Jones Colloquy and Allocution Imperatives in Supervised Release Revocation Proceedings

Introduction

United States v. Karijmah Tremaine Mosley (11th Cir. 2025) addresses critical procedural safeguards at the sentencing stage of supervised‐release revocation proceedings. Karijmah Mosley, a convicted felon who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm, had his original sentence vacated on direct appeal for failure to comply with the Jones objection‐elicitation requirement. Following a revocation hearing triggered by state‐law arrests, the district court imposed a 24‐month prison term (the statutory maximum) plus one year of supervised release. Mosley appeals that sentence on two main grounds: (1) the district court again failed to elicit fully articulated objections as required by United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990), and (2) the court did not personally address him to afford his right to allocution.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, vacated Mosley’s revocation sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that:

Jones Violation: By asking “Anything else?” rather than explicitly soliciting objections to factual findings and legal conclusions after imposing sentence, the district court failed to satisfy the Jones objection‐elicitation rule applicable in revocation proceedings.
Allocution Error: The court never personally addressed Mosley to invite him to speak on his own behalf, instead directing questions to counsel and referring to “Mr. Mosley” in the third person. This omission was plain error under Rule 32.1 and the right of allocution.

Because these procedural defects could affect substantial rights and the integrity of the proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for a new revocation hearing and resentencing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990) (enunciating the requirement that, after pronouncing sentence, a district court must “elicit fully articulated objections . . . to the court’s ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law”).
United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that asking only “Anything further?” fails Jones).
United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2007) (confirming that Jones applies with full force to supervised‐release revocation proceedings).
United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011) (clarifying the personal‐invitation requirement for allocution under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1).

Legal Reasoning

1. Jones Colloquy Requirement
Under Jones, once the court states its findings, applies the Sentencing Guidelines, and pronounces sentence, it must expressly ask the parties if they object to any factual or legal conclusions. This serves two purposes: (a) to create an adequate record for appellate review, and (b) to give the court an opportunity to correct any errors immediately. General invitations such as “Anything else?” do not satisfy this requirement, as they do not signal to the parties that the court seeks objections to its reasoning rather than logistical or ancillary requests.

In Mosley’s revocation hearing, the court asked “Does Mr. Mosley wish to address the Court?” and “Anything else?” At no point did it specifically solicit objections to its sentencing rationale. As in Campbell (where “anything further?” invited non‐objectionary requests), the court here received logistical inquiries (placement, credit, curfew times) rather than substantive objections, triggering vacatur.

2. Allocution Right
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(E) and Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) guarantee a defendant’s right to make a personal allocution—i.e., a final statement in mitigation—before sentence. Eleventh Circuit precedent requires the district court to personally address the defendant and clearly extend that right. In Mosley’s hearing, the court’s remarks about his ability to “speak freely” were directed generally; questions about addressing the court were phrased to counsel or in the third person. Under Perez, such a colloquy is insufficient: a defendant may reasonably believe the question is directed solely to counsel, thus depriving him of his own right to speak.

Impact

This decision reinforces two exacting procedures in federal sentencing and revocation hearings:

District courts must employ a Jones colloquy verbatim—e.g., “Do you, Mr. X, object to any factual findings or legal conclusions stated by the court?”—immediately after pronouncing sentence, even in supervised‐release revocations.
Courts must personally address defendants to afford their allocution right, using clear language such as, “Mr. X, before I impose sentence you have the right to speak on your own behalf. Do you wish to do so?”

Failure to adhere will result in vacatur and remand, potentially increasing the number of resentencing hearings but enhancing procedural fairness and clarity in the appellate record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jones Colloquy: A mandatory on‐the‐record dialogue in which the judge asks the defendant and counsel if they object to the court’s findings or the application of the Guidelines.
Allocution: The defendant’s right to make a personal statement to the judge before sentence is imposed, explaining mitigating circumstances or expressing remorse.
Plain‐Error Review: An appellate standard requiring (a) an obvious error, (b) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and (c) that seriously undermines fairness or judicial integrity.

Conclusion

United States v. Mosley clarifies that the Jones objection‐elicitation requirement is strictly enforced in supervised‐release revocation hearings, and that the right to allocution must be extended personally and unmistakably to the defendant. By vacating and remanding for resentencing, the Eleventh Circuit underscores the importance of procedural precision in preserving defendants’ rights and ensuring a complete appellate record. Future district courts should adopt clear, formulaic colloquies to avoid similar reversals and to safeguard the fairness and integrity of sentencing proceedings.