Joint Legal Custody, Domain-Specific Decision-Making, and Imputed Income in Shared Custody: Commentary on Leah R. v. Taylor R., 2025 NY Slip Op 06938 (3d Dept)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Leah R. v. Taylor R., 2025 NY Slip Op 06938 (Dec. 11, 2025), a matrimonial appeal arising from Saratoga County. The case addresses multiple key aspects of New York domestic relations law:

• When joint legal custody is appropriate despite parental acrimony;
• Under what circumstances one parent may be given final decision‑making authority in a specific domain (here, education) while legal and physical custody remain joint/shared;
• The weight courts give to forensic evaluations and coparenting dynamics;
• Continuity of mental-health treatment for children and the use of prior forensic reports in ongoing therapy;
• Imputing income to an underemployed but highly educated custodial parent under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) in a shared custody framework;
• Mortgage and carrying-cost credits on a marital residence post‑divorce;
• The duration of postjudgment maintenance under the maintenance guidelines for an 11‑year marriage; and
• Application of the presumption in favor of counsel fees to the less-monied spouse when there have already been substantial interim fee awards.

The opinion is not a radical departure from existing law, but it meaningfully refines and illustrates several principles. Most notably, it reinforces that:

• Acrimonious relations and prior problematic conduct do not automatically bar joint legal and shared physical custody when current evidence shows functional coparenting; and
• Courts may, and sometimes should, impute substantial income to a highly educated but underemployed spouse for child support purposes, even where that spouse has had minimal recent taxable income.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Marriage and Family

• Parties: Leah R. (wife/plaintiff, “the wife”) and Taylor R. (husband/defendant, “the husband”).
• Marriage: 2010.
• Children: Two children, born in 2013 and 2016.

The wife has a strong educational background: joint bachelor’s degrees in psychology and public policy, and a master’s degree in special education. The husband has significant earning capacity and sufficient financial resources to maintain housing and support for the children.

B. Proceedings in Supreme Court (Trial Level)

1. Commencement of Divorce Action (August 2021)
   The wife commenced an action for divorce based on an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage under Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 170(7). She sought custody, child support, and maintenance.
2. Family Offense Petition and Order of Protection (Footnote 1)
   Just prior to commencing the divorce action, the wife filed a family offense petition alleging disorderly conduct and harassment. A temporary order of protection issued, requiring the husband to stay away from the wife and children. That proceeding was later transferred to Supreme Court and consolidated with the divorce; it ultimately was not pursued, and the order of protection expired.
3. Pendente Lite Order (October 2021)
   Supreme Court (Pelagalli, J.) granted interim relief, including:
   • Temporary maintenance;
   • Temporary child support;
   • Counsel fees;
   • Exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence to the wife; and
   • Joint legal custody, with primary physical custody to the wife and supervised parenting time for the husband under a prior Family Court order.
4. Reunification Counseling and Parenting Time Expansion
   By letter order (February 2022), Supreme Court directed both parties to cooperate with reunification counseling between the husband and the children, using a therapist the children had been seeing since September 2021. Over time, the husband’s parenting time expanded:
   • From supervised visitation;
   • To overnights on alternating weekends; and
   • Three hours unsupervised on Wednesday evenings by August 2022.
5. Therapist Change and Forensic Evaluation
   In October 2022, the wife unilaterally terminated the children’s relationship with the original therapist and engaged a new therapist. The court also relied on forensic psychological evaluations, with a final report issued in October 2022.
6. Trial and Lincoln Hearings
   An extensive trial ensued, including Lincoln hearings (in-camera interviews with the children) to elicit their views privately.
7. Trial Court Decision
   Supreme Court (Pelagalli, J.) issued a written decision:
   • Dissolving the marriage;
   • Equitably distributing the marital estate;
   • Awarding joint legal and joint physical custody (shared physical custody);
   • Granting the wife final decision-making authority over educational decisions;
   • Directing the continuation of children’s therapy with the new therapist;
   • Awarding the wife maintenance, child support, and additional counsel fees; and
   • Ordering participation in coparenting counseling.
   After Justice Pelagalli’s retirement, Justice Knussman signed the judgment of divorce (CPLR 9002).

C. The Appeal and Cross-Appeal

• Husband’s appeal:
  • Contested the allocation of decision-making authority (seeking broader final authority);
  • Challenged the requirement that the children continue with the therapist chosen unilaterally by the wife;
  • Contested the duration of maintenance;
  • Challenged additional counsel fees; and
  • Initially challenged aspects of the child support calculation but, by oral argument, withdrew objections to any part of the support award (including use of the CSSA cap).
• Wife’s cross-appeal:
  • Sought sole legal custody or comprehensive final decision-making authority on all major parenting issues;
  • Opposed shared physical custody and sought sole physical custody;
  • Sought a credit for mortgage and carrying charges she paid on the marital residence during and after the action; and
  • Challenged imputed income and sought greater counsel fees.
• Attorney for the children:
  • Advocated for joint legal and physical custody at trial and on appeal (Footnote 3).

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department (Clark, J.P., with Aarons, Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald, and McShan, JJ. concurring) largely affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment with one limited modification.

Issue	Holding	Key Rationale
Legal custody	Joint legal custody affirmed; neither parent granted global final decision-making authority.	Both parents are fit; evidence of effective communication via messaging app; forensic psychologist recommended joint legal custody; concern about potential alienation if sole custody granted to wife; concern about unchecked power if husband given wholesale final authority.
Educational decisions	Wife’s final decision-making authority on educational issues affirmed.	Wife’s superior education and experience in education; history of primary responsibility for schooling and homeschooling; deep familiarity with the children’s private school.
Physical custody	Shared physical custody affirmed.	Husband’s prior concerning behavior tied largely to early years, concussion, and medication tapering; he has engaged in treatment and counseling; forensic evaluator supports shared custody; successful overnights for over a year without incident; adequate housing and financial stability.
Therapy and forensic reports	Continuity with new therapist upheld; order modified to direct that forensic reports be shared with that therapist.	Wife’s unilateral change was “poor judgment,” but no evidence the children were not benefitting from current therapy; continuity of care “imperative”; forensic reports provide valuable background.
Equitable distribution / mortgage credits	Distributive scheme deemed moot; denial of credits for mortgage and carrying costs affirmed.	Assets have been distributed, rendering challenges to allocation moot; wife had exclusive possession post-judgment and was made solely responsible for carrying costs; under the circumstances, no abuse of discretion in denying credits for pendente lite period.
Child support (CSSA, imputed income)	Imputation of $50,000 in income to wife affirmed; no challenge preserved to CSSA steps 2 and 3.	Wife’s education and prior earnings as a teacher; her testimony about the earning potential of her tutoring business; trial evidence showed earlier $27,300 imputation was too low; court properly used discretion to impute higher income.
Maintenance (amount/duration)	Three-year postjudgment maintenance award of $1,330.16/month affirmed.	11-year marriage → guideline range: 20–40 months; three years (36 months) is within range; purpose is to support transition to self-sufficiency; court properly considered statutory factors.
Counsel fees	Additional $7,500 in counsel fees to wife affirmed; request for higher amount denied.	Presumption in favor of the less-monied spouse; income disparity; prior substantial interim fee award and equitable distribution limited need for larger award; no abuse of discretion.

The sole formal modification was to direct the attorney for the children to provide the January 2022 and October 2022 forensic reports to the children’s current therapist within 30 days of the decision.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Custody: Joint Legal Custody, Shared Physical Custody, and Domain-Specific Decision-Making

1. Applicable Standards and Precedents

The Court starts from the long-settled principle that an initial custody determination must be guided by the best interests of the children, taking into account a non-exhaustive list of factors. The Court cites:

• Hassan v Barakat, 171 AD3d 1371 (3d Dept 2019);
• Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 (1982); and
• Funaro v Funaro, 141 AD3d 893 (3d Dept 2016).

From these precedents, the Court reiterates that relevant considerations include:

• Ability to provide a stable home environment;
• Children’s wishes (to the extent appropriate given age and maturity);
• Each parent’s past performance and relative fitness;
• Ability to guide and provide for the children’s well‑being; and
• Willingness to foster a positive relationship between the children and the other parent.

The Third Department also invokes the principle that:

Joint legal custody is preferred and should be ordered if the parents are able to communicate and make decisions cooperatively.

This preference, drawn from Hassan and Funaro, is qualified: joint legal custody is inappropriate where the parties are incapable of meaningful cooperation. However, the Court’s application here shows that some degree of conflict, even serious historical conflict, does not automatically render joint legal custody untenable.

Deference to trial-level factual findings and credibility determinations is also emphasized. The Court states it will not disturb the custody determination if it has a “sound and substantial basis” in the record—a standard reiterated with citations to Hassan and Funaro.

2. Joint Legal Custody: Rejection of Sole or Wholesale Final Authority

The wife argued she should have been awarded sole legal custody or at least final authority on all disputed issues. The husband, while not contesting joint legal custody per se, argued that he should be given final decision-making power on all major issues. The Court rejected both extremes.

Key factual points supporting joint legal custody:

• Both parties are fit and loving parents, able to “provide for and guide the children’s intellectual and emotional development.”
• The trial court expressed concern that the wife had not adequately shielded the children from parental conflict and the litigation—a factor cutting against granting her sole legal custody.
• The forensic psychologist raised concerns about the risk of parental alienation by the wife if she were granted sole legal custody.
• Despite acrimony, the parents were communicating effectively through a messaging app and had been successfully coparenting in practice. The Court cites:
  • Matter of David JJ. v Verna-Lee KK., 207 AD3d 841 (3d Dept 2022);
  • Matter of Kanya J. v Christopher K., 175 AD3d 760 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 905, 906 (2019); and
  • Matter of Patricia RR. v Danielle SS., 172 AD3d 1471 (3d Dept 2019).
• The forensic psychologist’s October 2022 report affirmatively recommended joint legal custody and suggested coparenting counseling for the wife, which Supreme Court ordered.

This record allowed the Third Department to find that the joint legal custody award was supported by a “sound and substantial basis.” In particular, the Court:

• Declined to grant the wife sole legal custody, echoing concern over potential alienation and her failure to meaningfully involve the husband in parental decision-making.
• Declined to grant the husband global final decision-making authority on all issues, given ongoing acrimony and the risk that such power would undervalue the wife’s historical caregiving role and judgment.

Importantly, the Court also addressed (in Footnote 4) the increasingly common technique of dividing parental authority into “spheres of influence”:

Although courts sometimes delineate specified "spheres of influence" for parties who have difficulty coparenting … we are not convinced that doing so here is in the children's best interests.

By declining to carve out multiple subject-matter spheres beyond education, the Court signals that while the technique remains available (per Shali D. v Victoria V., 172 AD3d 581 [1st Dept 2019] and Matter of Elizabeth S. v Edgard N., 150 AD3d 585 [1st Dept 2017]), it is not mandatory and must be tailored to the particular family.

3. Educational Decision-Making Authority Vested in the Wife

The principal substantive dispute at trial concerned the children’s schooling:

• The wife wanted to keep the children in their current private school.
• The husband wanted to move them to public school.

The Court upheld the trial court’s decision granting the wife final decision-making authority over educational issues, while all other domains remained subject to joint legal custody. The decision rests on clear, fact-based reasoning:

• The wife holds a bachelor’s in education policy and a master’s in special education.
• She was the primary parent managing the children’s schooling, including a two-year homeschooling period during COVID-19.
• She worked as a sixth-grade math teacher at the same private school the children attend, making her intimately familiar with its curriculum and philosophy.

Citing Matter of Michael T. v Dana U., 232 AD3d 1058 (3d Dept 2024), and Matter of Imrie v Lyon, 158 AD3d 1018 (3d Dept 2018), the Court effectively reiterates that final decision-making authority in a particular domain can be assigned based on:

• Relative expertise and experience;
• Historical responsibility for the relevant aspect of child-rearing; and
• The degree to which the issue is a “point of serious contention” between the parents.

4. Shared Physical Custody Despite Historical Concerns

The wife urged that she should have sole physical custody, given:

• Her role as primary caregiver throughout the marriage;
• The husband’s serious medical and mental health issues; and
• His prior problematic conduct when the children were younger.

The Court acknowledges that the record supports these allegations but finds several mitigating factors:

• The husband’s most troubling behavior largely occurred when the children were infants or toddlers—circumstances that can be more challenging even for healthy parents.
• The husband tied that behavior to:
  • The acute effects of a concussion; and
  • Adjustment of prescribed medications (tapering).
• The husband had since undergone treatment for his physical and mental health, was “doing well,” and was actively engaged in counseling.
• The forensic evaluator recommended shared physical custody in her final report and had “no reservations” about the husband’s ability to provide a positive, nurturing environment.
• The husband had exercised overnight parenting time for over a year without incident by the time of the custody determination.
• He had sufficient financial means and safe, appropriate housing.

On this basis, and citing precedents such as:

• Matter of Kelly AA. v Christopher AA., 240 AD3d 1011 (3d Dept 2025); and
• Matter of Patricia RR. v Daniel SS., 172 AD3d 1471 (3d Dept 2019),

the Court holds that the shared physical custody arrangement rests on a “sound and substantial basis in the record.”

Practically, this confirms a critical point: New York courts are willing to move from supervised parenting time to shared physical custody where:

• Past issues have been addressed;
• There is documented therapeutic engagement and improvement; and
• Real-world experience (e.g., over a year of successful overnights) shows the arrangement is working.

B. Children’s Therapy, Forensic Reports, and Continuity of Care

1. Unilateral Therapist Change and Court’s Response

The husband challenged the requirement that the children remain in therapy with the new therapist, whom the wife had retained unilaterally in October 2022 after ending the children’s relationship with their prior therapist.

The Court explicitly criticizes the wife’s conduct:

• It describes her decision to sever the prior therapeutic relationship and substitute a new therapist without agreement as “poor judgment.”

However, the Court nonetheless affirms continuation with the new therapist because:

• There was no evidence that the children were not benefitting from therapy with the new counselor; and
• Continuity of care is imperative.

This reflects a child-centered balancing: while unilateral decision-making and therapist switching are disfavored, disrupting ongoing effective therapy may be more harmful than maintaining it, especially mid-course.

2. Forensic Reports Shared with Therapist

The Court grants the husband’s request to provide the new therapist with copies of the forensic evaluator’s January 2022 and October 2022 reports. It notes:

• The wife’s counsel did not object to sharing the reports;
• The reports, while “now outdated,” provide relevant background that may assist ongoing therapy; and
• The attorney for the children is specifically directed to facilitate this within 30 days.

This constitutes the sole formal modification to the judgment and underscores two broader principles:

• Therapists treating children in high-conflict custody cases benefit from access to forensic reports, which synthesize historical details, psychological impressions, and relational dynamics.
• The child’s legal representative (attorney for the children) plays a critical role in mediating between the court process and the therapeutic process, acting as a conduit for relevant information.

The Court also dismisses the wife’s claim that it was error to admit hearsay testimony from the prior therapist, concluding that any error was harmless—another reminder that appellate courts will not disturb custody determinations over evidentiary imperfections where the outcome is amply supported by other evidence.

C. Equitable Distribution: Mortgage and Carrying-Cost Credits

1. Mootness of Distribution Challenge

The wife argued that challenges to the equitable distribution scheme were moot because the assets had already been distributed; the husband’s counsel agreed at oral argument. The Court accepts this position and therefore treats the manner in which assets were distributed as no longer at issue on appeal.

2. Credits for Mortgage and Carrying Costs

The wife nonetheless sought a credit for the amounts she paid toward the mortgage and carrying costs on the marital residence. The Court addresses two distinct time periods:

1. Postjudgment period (from entry of judgment to sale of the property):
   The judgment:
   • Awarded the wife exclusive possession of the marital residence; and
   • Made her solely responsible for the mortgage, taxes, and carrying charges.
   Under Markov v Markov, 304 AD2d 879 (3d Dept 2003), a party given exclusive occupancy and responsibility for carrying costs is not typically entitled to reimbursement for those costs. The Court therefore holds she is not entitled to a credit for this period.
2. Pendente lite period (during the action):
   The Court cites:
   • Rech v Rech, 122 AD3d 1286 (4th Dept 2014), lv denied 25 NY3d 905 (2015);
   • Soles v Soles, 41 AD3d 904 (3d Dept 2007);
   • and compares Uttamchandani v Uttamchandani, 175 AD3d 1457 (2d Dept 2019), and Beece v Beece, 289 AD2d 352 (2d Dept 2001).
   These cases illustrate that whether to award credits for mortgage and carrying costs during the pendency of an action is a matter of equitable discretion, hinging on:
   • Use and benefit of the property; and
   • The broader equitable distribution context.
   The Court finds no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s decision to deny credits for the pendency period.

Taken together, the Court confirms that:

• Exclusive occupancy and responsibility for carrying costs postjudgment typically preclude corresponding reimbursement; and
• Pendente lite allocations of carrying costs are subject to substantial trial-court discretion, rarely disturbed absent a clear abuse.

D. Child Support: CSSA Framework and Imputed Income to the Wife

1. The CSSA Three-Step Framework

The Court reiterates the standard three-step process under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), citing Ball v Ball, 150 AD3d 1566 (3d Dept 2017) and Abrams v Abrams, 238 AD3d 736 (2d Dept 2025):

1. Determine “combined parental income” under DRL § 240(1‑b)(b)(5)(i).
2. Apply the statutory percentage (based on number of children) to combined income up to the statutory cap (here, $163,000):
   • Then allocate that basic child support amount between the parents in proportion to their respective shares of combined income.
3. For income above the cap, decide what portion (if any) to apply the statutory percentage to, or whether and how to deviate based on factors in DRL § 240(1‑b)(f).

The husband initially challenged the failure to include income above the cap but, by the time of oral argument, withdrew that claim. Neither party challenged the trial court’s step-two or step-three calculations, so the appellate court’s focus narrowed to step one: the income figures themselves.

2. Imputing Income to an Underemployed but Highly Educated Parent

The central support dispute concerned the trial court’s imputation of $50,000 in annual income to the wife, an amount higher than the $27,300 imputed at the pendente lite stage.

Key legal principles, drawn from:

• Armstrong v Armstrong, 72 AD3d 1409 (3d Dept 2010);
• DeCrescenzo v Suslak, 238 AD3d 1406 (3d Dept 2025), lv dismissed 44 NY3d 1004 (2025);
• Gardner v Gardner, 228 AD3d 1074 (3d Dept 2024); and
• Morille-Hinds v Hinds, 87 AD3d 526 (2d Dept 2011),

include:

• A court is not bound by a parent’s self‑reported income and may impute income based on:
  • Prior earnings;
  • Educational background;
  • Work experience; and
  • Demonstrated earning capacity.
• The decision to impute income is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

Here, although the wife’s adjusted gross income was only $663 in 2022, the Court found substantial evidence of higher earning capacity:

• She holds multiple advanced degrees (psychology, public policy, special education).
• She previously earned up to $50,000 per year as a teacher.
• By the time of trial, she had started a private tutoring business and was substitute teaching.
• She testified that her tutoring business could “make as much or more money” than her prior teaching position.

Based on this, the Court characterizes the $27,300 pendente lite imputation as no longer reflective of her true earning capacity and upholds the trial court’s decision to impute $50,000 in income:

Given the wife's education and experience, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in imputing $50,000 in income to her.

This portion of the decision underscores that:

• Current actual income is not determinative when a parent’s underemployment is voluntary or inconsistent with their qualifications and professional history.
• Especially in shared custody arrangements, courts will scrutinize whether both parents are contributing economically to their capacity.

Because neither party contested how the court applied the $163,000 CSSA cap or how it handled income above the cap, the appellate court leaves those calculations intact.

E. Maintenance: Duration Under the Statutory Guidelines

1. Statutory Framework and Discretion

The husband did not contest the amount of maintenance but argued that its duration was excessive. The Court cites:

• Hughes v Hughes, 198 AD3d 1170 (3d Dept 2021);
• Sansone v Sansone, 144 AD3d 885 (2d Dept 2016);
• DeCrescenzo v Suslak, 238 AD3d 1406 (3d Dept 2025);
• Harris v Schreibman, 200 AD3d 1117 (3d Dept 2021);
• McCaffrey v McCaffrey, 107 AD3d 1106 (3d Dept 2013); and
• Quinn v Quinn, 61 AD3d 1067 (3d Dept 2009).

Under DRL § 236(B)(6)(f)(1), the advisory durational range for maintenance in an 11‑year marriage is:

• 15% to 30% of the length of the marriage, i.e., approximately 20 to 40 months.

Supreme Court awarded:

• Three years (36 months) of postjudgment maintenance at $1,330.16 per month, commencing February 1, 2024.
• The award was retroactive to the date of commencement, with credits for pendente lite maintenance already paid.

While 36 months approaches the upper end of the 20–40 month guideline range, the Court finds:

• The duration is squarely within the statutory range;
• The trial court properly considered the statutory factors and pre‑divorce standard of living; and
• The award furthers the core objective of maintenance: to afford the less-monied spouse an opportunity to achieve economic independence and self‑support.

Thus, there is no abuse of discretion, and the appellate court declines to adjust the duration.

2. Clerical Error in Amount

Footnote 7 clarifies a minor discrepancy: the judgment erroneously stated the monthly maintenance amount as $1,307.66 instead of $1,330.16. The Court notes that the correct figure is $1,330.16, as confirmed by the amended findings and the annual amount divided by 12. Although the opinion does not formally modify the judgment on this point, it clarifies the record.

F. Counsel Fees: Presumption, Interim Awards, and Final Allocation

1. Legal Framework

DRL § 237(a) provides that courts may direct one spouse to pay counsel fees to allow the other to “carry on or defend” the action, subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of awarding fees to the less-monied spouse. The Court references:

• Macaluso v Macaluso, 145 AD3d 1295 (3d Dept 2016);
• McGovern v McGovern, 218 AD3d 1067 (3d Dept 2023);
• St. Denny v St. Denny, 185 AD3d 1246 (3d Dept 2020);
• Hughes v Hughes, 200 AD3d 1404 (3d Dept 2021); and
• Stuart v Stuart, 137 AD3d 1640 (4th Dept 2016) (by way of comparison).

Critical considerations include:

• Relative financial circumstances of the parties;
• Interim counsel fee awards already made;
• The merits (or lack thereof) of each party’s positions; and
• The overall results of equitable distribution and maintenance.

Macaluso makes clear that the presumption favoring the less-monied spouse can be rebutted by substantial interim awards, generous maintenance, and equitable distribution outcomes.

2. Application in Leah R. v. Taylor R.

In this case:

• The wife had already received an interim fee award of $25,000.
• The Supreme Court then awarded an additional $7,500 in counsel fees.
• The husband argued that no further award should have been granted, given the interim sum and lack of evidentiary support; the wife argued that she was entitled to more than $25,000 in total.

The Third Department holds:

• The additional $7,500 award is supported by the record, given:
  • The income disparity;
  • The complexity and duration of the litigation; and
  • The need to ensure that the wife could adequately litigate as the less-monied spouse.
• However, in light of:
  • Equitable distribution;
  • The maintenance award; and
  • The substantial interim counsel fees,
  the Court finds no basis to increase the counsel fee award beyond $7,500.

This portion of the decision reinforces a balanced approach:

• The presumption in favor of the less-monied spouse is meaningful and results in actual fee shifting; but
• Courts will not automatically equalize litigation spending, particularly when there have already been significant interim awards and favorable financial outcomes for that spouse.

G. Appellate Procedure and Miscellaneous Issues

1. Appealability of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In Footnote 2, the Court notes that to the extent the parties appealed from the “amended decision” setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, this is not an appealable paper under CPLR 5512(a) (citing Englander v State of New York, 236 AD3d 1204 [3d Dept 2025]). However, those findings and conclusions are reviewable on appeal from the judgment of divorce itself.

This restates a basic appellate principle: appeals lie from judgments and orders, not from decisions. Yet, the contents of those decisions may be reviewed incident to an appeal from the resulting judgment.

2. Remaining Contentions

The Court summarily rejects the parties’ remaining arguments as “unavailing,” without specific elaboration, signaling no significant legal issues warranting published discussion beyond those already covered.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Legal vs. Physical Custody

• Legal custody is about who makes major decisions for the child (education, medical care, religion, major activities).
• Physical custody is about where the child lives and who has day-to-day care.
• Joint legal custody means both parents must, in principle, consult and agree on major decisions.
• Shared physical custody (or “shared parenting time”) means the child spends substantial time living with both parents, though not necessarily an exact 50/50 split.

B. Final Decision-Making Authority / Spheres of Influence

When parents share joint legal custody but cannot always agree, courts sometimes assign one parent final authority over specific types of decisions (such as education, medical care, or extracurriculars). This is sometimes called a system of “spheres of influence.”

In Leah R. v. Taylor R.:

• The court did assign the wife final authority over educational issues.
• The court did not subdivide every possible domain; it rejected broader “spheres of influence” and refused to give either parent comprehensive final say over all disputes.

C. Pendente Lite Orders

“Pendente lite” means “pending the litigation.” A pendente lite order is an interim order effective while the case is ongoing. It can address:

• Temporary custody and visitation;
• Temporary child support and maintenance; and
• Interim counsel fees, among others.

These orders can be changed at trial if the evidence warrants a different long-term arrangement, as occurred here with the wife’s imputed income.

D. Imputed Income

“Imputed income” refers to income that the court attributes to a parent based on capacity and history, rather than what the parent actually declares as income. Courts impute income when:

• A parent is underemployed or not working to their full capability;
• There is suspicion of unreported income; or
• A parent has voluntarily reduced income to avoid support obligations.

In this case, the court imputed $50,000 to the wife based on her:

• Education;
• Work history; and
• Statements about expected earnings from her tutoring business.

E. CSSA Cap and Shared Custody

Under the CSSA, the basic child support obligation is computed using combined parental income up to a statutory cap (here $163,000). Income above that level may be included or excluded in the calculation at the court’s discretion based on statutory factors.

In a shared custody situation, the parent with the higher income usually pays child support to the other parent, even if the children spend substantial time with both parents. The analysis still uses the three-step CSSA framework, but the trial court has considerable discretion for income above the cap and in determining deviations from presumptive amounts.

F. Maintenance Guidelines and Durational Range

New York’s maintenance guidelines prescribe:

• A formula for calculating an advisory amount; and
• A range for duration of maintenance based on the length of the marriage.

For an 11-year marriage, the advisory duration is 15–30% of the marriage’s length, i.e., 20–40 months. Courts may deviate upwards or downwards based on detailed statutory factors, including:

• Income and property of the parties;
• Age and health;
• Standard of living during the marriage;
• Present and future earning capacity; and
• Contributions to the marriage and to the other’s career.

G. Counsel Fees and the “Less-Monied Spouse” Presumption

By default, New York presumes that the wealthier spouse should contribute to the other spouse’s legal fees so that both can litigate on a somewhat level playing field. However, this presumption can be rebutted by:

• Equitable distribution awards that leave both parties well-resourced;
• Generous maintenance; and
• Substantial interim fee awards already paid.

The ultimate question is whether “justice requires” an award of further fees, given all the circumstances.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Custody: Function Over Form in High-Conflict Cases

The decision in Leah R. v. Taylor R. contributes to the growing line of New York cases that:

• Refuse to treat past conflict or even serious historical allegations as an automatic bar to joint legal or shared physical custody; and
• Focus instead on current functioning: communication quality, use of structured tools (like messaging apps), and the recent course of parenting time.

Trial courts and practitioners now have an additional, detailed example of:

• How joint legal and shared physical custody can be upheld alongside domain-specific final authority (here, in education); and
• How heavily courts weigh forensic recommendations, particularly when they are consistent with real-world parenting history.

B. Clear Support for Imputing Income to Highly Educated Caregivers

The case reinforces existing doctrine on imputed income but does so in a way especially relevant to:

• Highly educated spouses who have temporarily stepped back from full-time employment; and
• Shared custody situations where both parents are expected to contribute financially in proportion to their capacity.

By affirming a $50,000 imputation against a parent with minimal reported income, the Court sends a clear message: education and demonstrated earning history will drive imputation decisions, even when actual recent income is nominal.

C. Mental Health Treatment: Continuity Over Parental Missteps

The Court’s insistence on continuity of therapy—despite condemning the wife’s unilateral therapist change—signals a robust child-centered approach to mental health treatment. It acknowledges that:

• Therapeutic relationships for children should not be easily disrupted due to litigation strategies or unilateral parental decisions; and
• Nevertheless, courts can mitigate the harm of unilateral changes by ensuring that new therapists have full access to forensic and historical information.

D. Discretion and Deference in Financial Issues

On equitable distribution, maintenance, and counsel fees, the opinion is a strong reaffirmation of trial-court discretion and the difficulty of overturning such determinations on appeal. It underscores:

• The high threshold for showing abuse of discretion regarding mortgage credits, imputed income, and maintenance duration; and
• The nuanced application of the counsel fee presumption in light of interim awards and equitable outcomes.

VII. Conclusion

Leah R. v. Taylor R. is a comprehensive illustration of modern New York family law in action. It confirms and clarifies several important principles:

• Best Interests and Joint Custody: Even amid historical conflict and serious allegations, joint legal and shared physical custody remain viable where recent conduct shows effective communication and safe, nurturing parenting by both parties.
• Domain-Specific Authority: Courts may assign final decision-making authority in specific domains—here, education—based on expertise and historical caregiving while preserving overall joint legal custody.
• Imputed Income in Shared Custody: Imputation based on education and past earnings is firmly endorsed; actual recent income figures cannot be manipulated to escape equitable child support obligations.
• Therapeutic Continuity: The imperative of continuity in children’s mental health care can outweigh parental misjudgment in changing therapists, especially when combined with careful sharing of forensic information.
• Deference to Trial Courts: On credits, maintenance duration, and counsel fees, the Appellate Division emphasizes deference to the trial court’s holistic, fact-sensitive discretion.

Collectively, these holdings provide guidance for trial judges, lawyers, and parents navigating divorce and custody disputes: New York courts will prioritize children’s best interests and economic fairness, use forensic and financial evidence rigorously, and tailor custody and financial orders to reflect both parents’ genuine capacities and the lived reality of their coparenting relationships.