Joinder of Related Sexual Offense and Image‐Dissemination Charges Under NH Crim. P. 20

Joinder of Related Sexual Offense and Image‐Dissemination Charges Under NH Crim. P. 20

Introduction

State of New Hampshire v. Bradley Caprarello, decided April 10, 2025 by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, addresses two pivotal procedural questions: (1) whether aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) charges may be joined with nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images charges under New Hampshire Rule of Criminal Procedure 20; and (2) whether evidence of a third‐party website posting (Tumbex) was sufficient to sustain a dissemination charge. Bradley Caprarello was convicted in superior court on four counts of AFSA (RSA 632-A:2) and six counts of dissemination (RSA 644:9-a). On appeal, he argued (a) that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the AFSA counts from the dissemination counts, and (b) that one dissemination count lacked sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed both rulings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held, first, that the AFSA and dissemination offenses were “related” under Crim. P. 20(a)(1)(C) and that joinder served the best interests of justice. Applying the five‐factor test from State v. Brown, 159 N.H. 544 (2009), the Court concluded that the temporal-spatial overlap, same victim and defendant, common mode of operation (creation and posting of the same intimate videos), and duplication of witnesses justified a single trial. Second, reviewing the Tumbex charge under a plain‐error sufficiency standard, the Court found the circumstantial evidence—matching videos, victim testimony, timing of removal—excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than Caprarello’s guilt. Accordingly, both the joinder decision and the Tumbex conviction were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • State v. Brown, 159 N.H. 544 (2009): Established the five‐factor relatedness test under Crim. P. 20(a)(1)(C) and clarified that joinder aims at efficiency and economy.
  • State v. Rivera, 175 N.H. 496 (2022): Held that joinder decisions are reviewed for an “unsustainable exercise of discretion.”
  • State v. Houghton, 168 N.H. 269 (2015): Articulated the de novo standard for sufficiency review and the rule that circumstantial evidence must exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt.
  • State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440 (2021): Confirmed that sufficiency review does not demand exclusion of every possible hypothesis inconsistent with guilt, only all reasonable ones.
  • State v. Hodges, 176 N.H. 751 (2024): Defined the plain‐error framework for unpreserved challenges.

Together, these precedents provided both the procedural roadmap for evaluating joinder (Crim. P. 20 analysis, Brown & Rivera) and the evidentiary standards for testing sufficiency under plain‐error review (Hodges, Houghton, Seibel).

Legal Reasoning

On joinder, the Court applied a two‐step analysis:

  1. Relatedness: Brown’s five factors—(1) temporal/spatial nexus, (2) same victim/participants, (3) similar modus operandi, (4) overlapping statutory elements, and (5) duplication of evidence—were all satisfied because the same nonconsensual sexual assaults gave rise to the images that were later published on PornHub, XVideos, and Tumbex.
  2. Best Interests of Justice: Citing Rivera, the Court weighed potential jury prejudice against the economies of a single trial. It concluded that both AFSA and dissemination evidence were substantially the same (“videos depicting the assaults”), and any emotional reaction to one set of evidence would be no greater than the other.

On the sufficiency question, the Court invoked the plain‐error doctrine (Hodges). Viewing the circumstantial proof in the light most favorable to the State (Houghton), it found that the Tumbex posting, its similarity to the other sites, the victim’s denial of self‐posting, and the timing of removal excluded any reasonable theory that an automated process or third party had disseminated the images.

Impact

This decision solidifies the standard for joinder of related sexual‐offense and image‐dissemination charges in New Hampshire. Prosecutors may confidently join creation and publication charges when both stem from the same underlying assault, provided that juries can reasonably separate evidence and no single offense will unfairly taint the jury. Defense counsel must show either a lack of factual connection or unusual prejudice to secure severance. The ruling also underscores New Hampshire’s rigorous approach to circumstantial‐evidence sufficiency: even unpreserved challenges will fail absent any plausible innocent hypothesis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Joinder (Crim. P. 20): Combining multiple charges in one trial to save time and avoid duplicate witnesses, unless joining them would be unfair.
  • Relatedness: A legal test asking if separate charges are factually intertwined beyond showing a defendant’s criminal propensity.
  • Best Interests of Justice: A balancing test: does one trial prejudice the defendant more than it benefits efficiency?
  • Plain‐Error Review: A four‐part test allowing appellate courts to correct serious unpreserved errors that risk injustice.
  • Circumstantial Evidence Sufficiency: Such evidence must exclude every reasonable alternative explanation, not every remote possibility.

Conclusion

State v. Caprarello reaffirms that New Hampshire courts may join related sexual assault and image‐dissemination charges when both arise from the same conduct and do not unduly prejudice the defendant. It also confirms that circumstantial evidence—absent any plausible innocent explanation—can sustain a conviction even under plain‐error review. Together, these rulings advance procedural efficiency while safeguarding a defendant’s right to a fair trial and imposing a demanding standard for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

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