Jimenez v. Bondi: Clarifying “Particularly Serious Crime” Determinations and CAT Relief Review in Aggravated Felony Cases

Introduction

In Jimenez v. Bondi, Nos. 23-6005, 23-6143, 23-6895 & 24-665 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered four consolidated petitions by Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez, a Brazilian national with an aggravated-felony conviction for second-degree strangulation. After an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)—and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed, affirmed, and then denied motions for reconsideration, remand, and reopening—Jimenez sought circuit review on a range of procedural and substantive grounds. The principal questions were (1) whether his conviction categorically or factually constituted a “particularly serious crime,” barring withholding of removal; (2) whether he met the evidentiary burden for deferral under CAT; and (3) whether the IJ or BIA abused discretion in denying continuance, remand, reconsideration, and reopening. The court denied all petitions and dismissed the last one for lack of an arguable basis.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit issued a summary order denying Jimenez’s petitions for review in cases 23-6005, 23-6143, and 23-6895, and dismissing the petition in 24-665:

Withholding of Removal (INA § 241(b)(3)): Jimenez’s second-degree strangulation conviction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-64bb(a) was a “particularly serious crime” based on its elements (a crime against the person) and the BIA’s consideration of the statutory factors. His suspended sentence did not remove the conviction from the category of serious crimes.
Deferral of Removal (CAT): He failed to show that it was “more likely than not” he would be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, Brazilian officials. The IJ reasonably discounted omissions in his application and found no pattern of continuing threats or state acquiescence.
Continuance: Even if denial of a continuance to obtain an expert report was error, no prejudice attached because the BIA considered the substance of the evidence on remand and rejected it.
Remand/Reconsideration/Reopening: The BIA did not abuse its discretion. His ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed for noncompliance with Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1998). His motion to reopen was untimely and lacked evidence of changed conditions; administrative-closure relief was baseless.
In Forma Pauperis & Summary Reversal: The court denied IFP status and dismissed the last petition, finding no arguable legal or factual basis.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005): Endorsing review of IJ decisions as modified by BIA supplemental explanations.
Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005): Confirming that the BIA’s supplemental explanation is part of the agency record under review.
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020): Holding that § 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes review of withholding-of-removal factual findings but not necessarily CAT claims.
Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021): Articulating the “more likely than not” standard for CAT deferral and deference to factual findings under substantial-evidence review.
Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152 (2d Cir. 2022): Describing the two-step “particularly serious crime” analysis under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (B.I.A. 2007): Identifying relevant factors—nature of the offense, sentencing, danger to the community.
Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008): Emphasizing that crimes against persons are apt to be particularly serious.
Lanferman v. BIA, 576 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009): Declining collateral attacks on state convictions in removal proceedings.
Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021): Permitting adverse credibility findings when testimony conflicts with credible documentary evidence.
Flores v. Holder, 779 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2015): Articulating the abuse-of-discretion standard for continuance motions.
Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008): Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard to motions to reopen and reconsider.
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1998): Establishing procedural prerequisites for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Overruling Chevron deference but preserving specific agency actions as law of the case.

Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D), the court lacks review over discretionary factual findings in aggravated-felony removal orders but may review questions of law and constitutional claims de novo, and CAT deferral findings for substantial evidence.

2. Particularly Serious Crime. A conviction is per se particularly serious if the sentence is ≥5 years. If below, the agency conducts a two-step analysis: (a) do the elements “potentially bring the crime” within the serious-crime category? (b) if so, weigh all reliable evidence—conviction records, sentencing, nature and circumstances of offense, community danger. Jimenez conceded step (a) and his offense (strangulation) is a violent, person-to-person crime. The BIA affirmatively considered the suspended three-year sentence under § 1101(a)(48)(B) and the statutory factors (In re N-A-M-; Nethagani). Collateral attacks on plea validity are barred (Lanferman). Accordingly, he is ineligible for withholding.

3. CAT Deferral. To defer removal, an applicant must show torture “more likely than not” with official acquiescence (8 C.F.R. § 1208.17). The IJ discredited his late disclosures of police assaults (Ming Dai) and noted that threats by a loosely affiliated gang were sporadic (2001–2017), confined to his grandmother’s address, and not renewed despite years of residence in Brazil. Country-conditions evidence of police/gang violence did not compel a contrary finding (Mu Xiang Lin; Siewe).

4. Continuance, Remand, Reconsideration & Reopening. Broad IJ discretion governs continuance motions (Flores; Morgan). Even assuming an abuse, no prejudice resulted because the BIA later considered the expert evidence and found it insufficient (Gurung). Motions to remand or reopen require new, material, previously unavailable evidence within time limits (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)); his claims of ineffective counsel lacked the procedural underpinnings of Lozada and were forfeited. His reconsideration motion simply rehashed rejected arguments; the BIA reasonably denied it (Jin Ming Liu). His motion to reopen administrative closure was untimely and unfounded.

Impact

Although issued as a summary order (non-precedential), Jimenez v. Bondi underscores and clarifies several important immigration-law principles:

It reaffirms the two-step “particularly serious crime” framework and the agency’s broad discretion to weigh suspended sentences and crime elements under the INA.
It confirms that an aggravated-felony conviction, even with a fully suspended sentence below five years, can bar withholding if it is a violent crime against the person.
It illustrates the high bar for CAT deferral: sporadic threats without ongoing pattern or official acquiescence are insufficient.
It reiterates strict adherence to procedural rules for continuances, remand, reconsideration, reopening, and ineffective-assistance claims under Matter of Lozada.
It signals that post-Loper Bright, previously Chevron-based agency interpretations regarding the need (or lack thereof) for a separate dangerousness finding remain binding law of the case.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Particularly Serious Crime: A category in the INA that, if met, prohibits withholding of removal. Determined by sentence length or a multi-factor test (crime elements, sentence, danger to community).
Withholding of Removal vs. Deferral under CAT: Withholding blocks removal if a future persecutory threat is “more likely than not” on a protected ground. CAT deferral blocks relief only from torture, without requiring a protected-ground nexus.
Chevron Deference: A doctrine giving weight to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright limited its future application but left past specific interpretations intact.
Standards of Review: “De novo” means fresh legal review; “substantial evidence” means affirming if a reasonable factfinder could reach the agency’s conclusion; “abuse of discretion” means a decision outside the bounds of reasonable choice.
Lozada Requirements: To claim ineffective assistance, a movant must (1) provide an affidavit describing the attorney’s agreement and errors; (2) notify and allow the attorney to respond; (3) file or explain the absence of a disciplinary complaint.

Conclusion

Jimenez v. Bondi reaffirms the rigorous framework and deference accorded to agency determinations in aggravated-felony removal cases. Violent convictions—even with suspended sentences—can be “particularly serious crimes” precluding withholding of removal. CAT deferral demands clear, ongoing threat and official acquiescence. Procedural motions for continuance, remand, reconsideration, reopening, and ineffective-assistance claims must meet exacting standards or face forfeiture. Though non-precedential, the decision provides a detailed roadmap for practitioners and adjudicators navigating the intersection of aggravated-felony convictions, CAT relief, and immigration-procedure safeguards in the Second Circuit.