Jimenez v. Bondi: Clarifying “Particularly Serious Crime” and CAT Standards in Withholding of Removal

Introduction

In Jimenez v. Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed multiple aspects of removal proceedings involving petitioner Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez, a Brazilian national convicted of second-degree strangulation under Connecticut law. The consolidated appeals challenge (1) the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and deferral under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); (2) the denial of motions for a continuance, remand, reconsideration, reopening, and administrative closure; and (3) related procedural issues including in forma pauperis status and summary reversal. This decision reaffirms the “particularly serious crime” bar to withholding, clarifies the CAT review standards, and underscores the strict procedural requirements for challenging conviction validity, counsel effectiveness, and timeliness in removal cases.

Summary of the Judgment

On April 10, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit denied Jimenez’s petitions for review in case numbers 23-6005, 23-6143, and 23-6895, and dismissed the final petition in 24-665. The Court held:

Jimenez’s conviction for second-degree strangulation (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-64bb) is a “particularly serious crime,” rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii).
The conviction does not bar deferral under CAT, but Jimenez failed to carry his burden to show a likelihood of torture or government acquiescence in Brazil.
The Immigration Judge’s denial of a continuance and the BIA’s denials of remand, reconsideration, reopening, and administrative closure were not an abuse of discretion, and any claimed prejudice was insubstantial or procedurally barred.
Jimenez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were forfeited for failure to comply with Matter of Lozada’s procedural prerequisites, and his motion to reopen was untimely.
The in forma pauperis motion lacked an arguable basis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and the summary reversal motion was moot.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020): Established that CAT claims remain fully reviewable, while the scope of judicial review for withholding of removal is unresolved.
Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005) & Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): Set forth standards for reviewing IJ decisions as modified by the BIA.
In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (B.I.A. 2007) & Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008): Defined the two-step “particularly serious crime” analysis—first the categorical potential, then the “totality of circumstances” including sentencing and danger to the community.
Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152 (2d Cir. 2022): Reaffirmed the BIA’s two-step framework and relevant factors for “particularly serious crime.”
Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021): Confirmed that an IJ may discount even credible testimony if contradicted by “contrary evidence of a kind and quality” sufficient for a reasonable factfinder.
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1998): Established procedural prerequisites for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in removal proceedings.
Procedural-discretion cases: Paucar v. Garland, 84 F.4th 71 (2d Cir. 2023); Flores v. Holder, 779 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2015); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008).

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Withholding of Removal – “Particularly Serious Crime”
Under INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), an applicant convicted of an aggravated felony is barred from withholding if the crime is “particularly serious.” The Court applied the two-step analysis:

Categorical assessment: The elements of Connecticut’s strangulation statute criminalize violence against a person (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-64bb), making it “potentially” particularly serious.
Totality of circumstances: The BIA considered sentencing (a suspended three-year term), nature of the offense, and danger-to-community factor. Even absent actual incarceration, the statutory definition treats any suspended sentence as “imprisonment” for immigration purposes (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)). The BIA’s conclusion that the offense posed a serious danger to society was supported by fact and law and thus not reversible.

The Court rejected Jimenez’s challenge to the conviction’s factual basis and to a separate overall dangerousness finding, noting collateral attack on state convictions is disallowed (Lanferman v. BIA, 576 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009)) and that no separate dangerousness determination is required once a crime is “particularly serious” (Ojo, Flores).

b. Deferral Under the CAT
The CAT deferral inquiry requires a showing that torture is “more likely than not” and that a public official would acquiesce (8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(7)). The Court upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility finding on Jimenez’s testimony about past police abuse, due to unexplained omissions in his written application, and found the record did not compel the conclusion that gang threats—dating back years and targeting his grandmother’s home only—demonstrated a continuing risk or state acquiescence. General country-condition evidence of gang violence and police misconduct, without particularized proof of present risk and acquiescence, could not satisfy the “more likely than not” standard (Mu Xiang Lin v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005)).

c. Procedural and Discretionary Rulings
The Court reviewed denials of continuance, remand, reconsideration, and reopening for abuse of discretion. It found no prejudicial error:

A continuance denial did not prejudice Jimenez because the BIA later considered additional evidence and deemed any further submission unlikely to change the outcome (Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2019)).
His remand motion to present expert evidence was untimely and unaccompanied by a showing of materially changed country conditions or compliance with Matter of Lozada for ineffective counsel claims.
A reconsideration request merely rehashed rejected arguments without identifying any legal or factual error (Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2006)).
His motion to reopen and administratively close, filed eight months after the final order, was barred by the 90-day deadline (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)) and did not qualify for exceptions.
The in forma pauperis motion lacked an arguable basis in law or fact (Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)), and summary reversal was moot.

3. Impact

Jimenez v. Bondi is significant for practitioners and adjudicators in several respects:

It reconfirms the BIA’s two-step approach to “particularly serious crime” and the deference owed to its application of factors such as sentencing, statutory definitions, and community danger.
It reinforces the stringent standards for CAT deferral: clear proof of individualized torture risk plus explicit state acquiescence.
It underscores that challenges to the validity of state convictions and frozen collateral-attack arguments are impermissible in removal proceedings.
It highlights Matter of Lozada’s procedural demands for ineffective assistance claims, discouraging belated or incomplete assertions.
It illustrates the high bar for continuance, remand, and reopening, particularly where new evidence is speculative or untimely.
It affirms that general country‐condition reports cannot substitute for individualized proof in CAT claims, shaping future advocacy strategies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Particularly Serious Crime: A crime that by its nature or circumstances poses a grave threat to society; once so deemed, the noncitizen loses withholding protection.
Chevron Deference: A doctrine under which courts defer to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes by agencies entrusted with administering them. Although partially abrogated by recent Supreme Court methodology changes, key BIA holdings remain binding here.
CAT Deferral vs. Withholding: CAT deferral protects only against torture, without permanent status, and its bar for aggravated felons is narrower than the INA’s “particularly serious crime” bar.
Matter of Lozada Requirements: To claim ineffective assistance, a remand motion must include: (1) an affidavit detailing counsel’s agreement; (2) proof counsel was notified and given chance to respond; and (3) disciplinary complaint or explanation for failure to file one.
In Forma Pauperis (IFP): A status allowing indigent litigants to proceed without fees, but only if their claims are non-frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Standards of Review: “De novo” review for legal and constitutional questions; “substantial evidence” for factual findings; “abuse of discretion” for procedural rulings (continuances, remands, etc.).

Conclusion

Jimenez v. Bondi consolidates and clarifies critical doctrines in removal law: the scope of the “particularly serious crime” bar, rigorous standards for CAT deferral, and the precise procedural prerequisites for challenging convictions, counsel performance, and late‐filed evidence. By upholding the BIA’s reasoned application of statutory and regulatory frameworks, the Second Circuit both reinforces established precedent and provides a practical roadmap for adjudicators and practitioners navigating complex removal proceedings.