).
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse‑of‑discretion review; deference to variance decisions).
• Substantive reasonableness and factor weighting:
  • United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) (affirm if sentence is in the “ballpark” and district courts may weigh factors, including criminal history, heavily).
  • United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (similar deference).
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (defendant bears burden to show unreasonableness).
• Harmless‑error doctrine at sentencing:
  • United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020) (if the district court would impose the same sentence and the result is substantively reasonable, alleged procedural error is harmless).
• Supervised‑release conditions:
  • United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for special conditions).
  • United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (proper legal standards and procedures).
  • United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirm on any ground in the record).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (conditions must be reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors, impose no greater deprivation than necessary, and align with Sentencing Commission policy statements).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (for § 2250 and specified sex offenses, supervised release is at least 5 years and may extend to life).
• Fact‑finding at sentencing and Rule 32:
  • United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1989) (sources of facts for sentencing); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (unobjected PSI facts deemed admitted).
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (court must resolve or decline to consider disputed facts that would affect sentencing); United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (government must prove disputed facts by a preponderance).
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1), 32(i)(1)(D) (timely objections; court may allow new objections for good cause); United States v. Aguilar‑Ibarra, 740 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2014).
• Jones colloquy preservation:
  • United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (district court should solicit objections after sentencing); United States v. Mosely, 31 F.4th 1332 (11th Cir. 2022) (purposes of Jones colloquy).
  • United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (standing orders and PSI recommendations give advance notice; objections may be made when conditions are adopted in court).
• Comparative cases on similar conditions and variances:
  • United States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding minor‑contact restriction for a failure‑to‑register defendant based on prior sex offense).
  • United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2009) (plain‑error review; minor‑contact restrictions supported by earlier incidents involving minors).
  • United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009) (consideration of § 3553(a) factors).
  • United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015) (unwarranted disparity requires apt comparators and full context).
  • United States v. Alsante, 812 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2016) (affirming significant upward variance for failure to register given repeated noncompliance and related conduct).
  • United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2015) (plain‑error review where no specific objection to supervised‑release condition).

Legal Reasoning

1) Preservation and Rule 32: How the Objection Was Saved

Although the defendant did not object to the PSI’s recitation of the 2022 altercation or to the proposed special condition before sentencing, he objected immediately after sentence pronouncement when the district court conducted the Jones colloquy. The Eleventh Circuit treated that Jones-stage objection as sufficient to preserve the issue. Key considerations:

• The district court did not reject the objection as untimely and explicitly invited objections after pronouncement.
• Following the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Diggles, a standing order or PSI recommendation provides advance notice of potential conditions; the critical point to object is when the court adopts the conditions at the hearing. The Eleventh Circuit aligned with that practical approach.
• Thus, review proceeded under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard rather than plain error for the special condition.

2) No Reliance on Disputed Conduct; Alternatively, Harmlessness

On the merits of the Rule 32 challenge, the panel accepted the district judge’s explicit assurance that the sentence and conditions were not based on any unadjudicated allegations arising from the 2022 altercation. The court underscored:

• District courts may consider unadjudicated conduct if properly found by a preponderance, but here the judge disclaimed reliance and recognized the 2022 incident as merely an “accusation.”
• Because the court did not rely on disputed facts, there was no Rule 32 violation requiring resolution of a factual dispute.
• Even if one assumed a procedural misstep, any error was harmless: the special condition was independently justified by undisputed record facts—the qualifying sex offense against a child and repeated failures to register—rendering the condition substantively reasonable under § 3583(d).

3) Substantive Reasonableness of the Minor‑Contact Restriction

The court affirmed the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) because it:

• Was reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors, notably the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, protection of the public, and deterrence.
• Imposed no greater deprivation than necessary: the condition permits contact with minors when supervised by an approved, informed adult and subject to probation oversight—an important tailoring feature especially relevant to household dynamics.
• Aligned with persuasive authority (e.g., Mercado) upholding similar conditions in failure‑to‑register cases based on the underlying sex offense and demonstrated registration recidivism.

4) Substantive Reasonableness of the Upward Variance and 10‑Year Supervision

The panel emphasized the broad discretion district courts possess in weighing § 3553(a) factors and criminal history:

• Upward variance: The 48‑month sentence, 15 months above the low end of the advisory range, was supported by the defendant’s repeated noncompliance with SORNA, his expressed resistance to the registration regime, and the need to promote respect for the law and deter future violations.
• Criminal history weighting: The district court permissibly assigned significant weight to the underlying sex offense—even though it occurred when the defendant was 15—alongside two prior failures to register, to justify additional incarceration and supervision.
• Disparity argument: Statistics alone did not carry the day because fair comparisons require “apples to apples” assessments that account for individual characteristics and recidivism; the defendant had not shown similarly situated comparators.
• Supervised release term: The 10‑year term fell well within statutory authorization and policy for sex‑offense‑related cases. By statute, § 2250 is among the offenses for which supervised release must be at least five years and may extend to life (18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)). The district court reasonably concluded that extended supervision would reinforce compliance with registration obligations.

Impact and Practice Implications

1) Preservation via Jones Colloquy: Practical Clarity

The decision provides practical clarity in the Eleventh Circuit: a defendant’s objection at the end of the sentencing hearing, after the court adopts conditions (the Jones colloquy), can preserve a challenge to supervised‑release conditions even if the PSI was not previously contested—especially where the district court does not deem the objection untimely. Counsel should nevertheless object earlier when possible, but a Jones‑stage objection remains a viable safety net.

2) Rule 32 and Unadjudicated Conduct

The panel’s approach reinforces two points:

• District courts avoid reversible error by expressly stating whether disputed allegations affect sentencing decisions or conditions. An explicit disclaimer—“not based on pending charges”—goes a long way.
• On appeal, if a condition is substantively reasonable on undisputed record facts, any arguable Rule 32 misstep may be deemed harmless.

3) Minor‑Contact Restrictions in SORNA Failure‑to‑Register Cases

The opinion confirms that courts may impose tailored minor‑contact restrictions in failure‑to‑register cases grounded on:

• The original sex offense involving a minor; and
• Demonstrated registration recidivism and attendant public‑safety concerns.

Built‑in tailoring—such as permitting contact when supervised by an approved adult aware of the defendant’s background—helps ensure the condition imposes no greater deprivation than necessary, and accommodates family dynamics when appropriate.

4) Upward Variances for Registration Recidivism

The court’s affirmance supports the proposition that persistent failure to register and disregard for SORNA’s requirements can justify upward variances and extended supervision. Sentencing judges retain latitude to weigh criminal history significantly, including juvenile‑age convictions adjudicated in adult court, when fashioning both imprisonment terms and conditions.

5) Precedential Status

The opinion is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Nonetheless, it offers persuasive guidance on:

• Preservation of objections to supervised‑release conditions at the Jones stage;
• How explicit judicial disclaimers can neutralize Rule 32 disputes; and
• The reasonableness of minor‑contact restrictions and longer supervised‑release terms in § 2250 cases featuring persistent noncompliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• SORNA and § 2250(a): SORNA requires sex offenders to register and keep registrations current wherever they reside. Failing to register is a federal crime under § 2250(a), punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Supervised release for this offense must be at least 5 years and may be life (§ 3583(k)).
• Upward variance vs. departure: A “variance” is a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors. A “departure” is an adjustment authorized by the Guidelines themselves. Here, the court denied an upward departure but granted an upward variance.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
  • Procedural looks at method: correct Guidelines calculation, proper consideration of § 3553(a), no reliance on clearly erroneous facts, adequate explanation.
  • Substantive asks whether the final sentence falls within the range of reasonable outcomes given the totality of the circumstances.
• Rule 32 and PSI objections: The PSI compiles facts for sentencing. If a defendant does not object to a factual assertion in the PSI, courts may treat it as admitted. If the defendant objects, the government must prove the fact by a preponderance, or the court must refrain from relying on it.
• Jones colloquy: At the end of sentencing, the judge should ask whether either party has objections to the sentence or how it was imposed. Objections made at this stage can preserve issues for appeal.
• Keene harmless‑error principle: Even if there was a procedural error, an appellate court may affirm if the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence and the result is substantively reasonable. The panel’s analysis here also reflects a broader harmlessness rationale: a condition independently supported by undisputed facts will be upheld.
• Special conditions of supervised release (§ 3583(d)): Conditions must be reasonably related to statutory purposes (deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation), impose no greater liberty deprivation than necessary, and align with Sentencing Commission policies. Tailoring and probation‑office oversight often help satisfy these requirements.

Conclusion

United States v. Louis‑Jean delivers two important practical clarifications, albeit in a nonprecedential opinion. First, an objection lodged during the Jones colloquy can preserve a challenge to a supervised‑release condition, even if no prior PSI objection was made, where the district court entertains the objection and does not deem it untimely. Second, minor‑contact restrictions in SORNA failure‑to‑register cases remain firmly supportable when grounded in the underlying sex offense and demonstrated registration recidivism, particularly when crafted with tailoring and probation‑approval mechanisms.

On the broader sentencing front, the decision reinforces that upward variances and lengthy supervised‑release terms for persistent registration noncompliance are within the district court’s broad discretion, especially when tied to deterrence, respect for the law, and public safety. Explicit judicial statements disclaiming reliance on unadjudicated conduct are best practice to avoid Rule 32 pitfalls, and, on appeal, substantively reasonable conditions and sentences will be affirmed notwithstanding any arguable procedural missteps.