Johnson v. State: Demonstrative Video Evidence in Opening Statements and the Bounds of Prosecutorial Argument in Georgia

I. Introduction

Johnson v. State, decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia on December 9, 2025, addresses two recurring trial issues in criminal practice:

How far a prosecutor may go in using demonstrative evidence (here, video screenshots) and analogies during opening statement, and
What inferences a prosecutor may argue about a defendant’s knowledge and intent during closing argument, particularly in a multi‑defendant shooting where only a co‑defendant fired the weapon.

The appellant, McKinley Johnson, was convicted in Fulton County of malice murder and related offenses arising from a road‑rage–type confrontation that ended in the shooting death of Richard Antoine and the aggravated assault of passenger Wyman Lott. Although a co‑defendant, Antonio Spear, actually fired the fatal shot, the State prosecuted Johnson as a party to the crimes.

On appeal, Johnson challenged:

The sufficiency of the evidence supporting all of his convictions;
The propriety of the State’s opening statement, including:
- Use of a “campfire and gasoline” analogy, and
- Use of still images from a van’s internal camera system during opening;
The propriety of the State’s closing argument, especially statements suggesting Johnson knew Spear had a gun; and
The trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s comments.

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, it reinforced several important procedural doctrines:

Trial courts have broad discretion over the content of opening statements, including the use of demonstrative aids such as screenshots from video that is later properly authenticated and admitted.
Prosecutors enjoy “wide latitude” in closing argument and may argue reasonable inferences (including about a defendant’s knowledge of a co‑defendant’s weapon) so long as those inferences are grounded in the evidence.
When an objection is sustained, the trial court generally has no duty to rebuke counsel or give additional curative instructions unless the defense specifically requests such relief.
A defendant can waive a mistrial claim on appeal by accepting a curative instruction and failing to renew the motion for mistrial.

The decision also notes a sentencing “nomenclature” error regarding merger of an aggravated assault count into malice murder, reiterating Georgia’s approach to merger versus vacatur.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Land, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentence (with the exception of a harmless labeling error on merger):

Sufficiency of the evidence: Although the detailed sufficiency discussion is not fully reproduced in the provided text, the Court’s affirmance reflects its conclusion that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence allowed a rational jury to find Johnson guilty as a party to malice murder, aggravated assaults, battery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Opening statement – analogy: The Court assumed, arguendo, that part of the State’s “campfire” analogy could be viewed as argumentative for opening statement. But because the trial court sustained the defense objection, instructed the jury that opening statements are not evidence, and defense counsel did not request any further curative action or rebuke, there was no reversible error under Fleming v. State and Meadows v. State.
Opening statement – use of screenshots: The Court held there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the prosecutor to use still frames from video footage as demonstrative aids in opening. Relying on cases like McGee v. State and Highfield v. State, the Court recognized such visual aids as permissible when used to help the jury understand and remember expected evidence, particularly where the underlying video was later properly authenticated and admitted under Pearson v. State.
Closing argument – inference of knowledge of gun: The Court held that the State’s argument that jurors could reasonably infer Johnson knew Spear had a gun was within the “wide latitude” allowed in closing and properly grounded in the evidence (Lott’s testimony and the visibility of the gun on video). This was not improper argument under Menefee v. State, Arnold v. State, and Gaston v. State.
Mistrial and waiver: The Court held that Johnson waived appellate review of his mistrial motion based on those closing-argument comments by accepting the trial court’s curative instruction and not renewing his motion for mistrial, citing Bates v. State.
Sentencing / merger error: The Court noted that the trial court erred in treating one aggravated assault count (Count 3 – aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon to shoot the victim) as “vacated by operation of law” rather than merged into malice murder. Under Farris v. State and Dixon v. State, the aggravated assault conviction should merge as a matter of fact into the malice murder conviction. The Court deemed this an error in nomenclature that did not affect the sentence and was therefore harmless.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual Background

The events unfolded on February 21, 2023, on a Fulton County roadway:

Antoine and Lott, employees of Rogers Mechanical, were traveling in a company van equipped with interior and exterior cameras.
At an intersection, another vehicle in the left turn lane blocked Antoine’s ability to turn. Antoine maneuvered around that vehicle and proceeded through the intersection at a normal speed.
A Dodge Charger, driven by Johnson, with Spear in the front passenger seat and two women (including the owner, Teisha Ponder) in the back, pulled up next to the van.
Johnson and Spear began yelling and cursing at Antoine. Antoine rolled down his window and motioned an apology.
Spear challenged Antoine (“you think we’re playing with you?”), and Johnson, described as “kind of mad,” used the Charger to cut off the van, forcing it to stop.
Johnson and Spear exited the Charger. Johnson ran to the driver’s side of the van and began punching Antoine through the window.
Lott, unbuckling his seatbelt to assist Antoine, noticed Spear standing nearby with a gun. Lott testified Spear had a “crazy look” and that he feared for his life, causing him to stay in the van with his hands up.
Johnson returned to the van, pushed Spear out of the way, struck Antoine several more times, then stepped aside. Spear struck Antoine with the gun. As Antoine attempted to drive forward, Spear fired, delivering a close-range shot that passed through Antoine’s shoulder and neck. Antoine stopped the van, placed it in park, and soon died from the gunshot wound.
Video footage from the van showed the Charger leaving the scene seconds after the shooting. No one in the Charger called 911. Ponder later dropped Johnson and Spear at Spear’s house and subsequently had the Charger repainted at Spear’s direction.
Law enforcement identified the Charger via traffic cameras and, after locating it, interviewed Ponder, who identified Johnson and Spear as the assailants. The detective also obtained the van’s video. The firearm was visible in the footage and was identified as a .22‑caliber handgun. Autopsy evidence confirmed a close‑range gunshot as the cause of death.

B. Procedural History and Sentencing

The procedural posture framed the appellate issues:

On May 25, 2023, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Johnson and Spear for:
- Count 1 – malice murder (Antoine);
- Count 2 – felony murder (Antoine);
- Counts 3 and 4 – aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Antoine and Lott);
- Count 5 – aggravated assault against Antoine by striking him with a firearm;
- Count 6 – battery against Antoine; and
- Count 7 – possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Ponder was separately charged with tampering with evidence (Count 8) and pled guilty before trial.
Johnson and Spear were not jointly tried; only Johnson’s case is at issue on appeal.
After a three‑day jury trial in January 2024, Johnson was convicted on all counts.
The trial court sentenced Johnson as follows:
- Life with the possibility of parole on malice murder (Count 1);
- 20 years to serve on Count 4 (aggravated assault of Lott), concurrent with Count 1;
- 20 years to serve on Count 5, concurrent;
- 12 months to serve on Count 6, concurrent; and
- 5 years (suspended) on Count 7 (firearm during commission of a felony), consecutive to Count 1.
Felony murder (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law.
The trial court also purported to “vacate by operation of law” Count 3, rather than merging it into Count 1, which the Supreme Court later labeled an error in nomenclature but harmless.
Johnson filed a timely motion for new trial (February 2, 2024), later amended by new counsel. The trial court denied it on June 10, 2025.
Johnson noticed a timely appeal on June 23, 2025. The case was docketed to the August 2025 term and argued November 4, 2025.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although the excerpt does not reproduce the Court’s full sufficiency discussion, some points can be inferred from Georgia law and the factual recitation.

1. Governing standards

Jackson v. Virginia standard: On sufficiency review, Georgia courts apply the federal constitutional standard from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Party to a crime: Under Georgia law (OCGA § 16‑2‑20), a person is “concerned in the commission of a crime” (and thus a party to the crime) if he:
- Directly commits the crime;
- Intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or
- Intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.
A party is equally guilty as the principal, even if he does not personally perform each act (such as firing the gun).
Malice murder: Malice may be express (deliberate intention to kill) or implied from circumstances showing an abandoned and malignant heart (OCGA § 16‑5‑1). Malice can be inferred from conduct, including participation in a violent confrontation, use of deadly weapons, and conduct before, during, and after the crime.

2. Application to Johnson

Under these principles, the evidence (viewed favorably to the verdict) supports Johnson’s responsibility as a party:

Johnson initiated and escalated the confrontation by:
- Driving aggressively and cutting off the van;
- Stopping in a manner that trapped the victims’ vehicle; and
- Exiting his car and rushing to the driver’s side of the van to repeatedly punch Antoine.
Spear, armed with a handgun, stood nearby, visibly pointing the gun at Antoine and Lott, effectively holding them at gunpoint.
Johnson continued to participate in the physical assault even after the gun was brandished, then stepped aside, after which Spear struck Antoine with the gun and fired the fatal shot.
After the shooting, Johnson fled the scene with the others and made no effort to summon help. He later rode in the Charger that was repainted at Spear’s direction, showing consciousness of guilt and willingness to conceal evidence.

From this, a rational jury could conclude that Johnson:

Jointly participated in a violent attack that foreseeably involved the use of a deadly weapon;
Aided and abetted Spear’s assault and homicide; and
Was thus guilty as a party to malice murder, aggravated assault on both Antoine and Lott, battery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (as a party to Spear’s firearm use).

The Court’s affirmance, even without the full written analysis in the excerpt, is fully consistent with its longstanding approach to party liability and sufficiency under Jackson.

D. Prosecutor’s Opening Statement

1. The “campfire and gasoline” analogy

During opening, the prosecutor used a “campfire in the woods” hypothetical:

He described someone who lights a campfire and is responsible for keeping it under control.
He then discussed adding wood and gasoline to the fire and what that says about the person’s intent toward the forest.
He analogized this to Johnson “setting off” and “initiating a chain of violent events” on February 21, 2023, and then “throwing gas on the fire” that led to Antoine’s death and Lott’s aggravated assault.

Defense counsel objected partway through as “argumentative.” The trial court overruled the first objection but later sustained an objection when the prosecutor again used the “gas on the fire” phrase, reminding the jury that opening statements are not evidence.

The Supreme Court’s analysis rests on two pillars:

Scope of permissible opening: Quoting Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505 (2017), the Court reiterated that a prosecutor may state in opening “what the evidence is expected to show” and enjoys broad discretion in doing so. The line is crossed when opening becomes impermissibly argumentative rather than descriptive of expected evidence.
No duty to rebuke or give additional curative instruction absent request: Even assuming the analogy was inappropriately argumentative, the Court applied Fleming v. State, 306 Ga. 240 (2019), which holds that when an objection to prejudicial matter is sustained:
the court has no duty to rebuke counsel or give curative instructions unless specifically requested by the defendant.
Likewise, Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22 (2023), held that the trial court “had no duty to rebuke the prosecutor” where it sustained an objection and the defendant did not ask for further corrective action.

Here, Johnson’s counsel:

Objected to the analogy;
Obtained a sustained objection and an instruction that opening statements are not evidence; but
Did not request:
- A rebuke of the prosecutor,
- A more tailored curative instruction, or
- A mistrial based on the analogy itself.

Given this, the Court held the trial judge had no obligation to go further. The generic instruction—first at the time of the sustained objection and again in the final charge—that “opening statements are not evidence” was deemed sufficient under Georgia law.

2. Use of screenshots from the van’s video in opening

A more practically significant aspect of the opinion concerns the prosecutor’s use of visual aids from the van’s camera footage during opening:

The record does not show that video was actually played in opening, but the State represented that it used two still images (screenshots) from State’s Exhibit 3 (the van video).
The defense objected, arguing that opening is for stating expected evidence, not for “pre‑tendering” or showing evidence, particularly video or photographs, before proper authentication and admission.

The trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that:

Opening statements preview evidence; using screenshots for illustrative purposes fell within that function;
If the underlying video were not ultimately admitted, the defense could move for a mistrial; and
The defense would have an opportunity to challenge authenticity at trial.

Ultimately, during trial:

Lott testified about the events depicted in the video;
The defense objected on authentication grounds (arguing Lott was not the “custodian” of the video and had not explained the recording system);
The court allowed voir dire of Lott on authentication, then overruled the objection; and
The video was admitted into evidence.

The Supreme Court affirmed this handling by grounding it in two key lines of authority:

Visual aids in opening are proper where used to help the jury understand and remember evidence:
- McGee v. State, 272 Ga. 363 (2000) – the State’s drawing of a floor plan of the crime scene, showing entrances and the victim’s body, was a “permissible part of the opening statement,” as it assisted the jury in understanding and remembering forthcoming evidence.
- Highfield v. State, 246 Ga. 478 (1980) – a chalkboard listing participants and witnesses was an acceptable visual aid to help the jury track “the rather numerous cast of characters involved in the trial.”
Authentication of video by a percipient witness is sufficient:
- Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26 (2021), upheld admission where a witness testified she personally observed the events and that the video accurately depicted them, thereby properly authenticating it. The Court applied the same logic here: Lott’s eyewitness testimony that the video accurately showed what happened sufficed to authenticate the recording, even though he was not the technical custodian of the system.

Putting these strands together, the Court effectively announced or reaffirmed this practical rule:

A prosecutor may, in opening statement, use still images taken from video footage as demonstrative aids to help the jury understand the anticipated evidence, provided:

The images fairly represent the events as the State expects to prove them;

The underlying video is later properly authenticated (for example, by a percipient witness) and admitted into evidence; and

The trial court, in its discretion, concludes that the use of such aids does not unduly prejudice the defendant.

Thus, Johnson extends the logic of older “chalkboard and floor plan” cases into the more modern context of digital video stills.

E. Prosecutor’s Closing Argument

1. Inference that Johnson knew Spear had a gun

In closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury could infer that Johnson knew Spear was armed:

He said: “I submit you can make a reasonable inference that Mr. Johnson knew that Mr. Spear had that gun on him.” Defense counsel objected; the court overruled.
Later, the prosecutor emphasized that:
- “Every witness said they saw the gun.”
- The gun kept Antoine and Lott in the vehicle.
- “We know [Johnson] saw it. That’s why he’s able to turn his back to them after he just got through beating on him because he knows he doesn’t have to worry because those two people are being held at gunpoint.”

Defense counsel indicated his intent to move for mistrial at the end of the State’s closing, arguing there was no evidence that Johnson knew Spear had a gun before “the actual situation” and that the prosecutor’s comments would warrant a mistrial. The State responded that its argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence. The trial court:

Noted that the objection was preserved;
Concluded the comments did not rise to the level of requiring a mistrial; and
Offered to give a curative instruction; defense counsel asked that it at least be “preserve[d] on the record” and requested that instruction.

The court later charged the jury that “the inferences that [counsel] are urging you to accept, are just that and aren’t binding on your evidence in any way.”

On appeal, the Court framed the analysis around the long‑standing principle that prosecutors are granted “wide latitude” in closing argument:

Arnold v. State, 309 Ga. 573 (2020), and Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505 (2017), emphasize that within this wide latitude, prosecutors may argue reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, including those bearing on a defendant’s intent or a witness’s credibility.
Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634 (2020), upheld a prosecutor’s argument that the defendant sought a gun before a shooting, as a reasonable inference from text messages and other proof.

Here, the evidence supporting the inference included:

Lott’s testimony that:
- He saw Spear’s gun;
- Spear pointed it at both him and Antoine; and
- He was in fear for his life and remained in the van with his hands up.
The van’s video, which made the gun’s presence visually apparent.
Johnson’s own behavior—continuing to attack Antoine, then turning his back and stepping aside while Spear held the victims at gunpoint—suggested he understood the victims were being controlled by the weapon.

Against this backdrop, the Court concluded:

[T]he State’s argument was “based on permissible inferences and legitimately supported by the facts in evidence” about the lead up to the shooting and was therefore not improper.

Thus, the Court reaffirmed that a prosecutor may fairly ask jurors to infer a defendant’s knowledge of a co‑defendant’s weapon from circumstantial evidence, including visibility of the gun, co‑defendant’s conduct, and the defendant’s coordinated behavior.

2. Motion for mistrial and waiver

Johnson also argued that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based on these closing-argument comments. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of that mistrial claim, finding it waived under Bates v. State, 317 Ga. 819 (citation truncated in excerpt).

The waiver analysis turned on these key steps:

Defense counsel indicated an intent to move for mistrial but did not immediately and unequivocally move for mistrial at the time of the statements.
The trial court offered a curative instruction; defense counsel accepted and requested such an instruction.
Counsel did not then renew a motion for mistrial after the curative instruction or object that the curative instruction was inadequate.

Under Bates, where a defendant:

Accepts a curative instruction, and
Fails to renew the motion for mistrial or object to the curative instruction,

he does not preserve the mistrial issue for appellate review. The rationale is that accepting a curative instruction suggests that the defendant believes that instruction can remedy any prejudice, thereby waiving the claim that only a mistrial would suffice.

The Court explicitly applied this rule, holding that Johnson “did not preserve the issue for appeal.”

F. Sentencing and Merger: Nomenclature Error

An important but often overlooked aspect of criminal appeals concerns how convictions and sentences are structured when multiple counts arise from the same conduct.

Here, the trial court:

Correctly vacated the felony murder conviction (Count 2) by operation of law once Johnson was convicted of malice murder for the same killing; but
Incorrectly “vacated by operation of law” Count 3 (aggravated assault by shooting Antoine) instead of merging that conviction into the malice murder conviction.

The Supreme Court corrected this characterization by citing:

Farris v. State, 290 Ga. 323 (2012): holding that an aggravated assault conviction “for aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon to shoot the victim” merges as a matter of fact into malice murder when it is the same shooting that causes the death.
Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (2017): recognizing that errors in how trial courts describe or label merger (for example, “vacated by operation of law” versus “merged”) can be harmless when they do not affect the sentence or create practical prejudice.

In Johnson, the Court treated the trial court’s handling of Count 3 as an “error in nomenclature”—that is, a labeling mistake—because:

The aggravated assault conviction should legally merge into malice murder; but
Whether the trial court wrote “vacated” instead of “merged” did not alter Johnson’s actual sentence (life on Count 1) or create additional punishment.

Accordingly, the Court declined to disturb the sentence and merely noted the error for clarity.

G. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is firmly grounded in existing Georgia precedent. The key cases, and their roles, are as follows:

1. Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505 (2017)

Quoted for the proposition that prosecutors may, in opening, state what the evidence is expected to show, and that both opening and closing arguments are within the “broad discretion” of the trial court.
Also relied upon for the principle that prosecutors may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence, such as inferences about what weapons were used or fired.

2. Fleming v. State, 306 Ga. 240 (2019)

Establishes that when an objection to prejudicial matter is sustained, a trial court has no duty to rebuke counsel or give additional curative instructions unless the defendant specifically requests such relief.
Used in Johnson to reject the notion that the trial judge had to do more after sustaining an objection to the “gas on the fire” comment in opening.

3. Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22 (2023)

Reiterates that a trial court need not rebuke a prosecutor once it sustains an objection, if the defense does not request further corrective action.
Applied directly to Johnson’s failure to request a rebuke or specific curative instruction beyond the standard reminder that opening statements are not evidence.

4. McGee v. State, 272 Ga. 363 (2000), and Highfield v. State, 246 Ga. 478 (1980)

Both support the use of visual aids during opening to help jurors understand and remember forthcoming evidence.
In McGee, a floor plan diagram was permissible; in Highfield, a chalkboard listing participants and witnesses was acceptable.
Johnson extends their reasoning to digital screenshots from video evidence.

5. Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26 (2021)

Clarifies that video recordings can be authenticated by a witness who personally observed the events and testifies that the video fairly and accurately depicts those events.
In Johnson, this underpins the conclusion that Lott could authenticate the van video even though he was not the technical custodian.

6. Arnold v. State, 309 Ga. 573 (2020); Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634 (2020)

Both emphasize the wide latitude prosecutors enjoy in closing argument and uphold arguments that draw reasonable inferences about a defendant’s knowledge, intent, and conduct from the evidence.
They provide the doctrinal basis for allowing the State to argue that Johnson knew Spear had a gun.

7. Bates v. State, 317 Ga. 819 (citation truncated)

Establishes that a defendant waives a mistrial claim if he accepts a curative instruction and fails to renew his mistrial motion or object to the adequacy of the curative instruction.
Applied to hold that Johnson waived his mistrial argument regarding the prosecutor’s closing comments.

8. Farris v. State, 290 Ga. 323 (2012), and Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (2017)

Farris supports merger of aggravated assault by shooting into malice murder where the assault is the very act that causes the killing.
Dixon addresses harmless errors in how convictions are labeled as merged or vacated when the error does not affect the defendant’s punishment.
Both shape the Court’s treatment of the sentencing nomenclature error in Johnson.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Opening statement vs. closing argument

Opening statement is a preview: each side tells the jury what it expects the evidence will show. It is not argument and is not evidence.
Closing argument is advocacy: each side argues how the evidence should be interpreted and why that interpretation favors its position.
In Johnson, the campfire analogy came in opening (where argument is more constrained), whereas the inference that Johnson knew of the gun came in closing (where argument is more expansive).

2. Demonstrative evidence and visual aids

Real evidence is the actual physical or digital item introduced as an exhibit (e.g., the video file from the van).
Demonstrative evidence/visual aids are tools like diagrams, charts, and screenshots used to help the jury understand the evidence or testimony. They may or may not themselves be admitted as evidence.
In Johnson, screenshots from the van video were used as demonstrative aids in opening, then the actual video was later admitted as evidence.

3. Authentication of video evidence

“Authentication” is the process of showing that a piece of evidence is what it is claimed to be. Georgia allows video to be authenticated in at least two ways:

Pictorial testimony method: A witness who saw the events testifies that the video fairly and accurately depicts what occurred. This is what happened in Pearson and in Johnson with Lott.
Silent witness method: For recordings where no witness personally observed all the events, the party may instead prove the reliability of the camera system and chain of custody.

4. Curative instructions and mistrials

A curative instruction is a direction from the judge to the jury to disregard or limit their consideration of improper statements or evidence.
A mistrial terminates the trial without a verdict because the prejudice is deemed too severe to be corrected by instructions.
Georgia courts strongly prefer curative instructions over mistrials when feasible. If a defendant accepts a curative instruction and does not insist that only a mistrial will suffice, appellate courts often treat the mistrial claim as waived.

5. Merger vs. vacatur “by operation of law”

Merger occurs when one offense is considered part of another, more serious offense for punishment purposes (e.g., aggravated assault that is the shooting constituting the murder). The defendant is guilty of both, but only one conviction stands for sentencing.
Vacatur by operation of law is used, for example, when felony murder and malice murder both arise from the same killing; under Georgia law, only one murder conviction can stand, so one is vacated automatically.
In Johnson, felony murder was properly vacated by operation of law. Aggravated assault by shooting should have been merged into malice murder. The trial court’s mislabeling of that as “vacated” instead of “merged” was harmless nomenclature.

6. Party to a crime

A person can be convicted of a crime even if he did not personally commit every element, so long as he intentionally aids, encourages, or participates in the criminal enterprise.
In Johnson, even though Spear fired the gun, Johnson’s aggressive driving, initiation of the confrontation, physical assault, continued participation alongside an armed co‑defendant, and flight supported his conviction as a party to the crimes.

V. Impact and Future Implications

1. For prosecutors

Opening statements:
- They may confidently use demonstrative aids—including screenshots from video evidence—during opening, so long as the underlying evidence will be properly authenticated and admitted, and the visuals accurately reflect the anticipated proof.
- They should, however, be cautious that analogies during opening do not cross too far into argument. While Johnson shows appellate tolerance, it also illustrates that defense objections can be sustained when metaphors become too advocacy‑heavy.
Closing arguments:
- Prosecutors have strong support for arguing inferences about what a defendant knew or intended based on circumstantial evidence—particularly when video and eyewitness accounts make a co‑defendant’s gun or other weapon obvious.
- Johnson joins Menefee, Arnold, and Gaston in reinforcing that it is legitimate to draw robust conclusions from the “totality of the circumstances” in closing.

2. For defense counsel

Preservation of error:
- Johnson is a pointed reminder that to preserve misconduct or mistrial issues:
  - Counsel must timely and specifically object;
  - If seeking a mistrial, move clearly and promptly for mistrial;
  - If the judge offers a curative instruction and counsel believes it is inadequate, counsel should say so and renew the mistrial motion after the instruction.
- Accepting a curative instruction without renewing a mistrial request likely waives appellate review.
Challenging demonstrative use of video:
- Objections should focus not only on timing (use in opening) but also on:
  - Whether the screenshot fairly represents what the video will show;
  - Whether there is a real risk the visual will be more prejudicial than probative at the preview stage; and
  - Whether the State can, in fact, authenticate and admit the underlying video.
- Defense may consider requesting limiting or clarifying instructions about the status of demonstratives as “not evidence yet.”
Party‑liability strategy:
- Where the defendant did not personally wield the weapon, defense counsel must focus the jury on distinctions between mere presence, mutual combat, and shared criminal intent.
- Johnson illustrates how coordinated conduct, even without firing the gun, can be enough to uphold serious convictions.

3. For trial courts

Case management and discretion:
- Johnson affirms that trial courts retain broad discretion over the form and scope of opening and closing, and that appellate courts are reluctant to second‑guess reasonable exercises of that discretion.
- However, judges should be mindful to:
  - Clearly rule on objections (sustain/overrule);
  - Offer curative instructions when appropriate; and
  - Clarify on the record whether any mistrial motion is being ruled upon and, if denied, why.
Sentencing orders:
- Although the Court treated the merger/vacatur mislabeling as harmless, the opinion is a gentle warning to ensure that sentencing sheets accurately reflect whether each count is:
  - Convicted and sentenced;
  - Merged into a greater offense; or
  - Vacated by operation of law.

VI. Conclusion

Johnson v. State is less about groundbreaking new doctrine than about reaffirming and modestly extending existing Georgia law in several practical dimensions of criminal trial practice:

It confirms that prosecutors may use modern visual technology—specifically, still frames from anticipated video evidence—during opening statements as demonstrative aids, so long as the underlying evidence is later properly authenticated and admitted.
It underscores the wide latitude prosecutors enjoy in closing argument, including the ability to argue that a defendant knew of a co‑defendant’s weapon based on circumstantial evidence such as video, eyewitness testimony, and coordinated behavior.
It reemphasizes procedural rules that strongly shape appellate review:
- No duty on the trial court to rebuke prosecutors or craft special curative instructions when an objection is sustained, absent a specific defense request; and
- Waiver of mistrial claims when a defendant accepts curative instructions and fails to renew a mistrial motion.
It also clarifies, consistent with Farris and Dixon, that aggravated assault by shooting that causes a victim’s death merges into malice murder as a matter of fact, and that mislabeling such a count as “vacated by operation of law” rather than “merged” can be harmless if the sentencing structure is unaffected.

In sum, Johnson is a useful, modern precedent for Georgia practitioners on the permissible scope of prosecutorial rhetoric and demonstrative techniques, the robust reach of party liability in violent group encounters, and the technical but important rules governing preservation of trial-error claims for appeal.