Johnson v. State: Clarifying the Scope of the Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense and the Exclusion of Irrelevant Sexual Conduct Evidence

Introduction

In Johnson v. State, 2025 WL ____ (Del. 2025), the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed the extent of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense when the defense seeks to introduce evidence of a witness’s—and in this case, the victim’s mother’s—past sexual behavior. Isaac Johnson was convicted in the Superior Court of rape, three counts of sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust, authority or supervision, and six counts of unlawful sexual contact. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony regarding the sexual conduct of the victim’s mother, arguing that it was central to his theory that the mother’s alleged affair provided a motive for her daughter’s false accusations.

This commentary examines the background, the Court’s decision and reasoning, the precedents it relied upon, and the broader implications for the right to present a defense and evidentiary practice in Delaware and beyond.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Delaware unanimously affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that:

The trial court properly exercised its discretion under Delaware Rule of Evidence 401 by excluding testimony about the victim’s mother’s sexual behavior as irrelevant to any fact of consequence.
The exclusion did not infringe a “weighty interest” protected by the Sixth Amendment because the proffered evidence lacked genuine probative value and posed a risk of undue prejudice and confusion.
Johnson retained ample alternative means to argue motive—he testified to his suspicions and cross-examined the mother on her delay in reporting the allegations—so the restriction on evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.

Accordingly, the Court held no constitutional violation occurred and affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967): Established the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and presenting the defense’s version of events.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987): Recognized that a defendant’s right to testify in his own defense is fundamental but subject to reasonable evidentiary limits.
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) and Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986): Confirmed that trial courts have broad latitude to exclude evidence that is only marginally relevant or carries a high risk of unfair prejudice.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988): Held that the right to present a defense may be outweighed by the court’s interest in orderly procedure and reliable fact‐finding.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973): Emphasized that evidence exclusion becomes arbitrary when it bars a defendant from presenting a “weighty interest.”
Delaware decisions such as Coles v. State, 959 A.2d 18 (Del. 2008) and McCrary v. State, 290 A.3d 442 (Del. 2023): Articulated standards of review for constitutional and discretionary evidentiary rulings (de novo for constitutional issues; abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings).

These authorities collectively underpin the principle that while a defendant enjoys broad rights to present evidence, such rights yield when the evidence is irrelevant, marginally probative, or unduly prejudicial.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

Establishing the applicable standard: Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to a “complete defense,” including testimony supporting his version of facts. However, this right is not absolute. Courts may exclude evidence that fails the relevance threshold of Rule 401 or poses undue prejudice under Rule 403.
Applying relevance and prejudice tests: The Superior Court found that testimony regarding the mother’s alleged affair and sexual behavior had no tendency to make any element of the charged offenses more or less probable. It further concluded the evidence risked confusion and unfair prejudice given its highly charged nature.
Assessing constitutional impact: Even assuming a Sixth Amendment interest, the exclusion was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. Johnson retained alternative, less prejudicial avenues to argue motive—he testified about his argument with Smith and about his suspicions of her conduct, and cross-examined her about delayed reporting to police.

Thus, the Court held the trial judge did not exceed the permissible “wide latitude” granted to trial courts in managing the evidentiary record under the Constitution and Delaware law.

3. Impact

Johnson v. State reinforces several important takeaways for practitioners and trial courts:

Evidence of sexual conduct by a witness (including non-party witnesses) must satisfy strict relevance criteria; absent a direct link to an element or to the credibility analysis under Delaware Rule 412, such evidence is likely excludable.
Defendants must articulate specific proffers showing how the evidence connects to material facts rather than relying on broad theories of motive.
Courts have reaffirmed their broad discretion to manage evidence under the Sixth Amendment, so long as exclusions are neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.
Future challenges to evidentiary rulings will likely require detailed proffers of probative value and a demonstration that no less prejudicial means exist to present the defense theory.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Undue prejudice”: When evidence might lead the jury to decide based on emotion or bias rather than on the facts and law.
“Relevance” (Rule 401): Evidence is relevant if it makes a fact of consequence more or less probable than without it.
“Weighty interest” of the accused: A constitutional interest so important that its denial would render the trial fundamentally unfair.
“De novo” review: An appellate standard that re-examines legal issues from scratch, without deference to the trial court’s decision.
“Abuse of discretion”: An appellate standard for evidentiary rulings; the decision will stand unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the trial court’s permissible range.

Conclusion

Johnson v. State clarifies that the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, while robust, does not trump well-established rules limiting evidence to that which is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Trial courts possess broad discretion to exclude marginally relevant evidence—such as allegations of a witness’s unrelated sexual behavior—to preserve fairness and focus. In doing so, the Supreme Court of Delaware has provided a clear roadmap for assessing when a defendant’s proffered evidence crosses the line from legitimate defense to improper distraction, ensuring that future trials remain both thorough and just.